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Debating Security and Strategy and
the Impact of 9-11

Edited by

Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen

 **SAGE Publications**

Los Angeles • London • New Delhi • Singapore

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Introduction and editorial arrangement © Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen 2007

First published 2007

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London EC1Y 1SP

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2455 Teller Road
Thousand Oaks, California 91320

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B 1/1, Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area
Mathura Road
New Delhi 110 044

SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd
33 Pekin Street #02-01
Far East Square
Singapore 048763

British Library Cataloguing in Publication data

A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library

ISBN: 978-1-4129-2139-8 (set of four volumes)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2006938798

Typeset by Televijay Technologies (P) Limited, Chennai
Printed on paper from sustainable resources
Printed and bound in Zrinski d.d Croatia

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Should Strategic Studies Survive?

Richard K. Betts

A specter is haunting strategic studies – the specter of peace. This sounds odd so long after the burst of euphoria at the end of the cold war, which dissipated into so many nasty little wars. Political science, however, has been less interested in war per se than in cataclysmic war among great powers, war that can visit not just benighted people far away, but people like us. Half a century of world war and cold war provided that impetus for strategic studies. After the cold war, however, universities face other demands as resources shrink. Has the warrant for feeding this field expired? Certainly not.

First, one interest alone fully justifies keeping the flame burning: to have expertise on the shelf in case great-power conflict arises again, which is more likely to happen than not. For whatever reason, the United States finds itself in a war or crisis in almost every generation.

Second, confusion continues about what U.S. foreign policy should expect military power to do for less vital interests. What force can accomplish in a specific situation does not follow directly from standard international relations theories or rational choice models; the answer depends on military technology, organization, and doctrine, and how they fit with local political and geographic circumstances. After the cold war, liberals, on the one hand, who spent the last thirty years trying to reduce American military power, demanded that Washington “do something” with the armed forces to suppress atrocities, promote democracy, and keep peace in places like Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. Conservatives, on the other hand, insisted on buying hefty forces but not using them. Vague notions that military power can impose political solutions at a reasonable cost, or that outside military power is useless for doing so, were subjected to little analytical discipline after 1990. If capacity for informed strategic analysis – integrating political, economic, and military judgment – is not preserved and applied, decisions on the use of force will be uninformed and, therefore, irresponsible.

Third, the size and composition of the U.S. defense budget are crucial, affecting fiscal and social policy as well as foreign affairs. Who can rationally

recommend whether the budget should be higher or lower, or what it should buy, without any expertise on the nature of military forces and what combinations of them are necessary to achieve objectives set by elected officials? If civilian strategists are not to decide along with the professional military, either ignorant civilians will do it, disjoining political and military logic, or the military will do it alone.

Fourth, U.S. civil-military relations are problematic. The armed forces were reformed and rejuvenated over the same time that political leadership loosened oversight. Reagan's romantic nationalism made for laissez-faire civilian control, and Clinton's impaired moral authority, owing to his own draft evasion, precluded vigorous guidance as commander in chief. After Vietnam, the military became more popular with the mass public as the elite distanced itself from it. Fewer civilian policymakers have experienced military service themselves, while the military institution as it shrinks is growing apart from society after a half century of closeness enforced by the mass mobilization of world war and cold war. There is no danger of direct insubordination, but a larger proportion of military officers now feels more competent and more moral than the rest of their country and less respectful of their government. Education in strategy will not solve problems in civil-military relations and might even aggravate conflict if it emboldens civilians to question military judgments. But if checks and balances matter, it can only help.

Strategic studies is both necessary and contested because it focuses on the essential Clausewitzian problem: how to make force a rational instrument of policy rather than mindless murder – how to integrate politics and war. This requires the interdisciplinary joining of military grammar and political logic, in Clausewitz's terms, a marriage that gets lip service in principle but is often subverted in practice by those who identify more with one half of the union than the other. Soldiers often object to politics permeating war because it gives civilians the right to meddle in operations, while many intellectuals object to dignifying war as an instrument of policy or an academic priority. For all these reasons, political science became the main academic home for the field, and the place of military affairs within it is periodically challenged.

Within a field of international relations constantly riven by sectarian debates about overarching frameworks like realism, liberalism, and their "neo" variants, the murky boundaries of strategy fuel controversy. To clarify where strategic studies *should* fit, think of a subfield of three concentric circles: at the core is *military science* (how technology, organization, and tactics combine to win battles); the outer, most inclusive ring is *security studies* (everything that bears on the safety of a polity); and in the *middle* lies *strategic studies* (how political ends and military means interact under social, economic, and other constraints).

The distinctions are relevant in principle, because they illustrate why strategic studies should be the most important part of the subfield – broader in scope than strictly military problems, but more focused than security studies, which is potentially boundless. In practice, however, the distinctions solve few problems because the dividing lines between strategic studies and the

other two layers can never be clear, and the distinctions are not recognized institutionally. Only security studies has academic standing, so the place of strategic studies emerges through debates about defining security. Most scholars of security identify it with strategic studies, but much of what they do strikes some in other subfields as too close to military science for comfort. Critics then argue for reorienting the security subfield to so many other issues that the military core may become a pea lost in an amorphous ball of wax. The intellectual coherence of strategic studies increases with linkage to the military core, but institutional status and legitimacy grow with distance from it.

One danger in strategic studies is missing the political forest for the military trees. That danger was greater during the cold war than now. The opposite danger – that defining security broadly will squeeze out work on the military aspects – is greater now. There is no consensus that attention to military matters remains an important responsibility for social science, or even that knowledge of military systems is as vital for studying security as knowledge of economic systems is for studying political economy.

The Case for Scientific Strategy

The case for strategic studies had to be made a half century ago as well. Bernard Brodie's 1949 article, "Strategy as Science," was a brief for developing strategy as a systematic field of analysis because it was "not receiving the scientific treatment it deserve[d] either in the armed services or, certainly, outside of them."¹ The only scholars who had paid much attention to the subject up to that point were historians. The methodological model that Brodie endorsed was the one represented by the discipline of economics.

Perhaps Brodie should have heeded the warning to be careful what you wish for, lest you get it. Much of what he recommended came to pass, but with results that did not entirely please him or critics who had little use for his aim from the beginning. Brodie had in mind an instrumental science for solving practical problems. This evoked skepticism on two fronts. Although the services sometimes welcomed analysis by civilian scholars, many military professionals regarded outsiders' work on strategy as impertinent interference. Although scholars of strategy established lodgments in universities and think tanks, many intellectuals saw them as unprofessional or immoral, considering instrumental science inferior to loftier theoretical work, or, when applied to managing violence, the work of the devil.

Most scholars of international relations recognize that war is an important problem but are interested only in the before and after, not in war itself – in war's causes and consequences, but not its conduct, which is considered somehow epiphenomenal or intellectually puerile. Strategic studies is concerned with all three phases of war because they are interdependent; conduct becomes cause, as mechanisms of violence shape decisions about its political application. It is impossible to understand impulses and choices in the political

dimension of war or peace without understanding constraints and opportunities in the military dimension. Options for *how* to make war affect *whether* war is made, who wins or would win, and thereby the shape of the postwar world (or the peacetime world, if anticipated results of combat affect diplomatic deals). For example, it is not possible to understand how Germany managed to rule Europe for half of the 1940s without understanding how it overcame the opposing might of France and Britain as it had not been able to do in 1914. This cannot be explained by indices of power (GNP, population, the size of armed forces) that are accessible to nonspecialists but only by grasping innovations in the process of combat – how the Wehrmacht adapted the technology and doctrine of armored warfare to revolutionize operations. Similarly, one cannot understand why Germany ultimately failed by looking at military science, but only by looking to wider dimensions of strategy – the ideological and psychological reasons for Hitler's miscalculations in invading the Soviet Union and declaring war on the United States.

Intellectual support for strategic studies parallels cycles of international conflict and calm. When the danger of war obtrudes in the real world, the study of war prospers, because the academy considers it unavoidable. When danger slackens, academic interest or tolerance falter. Two decades after "Strategy as a Science" was published, as Vietnam was destroying the cold war consensus, Hedley Bull noted that the professional strategist's status was tenuous due to controversy over the legitimacy of the very question at issue: "What shall the state do with its military force? ... [T]here will not be general agreement about the worth and utility of students of strategy, in the way that there is ... about that of students of medicine, architecture, or economics."² Nearly half a century after Brodie's article, in the happy wake of the cold war, David Baldwin argued that "perhaps the time has come to abolish the subfield of security studies."³

The intellectual advances Brodie sought in 1949 did not solve all the problems he saw, and created some new ones. In the enthusiasm for science, strategic studies developed a scientific strain and overreached. Nevertheless, with later leavening of the scientism by better comparative historical analysis in the second half of the cold war, Brodie's brief yielded progress. If Baldwin's advice prevails, the problems that motivated Brodie – the superficial quality of analysis available to support public decisions about war and peace, and the absence of civilian analytical checks on preferences of the professional military – will grow again.

Brodie spoke as the Clemenceau of the academy: strategy was too important to be left to the generals. As one who knew military history and moved among those in uniform as a wartime officer and peacetime consultant, he was frankly cynical about the cultural and organizational constraints that inhibited serious strategic analysis by soldiers themselves. He considered professional officers unartuned to strategy because the complexity of military operations made them preoccupied with tactics and technology. He believed that regular officers view strategy in terms of the hallowed "Principles of War" (maxims about "the objective," "economy of force," "unity of command," and so forth that appear in manuals of most Western armies), that they have difficulty

grasping the real meaning of Clausewitz's insight on the relation between war and politics, and that anti-intellectualism and hierarchy prevent trenchant thought. In Brodie's view, "political scientists ... are concerned with the *context* of military operations," whereas "to the military, the means available, rather than the object, are what determine the character of a war" (pp. 467–68, 473, 486).⁴

Since military authors are tied to their services, it is hard for anyone but a civilian to proffer analysis independent of service doctrine. (There are exceptions. Perry Smith published an unflattering account of his service's strategic planning, yet survived, through the support of a patron, and reached two-star rank himself. Andrew Krepinevich savaged his service's doctrine in the Vietnam War, but finished his career as a lieutenant colonel working in the civilian reaches of the Pentagon.⁵ Most officers who challenge their services wait until retirement.) Moreover, the nuclear revolution put the dominant level of warfare beyond experience, which is the main teacher in the military ethos. Thus when strategic studies burgeoned in the 1950s, most of the writing was by civilians.

As Brodie noted in 1949, "The military profession is by no means alone in its frequent recourse to the slogan as a substitute for analysis – certain scholarly disciplines, not excluding political science, have been more than a little untidy in this regard" (p. 471). He saw economics, the most developed social science, as the model because strategy is about "problems involving economy of means, *i.e.*, the most efficient utilization of potential and available resources" (p. 475). Choices in weapon procurement, for example, should not be governed by slogan-like concepts like "balanced force," but by marginal utility (pp. 478–81).

All of this anticipated currents that would dominate the development of strategic studies in the first half of the cold war. Brodie wrote his article while at Yale, but at the same time that he was beginning his affiliation with the fledgling RAND Corporation. Established by the Air Force, RAND became a magnet for those who wrestled intellectually with the strategic challenge of the nuclear revolution. Some like Brodie, William Kaufmann, and Alexander George were political scientists versed in history, but most were mathematicians, physicists, or economists like Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, James Schlesinger, Andrew Marshall, Henry Rowen, Malcolm Hoag, Carl Kaysen, and Daniel Ellsberg. This group spawned much of the theoretical corpus that undergirded academic study of strategy during the cold war.⁶

The First Cycle of Cold War Strategic Studies

The year after Brodie's article appeared the Korean War confirmed the militarization of the East-West conflict, U.S. defense spending tripled, NATO became the centerpiece of foreign policy, and strategy became big business. In universities, realist theory and security policy took over the field of international relations, eclipsing the subfields of international law and organization

that had dominated in the interwar years. In the 1950s and 1960s the Social Science Research Council's (SSRC) Committee on National Security Research under William T.R. Fox built a network of academics. University programs sprang up at: Princeton's Center of International Studies, where Klaus Knorr theorized about war potential, economic mobilization, and NATO strategy, and which produced works on deterrence by Glenn Snyder, William Kaufmann, and Herman Kahn; Columbia's Institute of War and Peace Studies, which sponsored research by Kenneth Waltz, Samuel Huntington, Paul Hammond, Warner Schilling, and others on causes of war and defense policy-making; Ohio State's Mershon Center, which supported not only mainstream research on security, but critics as well, such as Philip Green; Harvard's Center for International Affairs, where Henry Kissinger continued to make his mark after the publication of his Woodrow Wilson Award-winning book on nuclear strategy for the Council on Foreign Relations; and MIT's Center of International Studies (and later its Defense and Arms Control Studies Program). In London, the International Institute for Strategic Studies was established and has since provided a steady stream of analytical publications and unclassified data compilations.⁷

Professors jumped into policy prescription, beginning with *The Absolute Weapon*, edited by Brodie.⁸ Strategy might not have developed academically outside of military history if not for the nuclear revolution. Nuclear war spurred theorizing because it was inherently more theoretical than empirical: none had ever occurred. Except for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where there was no question of retaliation, there was no messy store of historical evidence to complicate elegant abstractions. Available empirical data were technical – the physics of fission, fusion, and ballistics – and the implications appeared simple: for the first time, great powers would have the option to annihilate enemy societies overnight. Since no one had experience, intellectuals felt less inhibited by military expertise. Alain Enthoven, the prototypical Pentagon “whiz kid,” was notorious for his arrogant comment in a dispute over strategic plans: “General, I have fought just as many nuclear wars as you have.”⁹

With scant empirical grounds for testing propositions, nuclear strategy and deterrence seemed perfectly suited to deductive logic and game theory. A few simple ideas, based on a small number of assumptions and variables, seemed extremely powerful. By the 1960s theorists had highly developed ideas about how to organize nuclear capabilities to stabilize U.S.-Soviet deterrence. Arguments among strategists from the ivory tower about logical effects of “invulnerable second strike capability,” “reciprocal fear of surprise attack,” “counterforce options,” “mutual assured destruction,” “graduated escalation,” and “crisis stability” had a profound influence on civilian leaders.¹⁰

As long as nuclear weapons remained leashed and strategy seemed successful, strategic studies prospered. At the opposite end of the spectrum from nuclear war, however, strategy did not prosper. After the Cuban missile crisis, the focus of East-West competition shifted to the Third World. Many strategists turned their attention to problems of counterinsurgency. In this realm, in contrast to nuclear abstraction, theories *were* mercilessly

subjected to testing. Most nonspecialists saw Vietnam (rather than successful cases of counterinsurgency in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines) as the test and as evidence that theories failed when applied. Most of the work on counterinsurgency by professional analysts, however, was case-study research, and most of the theories came from practitioners.¹¹ Theoretical breakthroughs in the first cycle of strategic studies had been more about deterrence, nuclear strategy, and escalation than about revolution, intervention, and subconventional war. Apart from whatever credit it might claim for helping to prevent World War III, the field's weakness in the first cycle was the overwhelming attention given to the least likely type of war and the late consideration of the most likely. Given the utilitarian rationales for the field, it is hardly surprising that critics saw the Vietnam disaster as a reflection on it.

The other area in which analysts became influential in policy was defense program management. RAND provided not only deterrence theorists but cost-effectiveness experts to McNamara's Pentagon. Along with the unprecedented supervision of military operations in the air war over Vietnam, the managerial revolution was a prime precipitant of civil-military friction. To some, the military reaction to the civilian analysts evinced the anti-intellectualism that Brodie complained about in 1949, with military vested interests resisting dispossession as new players sought to rationalize the allocation of marginal resources.¹² In other respects, proponents of cost-effectiveness criteria overplayed their hand, blithely overruled traditional military judgment, and revealed the limits of economic analysis as a basis for military decision.¹³

In the 1960s Brodie made a midcourse correction. He rethought his enthusiasm for economic conceptualization of strategy, worrying that the approaches he had recommended in 1949 had been taken much farther than he had expected, and that tools that were useful for limited purposes had been abused to answer questions beyond their applicability. Leaving RAND for UCLA in 1966, he was appalled by the "astonishing lack of political sense" and the ignorance of diplomatic and military history that he saw among economists who had become eminent strategists. "It is not that they have no time for history but rather that the devotees of any highly developed science ... tend to develop a certain disdain and even arrogance concerning other fields." In 1949 he had seen professional soldiers as too limited by soft intuition and folklore; in the 1960s he believed economics could do no better without incorporating more of the knowledge that scientists often consider soft.¹⁴ By the 1970s, however, he need not have worried. Having played a central role in development of deterrence theory, economists were by then found hardly anywhere in the academic study of military affairs. RAND had also evolved into a bureaucratized contract research organization as much as a think tank and was no longer the hothouse of theoretical ferment it had been in the 1950s.

For a time no one took up the slack. Vietnam poisoned the academic well, and détente removed the urgency about deterrence. For a decade after the late 1960s, little serious work on military affairs was undertaken in

universities, apart from arms control studies. The 1970s produced ample work on U.S.-Soviet negotiations, much of it a valuable extension of ideas developed earlier,¹⁵ but most of which was technical and ahistorical. The Ford Foundation established research centers that concentrated on arms control at Harvard, Stanford, MIT, and Cornell. Systems analytic techniques were applied to defense program issues in monographs put out by the Brookings Institution, which influenced Washington policy debates of the 1970s but were not designed to advance theoretical debates (subsequent Brookings studies moved in that direction).¹⁶ Later, the MacArthur Foundation dispensed numerous grants but emphasized nonmilitary subjects.

There was also a counteroffensive against the dominance of strategic studies over the field of international relations. Scholars advocated shifting the focus to interdependence and political economy because the importance of states and the utility of force had declined.¹⁷ By the end of the 1970s, however, the tide turned. Klaus Knorr – an early colleague of Brodie, editor of *World Politics*, one of the few economists who kept working on questions of national security after the 1960s, and one of the few strategists to integrate political, military, and economic analysis – had been among the first to argue the declining utility of force. Like Brodie, however, Knorr became alarmed by those who took his argument too far and within a decade was publishing reconsiderations.¹⁸ Within a few years of publishing *Power and Interdependence*, moreover, Joseph Nye turned his own interests toward security issues.

The Second Cycle and After

The hiatus in strategic studies ended with the revival of the cold war at the close of the Carter administration. The logistical base for the field grew. In the first cycle, *World Politics* was the main outlet for academic articles on strategy. In the second cycle, specialized journals came to the fore, especially *International Security*.¹⁹ In the first cycle, ideas revolved around basic concepts (deterrence, stability, credibility). In the second cycle, debate was about the elaboration of concepts, variations on old themes, and how specific configurations of capability would buttress or undermine peace.²⁰ In the second cycle, the most novel research and theoretical development took an empirical turn.

One area that opened up at the end of the 1970s was strategic intelligence. A few excellent works on the subject had appeared early in the cold war because political pressure to account for disasters eased restrictions on information about a few cases. Roberta Wohlstetter's classic book, *Pearl Harbor*, was based on thirty-nine volumes of congressional hearings, and Klaus Knorr's article, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates," drew on his involvement in the postmortem of the Cuban missile crisis by the intelligence community's Board of National Estimates.²¹ Declassification surged in the 1970s. The revelation of secrets from World War II (such as "Ultra" code breaking)

produced a spate of historical studies.²² More theoretical works capitalized on these and on information about cold war intelligence activities that started to become available with the congressional investigations of 1975–76, as well as on ideas from psychology and organizational sociology.²³ The subject sustained two new journals: *Intelligence and National Security* and *The International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-intelligence*.

The bulk of research in the second cycle remained preoccupied with how to prevent World War III. (Lessons were often sought by revisiting World War I.)²⁴ New empiricism corrected prevalent assumptions about policy that had been inferred from deductive theories of deterrence. Scholars who burrowed into declassified documents and interviews revealed that much conventional wisdom among civilians about nuclear targeting did not in fact reflect strategy in practice – the doctrine embodied in the military’s Single Integrated Operational Plan for nuclear war. (“Counterforce” targeting, which mainstream theory and political leaders’ rhetoric had rejected as destabilizing, had never been abandoned.)²⁵ Others showed that much of the fundamental logic of canonical theories about nuclear “stability” that academics and civilian policymakers had come to take for granted was utterly confounded by the realistic operational limits of command and control systems.²⁶

The other main strand of empirical work was in conventional strategy. This shift in attention was prompted entirely by the nuclear impasse. None of the convoluted theorizing about how to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons had managed to discover a consistently rational solution to the contradiction between the aims of stabilizing mutual nuclear deterrence between the superpowers and deterring a Soviet conventional attack against NATO. The former required that any nuclear first strike would be suicidal and therefore unthinkable; the latter required that an attack by enemy conventional forces could be blocked without nuclear escalation. Conventional wisdom in the West held that NATO’s nonnuclear defenses were too weak and required reliance on the threat of nuclear first use – which meant that it must not be unthinkable. This in turn prevented Washington and Moscow from accepting any hint of inferiority in their respective nuclear forces. If nuclear competition was to be dampened, more confidence in conventional alternatives would be the price.

A new generation of analysts focused on assessing whether, why, and how NATO could achieve more such confidence, by examining in detail the data and assumptions behind standard estimates of the balance of forces and strategic alternatives in Europe. Questioning official assumptions, models, and calculations, and applying new conceptual frameworks, they took up where McNamara’s whiz kids had left off in the mid-1960s but approached the problem in more depth. Theoretically, they transposed the concepts and categories of nuclear deterrence theory, whereby particular configurations of forces and emphases in operational doctrine were alleged to foster stability.²⁷

This wave of attention to conventional forces brought new emphasis on comparative analysis of historical cases. Writing primarily in *International Security* and *Studies in Security Affairs*, a series published by Cornell

University Press, scholars sought additional analytic leverage on questions of relative capability to supplement debates about quantitative models of the military balance. New literature investigated political, economic, social, technological, organizational, and doctrinal issues that determined military effectiveness, and thereby focused the academic consideration of the essence of strategy: how to integrate political ends and military means.²⁸ A Clausewitz revival ensued in the same period, beginning with a new translation of *On War* (to which Brodic contributed a commentary). The classic *Makers of Modern Strategy* was also updated.²⁹

Scholars who did this work prospered in the 1980s. Political science departments that had grown blasé about strategy in the period of détente scrambled to build their staffs again as superpower competition reheated, the Vietnam hangover dissipated, and realist conceptions of world politics rebounded. Opposition to identifying security with strategic studies existed all along,³⁰ but the identification prevailed in academic hiring in this period. A generous supply of fellowships (especially through Harvard's Olin Institute and Center for Science and International Affairs, the Brookings Institution, and arms control centers sponsored by the Ford Foundation) kept up the corps of researchers in politico-military affairs. This renaissance lasted as long as avoiding World War III remained at the top of the real-world agenda.³¹

The end of the cold war turned security studies back to basics: questions about causes of war and peace, effects of the general distribution of power in international relations, economic and ideological influences on patterns of conflict and cooperation, nationalism, and so forth. Academic research on the operational and technical questions that dominated the 1980s stopped almost completely, but more general work on military institutions, history, and strategic issues thrived.³² In what we may call either the third cycle of post-World War II strategic studies or the first post-cold war phase, research is advancing on civil-military relations, organization theory, arms control, strategic culture, coercion, grand strategy, and other subjects.³³ In contrast to the cold war, when analysis revolved around deterrence and the East-West military balance, no one policy problem dominates the agenda. This makes the enterprise richer than ever. But without the danger of apocalyptic war at the center, the force of the claim to relevance that overrode intellectual skepticism about the field during the cold war has weakened.

Where should strategic studies go? The current trajectory, on which a wider array of research topics rides than during the first two cycles, is a good one. Weak spots in the earlier cycles could still stand more work today: the political dimension of internal or civil war, and the operational dimension of irregular or subconventional war. Since 1945 scholars focused most on interstate war and nuclear or conventional strategy, but most of the conflicts that actually occur are of the other sorts. The comparative politics field in political science attends to internal conflict, and there is plenty of atheoretical policy literature on "low intensity" conflict, but not yet enough academic attention within international relations and strategic studies.³⁴ Another topic that merits special attention is the evolution of Chinese forces, doctrine, and strategy, and

whether China's military development can match its economic surge. The cold war spawned an impressive corps of analysts of the Soviet military (Christopher Donnelly, John Erickson, Mary Fitzgerald, Raymond Garthoff, David Holloway, Arnold Horelick, Roman Kolkowicz, Stephen Meyer, Michael McCwire, William Odom, Thomas Wolfe, and many others); there are counterparts on China (such as June Dreyer, Paul Godwin, John Lewis, Jonathan Pollack, David Shambaugh, and Arthur Waldron), but the list is shorter.

Despite the widening ambit after the cold war, skeptics who never liked the ascendancy of strategic studies see less reason to indulge it and demand that "security" studies be broadened.³⁵ The effect of accepting these arguments would be to slash attention to military strategy in universities. The best solution to intellectual controversy is to let a hundred flowers bloom, but departments do not have a hundred flower pots. Few, as it is, have found room for more than one expert on military affairs, and some have none. Broad definitions of security would allow departments to hire specialists in areas far afield from war and strategy and still claim that they cover the security slot.

The Missing Discipline

As Thomas Schelling argued in 1960, strategy's theoretical development has been retarded because "the military services, in contrast to almost any other sizable and respectable profession, have no identifiable academic counterpart."³⁶ Strategic studies has piggybacked on other disciplines – mainly history and political science – instead of securing an autonomous institutional home. There are no *departments* of strategy or war studies in U.S. universities (in contrast to Britain). This in itself is not damning; not all interdisciplinary fields have departmental status. But there is still a disjunction between intellectual and institutional logics. The essence of strategy should be the integration of two disciplines – military science and political science – but one of them is missing. Interdisciplinary strategy suffers from the lack of an established academic *discipline* of military science to anchor it.

First, there is no institutional redoubt to fall back on when support for interdisciplinary work declines. To understand the causes, conduct, and consequences of war, one should know something of politics, economics, psychology, sociology, geography, technology, force structure, and tactics. When world developments favor strategic studies, the interdisciplinary character is an advantage, since it exploits strengths of several fields. Otherwise it is a vulnerability, since enthusiasm for interdisciplinary research falters when making room for it encroaches on one's own department.

Second, specialists in strategy are spread thinner. Unlike political scientists in international political economy (IPE), they have no analogue to economics as an allied field to draw on. They must develop the military science aspects of their work themselves, as autodidacts. (Then they smuggle military science

into political science, where colleagues sometimes wonder whether what they are doing belongs there.) IPE does not focus on the technical functioning of markets but can assume that serious students have at least taken a basic course in economics. Strategists must cram the relevant military science into their own teaching, since students do not get it anywhere else. Economics is assumed to be fundamental for education in international affairs, but elementary military science is not. (In my own university's master's program, all students must take three economics courses; none but the few specializing in security policy are required to take any course on military matters.) In a world of limited resources that keeps many claims at bay, none of this means that military science should be a full fledged discipline in the arts and sciences. But without an institutionally established discipline at the core, strategy must either be welcomed into other disciplines as a sideline or exiled from universities.

Academic work on strategy is sponsored elsewhere, primarily the service war colleges and the National Defense University. In "Strategy as a Science," Brodie wrote, "We need to make of our war colleges genuine graduate schools" (p. 487). This aim has been best approximated in the Naval War College, which has a strategy department dominated by civilian historians. These islands within military organizations, however, will never sustain strategic studies on their own, nor should they. Understanding of military affairs should not become a closed system, where none outside the uniformed establishment can claim expertise. If serious strategic studies is to survive, it needs a niche in real universities. Given the interdisciplinary and policy-oriented nature of strategic studies, graduate schools of public policy and international affairs should be a logical locus. But although such schools now give Ph.D.'s, they do not have an autonomous underpinning. Scholars staffing them still come mostly from the arts and sciences, which is where a viable academic enterprise must have roots.

Most social sciences have dealt with military subjects. For example, sociologists such as Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos built the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society and its journal *Armed Forces and Society*. Few of the social sciences, however, have generated a critical mass of scholars fully conversant with strategy. Economists got involved in strategic work as consultants, or by moving to RAND or Washington, not by establishing it as a field within their parent discipline. In practice, history and political science are the homes for strategic studies.

Military history is essential knowledge for anyone prescribing strategy, but it does not fare well within the history profession. Few major departments beyond Yale, Duke, and Ohio State have kept even a single military historian on their rosters. Strategic studies has been more welcome in political science. In part this is because political science has been an eclectic and permissive discipline, without a rigidly autonomous agenda, method, or qualifications. (Several major political science departments even appointed faculty with other degrees to cover strategy – mathematician Albert Wohlstetter at the University

of Chicago, chemist George Rathjens at MIT, and economist Robert Powell at Berkeley. It is hard to imagine departments in any of those other disciplines hiring a political scientist for anything.) Most researchers in international relations exploit other disciplines for much of their work. Empirically oriented ones look to history, those interested in deductive theory look to economics and philosophy. The most zealous social scientists, however, see methodological eclecticism as flabby indiscipline. Strategy will not fare well if scientific impulses achieve hegemony in the political science guild. Strategic studies can and should be as rigorous as any discipline, but it has a natural interest in a permissive writ for political science, if that discipline is to be its main home.³⁷

Lack of a military science discipline also limits institutional links between military and academic cultures. Both camps have come a long way since "Strategy as a Science." Officers have become civilianized, getting M.B.A.'s or social science Ph.D.'s, complementing the traditional military orientation to engineering; and civilians have become militarized, serving in the Defense Department or getting more rounded educational backgrounds in military operations than McNamara's systems analysts had. Blurry boundaries among the realms of policy, strategy, and operations, however, keep the proper balance of civil-military power uncertain. Most accord civilians the right to make policy, and the military the right to run operations, but strategy is what links the two. Pulled in two directions, strategic choices are inevitably seen by some as primarily political and civilian and by others as primarily operational and military.³⁸

Brodie did not consider the professional military equipped to accomplish the integration of policy and operations that is the essence of strategy, but American society would really not have it otherwise. Strategy sucks the military into high politics. Professional soldiers usually prefer a division of labor, segregating policy and operations into neat compartments, assuming that strategy will be their own mechanistic translation of policy guidance into military programs and plans that they can execute to the stipulated ends. Civilian strategists worry that military tunnel vision may yield dangerous and unrecognized political consequences – for example, building incentives for preemptive attack into the configuration of capabilities.

If strategy is to integrate policy and operations, it must be devised not just by politically sensitive soldiers but by militarily sensitive civilians. Either of these types makes third parties in politics or academia uncomfortable. Ironically, many academics who endorse strong civilian control of the military prove reluctant to support it by promoting civilian strategic studies. Amateurs should not control what they do not understand, especially in a business that puts legions of lives at stake. Yet many academic critics share military skepticism (albeit for different reasons) about intellectual attention to details of military operations.

The main problem is not the pacifist or radical fringes of the academic world, despite the distaste they evince for a field they associate with support for U.S. policy. Neither group has as much clout in political science as

elsewhere in academia. The problem is that many in the liberal mainstream concede that strategic studies is legitimate, but when major war appears to recede as a prospect in the real world – as it did in the 1970s and again after the cold war – they resist ranking the subject highly when their own fields' priorities are at stake. Seen as legitimate in principle, strategic studies faces marginalization in practice when departments see it as a second-rate claim on their discipline.

Strategic Studies and Security Studies

The intellectual and institutional status of strategy is confused by persistent lack of consensus on how much attention military aspects of security should get and where lines should be drawn between narrow military science, integrative strategic studies, and all-encompassing security studies. In "Strategy as a Science" Brodie noted that military strategy was subordinate to the larger problem of how

to increase one's advantage without unduly jeopardizing the maintenance of peace or the pursuit of other values. This broader enterprise, which might be called "security policy," can be construed to cover the total preparation for war as well as the waging of it. It would thus deal ... with political, social, and economic as well as military matters in both domestic and foreign contexts. (p. 477)

Brodie's "security policy" was closer to what I have called strategic studies, as his discussion of "strategy" was closer to military science, perhaps because he did not foresee vigorous arguments that security involves far more than preparation for war. His later frustration with economists' approach to strategy was their inattention to factors he lumped with "security" in 1949. Today it is fair to distinguish strategic and security studies in order to recognize that security includes things besides military concerns, as long as no doubt is left that security policy requires careful attention to war and strategy. Security studies today embraces many related topics such as diplomacy, policy formation, social and economic mobilization, scientific innovation, arms control, and terrorism.³⁹ Some, however, regard even this breadth as inadequate.

As semantic commentary on the *term* "security," arguments that security studies should consider problems ranging from economic performance to environmental damage are quite fair. They do not help to organize the field of international relations, however, because they do not delimit a subfield. A subfield must be broad enough to encompass a significant range of problems, but narrow enough to be a coherent area of inquiry, distinguishable from other subfields and the parent field. Expansive definitions of security quickly become synonymous with "interest" or "well-being," do not exclude anything in international relations or foreign policy, and thus become indistinguishable from those fields or other subfields. Recognition of this boundary

problem led Baldwin to suggest that security studies be abolished as a subfield and “reintegrated” into international relations. If the point was to reverse fragmentation and encourage the reintegration of all specializations, this argument would be reasonable, but he denies that the other main subfield of international relations, IPE, should be reintegrated as well.

First, Baldwin argues, no other subfield but security is “defined in terms of techniques of statecraft.”⁴⁰ Even if this is true, the difference is less significant than the similarities. IPE is as much or as little about economic phenomena as security studies is about military phenomena. Both trade and war involve conflict and cooperation, negotiation, and ultimate media of exchange and settlement (cash payment and combat). Both combat and commerce are modes of interaction in which purposes, constraints, instruments, and procedural dynamics produce outcomes and overlap with other realms of interaction.

Second, Baldwin suggests, “the rationale for subfields is to ensure that important subtopics are not neglected,”⁴¹ and security topics are established at the core of the parent field of international relations where realism is the dominant paradigm. Specialization, however, is at least as much for *deepening* knowledge on important subjects as for guarding against neglect. Moreover, it has been twenty years since one could worry that IPE might be neglected, and realism has been on the defensive again since the cold war ended. Considering that international relations has more or less broken down into two main subfields, it hardly seems necessary to drop to one. If anything, more subfields should be strengthened (for example, environmental studies, which covers subjects ultimately as important as the regnant subfields and is more neglected than either security or IPE).

Clarity and claims might best be served by renaming the security subfield “IPM” (international politico-military studies). This would confirm the focus on strategic integration of ends and means, highlight the parallel to IPE, and circumvent the dispute over “security” that mixes legitimate semantic claims with objectionable attacks on strategic studies. The deal would concede the case for identifying the scope of security with international relations in general, in exchange for recognition of an “IPM” subfield (strategic studies) on a par with any other. Practically, however, there is no constituency on either side for such recategorization, so strategy’s academic status will continue to be set through arguments about security studies.

As consensus on standards remains elusive, students of strategy regularly encounter criticisms of the field’s quality, occasionally in print but most often in professional badinage. One objection is that mainstream strategic work is theoretically weak or has not advanced since the deterrence theory of the early cold war.⁴² John Ruggie laments failures to consider possible transformations of international politics: “the worst offender by far is the American field of security studies,” because “no epochal thought has been expressed by any serious specialist in that field since 1957, when John Herz published ‘Rise and Demise of the Territorial State.’”⁴³ This confuses disagreement with closed minds: there is no evidence that those who disbelieve in

transformation have refused to consider it, any more than that those Ruggie admirers have refused to consider the case for continuity.

Have other subfields done much better in producing knowledge? Not by standards of cumulation or cross-fertilization. Work on deterrence and arms control represented as much cumulation as found in most of political science. Indeed, if work in the later cold war amounted to refinements of earlier breakthroughs rather than new ones, this represented progress based on cumulation. Debates on war causation and civil-military relations have filtered into other subfields via levels-of-analysis and bureaucratic politics arguments, and security studies adapted cognitive theory and organization theory before IPE did.⁴⁴

Even if it were true that theoretical innovation in strategic studies has been less paradigm-shattering than in other fields, this would not ipso facto demonstrate weakness rather than strength. Critics would have to demonstrate that more recent and numerous theories in other fields are *better* theories – more useful for understanding the world – than the fewer and older ones of strategy. Theories may endure because they prove durable, or may change constantly because each new one proves wanting. One Clausewitz is still worth a busload of most other theorists.

Are technical discussions about weaponry or operational doctrine evidence of strategists' atheoretical fixation on particulars? Such criticism has some merit in regard to technically denominated literature of the cold war (though most of it was not in political science) and is understandable when provoked by hardware fetishists often taken for representatives of strategic studies. Otherwise, it is no more reasonable than it would be to denigrate political economy for attention to specific commodities, financial instruments, or trade agreements.

Some critics such as rational choice theorists who deride traditional empirical work as “just telling stories,” or quantitative researchers who criticize it as “anecdotal,” see emphasis on comparative case studies as generically weak compared to deductive theorizing or “large-N” studies. These other approaches thrive and compete effectively in universities with mainstream strategic studies as practiced in Brodie's tradition. Such work appears mainly in *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *American Political Science Review*, and *International Studies Quarterly*.⁴⁵

Distaste for military studies sometimes comes from moral suspicions that it embraces war rather than attending to how to abolish it. American strategic research, however, is mainly about how to avoid war. Most work in strategic studies is profoundly *conservative*, in the literal sense, because it is concerned with *stability*, a value that privileges peace over revisionism. In this respect, liberals interested in arms control have been the most conservative. Few academic works promote schemes for using force to change the status quo. Rather, they focus on deterrence or defense, to discourage the resort to violence to effect political change.

Focusing intently on how to manipulate the threat of deadly force, for whatever benign purpose, strikes some as fatalistic, selling short the search

for cooperative strategies. Why waste time and foundation grants on finding better ways to do a bad thing when we might apply our talents to making it unnecessary? But accepting the occurrence of war and considering how to cope with it more effectively are no more fatalistic than accepting liberal capitalism, and considering how to optimize trade within it, would seem to a Marxist. Realist assumptions about group conflict that underlie most strategic studies require no more and no less validation than those of optimists who believe in the obsolescence of war. Debate over these assumptions lies at the heart of political theory and has been recycled and unresolved for centuries. It would be foolhardy to bet that social science can resolve it and arrogant for either side to deny an academic place to the other.⁴⁶

Strategy for What?

Are scholars of strategy too policy-oriented (not sufficiently theoretical) or too involved in government consulting to keep straight the conflicting demands of truth and power? (At different times, critics have given it both ways – denigrating the field for being too relevant in the era when there were huge security problems and dismissing it now for not being relevant enough.) At high points of the cold war, analysis often did fixate on the U.S.-Soviet balance of military power and the relative merits of particular weapons programs. It is also true that few strategists apologize for wanting to affect prospects for war and peace in the outside world. Apart from aesthetic fascination with the elegance of theory itself – theory for theory’s sake – the rationale for valuing theoretical over policy analysis in the intellectual pecking order is that the former can subsume and inspire a wider range of analysis, and thus reveals more and lasts longer than work on a transient issue. This utilitarian rationale means that one good theory can illuminate many policy questions – but also that some link between theory and practice is ultimately the test of a theory’s value. *Neither theory nor policy can be optimized apart from each other.* Central theoretical insights often flow from grappling with concrete questions rather than a priori constructs. For example, Albert Wohlstetter drew basic precepts about strategic instability from his work on a RAND study of choices in bomber deployment patterns.⁴⁷

Two academic pathologies should raise the stock of policy studies. One is that the professional premium on theorizing tends to proliferate theories, promote constant revision of theories, and encourage production of second-rate theories over first-rate applications. Albert Hirschman, with impeccable credentials as a theorist, long ago indicted “the tendency toward *compulsive and mindless theorizing*.”⁴⁸ One sure sign of intellectual degeneration in a field is when the logical relationship between generalization and specification is inverted, theories threaten to outnumber their applications, and the shelf life of theoretical work turns out to be hardly longer than that of policy analysis. Some social scientists are untroubled that professional incentives encourage such imbalance, because never having had to meet a payroll in the policy

world, they overestimate the ease with which an effective application can be derived from a theoretical insight. Every intellectual would rather be an Einstein than an engineer, but useful knowledge is not advanced if the academy generates a horde of would-be Einsteins but few competent engineers. Strategists are not just engineers, but they consider empiricism and application no less important than the theoretical part of their work.

The other pathology is when theorization becomes a closed system, with no connection through which insights can be applied to the outside world – when theorists communicate effectively with no one but each other. When this happens, a theory may remain beautiful but it loses the claim to utility. It is the widespread perception in the outside world that theorization is a closed system that makes “academic” a pejorative adjective in normal parlance. A system can be closed in two senses: lack of feedback from policy application, or lack of interest in testing theories against evidence. Both problems are addressed in typical strategic studies research programs that proceed from policy issues, to theoretical formulation, to empirical testing, to policy application.

Intellectuals who spend much time in Washington sometimes worry that much theoretical work in contemporary political science reflects both pathologies and has not proved much less ephemeral or more useful than good applications of old theory. Unless academics themselves become involved on the periphery of policy-making, the only way that their work can have effect outside the closed system in universities is if practitioners read it. Few high-level staff in the U.S. government read anything more academic than *Foreign Affairs*, and high-level policymakers seldom have time to read any unofficial material but op-ed pieces. One academic journal that is read occasionally in Washington is *International Security*, because it melds policy analysis and theory. This is one reason it has had a circulation 50 to 80 percent higher than its IPE counterpart *International Organization* and that academics in other fields sometimes denigrate its academic quality.

Some academics may value the aesthetic qualities of theory as much as the utilitarian. Strategists can get as excited as anyone over the elegance of an idea, but see elegance without empirical confirmation and applicability as no more science than art. As Brodie suggested, any criterion for strategy but a utilitarian one is a contradiction in terms: “The question that matters in strategy is: Will the idea work? ... *Strategy is a field where truth is sought in the pursuit of viable solutions.*”⁴⁹

In the first half of the cold war, academic strategists played a visible role in U.S. defense policy. There have been many officials with Ph.D.’s since. For better or worse, however, few practicing academics in strategic studies have been directly influential since the 1960s, except for Henry Kissinger. Most scholars who have held high national security offices have been generalists (McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, Zbigniew Brzezinski) or ones from strategic studies who left academia early in their careers (Michael Armacost, Paul Wolfowitz, Arnold Kanter, Dennis Ross, Lynn Davis). Some academic strategists are consultants to foreign affairs agencies, but few are reputed to be powers behind

any throne. Ironically, in the past quarter century, policy experience has enriched academic research more than the reverse, since many prominent scholars of strategy spent brief periods early in their careers working at middle levels in the government (usually thanks to fellowships from the Council on Foreign Relations).

The direct effect of strategic studies on the outside world may be greater than that of much other social science. It remains quite limited, however, perhaps because scholarship in the field became more academic after the first cycle. Thus the field is more like others than it is different, in the sense that the influence of education is hard to pinpoint. It percolates through students who go into the outside world, through the few policymakers who read research, or through other channels difficult to trace. In any case, to whatever extent strategic studies is not a closed system, it is cause for celebration, not criticism.

Brodie's disappointment with the first cycle reflected the failure of strategists then most prominent to integrate the analytic rigor of economics with the broader expertise in military science, politics, and history that he himself had. Strategic studies improved in those terms in the second cycle. Now the question is whether strategic studies, larded as it is with military science, will remain at the center of security studies or will wither as academic guilds drive the focus of research to other subjects.

Strategy is not the whole of security and need not be anointed as the first priority of international relations. This defense of strategic studies is not a special pleading to return the field to a dominant position, but simply a case for keeping its status equal to any other subfield. Whatever resources are available for hiring, faculties should decide what to cover on the basis of long-term evidence of what has mattered in world politics rather than recent events, intellectual fads, or moral hopes. A department that can afford only one professor of international relations needs a generalist and cannot demand that she know much military science. A department that can hire in separate subfields, however, should ensure that coverage of "security" includes as much emphasis on strategic studies as if the slot were defined as in "IPM."

War has always been an essential phenomenon in world politics. There is nothing wrong with asserting that it is waning as long as such propositions (which have been popularized and discredited three times before in the past century) are not allowed to strike the issue from the agenda of highest priority problems. If war does become obsolete, the wasted intellectual effort in continuing to study it will have been a small price. If it does not, and if research ever has any useful impact at all, future generations may be glad that we kept our intellectual powder dry.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Robert Art, David Baldwin, Michael Desch, Peter Feaver, Stephan Haggard, Michael Handel, Samuel Huntington, Robert Jervis, Miles Kahler, David Lake, Michael Mandelbaum,

John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, Cynthia Roberts, Gideon Rose, John Ruggie, Warner Schilling, Jack Snyder, Barry Steiner, Marc Trachtenberg, and Stephen Walt. The value of their criticisms exceeded my ability to incorporate them within length restrictions, which also limited bibliographical footnotes to illustrative examples rather than recognition of the full range of important works.

Notes

1. Brodie, "Strategy as a Science," *World Politics* 1 (July 1949), 468.
2. Hedley Bull, "Strategic Studies and Its Critics," *World Politics* 20 (July 1968), 596.
3. David Baldwin, "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War," *World Politics* 48 (October 1995), 135.
4. See also Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 11, 13; idem, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 9–11; idem, "Scientific Progress and Political Science," *Scientific Monthly* 85 (December 1957), 317.
5. Smith, *The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943–1945* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970); Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
6. Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983); Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989); Barry Steiner, *Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991).
7. Knorr, *The War Potential of Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956); Knorr, ed., *NATO and American Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Kaufmann, ed., *Military Policy and National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956); Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962); Schilling, Hammond, and Snyder, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962); Demetrios Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Michael Armacost, *The Politics of Weapons Innovation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Green, *Deadly Logic* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966); Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper, 1957). ISS publications include the journal *Survival*, the Adelphi Papers, and the annuals *Military Balance* and *Strategic Survey*.
8. Brodie, ed., *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946).
9. Quoted in Kaplan (fn. 6), 254.
10. Marc Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), chap. 1; Patrick Morgan, *Deterrence*, 2d ed. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983); Richard Betts, "Nuclear Weapons," in Joseph Nye, ed., *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); Colin Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (Lanham, Md.: Hamilton Press, 1986); Lynn Eden and Steven Miller, eds., *Nuclear Arguments* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).
11. *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 2 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965); Jay Mallin, ed., *"Che" Guevara on Revolution* (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1969). Academics developed limited war theories mostly about Korea and NATO, not subconventional war. Robert Os-good, *Limited War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Henry Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice* (New York: Harper, 1961); Morton Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Wiley, 1963). On unconventional war in the third World, French and British colonial veterans wrote theoretical statements: David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1964); Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (New York: Praeger, 1966). One of the few theoretical works by academics that holds up is Samuel Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," in Huntington, ed., *Changing*

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12. The seminal cost-effectiveness work on defense management is Charles Hitch *et al.*, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960). See also F.S. Quade and W.I. Boucher, eds., *Systems Analysis and Policy Planning Applications in Defense* (New York: American Elsevier, 1968).

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14. Trachtenberg (fn. 10), 13n; Brodie, quoted in Steiner (fn. 6), 196–97; Brodie, "Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?" *Foreign Policy*, no. 5 (Winter 1971–72), 154. One of the principals who imposed economic analysis in the Pentagon foresaw the problem; Charles Hitch, "National Security Policy as a Field for Economics Research," *World Politics* 12 (April 1960), 448.

15. Donald Brennan, ed., *Daedalus* 89, special issue (Fall 1960); Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, with the assistance of Donald Brennan, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).

16. Examples of Studies in Defense Policy published by the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., in the trough between the first and second cycles include Martin Binkin, *Support Costs in the Defense Budget* (1972); William White, *U.S. Tactical Airpower* (1974); Barry Blechman, *The Control of Naval Armaments* (1975). More academic Brookings publications in the second cycle include Joshua Epstein, *The Calculus of Conventional War* (1985); Richard Belts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (1987); Thomas McNaugher, *New Weapons, Old Politics* (1989); Bruce Blair, *The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War* (1993).

17. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), chap. 2.

18. Knorr, *On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); idem, "On the International Uses of Military Force in the Contemporary World," *Orbis* 20 (Spring 1977); Richard Belts, Michael Doyle, and John Ikenberry, "An Intellectual Remembrance of Klaus Knorr," in Henry Bienen, ed., *Power, Economics, and Security* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), 17–19.

19. See also *The Journal of Strategic Studies, Survival, Defense Analysis, Comparative Strategy, Arms Control, and Small Wars and Insurgencies*. One of the better journals, *Security Studies*, began publishing after the cold war ended. Official journals include *Naval War College Review, Parameters*, and *Joint Force Quarterly*.

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24. *International Security* 19, special issue (Summer 1984).

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40. Baldwin (fn. 3), 140. See also Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies* 23 (1997).

41. Baldwin (fn. 3), 140.

42. Nye and Lynn-Jones (fn. 30), 12, 21–22, 26.

43. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," *International Organization* 47 (Winter 1993), 143.

44. Thanks to Peter Feaver for this point. See John Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Harvey Sapolsky, *The Polaris System Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).

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Identity and the Politics of Security

Michael C. Williams

Among the myriad themes which have swept across the post-Cold War field of security studies, perhaps none has been so prominent as the renewed concern with questions of identity. Spurred by the rise in ethnic and nationalist conflicts in the wake of the Cold War, and abetted by the notable 'return of culture and identity' (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996) in International Relations scholarship as a whole,¹ 'identity' concerns have rapidly become among the most discussed elements of the field.² This article attempts to explore these controversies and to assess their implications for the broader Critical³ 'rethinking' of security and security studies by developing a brief account of the largely unexamined historical background against which they take place. One of the major contributions of the 'critical' movement in International Relations has been to denaturalize the modern state as a starting point for analysis, and to initiate a serious examination of its historical genesis and evolution. Both the structure of the modern political order and that of the modern episteme have become areas of significant inquiry.⁴ I want here to examine briefly some of the ways in which the construction of the modern state and the construction of modern modes of knowledge were related in recasting the nature of security. Indeed, the new conceptions of knowledge which characterized this transformation were part of an explicit political agenda which had the problem of security at its centre.

Undertaking such an examination, however, requires a considerable recasting of the way in which the relationship between security and identity is often portrayed within International Relations. To begin with, it requires challenging a consensus that has, ironically, frequently underlain competing positions on the issue – the widely held view that 'identity' was untheorized in previous forms of security studies and that the key questions involve uncovering why this was the case and assessing the implications of its 'return'. The premise of this consensus, I argue, is largely mistaken. 'Identity' concerns have never been missing from theorizing about International Relations and security. On the contrary, a specific conception of identity is in fact *constitutive of*, rather than missing from, prevailing theories of International Relations and security.

The background against which these debates over identity need to be seen can be traced to what I will call the emergence of the 'liberal sensibility' in thinking about the politics of security, an historical attempt to construct a new ensemble of 'knowledgeable practices' in response to turmoil and violence – the *security concerns* – of the early modern era. The *apparent* absence of a concern with identity in conceptions of security needs to be understood in fact as an historical legacy of a conscious attempt to exclude identity concerns from the political realm, or as what might be called a *negative identity practice* that is a central element in the liberal sensibility and in its construction of the place of identity in understanding the politics of security.⁵ The progenitors of this liberal sensibility were all too conscious of the importance of strongly held values and identities. But they saw them as perhaps the primary source of violence and insecurity in the early modern era. What they sought to do in response was to confute these beliefs in theory, to *marginalize* them in practice, and to replace them with new forms of understanding and political action,⁶ and in so doing to transform fundamentally the politics of violence and the nature of security.

This article does not seek explicitly either to defend or attack this liberal sensibility in any systematic fashion.⁷ It does seek, however, to demonstrate that contemporary security studies and International Relations need to consider this heritage more fully and, via such a consideration, to address seriously the entire question of the politics of security and the quintessentially political issues – both domestic and international – which are at stake in theorizing security.⁸ While I cannot develop these implications fully in this context, I argue that commonly accepted contrasts in the emerging debates between neorealist and critical theories of security obscure more than they reveal. In particular, the argument that neorealism rests upon an objectivist understanding of security (and materialist ontology and an empiricist epistemology) which stands in stark opposition to the 'constructivist' foundations of critical theories is significantly misleading. The (often obscured) historical lineage of neorealism lies in the liberal sensibility, in an attempt to *construct* a material and objective foundation for political practice. These debates should not, therefore, be structured as a contrast between objectivist or 'positivist' theoretical foundations, but as historically located disputes about the politics of theorizing security and the practical implications of doing so in different ways.

Identity and Security: Method and Politics

Current debates between neorealists and critical theorists over the relationship between identity and security often begin from a shared consensus that identity concerns were largely missing from prevailing analyses of security studies. Their divergence, however, can be seen as emerging from different responses to two central questions – first, why has a concern with identity been so conspicuously missing in the study of security? And second, what

are the theoretical and practical implications of adopting an 'identity agenda' in the field of security studies?

While they have not couched their analyses specifically in terms of a concern with 'identity', neorealist writers who have begun to focus seriously on questions of nationalism have often remarked upon the peculiar absence of a concern so seemingly central to the field. In setting out his 'Hypotheses on nationalism and war', for example, Stephen Van Evera notes that despite the apparent centrality of nationalism, scholars have 'said strikingly little about its effects, especially its effects on international politics. Most strikingly, the impact of nationalism on the risk of war has barely been explored' (1994: 5). Similarly, Barry Posen begins his analysis of the role of nationalism in the construction of mass armies by pointing out the 'noteworthy' fact that even though nationalism was 'hardly quiescent' in the postwar period, 'students of strategy concerned themselves with the dynamics of superpower conflict and its effects on regional enmities more than with the dynamics of nationalist rivalries' (1993: 80).

Yet having raised the question of the absence of identity concerns in security studies, and having noted its 'striking' or 'noteworthy' status, neorealist authors have chosen to leave the question of why this was the case largely unanswered. Instead, they tend to move directly to attempts to integrate a concern with identity into their overall theoretical framework. Both Van Evera's analysis of ethnic conflict and Posen's evaluation of the role of nationalism in the rise of mass armies, for example, attempt to show how identity concerns can be integrated into the traditional neorealist concern with the structural determinations of anarchy and the dynamics of the security dilemma. In Posen's portrayal, for example, the rise of nationalism is tied to the emergence of mass armies, a factor itself caused by the 'anarchical condition of the international system' (1993: 82). The clear implication here is that even if identity concerns have not traditionally formed a part of neorealist analyses, they can be 'added in' in ways that are not only unproblematic for neorealist theory, but which actually strengthen its claims.

These neorealist analyses of nationalist and ethnic conflicts have been subject to specific criticisms.⁹ But for many critical theorists, the question of why a concern with identity was missing from traditional (neorealist) security studies is not a question which can be glossed over. Nor is it something which can simply be noted and then 'added in' to pre-existing neorealist theories. On the contrary, they argue that the emergence of an identity agenda in International Relations calls for a 'detailed metatheoretical discussion of the promises, perils and stakes involved' (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996: 106), a discussion that at the very least raises fundamental dilemmas for neorealist theory and which may indeed point to the need for a broader restructuring of International Relations theory (Neufeld, 1995) and with it the study of security (Krause and Williams, 1996). We must, in short, take the absence of identity concerns in theories of International Relations seriously and, in Yosef Lapid's words, inquire into 'the historical context and scholarly practices that have rendered them incompatible in the first place' (1996: 9).

A substantial body of analysis has developed in critical theory which finds this historical and scholarly context in the rise to dominance of a positivist methodology which, it is argued, has been part and parcel of the corresponding postwar ascendance of neorealist theory. Although the elements of this argument may differ, many critical theorists would generally subscribe to Jim George's argument that the core of neorealism lies in an 'orthodox consensus' dominated by the methodological 'power of the positivist/empiricist "metaphysic"' (1994: 18).¹⁰ This consensus is held to centre around two essential elements. The first involves neorealism's adoption of a materialist ontology. As George characterizes it, this involves a view of reality 'as existing "out there" and is articulated through the language and logic of immediacy. Reality, on this basis, is a world of tangible, palpable, perceptible things or objects. ... It is material and concrete' (1994: 11).¹¹ The second involves neorealism's reliance upon an empiricist epistemology. Valid knowledge claims must refer to materially existing, observable objects. As George notes, this means that 'general statements about the world that do not have their reference in independent, observable, atomized objects should not be afforded real knowledge status. Objects, therefore, that are not referable to the senses cannot, by nominalist logic be assumed to exist outside of the senses' (1994: 51).

The upshot of these criticisms is that neorealism's materialist ontology and empiricist epistemology render the ideational realm of social life opaque to its analyses. Ideas, norms, culture – the whole 'socially constructed' realm of social life – are inaccessible to an empiricist form of knowledge that takes material objects to be the foundational ground of inquiry. The implications of this foundation are myriad, but as regards the issue of identity they appear profound; indeed, neorealism's lack of attention to questions of identity and subjectivity has been traced directly to this positivist core. In Robert Cox's influential portrayal, the key to understanding the nature and limits of this positivist approach is that it 'denies the relevancy, for an understanding of the social world, of the inward and outward duality of human institutions and events ... historical events have to be converted into objects. ... Positivism requires *data* – i.e. externally observed "givens"' (1976: 178). In this view, neorealist theory, constituted by the materialist-empiricist synthesis, seems by its very foundation to exclude a concern with subjectivity and agency. If identity is about self-understanding, and shared understandings concern the relationship between selves and others, then the positivist limitation of legitimate theorizing to the analysis of *material* objects seems to render it incapable of addressing such questions. Treating the objects of inquiry *as* objects precludes coming to terms with nonmaterial, ideational phenomena such as identity. A materialist ontology renders inadmissible the very concern with structures of meaning and understanding which an identity agenda is held necessarily to embrace. In Mark Neufeld's words, 'positivist' neorealist analysis 'is fundamentally unable to appreciate the constitutive and potentially transformative nature of human consciousness' (Neufeld, 1993: 53).¹²

Developing a critique of neorealism as a part of a broader critique of 'positivism' in the social science puts the question of neorealism's traditional

marginalization of identity concerns, and the adequacy of its current attempts to reintegrate them into its theoretical purview, in quite a different light. Here, the absence is no accident – it is a consequence of the foundations of neorealist theory. Furthermore, rectifying the absence involves more than a belated sensitivity to ideational issues: it actually represents a fundamental challenge to the theoretical foundations of neorealism as a whole. Neorealism cannot simply ‘add in’ a concern with identity questions without rendering its own objectivist claims to methodological authority profoundly problematic. And since these arguments about the status of legitimate knowledge claims have been at the core of neorealist criticisms of critical theory, a concern with identity issues can be seen as revealing a deep problem within neorealist theory as a whole.

Approaching the question of theory, practice and identity in neorealism as part of a critique of ‘positivism’ or ‘materialism’ has in this form played a significant role in opening up the realm of ‘metatheory’ in International Relations, and in subjecting neorealist (and other) theories to foundational debate. And at the level of method narrowly considered its insights are sound, and its criticisms reveal serious – if not fatal – weaknesses in the methodological authority frequently claimed by neorealism. But I want here to sound something of a dissenting note. An analysis of neorealism which takes the issue of ‘positivism’ (or method in general) as its core risks misunderstanding the deeper structure of the materialist position and the significance of the political issues embedded within that structure. In fact, adopting the view that what is at issue is a particular theory or method tied to the positivist tradition of social science risks misunderstanding neorealism’s heritage and the issues at stake in adopting an identity agenda in security studies. Neither neorealism nor its critics have generally been particularly acute in articulating this heritage or these issues, even though the themes involved provide a largely unspoken background against which their debates have taken place.

Security, Knowledge and the Rise of the Liberal Sensibility

As Steven Toulmin (1990) has forcefully argued, the relationship between modern knowledge and security (or violence) is more intimate than is often acknowledged. Echoing the portraits of modernity painted by philosophers such as Richard Rorty (1979), Toulmin finds the core of modernity in a search for commitment to formal rationality, universality and, most particularly, a ‘Quest for Certainty’.¹³ Unlike those who treat this transition in purely intellectual or philosophical terms, however, Toulmin finds the genesis of this Quest for Certainty in what could (with only slight violence to his ideas) be called a ‘Quest for Security’, an intellectual transformation spurred by the violent social conflicts of the time. In his words, ‘The seventeenth century “Quest for Certainty” was no mere proposal to construct abstract and timeless intellectual schemas, dreamed up as objects of pure, detached intellectual study. Instead it was a timely response to a specific historical challenge – the

political, social, and theological chaos embodied in the Thirty Years' War' (1990: 70).¹⁴

For Toulmin, the dominant account of the rise of the modernist vision of knowledge which portrays the process as an essentially *intellectual* endeavour presents a profoundly misleading account of the emergence of modernity. Rather than comprising a disembodied intellect, or a self-evident method optimistic in its ability to advance objective knowledge for its own sake, the modernist vision emerged in a context of fear, violence and conflict. The modernist search for new foundations was more than a purely intellectual enterprise, because the articulation of an empiricist and materialist foundation for knowledge was as tied up in the question of politics in the 17th century as it was with questions of science.¹⁵ This is not to say that this development can be reduced to politics, but it is to say that to see this broad epistemological project purely as the outcome of an intellectualist paradigm shift (the rise of empiricism and 'positivism') is to misunderstand its genesis and structure. Rooted in the concrete dilemmas concerning the grounds of political belief, assent and order, the rise of the materialist-empiricist synthesis was located in a complex set of controversies which I shall attempt very briefly to trace by examining the issues of 'conscience' and 'enthusiasm'¹⁶ at the heart of 17th-century intellectual and political conflict.

Conscience and Conflict

Questions of knowledge, assent, and consent were at the heart of the relationship between conscience and conflict in the early modern era. As James Tully has pointed out, 'The religious wars that swept Europe were partly a response to and partly the carrier of the rule of faith controversy. This was the great struggle over the "true" faith that rapidly deepened to an intellectual battle over the grounds for rational belief or assent in matters of faith. This was the most important question in a person's life not only because it involved eternal salvation or damnation, but also because the answer could bring persecution or the duty to take up arms in this world' (1993: 182).¹⁷ Even more importantly, as it seemed increasingly likely that theological disagreement was not only rampant but irresolvable, conscience became not only the ultimate (personal) arbiter of belief, but the object of belief itself. As Toulmin has argued, as the conflict became more and more brutal, 'For many of those involved, it ceased to be crucial what their theological beliefs were, or where they were rooted in experience, as 16th-century theologians would have demanded. All that mattered, by this stage, was for supporters of Religious Truth to believe, devoutly, in *belief itself*. For them, as for Tertullian long ago, the difficulty of squaring a doctrine with experience was just one more reason for accepting this doctrine that much the more strongly' (1990: 54).

The elucidation of a materialist-empiricist foundation for knowledge represented one response to this situation. By limiting discourse to the positive, phenomenal world (it was hoped and claimed), politics and society could be

freed from the conflict which emerged from non-empirical claims of individual conviction and conscience beyond public demonstration and discussion. Claims of faith were separated from claims of knowledge and the latter were located in the phenomenal world, not in the realm of 'essence', the enthusiastic consciousness of the believer, or the faith-derived authority of rulers. To take a notable example, Hobbes's materialism is driven – in part – by the concern that a belief in non-material entities is the high road to irrationalism and conflict. For Hobbes, mistaken knowledge foundations were a source of mistaken political beliefs and were at the heart of the conflict he saw around him. Reducing claims about reality, including claims concerning individuals, to material terms – to 'matter in motion' or 'unencumbered selves' (Sandel, 1982) – was part of an attempt to liberate those selves from the violence which had come to attend a non-materialist, ontologically-driven politics. By rendering the soul either a material substance or a nonsensical conceit, for example, Hobbes sought to marginalize the political conflict which he saw as inevitable if action was guided by a concern with salvation and the criteria of salvation were purely a matter of personal conscience.

Only by limiting knowledge claims (as opposed to private belief or faith) to the material realm could a *public* arena of discussion concerning the truth be secured. But more importantly, only in this way could a degree of liberty and security from the 'enthusiasm' of others be achieved. Hobbes's limitation of the grounds of knowledge is spurred by, if not reducible to, a concern with religious toleration and a desire to remove the destructive conflict engendered by irresolvable questions of religious truth from the political realm.¹⁸ Moreover, a purely 'material' understanding of the self (and self-understanding) would make possible a new set of political practices based on the (now rationally, *not* naturally) universal fear of pain and death which provided a basis for a legitimate theory of sovereignty (the social contract) and obedience to the sovereign and the laws of nature.¹⁹ The transformation of theory was intimately linked to an attempt to transform practices.

Despite their differences, Locke's political project shares Hobbes's concern with transformative knowledge practices, and also reflects the context of conflicts in which governmental propagation of the 'good life' had degenerated into conflict as a result of conflicts over the definition of the 'good' itself. As such, it was also part of the broad movement that attempted to reformulate the ends of politics as a means of ending political conflict.²⁰ For Locke, the enthusiastic consciousness which knew that it held the truth on the strength of conviction (and conviction of its own virtue) was sure to generate conflict and intolerance. But despite his attempts to respond to this conflict through the construction of an empiricist theory of knowledge, Locke is no naive empiricist. His vision of knowledge acknowledges the problem of assent to knowledge claims, highlights the issue of judgement, and is inherently uncertain and probabilistic (Tully, 1993: 192–5). Locke was fully conscious of the impact of emotion and belief on the process of knowledge; indeed, as Tully brilliantly demonstrates, he gradually came to believe that purely rational accounts of (and grounds for) assent to knowledge claims

could not be sustained. Judgements of truth are obscured by prevailing opinion, ill-education or personal passions. There is no direct access to the truth, nor any straightforward means of judging alternative accounts (Tully, 1993: 199–201).

Yet the recognition of the shortcomings of a purely empiricist conception of knowledge led Locke and others neither to dogmatic reassertion of the need for such knowledge, nor to despair. Rather, in combination with a new ‘voluntarist’ theology it marked the emergence of a new ‘constructive scepticism’ (Rabb, 1975), which embraced the concept of probability and sought a practical response to both scepticism and enthusiasm. Locke’s empiricism, which devalued teleological or innatist theories of knowledge (that a person had an innate capacity or disposition to know what was true in face of competing opinions) and his commitment to voluntarism (that knowledge could only be probable, not certain, without limiting the creative power of God), meant that both traditional and enthusiastic claims to absolute knowledge were delegitimized and that a space was constructed in which individual conscience and inquiry could take place without devolving into either accusations of nihilism or claims of enthusiasm.

The acknowledgement that knowledge was always only probable meant that certainty was no longer the hallmark of truth, that scepticism no longer necessarily entailed nihilism, and that even the enthusiast had ‘to regulate his assent by these criteria and so relinquish his certainty and admit “reasonable doubt”’ (Tully, 1993: 196). Moreover, it became a basis for the construction of a new set of knowledgeable practices which acknowledged these foundations and yet attempted to *build upon* them, not toward certainty, but toward probable, practical and pragmatic uses.²¹ The destruction of certainty was not seen as ending the quest for knowledge or rendering it senseless; on the contrary, it opened up a basis upon which modern science and knowledge claims could be constructed (Hooykaas, 1972).

With the devaluation of certainty comes a focus on use and practice – on the construction of modes for judging knowledge claims (which understand themselves as constructions) and on a definition of science as a search for what is useful for (mediocre) human beings rather than an aspiration to (Divine) absolute knowledge. Empiricism thus emerges as a social practice conscious of its constructed nature and its limits; indeed its sense of limits is paradoxically one of its goals. A space for the individual pursuit of truth is only created by a limitation of truth – a transformation of the practices of knowledge provided the foundation for a practice of religious toleration and a political realm secured from theological strife and contestation.²²

Jettisoning straightforward visions of truth, and devaluing teleological or innatist claims that individuals (or certain individuals) have access to absolute truth, became a foundation for tolerance and the platform for an attack upon innatist (ontological) visions of social hierarch and authority. These sceptical and voluntarist notions became key planks in the liberal platform against innatist justifications of social identity, political privilege and in the articulation of a liberal vision of equality and political right. It constitutes, in short,

a *negative ontology*, a reduction of individuals to purely atomistic individuality in the name of opposing innatist ontologies of privilege and traditional authority, and becomes an essential argument opposing the absolutist state in the name of universal *citizenship* and legal equality. In liberalism, the role of the state is not to proclaim an identity, but to disregard particular identities in favour of abstract universality. But this universality emerges not from a lack of understanding of the importance of identity but from a conscious *exclusion* of its significance from the political realm in light of the conflict it was seen to entail.²³

A transformation of epistemic practice was seen as a means of transforming social and political and ethical practices. Materialism and empiricism were intrinsic elements in an assault upon various forms of innatism and essentialism; in fact, it is probably not too much to say that materialism and empiricism can be considered epistemic ethical practices, justified not only in terms of knowledge but also in terms of their practical contributions and consequences. Liberalism sought and represented a transformation of knowledgeable practices involving not simply a 'theoretical' innovation, or a naive vision of a natural evolution toward 'objective' knowledge, but was part and parcel of an attempt to construct a new set of political institutions and practices *within* the state, a set of practices which had the question of 'security' in the broadest sense at their heart. The new knowledgeable practices of liberalism sought to provide foundations within which *political* agreement could be obtained and social concord achieved. It sought, above all, to restore a foundation and provide stability to a culture wracked by political conflict and slaughter.

The liberal vision of citizenship, the conception of individual security and liberty, and the constitutive political categories of the public and private realms in liberalism are in significant ways constituted by an unwillingness to ask the question of identity. Historically speaking, this unwillingness was a *conscious choice*, reflecting a practical political stance, and emerging out of the historical context of the early modern era where a concern for the dangers and potential conflict which raising such issues had become paramount. For example, reducing political identity to abstract individuality got rid not only of ascriptive hierarchies of class (the most common liberal focus) but also ascriptive identities which were intrinsically implicated in the structure of violence. The liberal assault ranged from an attack on dogmatically theological politics to the militaristic ideologies and identities of the aristocracy. Just as conflicts within societies were to be avoided by this strategy, so were those between them. As Tully has noted, 'the practice of toleration was intended, *inter alia*, to undercut the religious motive for warfare', but the 'emptying' of the liberal self also allowed an attack upon a second cause of conflict, the 'Renaissance humanists' glorification of warfare and the identification of military achievements with heroic virtue' (1993: 239).²⁴ Stripping away this conception of an heroic identity was part of an assault on militaristic aristocratic identities. Moreover, since a person's identity no longer resided in their physical being (no longer literally *was* their being,

ontologically speaking), their simple physical existence was no longer by its very existence a threat.²⁵ Thus the individual body could be secured and conflicts of belief placed within the realm of personal conscience which became public in the non-physically violent realm of politics.

In these ways, political violence was to be removed from the private or personal realm, and the public or political realm was to be insulated from personal acts of violence.²⁶ The categorical structure of violence was also universalized – private physical violence, either wielded by one individual over another, by one class over another, or exercised by a class which defined itself in part by its right to exercise private violence – duelling, for example (Kiernan, 1988) – was delegitimized and its elimination from the public realm was undertaken. Citizens were to be formally equal, and violence became (in principle and, to significant if varying degrees, in practice) institutionalized, rule-bound and centralized. The shift to abstract visions of the person (separable in principle from their religious, ethnic or class ‘identities’ or ‘communities’), was a move toward pacification. The liberal focus on rules and rights as opposed to ‘the good’ and values emerge not primarily (if at all) from an uncritical certainty concerning the universality of individual ‘interests’ or a naive assumption of atomistic egoism.²⁷ On the contrary, the stress on rules and rights as opposed to substantive visions of justice and community reflects a deep and abiding *fear* of what happens when ethics of ‘absolute ends’ leave the realm of personal conscience and enter the field of politics and the contestation for state power.²⁸

Threats became threats to the rule-bound (and bounded) political structure, a structure articulated in terms of contractual sovereignty. ‘Domestic’ security threats came to be articulated in terms of a threat to the state, threats which were defined in terms of material actions. What citizens thought (their political beliefs) and what they said (in the realm of public political discourse) did not make them threats subject to violence either at the hands of the state or zealous patriots.²⁹ Defining threats in *material* terms (like all other phenomena) was held to allow a reasoned discourse surrounding them. To place the discourse of war and peace within the bounds of *physical* threat and the capacity for it was a *pacifying* move. It sought to remove a central source of social conflict and thus to secure individuals and the political order from civil violence arising from the ‘enthusiasm’ of different groups or individuals.

Similarly, in the international realm, other polities could *in principle* be threats – something more likely if they were not liberal³⁰ – but they were not *necessarily* so. Whether they were or not in this view became an empirical question – an issue of material military capabilities. The stress on instrumental reason and material capabilities (strategy, as it has come to be narrowly defined in modern terms) represented a new political practice. No other sovereignty was *in essence* or by its very (ontological) nature a threat or challenge (consider the difference between this and the logic of religious conflict in the Thirty Years War). Whether they were or not was held to be an empirical question susceptible to the newly defined form of reasoned discourse in a public realm and capable, in principle, of practical coordination between states.³¹

Transforming the relationship between knowledge, identity and practice in these terms was part of a broader transformation in the ordering of political practice throughout the early modern period. As Jens Bartelson (1995) has brilliantly shown, it was entwined in the operation of a new form of political 'technology' that he has usefully termed '*mathesis*', the transformation of social life into *objects* of knowledge, control and management. While the foundations of this transformation were extremely broad, on one source of its impetus – as Bartelson notes, and Toulmin stresses – was an attempt to manage the violence of identity-driven politics. Seen in these terms, the Classical *mathesis* of security politics – underlain intellectually by a commitment to materialism and empiricism exemplified in security politics by the 'balance of power' – represents not the triumph of an intellectualist movement called 'positivism', but a profound transformation in the political practices that played a central role in the constitution of modern states and societies.

Contemporary Security Studies: Some Implications

Treating contemporary debates in security studies against the background of the liberal sensibility provides a significantly different perspective on their structure and significance. Indeed, understanding this historical context as marking the emergence of a new set of *knowledgeable practices* tied directly to questions of the politics of security – as opposed to a set of scholarly practices centred around questions of abstract method – means that difficult questions regarding the relationship of the analysis of security and the politics of security must necessarily be confronted by those engaged in discussing the future agenda of security studies and its political consequences. To conclude, I would like briefly to sketch two of these implications for debates in security studies between neorealist and critical perspectives.

First, taking seriously the place of the liberal sensibility in the genealogy of security calls into question the basic (methodological) oppositions within which the debates between neorealist and critical theories of security have increasingly been conducted. A fundamental source of the materialist and empiricist predispositions of an objectivist stance toward security (of which neorealism is simply one expression) is to be found not in its methodological genealogy, but in its political one. The key issues lie not just in the impact of positivist method, but in the enduring influence of the liberal sensibility. 'Objectivity' in traditional security studies needs to be understood neither in the context of a naive epistemology (positivism), an unreflective ontology (materialism) or a set of unexamined political presuppositions (statecentrism). There is no doubt that such a vision of security has, all too frequently, been uncritically adopted on any or all of these bases. But seen in terms of its broader historical and political location – as an attempt to *construct* a realm of 'objectivity' for reasons directly related to questions of the politics of security – the desires for, and claims to, objectivity become considerably more substantial, complex and understandable.

Somewhat more narrowly, the opposition of neorealist theory to the constructivist claims of critical theories on the grounds that the latter fail to meet the unproblematic (abstract, ahistorical) criteria of 'objective' *methodological* rigour, cannot itself be understood and sustained as a debate over knowledge in itself. As I hope to have shown, claims to objective knowledge in the materialist and empiricist sense represented by neorealism mark not a set of theoretically secure tenets from which alternatives can be unproblematically judged, but a set of historical, social and political practices concerned with (among other things) the politics of security. Neorealism is not the heir to a neutral, non-political orientation toward the world, but the (frequently unconscious) result of an attempt to transform theory in order to transform practice. Assaults on critical theories as representing illegitimate attempts to introduce a 'political' agenda into security studies misconstrue the issue. The 'objective' understanding of security is political through and through, from its methodological precepts to its practical political orientations. The issues which this raises are certainly complex, but our understanding of them will only be furthered by attempting to deal with them in their complexity, not by retaining a set of rhetorical oppositions that obscure their serious discussion.

Seen from this perspective, the critique of neorealism must also deal with difficult questions well beyond those of method. At a deep level, often unacknowledged by both its proponents and its critics, neorealism does not lack a grasp of identity practices, it *is* an identity practice. And neorealism's metatheoretical stances do not reflect a simple disregard for the questions of the relationship between interpretation, identity and practice; on the contrary, they emerged as a conscious response *to* such questions. The question should not be limited to whether neorealism can '*have*' an identity agenda (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996: Ch. 6), or whether adopting such an agenda involves a fundamental challenge to neorealist theory. The apparent absence of identity concerns in neorealist theory again leads to a misleading formulation of this problem. Viewed in its relationship to the liberal sensibility, the heart of the neorealist case regarding the theorization of security emerges from the fact that it *is* an identity agenda.

The methodological stance of neorealism needs itself to be understood as the consequence of a transformation in political practices, not as an objective reflection upon those practices. Critical approaches to security must, therefore, engage with the complex questions raised by understanding objectivist theory as a practice, rather than seeing it as opposed to practice. Seen historically, the absence of identity in thinking about security can be seen not as an oversight or a blindness, but as a principle. It reflects not a denial of the realm of norms, ethics and values in security relations, but an attempt to deal with some of the difficult questions raised by these issues. The adequacy and implications of these attempts – and of the liberal sensibility as a whole – is in many ways at the heart of modern politics, and extends far beyond the relatively narrow purview of security studies.³² Whether in terms of debates over the ethical implications of new understandings of security – from the question of 'emancipation' to the issues raised by attempts to understand broader

realms of security, such as 'societal security'³³ – critical approaches push the field into areas from which it has long apparently been absent. Yet here, too, it is necessary to be conscious of the nature of the absence, of the connection between traditional conceptions of security and their treatment of the politics of identity, and to attend carefully to the difficult political issues which it may actually enfold.³⁴

The absence of identity in theories of security can be understood as a result of the clear realization that theories about the world, and about security, were integral elements in the political practices constituting that world. As the heated 'moral' debates which have sometimes surfaced around them clearly indicate,³⁵ these issues remain at the heart of contemporary debates over what is at stake in theorizing security. A true 'renaissance' of security studies should involve an increasingly serious engagement with such issues, not a casting of them back within well-worn (and, I hope I have shown, historically obtruse) shibboleths concerning the perils of relativism and irrationalism, or salvation through the subordination of politics to the authority of science (whether objectivist or constructivist). If nothing else, a greater engagement with the liberal sensibility should warn against the tendency to treat these questions as issues of method alone, to turn them into yet another set of aseptic debates about the nature of 'social science' in its narrowest terms. By taking more seriously the legacy of its past, security studies may be able to confront more cogently the challenges of the future.

Notes

For helpful comments on earlier formulations of this paper I would like to thank Barry Buzan, James Der Derian, Alexandra Gheciu, Lene Hansen, Martin Hewson, Jef Huysmans, Keith Krause, Ole Wæver, Jutta Weldes, Alexander Wendt as well as the reviewers of the EJIR. I would also like to thank the Copenhagen Research Project on European Integration for its support of aspects of this research. Earlier versions were presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the British International Studies Association, Durham, England, and at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada.

1. See also, for example, Mercer (1995), Neumann (1996), Weldes (1996), Wendt (1992). The idea of a 'return' of culture and identity may itself be seen as symptomatic of the American dominance of International Relations, since these concerns have long been present in other traditions of thought, most particularly in the English School.

2. As examples in a rapidly expanding literature, see Campbell (1992), Klein (1990, 1994), McSweeney (1996), Mearsheimer (1994/95, 1995), Wæver *et al.* (1993), Buzan and Wæver (1997), Wendt (1995), Katzenstein (1996). An attempt at an overview of some of the issues involved is Krause and Williams (1996).

3. Labels here are notoriously tricky, but in general terms I accept Alexander Wendt's (1995: 75) grouping of the diverse strands of 'critical' theorists on the grounds that they emphasize the 'constructed' nature of social reality.

4. For other explorations along these lines, see Devetak (1995); in security studies, see Der Derian (1995); Dillon (1995); Latham (1995, 1996). For a superb, overarching analysis, see Bartelson (1995), Chapter 5 especially.

5. My argument here has affinities to Daniel Deudney's (1995) analysis of republicanism as a negative practice of ordering which opposes both hierarchy and anarchy, embodying a

stance Deudney calls 'negarchy'. Just as International Relations theory has tended to overlook this *negative practice* in the ordering practices of republicanism, I argue it has overlooked it in identity as well.

6. Characterized by historians, in different ways, as the growth of 'discipline'. For alternative readings of this process, see Foucault (1979, 1980), Tully (1993) and Oestreich (1982). See also Shklar (1989).

7. Nor can I deal with questions surrounding the rise of nationalism which, while intimately connected to this background, comprise an issue beyond the scope of this treatment.

8. In this regard, the position exemplified by Richard Ashley's (1987) approach to realism is perhaps closest to my concerns. This theme is also consistently articulated in different forms by R.B.J. Walker (1993); for its application to the question of security, see Walker (1997).

9. On the work of Mearsheimer and Posen, see Lapid and Kratochwil (1996: 110-16); on that of Van Evera and Posen, see Krause and Williams (1996: 239-42).

10. See, for example, Cox (1976: 178-81), Hollis and Smith (1990: 12), Neufeld (1993), Sjolander and Cox (1994).

11. In a similar vein, Alexander Wendt considers materialism to be the 'essence' of realism (Wendt, 1994: 393). A similar point is made in Jepperson *et al.* (1996: 33, 38). This agreement should not be taken as constituting a consensus regarding alternative epistemological stances within critical theory. As Wendt notes (1995: 75), there are fundamental differences between modernist and postmodernist critical theorists in this regard and to conflate them obscures important issues.

12. Or, as Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) argued in regime theory, an empiricist epistemology stands in contradiction to an intersubjective norm-oriented ontology. See also the qualified, though generally approving, restatement of this theme in Price (1994).

13. For a recent exploration in International Relations, see Saurette (1996); more generally, see Rengger (1995) and Touraine (1995).

14. A powerful analysis of this shift has also been developed by Reinhart Koselleck (1988). However, since coming to terms with the broad claims underlying Koselleck's evaluation of this process would take this article even further afield, I will leave his analysis aside in this context.

15. For a fascinating treatment see Shapin (1995). Clearly, the materialist-empiricist synthesis was neither a simple, nor the only, avenue pursued. As Toulmin's emphasis on Descartes and Oestreich's (1982) analysis of the rise of neostoicism demonstrate, the search for solutions was wide ranging and often interrelated. My treatment here will also overlook significant counter-currents and inevitably involves a (sometimes high) degree of oversimplification and distortion. I hope, however, that a clarification of the general thrust of liberal modernity in the field of security studies justifies such distortions and omissions.

16. As Tully has noted, 'enthusiasm', the assertion of the absolute authority of the individual conscience (characteristic, for example, of radical Protestantism) was 'used in a pejorative sense, and a massive attack was waged on all its forms, especially after 1660' (1993: 187).

17. In what follows, I shall rely heavily on Tully's superb analysis, but see also Baker (1952) and Rabb (1975). On Locke, see also Dunn (1969, 1990, Chapters 2 and 3 especially), and Ashcraft (1985).

18. The role of the 'independency crisis' concerning the relations between church and state in Hobbes's thought has been highlighted by Tuck (1989). See also Johnston (1986).

19. For a reading of Hobbes's view of International Relations which stresses some of these aspects, see Williams (1996).

20. As Tully succinctly puts it, 'the answer, from Lipsius to Locke, was that the objective of government is preservation of life, not religion' (1993: 182).

21. Tully stresses the way in which the development of new visions of scientific knowledge based upon 'evidence', 'proof', 'probability' and 'testimony' was not *sui generis* but actually drew upon developed *judicial* procedures that 'were gradually constructed in the context of the spread of the inquisitorial methods of justice throughout Europe from the condemnation of the trial by battle of 1215 to the great codification in the French ordinance of 1670' (1993: 197). Shapin (1995) stresses the way these new knowledge practices were bound up with and drew upon existing social conventions, particularly 'gentility' and 'civility'.

22. For a fuller analysis of the important transformations of practice at the heart of this project, which I cannot enter into more fully here, see Tully (1993: *passim*).

23. Perhaps most significantly, new understandings of 'property' and the market, and their role in the construction of new political relations, were advanced. As numerous studies on the emergence of 'possessive individualism' in the 17th and 18th centuries have argued, the centrality of 'property' had less to do with the ideological justification of an emerging market society than with an attempt to discern and construct principles of political order and obligation, rights and practices, in response to turmoil and change. Property, as a 'juridical concept of self-ownership' was 'moral, political and military, not economic. It is not concerned with the alienation of labour power but with political power (the power of self-defence). The individual as well as the state are concerned with preservation not consumption' (Tully, 1993: 82). On this theme see also Pocock (1985: chapters 3, 6 and 11 especially) and Hirschman (1977).

24. For an interesting account of the confrontation between liberalism and 'romantic militarism', see Rosenblum (1987: Chapter 1).

25. For example, the passage of the Toleration Act in 1689 – in the wake of theological conflict – meant that, as Barlow (1962: 24) notes, 'Henceforth, a man might be a citizen of England without being a member of the English Church'.

26. As Carole Pateman (1988), among others, has shown, early liberalism's attitude toward women in these arrangements raises serious challenges to its adequacy as a whole (see also Benhabib, 1992). Again, however, this is an issue I cannot pursue in this context.

27. Contrast to George (1995).

28. Here lies one of the forms of historical mediation whereby the concerns of the liberal tradition feed into the development of neoliberalism. Two crucial figures in this regard are Max Weber and Carl Schmitt. For an important reading of Weber in terms of liberalism, see Bellamy (1992: Chapter 4, especially).

29. Here, of course, there is an abiding conflict in liberalism over whether ideas or specific actions constitute a threat, a problem related to the familiar dilemmas of determining intentions from capabilities that is so familiar in discussions of IR. While I will return briefly to this theme in the conclusion, it is again my goal here to explicate these liberal foundations rather than subject them to sustained critical evaluation.

30. And less, if they were not, reflecting in no small part the shared *epistemic* and *ontological* principles of liberal states. Here is an opening for further research into the democratic peace.

31. Or, to put it another way, it involved a fundamental restructuring of the politics of security. While a critical analysis of this development is not my intention here, it is important to note how a grasp of these foundations is central to such an appraisal. Abstract citizenship, hedonistic calculation, probabilistic reasoning, were all part of the rationalization of violence characteristic of the modern state and the way in which violence becomes deployed in transformed and potentially catastrophic ways. For a variety of perspectives, see Baumann (1989), Pick (1993).

32. For only a few different perspectives, see Koselleck (1988), Holmes (1993) and Dingeser (1995).

33. On security and emancipation see, for example, Booth (1991), and his recent exchange with Wallace (1996), Booth (1997). On the debates over the moral and practical implications of the concept of 'societal security': McSweeney (1996) and the 'Copenhagen School' represented by Buzan and Weaver (1997). See also Huysmans (1995).

34. Speculations, for example, about an emerging clash of civilizations as the future of international politics being only the most drastic of these potential implications.

35. See, for example, the exchange on moral responsibility between Alexander Wendt (1995) and John Mearsheimer (1995: 92).

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Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe

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- Egbert Jahn, Pierre Lemaitre and Ole Wæver, *Copenhagen Papers 1. European Security – Problems of Research on Non-military Aspects*. (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1987.)
- Ole Wæver, Pierre Lemaitre and Elzbieta Tromer, eds, *European Polyphony: Perspectives beyond East–West Confrontation*. (London: Macmillan, 1989.)
- Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer and Ole Wæver, *The European Security Order Recast. Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era*. (London: Pinter, 1990.)
- Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*. (London: Pinter, 1993.)
- Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998.)

In 1985 a Centre for Peace and Conflict Research was established in Copenhagen – now Conflict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI). One of its research projects developed under the title ‘Non-military Aspects of European Security’. Notwithstanding a coming and going of researchers in the past 13 years, the project has succeeded in establishing a rich body of work with a sufficient degree of coherence and continuity to warrant the label ‘School’ (McSweeney, 1996) or ‘coterie’ (Neumann, 1996). To build that level of coherence, Copenhagen relied on a minimal continuity of people involved, especially for the conceptual dimension of the project. Ole Wæver has participated since the very beginning, and Barry Buzan has been project director since 1988. The first book which bears the latter’s mark as director is *European Security Order Recast*. But even before he was Director, his work on security

had a significant impact on the Copenhagen project. The many references to his work in the 1987 working paper indicate this. The Copenhagen group also explicitly developed its successive pieces of research through a critical engagement with the previous work of the group. It also explains why the project retains an image of continuity despite some radical changes.

The five publications under review define a specific research agenda in security studies. They constitute possibly the most thorough and continuous exploration of the significance and the implications of a widening security agenda for security studies. In its travelogue, the Copenhagen School has also set to work innovative concepts and insights such as 'securitization', 'societal security' and 'regional security complex' with the aim of grasping a European security problematic in flux. Moreover, without wanting to introduce a radical split between European and other, especially American, security studies the Copenhagen project has emerged within a typically European security landscape which has given its work an explicitly European flavour.

This review essay is based on the assumption that all five texts are crucial for understanding the Copenhagen School. I will also treat the project as a collective enterprise, which implies that I will not single out any particular member of the group. In that sense, this review differs from Bill McSweeney's in the *Review of International Studies*, which concentrated on one text – *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* – and singled out one particular person – Barry Buzan.

The review takes off with a brief reflection on how to interpret an author's or a school's oeuvre, in the process clarifying what it means to approach the work of the Copenhagen group as a *creative development*. After this I will look more closely at how the group has ploughed its furrows in security studies, including a reflection on the School's European nature. The bulk of the essay consists of a review of how the group developed some of its key ideas along three thematic axes – security sectors, the meaning of security and regional security dynamics. It concludes with a proposal of how their understanding of security could be extended further and make it more sensitive to its cultural and historical situatedness.

The Creative Development of a School

'Books about thinkers require a kind of unity that their thought may not possess' (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 1). This is the opening line of an impressive book by Garry Morson and Caryl Emerson on Mikhail Bakhtin's work. Although this review article focuses on a School instead of on an individual scholar, the general problem is the same. Reviewing a body of work requires that one looks for that which unifies it as a School; but by concentrating on the identity of the School one runs the risk of overlooking the *creative development* of its ideas. A School develops through an intensive discussion with previous work and challengers against a background of societal developments. This allows their ideas to grow and to change. To give room to this aspect of

creativity in the review of a School, I will follow a somewhat watered-down version of Morson and Emerson's approach, based on Bakhtin's understanding of the process of writing – and life itself – as one of *real becoming*. Interpreting a School in this way focuses on key ideas of the School but allows for shifting and shuffling in the way they are developed. Approaching a body of work in terms of its *creative development* differs from a structuralist interpretation, for example, which would represent a School as a series of variations on a theme which are surface transformations of an unchanging deep structure. It also differs from understanding a work as a continuous variation of an initial idea which is present at the beginning of a career and which unfolds rather than develops in the School's 'life'. This embryonic model has also a teleological variant, which interprets a work as a process leading to a final outcome which functions as a resting point that is authoritative for understanding everything coming before. Unlike these approaches, interpreting a work in terms of its *real becoming* should open the construction of a School for a *real* creativity, for intensive shifting and shuffling in its process of formulating ideas, thus managing the tension between a request of unity and a request of creativity in the review (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 4–10).¹

This approach implies a sympathetic interpretation of a work, at least in the first instance. The interpreter stresses how the School has struggled with problems, has changed and reformulated ideas, has introduced new themes in an attempt to explain concepts, to clarify social developments, etc. In that sense, it differs from a more antithetical interpretation. In its most radical form the antithetical approach is not concerned with developments in and of the School but freezes the School's work into an 'image' which is directly opposite to the one the reviewer wants to promote. One could argue that postmodern authors in IR have constructed neorealism in that way and vice versa, or that supporters of Realism freeze an Idealist School in order to posit their own view. It is primarily concerned with formulating ideas which are located outside the body of work under review, using a representation of the latter to strengthen the power of one's own interpretation. In my view, McSweeney's review of the Copenhagen School comes close to this model (McSweeney, 1996). A sympathetic interpretation does not prevent criticism but it requires that the critical remarks 'emerge' primarily from within the process of the School's *real becoming*. Within this process one can detect weaknesses and shortcomings; but not all tensions or even contradictions are necessarily weaknesses since they may very well be key issues which the School has tried to grasp and develop.

Copenhagen – A European Security Studies Agenda?

It is always an artificial enterprise to reduce an activity to a few furrows ploughed in a particular landscape. Nevertheless I think we can grasp some of the elements unifying the Copenhagen School and still be open to its *creative development* by having a closer look at where and how it has ploughed its

main interventions. A quick glance at the titles of the books under review is sufficient to see that they plough in the landscape of security studies. How has the School developed its security studies agenda in this landscape? Where do its contributions to security studies lie?

A good entrance point is a question the Copenhagen group has struggled with since its initiation in 1985 – how to move security studies beyond a narrow agenda which focuses on military relations between states while avoiding ending up with an all-embracing, inflated concept dealing with all kinds of threats to the existence, well-being or development of individuals, social groups, nations and mankind? A double motivation drives their interest in widening the security studies agenda. First, since the mid-1980s security agendas in Europe have increasingly shown a tendency to expand security questions beyond the more narrow military issues. This sparked an interest in developing conceptual tools in order to interpret this political widening of the security debate (Jahn *et al.*, 1987: 1, 5; Wæver *et al.*, 1993: ix). However, the Copenhagen group has not been motivated by this empirically driven interest alone. They also have a more scholarly interest in formulating an original contribution to the theoretical debates in security studies. What does this theoretical contribution consist of? What is typical about how they intervene in the more conceptual discussion on security?

It is not easy to pin this down on a page or two. The widening problem itself is not specifically their question, although they have produced what is probably *the* most systematic and continuous exploration of its implications for security studies and policies. Also, the key concepts which characterize the Copenhagen approach are not primarily developed within the School. While the constructivist approach to security or the idea of security sectors and security complex have been developed by members of the School, they have done so in their individual work rather than in the collective projects (Buzan, 1983; Wæver, 1989). In that sense, one could argue that these concepts are brought into the collective dynamic of the School from the outside. The original aspect of the group consists in the way they have developed these concepts and set them to work in an empirical and/or theoretical context. One of the additional characteristics is that the concepts have been subjected to a collective dynamic. The group has brought people together who in their individual work develop rather different interpretations of international relations. Thus, for example, in this group Buzan's more or less neo-realist oriented approach encounters Wæver's social constructivist perspective, which is primarily informed by poststructuralism and classical realism. As a result, the concepts introduced by the authors have evolved dynamically. For example, the security sector concept has certainly changed – and in my opinion been strengthened – in the Copenhagen environment. The discussion on the societal security concept below will illustrate this.

Another characteristic is that the Copenhagen School is a European school of security studies. What does this mean? One way of arguing for its European nature would be to say that the Copenhagen group consists of Europeans. However, this would be a rather banal statement and would be completely

irrelevant if their discourse is not different from what others – especially security studies developed in the US – have produced. Another way of defining it would be to establish a difference on the basis of the general concepts the project builds on, such as security sector, security complex, securitization. Although one could establish a difference with other research agendas in security studies on this basis, I doubt if it would make sense to refer to it as a European difference. For example, the School's latest book articulates a social constructivist security discourse which differs considerably from the social constructivism developed in Katzenstein's volume *The Culture of National Security* (1996); nevertheless, there is no reason in terms of the general concepts upon which the discourse rests why one would characterize their constructivism as particularly European. Or, should we call it European simply because the group has developed its social constructivism in Copenhagen? That would again be rather banal. If we want to establish the difference as European we have to argue how this social constructivism articulates an inherently European substance and/or form. If 'European' is to connote a relevant difference it has to refer to differences in the content or form of the discourse.

One such difference is that the School's work seems to be fundamentally anchored in European security dynamics. With the exception of the latest book, its texts articulate an internal relation between the empirical developments in the European security problematic and its conceptual work – which consists of elaborating categories developed from a more universal position. What I mean here is that the School theorizes from specific European security experiences and/or questions. For example, the 1989 book studies security concepts and interests in Eastern and Western European states. It recognizes that the security dynamic is not just driven by the two superpowers but has also a more internal European character. The approach partly reflects how the European peace movement and the German Ostpolitik approached the East–West divide. Another example is the societal security concept. It relates to European security experiences in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, especially the intensifying politicization of migration from a security perspective, and the negative reaction to the European integration process in some countries after the Maastricht Treaty. When Ole Wæver presented the concept at the first conference of the ECPR Standing Group on International Relations in Heidelberg (1992), he explained that he had experienced difficulties getting the message across in the US. It was apparently not always simple to argue the relevance of the ethnic-cultural identity theme which is central to the concept and which builds upon a European historical-cultural understanding of the nation. (I will return to the significance of this European empirical basis in more detail in the following sections.)

One could object to this view that European security questions have always figured high on the security studies agenda. That, however, is not the issue. The question is how one integrates European security experiences in the research agenda and how this may constitute a bias. While US security studies link their analysis back to US foreign and national security policy, the

Copenhagen School is primarily interested in European security for the sake of European security. The policy relevance of the studies is not defined from an American perspective, and this changes how the security questions are raised; it changes how the European security dynamic enters into the picture. It explains, for example, why societal security questions play such a prominent role in the Copenhagen security agenda. Moreover, by emphasizing how developments in international politics have an impact on European security dynamics, the Copenhagen group stresses a collective security problematic instead of a national security one. Rather than concentrating on the protection of a particular state, they are concerned with the possibility of creating peaceful relations between the states and peoples of Europe.

Another interesting issue here is how the research agenda integrates empirical findings and the theoretical issues. For example, when reading articles in *International Security*, which have an explicit theoretical focus, the empirical material and the theoretical issues are presented as belonging to separate realms. The empirical material (the discourse on social, political and economic developments) seems either to illustrate the theoretical statements or to corroborate or falsify them. Theory and fact are kept separate. The theory develops in a discussion with other theories which results in hypotheses about the real world. These hypotheses are then tested by comparing them to empirical findings. The political security dynamic informs the theory when the research question is formulated and after the theoretical framework has been developed, that is when the truth-value of the deduced statements is tested. In the texts of the Copenhagen School the empirical developments do not seem to be separated this radically from the theoretical enterprise. Rather, they articulate a mix in which political developments 'speak' to the theoretical concepts and vice versa. The facts do not corroborate or falsify; they are not externally but internally related to the theoretical enterprise.²

This line of argument raises some interesting questions. Does this more hermeneutic approach of theory/fact interaction make it possible to escape theories which have been obviously constructed from American experiences? If one develops statements within a particular theoretical corpus which is indebted to a particular position, and the political dynamic enters the picture only to corroborate or falsify the hypotheses, does this imply that the political perspective remains unquestioned? Thus, to what extent does the deductive, hypothesis-testing approach protect the security studies agenda from the effects of non-American security experiences? Does a more interpretative approach, in which experience-near concepts and experience-distant concepts³ continuously inform one another (as in the hermeneutic circle) make it possible to use theoretical concepts of the American agenda but make them vulnerable to changes of meaning by putting them in an imaginary dialogue with a non-American political and social context?

A second dimension which gives the Copenhagen project a European flavour is its linkage to European peace research. The Copenhagen School has straddled the boundary between peace research and security studies. Although one could argue that the peace research perspective has been moved

to the background since 1990, it is worth emphasizing that the Copenhagen project has articulated some interesting aspects of the relation between peace research and security studies. In 1989 the Copenhagen group definitely referred to themselves as peace researchers (Wæver *et al.*, 1989: 2), while the working paper of 1987 comprises a most interesting section on the relationship between the concepts of peace and security (Jahn *et al.*, 1987: 39ff.). With the 1990 book the focus seemed to have turned more exclusively to a security approach. This may partly explain, for example, why social movements and the grass roots have been given less attention after 1989.⁴ But even after they opted to make security their focal point rather than to keep the tension between 'peace' and 'security' open, the linkage to peace research has not fully disappeared. Concepts like non-violent conflict culture and the continuing concern with the conservatism of mainstream security agendas, for example, refer back to its peace research roots. Although I cannot here go into the influence that peace research has had on the development of European perspectives in IR (especially in Germany and Scandinavia), it is a question which deserves to be looked at in greater detail if one wants to pursue the idea of a European International Relations perspective. For example, international regime theory in Germany emerged explicitly within a peace research and conflict analysis agenda, while the American approach has largely developed in the context of international political economy (e.g. Kohler-Koch, 1989).

So far, I have indicated two general characteristics of the School's work. However, this does not tell us very much about the specific ideas it has developed. What is the substance of this European security agenda which has emerged through a collective dynamic? The rest of the article will show how the Copenhagen School creatively developed its agenda. As a way of organizing it, I have constructed three thematic axes along which a big proportion of the group's work has developed:

- the understanding of security sectors;
- the interpretation of the meaning of security;
- the conceptualization of regional security dynamics.

The axes as such are not characteristic only of the Copenhagen texts. Researchers outside the Copenhagen group also focus on these themes; and, as already indicated, often key concepts such as security sector or securitization have been brought in from outside the group.

The fact that I have selected three thematic axes does not imply that one could not organize the Copenhagen School slightly differently. For example, one could easily introduce a fourth axis which concentrates on how the relationship between politics and security has been interpreted, or one could amalgamate the first and second axes. I have no special preference for the number 'three', but given the space available these three thematic axes seemed to offer a convenient way of presenting some of the main traces the Copenhagen School has left in the field of security studies.

Multiple Security Sectors

In the first working paper, *European Security – Problems of Research on Non-military Aspects*, Jahn *et al.* formulate the framework of the Copenhagen research project on ‘Non-military aspects of European security’. They position it in a field which is torn apart by the opposition between a mainstream and an alternative interpretation of security, which clearly has its roots in peace research. For the mainstream, security relates to the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of violence by armed forces in the domestic and international environment of the state. Security refers primarily to military aspects of security and to questions of law and order. As a consequence, security policy consists of the use of armed forces – the military and the police – to free the state and its citizens from threats. To define a wider and more general concept of security challenges the specific focus of this mainstream conception. Introducing non-military threats and questioning the state-centric focus by defining the well-being and development of a wide variety of units (individuals, social groups, states, mankind, etc.) as possible endangered referent objects, opens the security studies agenda to a variety of questions that do not emerge in the mainstream approach. Instead of being a policy of protection of the state against (possible) enemies, security policy addresses the general question of the protection of individuals and of progressively securing a better social order in Europe (1987: 11–12).⁵ For the alternative approach, security policy thus refers to a general question of social order rather than to a specific question of national security.

Jahn *et al.* were not convinced about the value of the alternative approach, which interprets virtually all aspects of human life from a security perspective and which equalizes security largely with the general question of social order; but neither did they want to stick to the narrow military concept. The niche in which they define their project thus consists of the need to define a wider security concept but without expanding the research focus to the general question of social order; or in other words, widening security studies while retaining a specific meaning of security which distinguishes security policy from non-security policies.

One of the key questions for such a project is, of course, how to counter the conceptual pressure for an ever widening security concept once one has introduced non-military aspects. Instead of abstractly speculating about which threats could possibly constitute a European security problem, the Copenhagen project limited the range of threats and units to those articulated in an ongoing political debate about European security in a particular historical context:

For analytical and for practical peace-political purposes, it is useful to concentrate attention on those specific and rather clearly discernible threats and problems that have provoked a political and scientific debate on European security in a specific historical situation, as opposed to other ongoing debates and thoughts about security. (1987: 12)

The School thus makes the questions explicitly dependent on current security debates in European politics, thereby embedding its project firmly in the empirical world. In part, this could explain why the Copenhagen project has been very sensitive to changing security agendas in Europe. The book on societal security (1993), for example, is a clear effort to integrate a key change of security policies in post-Cold War Europe into a general framework which looks at the relation between societal and state dynamics of security. The School has thus mainly employed an empirical strategy to limit the risk of fragmentation of security studies resulting from a widening security concept. As will be shown in the next section, it is only in the new book (1998) that they explicitly propose a conceptual solution to this problem.

Another key question for a research project looking at non-military aspects of security is how to define the distinction between military and non-military aspects of security. At first sight, Jahn *et al.* seem to use the dichotomy simply to categorize different kinds of factors affecting security (or, different causes of war); but the way they develop the distinction (pp. 17ff.) suggests that more is at stake. They also construct a hierarchy by arguing that the political aspects of security are the most important ones. They assume that all factors, including military ones such as developments in arms technology, have to be transformed into a political question in order to have an impact on security. While technological and military developments are important, they do not determine the likelihood of war. It is the way in which they are politicized which is crucial. Hence, the political aspect does not just refer to a causal factor located in a specific functional sector of society similar to the military, the social or the economic sector, but it also concerns a process to which all factors have to be subjected, independent of the functional sector in which they are embedded. The political dimension of security is about defining the relevance of particular factors or developments for European security (e.g. 1987: 18).⁶

The political aspects thus have a somewhat ambiguous status in the Copenhagen project – on the one hand they refer to a specific kind of factor affecting security, but – on the other hand they also refer to the process of definition of security questions, both military and non-military. This implicit ambiguity in their early work also suggests that the discussion about the widening of the security studies agenda involves – or at least could involve – more than just a question of adding factors to the military one. It also poses an important question about how to conceptualize the relation between the different categories of factors – that is, in the language used later, between the different sectors of security. This question, together with the issue of the double status of the political, has had to wait ten years – that is until the publication of *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* – to receive a more systematic reflection in the Copenhagen group, and more surprisingly, in the literature on widening security in general.

In *The European Security Order Recast*, the group refines the dichotomy of military/non-military aspects of security. Buzan's concept (1983, 1991) of security sectors is introduced to articulate that 'the security of human

collectivities is affected by factors in five sectors' (Buzan *et al.*, 1990: 4) – the military, the economic, the political, the societal and the environmental. It refines the previous understanding of non-military aspects by identifying four kinds of non-military factors which influence security; but, by reducing the political aspect to one of the five sectors, it also takes away some of the interesting fragrance which surrounded the political dimension in the previous work. Essentially these five sectors function as analytical categories supporting the research of non-military aspects and thus help to set military factors in the broader European security context (1990: 4–5).⁷

In the next book, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, the group moves beyond treating 'sectors' merely as tools to categorize different factors affecting European security. At first sight, it may look as if this book just singles out one specific sector – societal security – in order to study it more thoroughly. But such a reading misses the key point. In this book, the Copenhagen Group does not just refine the non-military aspects by spelling out one non-military sector in greater detail; it also considerably qualifies the meaning of the sector concept itself. It transforms it from an organizational device which classifies factors of security into an interpretation of a transformation of the security dynamic in post-Cold War Europe (e.g. 1993: 20–1). In *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, the concept of societal security does not identify a sector which is defined by specific kinds of threats and vulnerabilities; rather, it interprets a specific interplay between these threats and vulnerabilities, on the one hand, and the constitution of society and cultural identity as a referent object (that which is threatened), on the other hand (1993: 23). As a consequence, the problem of the relationship between (the dynamics of) state and (civil) society also appears in the heart of the security studies agenda, which to a certain extent links the Copenhagen School back to peace research, which has always been more sensitive to state–society relations than have strategic and security studies.

While changing the sector concept into a more embracing concept which identifies a distinct security dynamic has made *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* a really innovative book in security studies (which is increasingly recognized),⁸ this is also the source of one of the main critiques of the Copenhagen School. Although the book introduces the question of how threat definitions have an impact on the identification or constitution of society, it to a considerable extent freezes the dynamic of identification itself by positing an objectified, deeply sedimented understanding of the identity of society in Europe, namely society as the nation thereby bracketing the process of political and societal identification itself as it emerges within security practices.⁹

In *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998), the five sectors appear again. As in *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, a sector refers to a specific security dynamic rather than to a collection of particular kinds of threats. The School further refines its interpretation of the dynamic by adding two conceptual elements. A sectoral security dynamic does not involve only a referent object which is threatened and specific kinds of threats and vulnerabilities. It also consists of (a) securitizing

agents (e.g. governments) which act in the name of the referent object (e.g. the state) and define the security problem; and (b) functional agents who affect the security dynamic in a sector but without defining the security problem (e.g. firms polluting rivers in the environmental sector) (1998: 35ff).

But despite defining sectors as specific security dynamics, in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* the sectors nevertheless function largely as an organizational tool (e.g. 1998: 168). While the societal security concept interpreted or theorized a specific transformation of the security dynamics in Europe, in the new book the sectors are universally applied to classify a possible diversity of security problems. Rather than being integrated into an effort of explaining specific security dynamics, the concepts seem to be imposed upon (regional) social practices. Previous work of the Copenhagen group always 'grounded' its conceptual innovations in interpretations of specific developments of the European security dynamic. The new book largely lacks this characteristic and concentrates on spelling out a conceptual framework for security analysis which is then used as a universal tool to categorize different security dynamics in different regions.

This more exclusively conceptual orientation certainly dilutes the interesting flavour of the work of the Copenhagen School. But, on the other hand, one has to recognize that it also allows them to spell out some analytical issues more sharply. For the sector concept, the central question of the book is how to re-connect sectoral dynamics. In reality a security problematic is not necessarily sector bound. Most often it will involve dynamics criss-crossing different sectors. In such cases the problem is how to re-integrate sectoral analyses into a more holistic understanding of security (1998: 167ff., 189ff). According to the Copenhagen group, the relevance of this question depends on the purpose of the analysis. It is only a major issue if one is interested in understanding contemporary security *constellations*. The sectoral dynamics are then synthesized by looking at the interrelated practices of the units (1998: 189ff.). This of course raises the question of how to identify the relevant units. For the Copenhagen group this is a complex question because they can no longer assume that one specific unit, e.g. the state, is the key player and referent point in all security constellations. In the 1998 book they argue strongly that different kinds of units can play a role in security dynamics, sometimes depending on the sector in which the dynamic develops. In the end, it once again becomes an empirical question. Here they differ from a more normative orientation in security studies, which stresses that the choice of the units of security in security analysis – the answer to the question 'whose security?' – has ethico-political implications and is therefore never merely an empirical issue (e.g. Booth, 1991a, 1991b; Dalby, 1992, 1997; McSweney, 1996; Walker, 1990).

The Meaning of Security

The question 'what is security?' is closely related to a widening of the security studies agenda. Once scholars let go of the idea that security is about

specific referent objects (such as states) and/or about a specific kind of threat (such as military), the question of what makes a problem a *security* problem moves to centre stage. If everything can in principle become an item on a security agenda, defining what determines the difference between a security question and a non-security question becomes controversial. If this difference cannot be established, security will be a trivial concept; it will be everywhere. It is in the 1998 book that this question is most pressing for the Copenhagen group, because they conceptually widen the agenda radically without embedding it in a specific empirical security dynamic. But the question regarding the meaning of security – about what is specific about security problems – also featured strongly in the Working Paper of 1987.

For Jahn et al. security questions refer to threats which challenge the capacity of the political actor to control developments:

The concept of security is linked to essential threats which alter the premises for all other questions. Security problems have to do with forced developments which exceed the capacity for self-rule or at least self-management of problems. (1987: 9)

In that sense, security problems pose an extreme challenge to political actors. If actors do not successfully neutralize these threats, they lose their political character, that is their capacity to rule (see also 1989: 300). Consequently, security problems have priority over other questions and will enter the political sphere as extremely urgent issues.

In the Working Paper, a threat involves two dimensions – as subjective and objective (1987: 14–15). Following Wolfers's (1962: 150) distinction between threats to acquired values and fears that such values will be attacked, Jahn et al. distinguish between a real threat and a perceived threat. Since they assume that security is primarily a political issue (see the previous section), the second dimension is the most important one. To be relevant a threat has to enter the political scene. In the objective/subjective scheme this implies that a threat has to be perceived. It can be perceived wrongly but it has to be defined by actors to be of relevance to the political debate. 'Political behaviour is determined first of all by the perception or non-perception of threats and not by real threats as long as they do not materialise in actual aggression' (1987: 34). The 1989 book is probably the most explicit recognition of this approach. It analyses how different political actors in Europe define security problems. Similarly, the more structurally oriented books of 1990 and 1993 also develop their arguments largely within a framework based on Wolfers's distinction between objective and subjective security.

In *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, the Copenhagen group breaks with this interpretation of security. That does not mean that every aspect of the 1987 approach has been scuttled; however, rather than defining security in terms of threat perception, it is now conceived of as a rhetorical structure.

Following Wæver's securitization approach (1995), security changes from a perception into a speech act. Security is no longer a perception referring to something real which exists independently of this perception. As in the case of promising or baptizing, calling something 'security' makes it into a security problem (1998: 26). When successfully performed, it changes the situation; it transforms an issue from, e.g. being an economic question, into being a security problem. In this view, security becomes a self-referential practice (1998: 26). In distinction to a threat perception, which is a perception of something externally given, a speech act only refers to itself, that is, the very act of uttering 'security' – a threat is only a threat because of a threat being evoked by saying 'I threaten...' or 'I am threatened...'

Obviously, it is not just the uttering of 'threat' or 'security' as such which is involved. The use of the term introduces a particular (rhetorical) structure – a logic or a grammar – which organizes dispositions, texts, social relations, etc. in terms of security (1998: 55). It is this aspect which is hinted at in the conceptual chapter of the 1993 book:

Whenever security is defined via individual security there is a high risk that the core of the classical security problematique which one is allegedly trying to redefine, not forget, will be missed. A new agenda may be set successfully only at the price of losing one's grip on something which is also very real: the specific type of *interplay* among human collectivities which follows *the logic of security*. (1993: 24; emphasis added)

But this element is not really developed further in the 1993 book. Although the book comes close to a more social constructivist interpretation of security, it remains very much embedded in a project which stresses security perceptions and structural dynamics. It is as if the Copenhagen group at that point could not make up its mind about how far it should go in a social constructivist direction.

Interestingly, it is actually the 1987 working paper which most extensively formulates the security logic which characterizes the rhetorical structure. The key dimension of the security logic is defined in the passage quoted earlier, in which they emphasize that security is about threats that exceed the capacity of control by the actors (1987: 9–10).¹⁰ The 1998 book to a large extent repeats this while systematizing it in the form of a rhetorical structure constituting the speech act of security consisting of three key components – 'existential threats, emergency action, and effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules' (1998: 26).

The construction of a security problem by means of the speech act of security – i.e. securitization – is not in the hands of an individual actor. Neither is the logic of security a cognitive structure located in the individual actor's mind. If this would be the case, the speech act would not differ much from a subjective interpretation of security. Perception could be easily exchanged for speech or speech could be added to perception as another variable, and

that would be it. Wolfers's dichotomy objective/subjective would remain largely intact. The key element which constitutes the break with the previous work is the intersubjective character of securitization – 'security (as all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects, but *among* the subjects' (1998: 31). Both the successful performance of the speech act and the logic of security are ultimately internal to the interplay of social practices.

Thus, in the 1998 book the Copenhagen School goes social constructivist – 'security ultimately is a specific form of social praxis'; (1998: 204). But, as they state themselves, their constructivism is not uniformly distributed. While their understanding of security is radically constructivist – there is no reference made to real existential threats existing independently of the definitional practices – their interpretation of social relations in general is not (1998: 203ff.). Once an ontological constructivism has been accepted which assumes that social relations are not a product of nature but of human action and therefore potentially always open to change, one can argue that not all social practices are equally malleable. Some practices are deeply sedimented and therefore not really a matter of choice (1998: 204–5). One could amend the realist understanding of anarchy in that way and still pursue a largely realist analysis – anarchy is then not an ahistorical structure but an historically sedimented deep structure. This interpretation of social constructivism allows one to keep particular identities (societies, states) and structures (anarchy, international society) fixed while one concentrates on analysing how particular agents representing these identities in these structures manipulate definitions of security as a political tactic or strategy to reach particular goals.

Although one might justify this approach as a methodological choice, there is something odd about it. In particular, the suggestion that one is radical constructivist in one sense and only basically constructivist in another sense, indicates ontological gerrymandering – a concept coined by Woolgar and Pawluch (1985):¹¹

... this sort of analysis depends upon the 'objective' statement about the constancy of the condition under consideration in order to justify claims about the shifting definitional process. ... [T]his selective 'objectivism' represents a theoretical inconsistency in the definitional approach since it manipulates an analytic boundary to make certain phenomena problematic while leaving others unquestioned. (Miller and Holstein [1993: 6] referring to Woolgar and Pawluch)

Even if one accepts that some form of ontological gerrymandering may be inherent in any social constructivist project, this does not mean that the particular gerrymandering one develops is without implications. For example, in the Copenhagen School's project the dualistic constructivism leads to a downplaying of the internal relationship between a process of securitization and a process of identification of both agents (the self-understanding of state or society) and system (the specific organization of the relationship

between these agents).¹² Securitizing migration or Europeanization simultaneously constructs the identity of the referent object (society, nation) and the agents speaking for that object (governments, bureaucrats, social movements, etc.).

Introducing this mutually constitutive dynamic between identity and security into the Copenhagen project could lead to interesting analyses of contemporary European security dynamics, especially in the realm of societal security, but also in the more traditional field of military interstate security. It could also more explicitly introduce normative questions concerning the constructions the Copenhagen School's own writing involves. As argued elsewhere, bracketing the power of identification of securitization increases the risk that the societal security concept, for example, confirms the objectification of cultural communities as they are articulated in the securitization processes researched (Huysmans, 1995; McSweeney, 1996). It raises the more general question about how to do security analysis – which is performing the speech act security – without contributing to a securitization of the migration question, for example; in other words, how to write and speak security critically (Huysmans, 1998).

Regional Security Dynamic

In the Working Paper of 1987, the Copenhagen group argued that there are two perspectives from which security can be interpreted. The first looks at the understanding of security by the actors. The second focuses on the nature and dynamics of the situation, without concentrating on the concepts employed in the actors' thinking (1987: 9).

The actor-level research requires that one defines the relevant actors whose security concepts matter. The Copenhagen group emphasized that one should not limit the research to governmental bodies but one should also include the grass roots:

... how specific political actors from the governmental to the grass-roots levels have been historically capable and are probably able in the future to represent short-, middle- and long-range security and peace interests. (1987: 63)

In *European Polyphony* (1989), they use the actor-oriented approach to research differences in the definition of security interests among governmental actors, opposition parties, and grass roots – in particular, the peace movements – in a wide range of East and West European countries. After 1989, the actor-perspective moved to the background. The research of 1990 and 1993 was more structurally oriented, concentrating on the security dynamic, that is, patterns of threats and vulnerabilities which articulate security interdependencies between units (1990: 3). Also the new book does not reincorporate an explicit actor-based analysis similar to the one in *European*

Polyphony (1989). It would nevertheless be interesting to bring the actor-oriented approach again into the project for at least two reasons. First, redoing the 1989 book in the present post-Cold War European context would be a real contribution to the security literature. It would offer a bottom-up understanding of the post-Cold War, indicating how the definition of security interests has changed, both in the governments and the grass roots. Second, it would also be interesting for more theoretical reasons. As the Copenhagen group recognized in 1987, the problem with an actor-oriented approach is that it tends to fragment the security dynamic into individualized perspectives. The structural dimension of the dynamic disappears under a multitude of individualized practices and perspectives. Linking the 1989 approach more explicitly to their more structural research projects would reintroduce this theoretical puzzle. As long as one treats the agent-structure problem as a question of two different perspectives which one employs separately, the puzzle about how to incorporate the complex relation between agent and structure in the research of European security cannot really surface.

In the Working Paper, the Copenhagen group used Elias's concept of figuration to open up their research project to a study of the overall security dynamic (1987: 10).¹³ A security figuration is a 'hardened' security dynamic consisting of an institutionalized pattern of threats and vulnerabilities and an organization of the positions of the units in this pattern. As a sedimented dynamic it considerably structures the possible options for future developments of the security dynamic. Since it limits the range of changes that are possible, a good understanding of a security figuration can be used to suggest *realistic* options for peace and security within the contours of the figuration.¹⁴ The use of scenarios of possible developments in post-Cold War Europe, as formulated very explicitly in *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era*, are a good example of this view.

A key concept the School has used to develop the idea of a security figuration is Buzan's 'security complex'.¹⁵ Although the concept was already present in the 1989 book, it has occupied a central position in the School's work since 1990. The concept has a somewhat specific connotation because it is explicitly linked to the question of regional security dynamics (e.g. 1998: 201). Given that the Copenhagen project wanted to interpret *European* security dynamics, the question of how to identify security regions has been central to the project from the very beginning. Buzan developed the idea of a security complex precisely to reintroduce the regional level into security studies. The security complex approach assumes that a relatively autonomous security dynamic can exist between units of a region. It articulates a security interdependence of such an internal intensity that it forms a sub-system security pattern which can be separated from its environment:

All the states in the system are to some extent enmeshed in a global web of security interdependence. But because insecurity is often associated with proximity, this interdependence is far from uniform. Anarchy plus

geographical diversity yields a pattern of regionally based clusters, within which security interdependence is markedly more intense between the states inside such complexes, than it is between states inside the complex and those outside it. (1990: 14)

The Copenhagen School uses the security complex to formulate an interesting interpretation of the significance of the end of the Cold War for a transformation in the regional security dynamic in Europe. The general argument states that the end of the Cold War has re-established a European security complex, or in other words, Europe is experiencing a new Europeanization of its security dynamic.

After World War II the European security complex of the 19th century ceased to exist. The superpowers' interests dominated Europe so heavily that local patterns of security relations virtually ceased to exist, thus creating a condition of superpower overlay (1990: 15). The question about a Europeanization of Europe was limited to whether the European states could develop a more autonomous European dynamic under the condition of overlay (1987: 25–6): How could Europe define itself more from the inside (1989: 1, 26)? Since the breakdown of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of the Soviet Union the question has changed. The Europeanization of Europe has no longer been about compentional moves under conditions of overlay but has referred to a process of redefining Europe from the inside (1993: 63).

The key dynamic that the Copenhagen group identifies within this process of redefinition is a dialectic of fragmentation and integration. In 1990 integration and fragmentation featured as two of three possible scenarios for the redefinition of Europe after the end of the Cold War (the third being a new Cold War). The 1993 book pushed this a bit further to the interesting thesis that the Europeanization of Europe is now characterized by a self-feeding dialectical interplay of the dynamics of fragmentation and integration:

... for now we are confronted with a dialectic of integration and fragmentation, where each drives the other. Since each becomes a motive for the other, we get more of both, and it is impossible to determine any firm direction. Integration and fragmentation logics have entered a kind of loop where each swing to the one side generates its opposite. (1993: 7)

In more concrete terms this dialectic works as follows:

It is widely assumed that the only viable way to counter and contain fragmentation in Eastern Europe is to strengthen European integration. This in turn generates opposition and resistance among peoples (like Danes and Britons) in Western Europe, and this in turn leads to new initiatives for integration with a hard core, and so forth ... (1993: 7)

The sectoral widening of security dynamics and the social constructivist turn of the Copenhagen School challenged the original understanding of the security complex. Initially, security complex theory introduced a sensitivity

to regional dynamics in a relatively traditional understanding of security. Political and military questions combined with a state-centric interpretation of security dynamics defined a security complex. The definition of a societal security dynamic in *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* challenged security complex theory by introducing a dynamic which could not be grasped through politico-military interstate dynamics. As a result the question became pertinent whether the security complex is to be defined within a sector (e.g. as a societal security complex) or whether it is a holistic concept identifying the interdependence between the sectoral dynamics. If the latter is the case it does not make sense to speak of a societal security complex, for example, because the complex is defined by the interplay of security dynamics independent of the sector in which they are located. This question about how to identify a regional security dynamic in a situation in which the security agendas contain a variety of sectoral dynamics is a key problem in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998: e.g. 16–17). The main answer is that the sectors in a complex are synthesized through the patterns of interaction between the security units (1998: 167ff).

Although what this means concretely is nicely illustrated through a reading of the European Union, I do not find the answer fully satisfactory, possibly because a major tension remains largely untouched – the tension between the territorial connotations of the security complex and the more fluid, exchange-oriented understanding of the sectoral security dynamic. A security complex is largely conceptualized in territorial terms as a geographically located regional security system within which the security practices are more interdependent with each other than with the security practices of external actors. The sector concept, on the other hand, refers to specific security exchanges which differ in terms of the kind of units and threats they involve and which therefore are not necessarily territorially delimited.

It would also be interesting to see how the project combines the territorial perspective on security patterns (the security complex) with an exchange-oriented interpretation of sectoral dynamics when the somewhat general conceptual reflections in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* are operationalized in more thorough empirical research of multi-sectoral securitization in a less straightforward case than the European Union, such as the Mediterranean area. How do the multi-sectoral securitizations possibly constitute the Mediterranean area as a regional security complex? In other words, we are in a sense back to the old question – how does one define a region or a regional dynamic?¹⁶

Besides the widening of the security agenda, the turn to a social constructivist understanding of security also required a change in security complex theory. As a result of the intersubjective perspective, they had to amend the idea that the complex results from the agents' perceptions and objective interdependencies resulting from territorial proximity, for example. Interweaving processes of securitization moved centre stage in the definition of the security complex.

The new book nicely summarizes this by putting the old definition next to a new definition. The old definition said:

A security complex is defined as a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another. (1998: 198)

The new one amended this sentence as follows:

A security complex is defined as a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another. (1998: 201)

The new security complex theory substituted the more general concept 'units' for the state and moved from interdependence of security interests to interdependence of processes of securitization. This amendment of classical security complex theory brings it closer to Elias's concept of figuration. It pushes the theory somewhat away from a Waltzian inspired structuralist project (most explicit in 1990) to a more structurationist one in which the structuring effects of the practices of agents and the simultaneously empowering and constraining nature of the structure are emphasized. As a result the agent-structure puzzle is reintroduced in the Copenhagen project, at least as a conceptual question. Although the security complex concept seems to favour a territorial understanding of security figurations (or constellation), the linkage to Elias's concept of figuration could easily open it to a more sociological understanding of institutionalized patterns of interaction without having to think of them primarily in territorial terms. Such a move would probably ease somewhat the tension (mentioned earlier) between the territorial and exchange-oriented concepts in the Copenhagen framework. Territorial dynamics would enter the picture as one of the factors possibly involved in the process of institutionalizing security complexes.

Conclusion: The Double Europeanness of the Copenhagen School

The work of the Copenhagen School, reflecting the turbulent developments of security questions since the mid-1980s, defines an interesting and complex research agenda for security studies. Their work constitutes (one of) the most extensive and systematic interpretations of the implications of widening the security studies agenda. This does not mean that their reformulation of security studies is without problems or contradictions; but the Copenhagen School takes the reader through the many complexities a widening security landscape poses for our understanding of security in international relations. The

deepening of the sector concept via the societal security question, which puts state–society relations at the heart of security analysis, together with their recent constructivist turn which defines security as a specific speech act implying a particular rhetorical structure, are two major contributions to the contemporary debates in security studies.

The research agenda of the Copenhagen School has deep European roots in a double sense. First, as has been argued in the second section of this article, the School's theorizations and reformulations have emerged from inside turbulent European security dynamics. In other words, its interpretation of security is strongly embedded in the shifts and continuities of European security questions. The School's strength to a considerable extent relies on successfully anchoring conceptual reflections in experiences of European securitization processes and vice versa. In that sense, I would argue that the last book is somewhat atypical for the Copenhagen School because it separates the conceptual questions from the empirical research agenda of the School. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde justify this turn to the conceptual issues because it would allow them 'to resolve misunderstandings about the general domain of security'. Although this is to a certain extent the case, the book also incorporates a tendency to present grand synthetic security interpretations in which the security dynamics in (the regions of) the world are dealt with in a generalizing swoop. If the Copenhagen School continued with this universalizing synthetic-macro approach, their Europeanness, at least in the sense it is defined in the second section of this article, would largely disappear.

The Copenhagen School is also Euro-centric in another sense, one not yet discussed. By way of conclusion, I want to pay some attention to this and highlight how it limits the Copenhagen project. This second Euro-centric dimension of the Copenhagen School refers to the fact that its understanding of security is based on a particular Euro-American tradition of international relations and security. This is rendered very visible in their latest book, in which they have explicitly moved towards a social constructivist interpretation of security. They stabilize their research agenda by means of a particular interpretation of the meaning of security; the rhetorical structure upon which the intelligibility of security depends is the fixed point – the threats, the units, the agents fluctuate but the signification of security remains the same. Understanding security as a particular rhetorical structure thus allows the group to widen the agenda to a myriad of threats and referent objects without losing its coherence.

For an issue to be a security issue it has to articulate that specific rhetorical structure, that is, the security logic. As a consequence, once defined this structure or logic itself is no longer an object of research. The research consists of 'discovering' social practices structured according to this security logic – i.e. practices of securitization. This is reflected in the advice the Copenhagen group formulates for those who want to pursue empirical research on the basis of their newest book – researchers should not start from cutting up the security problematic into five sectors independent of the empirical dynamic, but they should start from identifying processes of securitization as a specific practice (1998: 168–9).

As a result of fixing the rhetorical structure of security, the Copenhagen agenda moves the question of changes or rearticulations of the security logic itself to the background. As it now stands, their research agenda has difficulties in including social challenges to their understanding of the logic of security itself. For example, recent developments in industrialized societies seem to produce an inflation of risks – global, local, regional risks, health risks, environmental risks, etc. There is an increased sensitivity to these risks which correlates with a decrease in the capacity to manage them. This puts the insurance model guaranteeing protection against any risk under severe pressure. Ulrich Beck (1992, 1996) identifies these developments as a shift from a class-based, industrial society to a risk society. It could be argued that such developments question the logic of security. For example, in a society overwhelmed by a myriad of risks making insurance against them impossible, it could be argued that securitization loses its element of prioritizing and hierarchizing risks in societies. If societies experience an explosion of risks which undermines their capacity to differentiate between existential and ordinary risks, security questions are suddenly to be found everywhere. Since the security logic, as it is defined by the Copenhagen group, implies that particular risks are singled out as existential ones, an equalization of risks would challenge the security logic itself. This could be developed further, for example, by spelling out how the logic of security relies heavily on the insurance model and how developments towards a risk society fundamentally challenge the viability of insurance, thereby probably considerably amending what security means – the rationality of security – in such a society.¹⁷

This does not imply that the Copenhagen School has to let go of its understanding of security as a rhetorical structure; on the contrary. But it may be useful for the School to find a way to open its agenda to changes in the logic of security so that the logic itself becomes an object of research in the empirical study of security dynamics. If interpretations like Beck's are correct, it may well be a necessary move if the School does not want to blind itself to key developments in the European security problematique.

Moreover, such a move would also considerably reduce what could be called the risk of a constructivist ethnocentrism. Briefly stated, this means that by fixing the logic of security one risks investing a particular understanding of security in historical and cultural contexts where security does not imply this particular rhetorical structure. For example, anthropological research on war-like practices (e.g. Riches, 1986; Fried, 1968) has shown that the social significance of war and the way war-like practices are organized can differ considerably from the Clausewitzian understanding of war. Walker's argument about how the significance of security is bound up with the development of cultural modernity also indicates that the logic of security is based on specific cultural and historical experiences (Walker, 1986, 1990; see also Shapiro, 1992). A cultural-historical interpretation of the rhetorical structure would reduce a tendency to universalize a specific logic of security.

There is no internal limitation in the Copenhagen agenda which would prevent an introduction of this question of the cultural specificity of the rhetorical

structure. Delving deeper into the specific characteristics of the logic of security, e.g. by means of genealogy of security practices or a comparative anthropology, would be a major contribution to security studies.

The way the Copenhagen School interprets security questions has contributed considerably to making it possible for these questions to be raised in security studies. In that sense one could argue that the question unfolds within, and partly because of, the kind of discourse the Copenhagen group has developed. In other words, taking up that challenge would be a way of pushing the project further from inside its own conceptual space.

Notes

I would like to thank Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver for helpful comments and information. It goes without saying that the responsibility for the end product lies with me.

1. In their reply to McSweeney's review article of the Copenhagen School, Buzan and Wæver reproach him for not allowing a School to develop its ideas because he gives changes a negative connotation by reducing them to inconsistencies (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 250).

2. This epistemological position is of course not typical of the Copenhagen School alone, but it makes it possible for European security experiences to define a theoretical difference at the heart of the agenda.

3. Experience-near concepts articulate ordinary, immediate meaning while experience-distant concepts formulate in more abstract terms a foreknowledge an author has of the whole (borrowed from Geertz [1987: 134–5] who borrowed it from H. Kohut).

4. They have been reintroduced conceptually in the 1997 book via the category of agents of security. In a sense also the 1993 book on societal security keeps an opening for social movements as agents of security. But, keeping a conceptual place for them is not the same as giving them a central place in the analysis of European security dynamics, as, for example, in the 1989 book. Moreover, it seems that the reintroduction of social movements required a move away from the military sector and interstate security relations, which it did not in 1987 and 1989.

5. Some forms of critical security studies, such as Ken Booth's argument for emancipatory security studies (Booth, 1991a, 1991b), clearly refer back to this alternative approach of security inspired by the peace research agenda.

6. On the old question whether military and technological factors or politics are primary determinants of war (see e.g. Buzan, 1987), the Copenhagen group positions itself firmly on the side of those who argue that politics is what matters.

7. The five sectors are borrowed from Barry Buzan's work (1983, 1991). For him a sector is a lens through which one looks and which highlights a specific dimension of a holistic reality – sectors 'are views of the whole system through some selective lens that highlights one particular aspect of the relationship and interaction among all of its constituent units' (Buzan et al., 1993: 30–1).

8. See for example Krause and Williams' overview of recent developments in security studies: Krause and Williams, 1996: 243ff.

9. This is what McSweeney (1996: 82–4) argues when he criticizes the Copenhagen School for using a Durkheimian concept of society. For a similar criticism see Huysmans (1995: 55–7) and Albert (1998: 25). In addition, Neumann recently argued for introducing the relation between violence and identity in the Copenhagen School (Neumann, 1998).

10. Compare 1998: 'What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience' (1998: 27).

11. Although he did not use the concept ontological gerrymandering, some of Bill McSweeney's (1996) most critical comments on the Copenhagen School rely on a similar idea.

12. They do not ignore – as McSweeney (1996) seems to argue – the linkage between the two processes, but it is not really a substantial element of their research. They hint at the linkage by suggesting that threat definition has an impact on the identity of what is threatened, but this general remark is not further developed and the issue disappears almost completely in the case studies (the 1993 book is a very good example).
13. On Elias's concept see e.g. Elias (1983: 1–34).
14. Sometimes they also used the word 'security constellation' (see 1997: 191, n. 3, 201).
15. The most extensive development of the original concept is to be found in Barry Buzan's *People States & Fear* (1991: Ch. 5).
16. For this last point I am indebted to a discussion I had with Richard Whitman.
17. See also Huysmans (1998).

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After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity

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An era of unprecedented peace appears to be at hand as the twenty-first century draws near. The world's major powers enjoy cooperative relations, democracy is taking root in many countries that have long suffered under authoritarian rule, and the world economy is becoming increasingly liberalized and integrated. Contrary to the dire predictions of a return to a Hobbesian world, the end of the Cold War has not been accompanied by the fragmentation of international order and the emergence of rivalry among atomistic national units.¹

A sobering reality, however, must temper optimism about the emerging international landscape. The peace and prosperity of the current era rely too heavily on a single ingredient: American power. The United States serves as a critical extraregional balancer in Europe and East Asia, is the catalyst behind multilateral efforts to combat aggression and peacefully resolve long-standing disputes, and is the engine behind the liberalization of the world economy. But America's preponderance and its will to underwrite international order will not last indefinitely. Even if the U.S. economy grows at a healthy rate, America's share of world product and its global influence will decline as other large countries develop and become less enamored of following America's lead.² Furthermore, the American electorate will tire of a foreign policy that saddles the United States with such a disproportionate share of the burden of managing the international system. America's unipolar moment will not last long. To assume that international order can indefinitely rest on American hegemony is both illusory and dangerous.

How should the prospect of waning American power affect the conduct of American grand strategy?³ Several prominent schools of thought suggest that the decline of American hegemony need not be cause for concern; peace will outlast American preponderance. The optimists contend that democracy, globalization, the spread of international institutions, and changes in the sources

of state power are eroding national boundaries and making warfare an obsolete tool of statecraft.⁴ The end of the twentieth century, however, is not the first time in history that students of international politics have proclaimed an end to war. In the years leading up to World War I and again during the interwar period, scholars and diplomats alike argued that economic interdependence, technological innovation, and societal aversion to the horrors of war were making armed conflict a historical artifact.⁵ If today's optimists prove to be as wrong as yesterday's, there is good reason to be worried about the potential consequences of a relative decline in U.S. power.⁶

Even if the optimists are right that international politics have entered a more peaceful era, the waning of American hegemony still provides cause for alarm. Although scholars disagree about whether bipolar or multipolar systems are more stable, most agree that both are less stable than unipolar systems.⁷ The end of America's unipolar moment and the return to multipolarity thus threaten to trigger structural sources of competition that may well override other sources of peace. Indeed, the ongoing debate between realists and institutionalists of various stripes essentially revolves around pitting structural sources of competition against ideational and institutional sources of cooperation.⁸

Structure, however, may be the solution, not an endemic source of rivalry that must be overcome by antidotes such as democracy, globalization, and international institutions. If order devolved from structure itself, rather than from efforts to tame systemic forces, that order would be more durable and self-sustaining. The prospect of the end of American hegemony thus raises a crucial question: Is it possible to construct a stable multipolarity?

I argue that the United States should prepare for the inevitable decline of its preponderance by encouraging the emergence of regional unipolarity in each of the world's three areas of industrial and military power – North America, Europe, and East Asia. Unipolarity at the regional level will offset through structural forces the fragmentation and rivalry that otherwise would likely accompany the decline of American hegemony. Because even global wars start at the regional level, securing peace within regions is an essential first step toward securing peace globally.

I introduce the notion of "benign unipolarity" to map out the logic upon which my analysis rests. Benign unipolarity refers to a hierarchical structure in which a preponderant geographic core establishes a hub-spoke pattern of influence over a weaker periphery. As in an empire, the core exerts a powerful centripetal force over the periphery by virtue of its uncontested preponderance and the size and scope of its economy. In contrast to a classical empire, however, regional order emerges from a consensual bargain between core and periphery, not from coercion. The core engages in self-restraint and agrees to subject the exercise of its preponderant power to a set of rules and norms arrived at through multilateral negotiation. In return, the periphery enters willingly into the core's zone of influence. Regional spheres of influence again become the main ordering formations in the international system, but these spheres are based on voluntary, not forced, participation. Furthermore, order

emerges precisely because of the withholding and moderation of power, not its unfettered exercise. Benign unipolarity thus holds promise for dampening competition among regions as well as within them.

I argue that consensual unipolar formations are already emerging in North America, Europe, and (to a lesser degree) East Asia, but that scholars and policymakers need to understand more fully their attributes and take explicit steps to encourage their further development. The challenges ahead vary considerably across these three regions.

North America has long been unipolar. Unipolarity came about through a willful act of structural transformation – the amalgamation of the United States into a unitary state. Since America's rise as a great power, its preponderance has been a key factor in preventing major interstate war in the region. Because the uncontested power of the United States now endows North America with a natural unipolarity, the key challenge is taming the unilateralism made possible by preponderance and deepening the consensual character of America's relationship with its neighbors.

Europe has long been multipolar – and suffered the consequences. Since the close of World War II, however, Western Europe has pursued an ambitious experiment aimed at eliminating the ill effects of multipolarity by transforming its structure to unipolarity. The vehicle for doing so has been European integration and the construction of the European Union (EU), a process that has succeeded in establishing a preponderant Franco-German core at the center of a consensual regional formation. With the help of America's protective guarantees, Europe's core engages in strategic restraint and exercises its power in a benign manner. In return, Europe's smaller powers have willingly entered the regional formation. Not only has interstate rivalry been all but eliminated, but the core exerts a powerful magnetic attraction over the periphery, creating an effective hub-spoke pattern of governance. Indeed, the continent's new democracies are now clamoring at the gate to become part of Europe's unipolar construction. The key challenges ahead are to ensure the integrity of the Franco-German coalition and Europe's unipolarity even as American power wanes and Europe's border moves eastward.

East Asia has long been, and remains, multipolar. America's military presence continues to hold in abeyance the competitive jockeying that would otherwise emerge. Unlike Europe, however, East Asia has not taken advantage of the luxury provided by an extraregional balancer to proceed with its own political integration. Postwar Germany integrated into Europe even as Europe integrated into the West. In contrast, postwar Japan was deeply integrated into the community of capitalist democracies, but its integration into East Asia has been shallow and only economic in form. The region's major states have strong political ties to the United States, but not to one another. In this sense, America's presence, although it keeps the peace for now, also stands in the way of the intraregional integration needed to ensure stability in the aftermath of American hegemony. East Asia has a long way to go if it is to construct a consensual regional formation capable of overcoming its dangerous multipolarity.

An effort to bridge realist and idealist approaches to the preservation of peace guides this exploration into the construction of a new international order. I recognize the pervasive role that power will continue to play in international affairs and the extent to which power asymmetries will serve as inescapable determinants of order. It is no accident that empires have been the most pervasive provider of order throughout history. At the same time, profound material and ideational changes over the course of the twentieth century have made classical empires obsolete, established consensual politics as an international norm, and removed many of the traditional incentives to coercive and predatory behavior. The notion of benign unipolarity rests not on the denial of power realities, but on the opportunity to channel through willful agency the manner in which, and the ends to which, power is exercised. In addition, I am seeking to help break down the barriers between security studies and international political economy by bringing geopolitics back into the study of regionalism. In the pages that follow, I explore the strategic implications of an international landscape increasingly shaped by flows of trade and capital and the economic implications of an international structure increasingly characterized by regional concentrations of power.⁹

I begin by laying out the logic of benign unipolarity. I then discuss the descriptive and prescriptive implications of the notion for North America, Europe, and East Asia. In the final section, I theorize about the dynamics that would characterize international politics in a world of benign unipolar regions, exploring how to effect their internal cohesion as well as cooperative relations among them.

The Logic of Benign Unipolarity

The promotion of intraregional peace is the logical starting point of efforts to construct a stable international order to follow American hegemony.¹⁰ If neighbors are at peace with each other, they are likely to be at peace with states further afield. If neighbors are at war with each other, states further afield are likely to become involved, both to contain the war and to prevent the emergence of a powerful victor with extraregional ambition.

Regional unipolarity provides order and stability through power asymmetry and the structural hierarchy that follows from it. The preponderance of the leading regional state discourages others from balancing against it and enables the leader to underwrite the institutions and norms of regional order. Whereas roughly equivalent power produces balancing and contestation over leadership, asymmetry produces hierarchy and a core-periphery pattern of relations. Asymmetry by itself does not prevent balancing, however. The character of the leading state and the manner in which it wields its power also determine how other states react to preponderance. Cores that engage in self-binding and exercise their power in a benign manner are unlikely to trigger balancing.¹¹ Indeed, the benign exercise of power gives rise to the trust, shared interests and identities, and international institutions essential to escaping

anarchy and fostering a community of states within which the rules of self-help competition no longer apply.¹² In contrast, states that exercise unfettered power and that engage in predatory and exploitative behavior are likely to trigger balancing coalitions and strategic rivalry. Locking in regional peace means getting right both the structure and the character of power.¹³

Benign unipolarity represents a means of combining the right structure with the right character. The structural hierarchy that accompanies power asymmetry is a potent peace-causing agent. Hierarchy alone is not enough, however; the emergence of a stable order also depends on the benign character of the core and its willingness to forge a consensual bargain with the periphery. The core agrees to engage in self-binding. In return, the periphery bandwagons and agrees to enter into the core's sphere of influence. This bargain provides the core with what it wants – a regional order to its liking at low cost. It also provides the periphery with what it wants – the taming of the core's power by exposing it to the moderating influences of a multi-lateral framework. Power asymmetries create hierarchy, but order emerges because power is withheld at the same time that it is exercised. This bargain also sets in motion a gradual process through which individual states come to equate their own interests and identity with the interests and identity of the region as a whole. Regional cohesion then rests not only on a coincidence of separate national interests, but also on a nascent social character and sense of community.¹⁴

Daniel Deudney's concept of "negarchy" provides further insight into the logic of benign unipolarity.¹⁵ Consensual regional formations provide order by mixing traditional hierarchy with elements of negarchy – order that emerges through self-binding, through the constraint and moderation of power rather than its unfettered exercise. Like the U.S. Constitution, which uses "particular configurations of negatives" and an "elaborate system of power-constraint devices" to establish domestic order, benign unipolarity relies on a system of negotiated checks and balances to establish international order. It is this notion of mixing empowerment with disempowerment, of hierarchy with mechanisms that check the advantages of preponderance, that is at the heart of benign unipolarity and the conception of regional order that follows from it.¹⁶

The power-constraint devices that work together with asymmetry to produce benign unipolarity take two forms. First, core states erect internal rules and institutions that check their external power. Societal norms against coercive intervention, checks and balances among branches of government, and constitutional limits on the use of force are examples. Second, core states erect external rules and institutions that bind themselves to other states.¹⁷ For example, the institutions that govern the Franco-German coalition, and the EU more generally, check the power of individual states, establish mechanisms for collective decisionmaking and initiative, and promote the spread of region-wide interests and identities.¹⁸

These power-checking devices endow contemporary unipolar formations with quite different attributes than their historical antecedents – empires.

Today's cores will exercise influence over their peripheries through more subtle and less coercive means than in previous eras. Multilateral institutions and the indirect influence of markets, capital flows, and information have replaced the direct intrusions of colonial rule. In addition, cores will rely more on the spread of shared values and identities to facilitate governance and engender cohesion.¹⁹ Furthermore, both core and periphery will be more cost-sensitive than in the past. Consensual participation means that the periphery can exit if it is no longer reaping benefits or deems that the core is not honoring its commitment to self-binding. Core states too will be more cost-sensitive than during previous eras, tending to see foreign commitments as liabilities rather than as assets.²⁰ This strategic stinginess means that contemporary unipolar formations will not fall prey to overextension, as did many classical empires.²¹ On the contrary, they will be exclusive groupings of the wealthy and soon-to-be wealthy. Whereas imperial cores used to extend their reach over far-flung possessions of little economic or strategic value, today's have-nots are likely simply to be ignored.

Constructing Polarity and the Sources of Strategic Restraint

The notion of benign unipolarity requires two conceptual amendments to conventional accounts of polarity and structure. The first stems from the claim that polarity can be willfully constructed rather than being an immutable product of the distribution of power among nation-states.²² To call for the construction of regional unipolarity assumes that agents have considerable control over structure. This claim does not represent as radical a departure as it initially appears. History provides many examples of willful processes of integration and amalgamation that transformed structure. The United States once consisted of separate and competitive state units. It became a single pole through federation. About one hundred years later, Germany overcame its multipolarity through its own process of unification. Europe is now in the midst of a similar transformation. It is not becoming a single pole, but the EU is endowing Europe with a unipolar structure through the establishment of a preponderant Franco-German coalition – what I call a “pluralistic core” – that governs in a hub-spoke pattern over its periphery.²³ These instances of geopolitical engineering take time, but they have succeeded in producing structural transformation.

The second conceptual amendment stems from the claim that poles have character and that the manner in which they exercise their power shapes relations with their smaller neighbors as well as with other poles. The attributes of international structure are determined by polarity, but also by the character of the poles. Self-regarding and competitive behavior is not endemic. Indeed, my analysis rests on the claim that strategic restraint and the withholding of power are becoming embedded features of contemporary international politics. Because a core's willingness to engage in self-binding, not just its preponderance, is central to the peace-causing effects of benign unipolarity, justifying this claim is necessary to complete the logical foundation of my argument.

Core states are exercising their power in a more benign fashion than in previous historical eras for five main reasons.²⁴ First, changes in the sources of state power have diminished the returns to predatory behavior. Technology, information, and productivity have replaced land and labor as the key determinants of wealth, making trade and investment far more effective tools of statecraft than territorial conquest.²⁵ Nuclear weapons and the proliferation of sophisticated conventional weapons also make conquest more difficult. Liberating wealth creation from questions of territorial control enables core and periphery to pursue joint gains through cooperative strategies more regularly than during previous eras. In addition, economic and technological transformation gives core states considerable influence over their smaller neighbors.²⁶ In sum, core states can get what they want and think they deserve without resorting to overt forms of coercion.

Second, changes in prevailing international norms encourage benign behavior. Were a regional power to attempt to coerce its neighbors into a hierarchical order, both its victims and extraregional states would resist. So too might its own population oppose such coercive behavior. Order that emerges through consensus is thus likely to be cheaper and more durable than order that emerges through coercion. Accordingly, cores face normative – and, consequently, instrumental – incentives to self-bind even when preponderance provides them the option of resorting to coercive behavior.

Third, the spread of democracy makes more likely the benign exercise of power. Cores ruled by democratic regimes tend to pursue moderate foreign policies toward other democracies for both institutional and normative reasons. On the institutional side, the checks and balances associated with democracy constrain the conduct of foreign policy and limit the resources that the state allocates to foreign engagement. Open debate also tends to produce centrist policies. On the normative side, democracies develop a mutual respect based on their shared commitment to the rule of law and consensual politics. Conflicts of interest between them are therefore settled through peaceful means.²⁷ In addition, common domestic norms nurture a shared sense of community, helping to forge a transnational space in which the rules of self-help competition no longer apply.

Fourth, ongoing processes of integration are normalizing and institutionalizing self-binding practices. For example, pluralistic cores (cores that consist of more than one state) produce an intrinsic binding effect that extends into the core's relationship with its periphery. Sustaining the coherence of the Franco-German coalition requires bargaining and self-limitation on behalf of both parties, which in turn moderate the influence that the coalition wields over the periphery. The EU as a whole, because it institutionalizes power-constraint devices internationally just as a constitution does so domestically, and because it promotes regionwide interests and identities, reinforces self-binding practices.

Fifth, many of the world's leading regional powers have undergone moderating social transformations. The political and social legacy of World War II reinforces self-binding in Germany and Japan. Societal aversion to war and a

commitment to wielding influence through other than military means continue to limit the scope of external ambition in both countries.²⁸ Even in the United States, whose territory has not been subjected to the devastation of war since the nineteenth century, aversion to the use of force and the potential loss of life runs strong.²⁹

Relations between Benign Poles

Even if benign unipolarity promotes regional order in the manner outlined above, the formation of unipolar regions would be undesirable if the resultant blocs ended up in a security competition with one another. My prescription would then constitute a recipe for triggering conflict among regional behemoths, not for securing global stability. For four reasons, however, benign unipolarity would make for more peaceful relations not just within regions, but also between them.

First, precisely because benign unipolar formations are instruments for managing rather than accumulating power, they would dampen, not stimulate, interregional rivalry. The self-binding and consensual bargaining that constrain the exercise of power within regions would also operate between regions; power that is checked at the regional level will be similarly checked at the extraregional level. Benign regional formations by their very nature turn their energies inward rather than outward, seeking to hold power at bay, not to project it. The European Union provides an excellent illustration. The EU is often criticized for its failure to forge a common defense policy and its unwillingness to assume a greater defense role beyond its boundaries, but the purpose of the EU is to manage power within, not outside, Europe. Accordingly, it has been designed with a host of checks and balances that moderate competitive behavior among its members and that constrain its ability to project power externally. That the EU is inwardly focused is evidence that its experiment in geopolitical engineering is working well. Consensual unipolar formations are – and would be seen by actors in other regions as – providers of security and stability, not blocs with predatory intent.³⁰

Second, interregional relations would benefit from the deeper intraregional integration associated with benign unipolarity. Relations between regions would be moderated because relations within them would be cooperative and consensual. Consider the cases of Europe and East Asia. European integration has to some extent come at the expense of Europe's external ties,³¹ but the internal peace and stability that integration has engendered have contributed to Europe's ability to sustain cooperative relations with outside powers. As a result, Europe is set to enjoy internal stability and hence cordial external relations even as the United States retracts the protective umbrella that initially made possible European integration. In contrast, East Asia has been well integrated into the global economy, but in a way that has stunted its own political integration. Ongoing intraregional rivalries and competitive jockeying complicate its relations with outside powers. Absent America's protective umbrella, these rivalries would likely intensify, embroiling East Asia in conflict and jeopardizing its engagement with other regions.

Putting regional integration before global integration will help construct benign unipolarity in each of the world's three main areas of military and industrial power, in turn laying the groundwork for peaceful interregional relations.³²

Third, the constraints on political centralization inherent in a unipolar regional formation would check the concentration of power under a single authority, decreasing the likelihood that it would evolve into a unitary regional behemoth. Benign regional formations are more than groupings of national states each of which retains the traditional prerogatives of sovereignty, but less than federations that centralize governance and sublimate the autonomy of their constituent units. And although these formations have a nascent social character that is rooted in a sense of community and shared identity, this identity coexists with distinct cultural and linguistic differences that serve as barriers to centralization and the transfer of political loyalties to an authority beyond the nation-state.³³ Even as regions evolve into unipolar structures, they are not likely to amalgamate into single poles of power under a central authority.³⁴

Finally, consensual regional formations are unlikely to evolve into predatory behemoths because they would unravel from within if they sought to do so. For reasons just outlined, the separate national units in regional formations will retain a significant degree of autonomy and will not amalgamate into a unitary federal structure. Accordingly, if a core state were to develop predatory ambition and pursue aggressive behavior, its immediate neighbors would be the most threatened. The pursuit of such ambition and the explicit amassing of power it would entail would thus constitute a violation of the consensual bargain at the heart of benign unipolarity. Were France, for example, to act upon its rhetoric and seek to turn the EU into a global imperial power, Germany itself and France's smaller neighbors would be the first to resist. The return of geopolitical ambition to Europe would therefore be far more likely to trigger intra-European balancing and the end of the Franco-German coalition than it would the emergence of the EU as a global power. Regional multipolarity, not an aggressive regional unipole, would be the result.

The Rise of Benign Unipolarity in North America, Europe, and East Asia

My aim in this section is to demonstrate that benign unipolarity is not just a theoretical construct, but a geopolitical formation that holds considerable promise of becoming a reality. I provide evidence that benign unipolar regions are in fact taking shape and are having a powerful impact on the emerging international order.

North America

North America has enjoyed a relatively peaceful century and has been spared the great hegemonic wars that cost so many lives in Europe and East Asia.

The reason is straightforward: North America has been unipolar. Its major states have not fought for supremacy because American preponderance naturally establishes a regional hierarchy. The United States has throughout the century enjoyed an uncontested advantage in economic and military power. Today U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) is eight times that of Canada and Mexico combined, while U.S. military expenditure is twenty-seven times that of its two neighbors.³⁵ Mexico and Canada send some 70 percent of their exports to the United States, while the United States sends in return only 25 percent of its exports.³⁶ The power of the U.S. market and the threat or reality of military intervention have long ensured that North America, Central America, and the Caribbean fall within America's sphere of military and economic dominance.³⁷

That unipolarity comes so easily to North America has in fact worked against the establishment of more formal institutions of regional governance. Instead, U.S. preponderance creates a *de facto* core and a surrounding periphery. A hub-spoke pattern of intraregional relations has evolved largely through the operation of the market and America's unilateral efforts – including direct and indirect military intervention – to create a security environment to its liking.³⁸

Since the mid-1980s, order based on *de facto* power asymmetries has given way to a regional formation exhibiting the *de jure* characteristics of benign unipolarity.³⁹ The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) institutionalized a regional order based on consensual bargaining between core and periphery and a new American willingness to subject the exercise of its power to a multilateral framework.⁴⁰ The original idea for, and impetus behind, the agreement came from Canada and Mexico. Both countries could do nothing to change the asymmetries in their relationship with the United States, but they could make a deal to subject U.S. policy to the constraints of a multilateral framework. As Stephan Haggard and Albert Fishlow put it, NAFTA reflected “the efforts by weaker countries to bind the United States to clear rules.”⁴¹ The agreement in many respects represents the periphery's decision to structure and control *de facto* power asymmetries by design, rather than to let them operate by default.⁴²

The United States was attracted to the deal in part for economic reasons: to gain market access and cheaper labor and to use the threat of hemispheric regionalism to encourage Japan and Europe to move forward on the Uruguay Round trade negotiations.⁴³ Washington also used NAFTA to pursue a host of order-related objectives. NAFTA was to lock in political and economic reforms in Mexico, strengthen liberal political forces by widening the middle class, and attract foreign capital to Mexico, which would bolster the economy and promote political stability.⁴⁴ Economic growth and political reform would in turn help stem the tide of illegal immigration and facilitate efforts to limit drug trafficking. The agreement also contains measures for environmental cleanup and protection.

The United States was thus using a host of subtle forms of penetration to promote stability in its periphery.⁴⁵ Looking outward from the core, NAFTA

represented much more than a trade agreement and was to a considerable extent a vehicle for recasting Mexico's political economy in America's image. As Andrew Hurrell remarks, institutionalized regionalism in North America is "part of a broader rethinking of relations ... which has important strategic and geopolitical implications."⁴⁶ In effect, NAFTA resulted from a deal struck between a periphery looking to tame and moderate the behavior of the core and a core looking to enhance its ability to shape regional order.⁴⁷ And despite the core's reluctance to extend this bargain further south – Congress denied President Bill Clinton fast-track negotiating authority in 1997 – other states in the Americas are pressing for entry into the club.

Europe

Europe has long suffered the effects of multipolarity. The Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, the wars of German unification, and the two world wars are all testimony to the destructive potential of rivalry among proximate poles of power. Since 1945 Europe has pursued a novel solution to its structural instability: replacing multipolarity with unipolarity. Most Europeans would object to the notion that the EU is an instrument for endowing Europe with unipolarity; conventional wisdom holds that integration is meant to banish power politics from the continent, not recast it. Nevertheless, European integration has from the outset had potent geopolitical objectives. In the words of Robert Schuman, a founding father of European integration, "Because Europe was not united, we have had war. . . . The action to be taken must first of all concern France and Germany. This proposal [for a coal and steel community] will create the first concrete foundation for a European federation which is so indispensable for the preservation of peace."⁴⁸ Europe's smaller powers came to welcome this effort to render benign the continent's power center, even if participation in Europe meant entering a regional order crafted principally by the Franco-German coalition.

The United States played a central role in enabling Europe to pursue unipolarity. America's military presence essentially took security issues off the European agenda, buying time for economic and political integration to proceed.⁴⁹ The process of integration has produced an effective unipolarity that has succeeded not only in eliminating competitive balancing among Europe's major powers; the EU also exerts a powerful centripetal force across the continent, with most current members eager to participate in the inner circle of monetary union and many of Europe's new democracies waiting impatiently for admission to the club.

Constructed, as opposed to natural, unipolarity, and a pluralistic rather than an amalgamated core, endow Europe with a center that has quite different attributes than that of North America. Although more unwieldy than an amalgamated core, a pluralistic core encourages consensual forms of politics because the pulling and hauling of coalition management act as an internal check and make negotiation and compromise a central feature

of governance. Compromise within the core encourages compromise between the core and the periphery. Core self-binding is also far more deeply ingrained in societal attitudes in Germany than it is in the United States. Germany is as averse to unilateral action as the United States is fond of it. A large part of the reason is the extent to which Germany has come to equate its own interests and identity with those of a broader European construction. In the words of Peter Katzenstein, German "interests, pursued through power and bargaining, were fundamentally shaped by the institutional context of Europe and the Europeanization of the identity of the German state."⁵⁰

The power asymmetry between core and periphery in Europe is also less stark than it is in North America. The GDP of the Franco-German coalition is about 80 percent of the GDP of all other EU members combined. Franco-German defense spending represents roughly 85 percent of that of all other EU members combined.⁵¹ Furthermore, asymmetries in defense capability are tempered by Germany's continued reluctance to assume defense responsibilities commensurate with its size because of the legacy of World War II and because America's presence in Europe obviates the need for a greater German role. Again, less stark asymmetry works to the advantage of regional cohesion. The core does not have sufficient preponderance to rely on unilateral initiative and thus depends more heavily on compromise with the periphery, in turn reinforcing the consensual bargain at the heart of Europe's constructed unipolarity.

Europe's unipolar structure is reflected in its patterns of governance. Despite formal institutions that seek to diffuse authority across member states, most decisions within the EU arise from agreements struck between France and Germany. The union's major initiatives – the single market, monetary union, and enlargement – have emanated primarily from Paris and Bonn, not from other European capitals or from the EU bureaucracy in Brussels.⁵² This core draws the periphery toward the center through both inducement (the rewards of inclusion) and threat (the punishment of exclusion).

The prospect of material gain has ostensibly been the EU's driving force, but geopolitical objectives lie just beneath the surface. Indeed, the evolution of the EU is to a large extent the story of consensual bargaining among member states over the construction of benign unipolarity. Constitutionalized self-binding in Germany, the checks and balances intrinsic to the Franco-German coalition, the institutional diffusion of power across member states – these are all mechanisms that serve to mix empowerment and disempowerment, to create order through power asymmetry, but also through the core's willingness to reduce the benefits of preponderance and engage in consensual bargaining.

European monetary union (EMU) is only the most recent example. Germany will voluntarily bind its power by handing over control of its monetary policy to a supranational authority that governs through consensus and that is politically independent.⁵³ Other European states will have greater input into monetary issues, and the euro, not the deutsche mark, will be

Europe's dominant currency. At the same time, however, Germany is effectively exporting its own monetary policy to its neighbors; ultimately, the EU will have a political economy crafted in Germany's image. Moreover, the primary impetus behind EMU came not from ministries of finance or firms doing business in Europe, but from politicians concerned about the geopolitical structure of Europe. EMU is first and foremost about embedding the German state inside a broader Europe and preventing the return of national rivalries, not about wealth creation. As Chancellor Helmut Kohl has stated, "In reality, the policy of European integration comes down to the question of whether we have war or peace in the twenty-first century."⁵⁴ Although the economic benefits to smaller powers remain unclear, they play along because the deal deepens a unipolar structure that moderates and renders more benign the behavior of Europe's power center.⁵⁵

Europe exhibits many of the attributes of a benign unipolar formation. The core's influence over the periphery operates through formal institutions as well as a host of subtle mechanisms – the market, the allure of entry into Europe's dominant political formation, and the propagation of a sense of community and common identity.⁵⁶ At the same time, linguistic and cultural differences constitute natural barriers to centralization and political amalgamation, leaving the EU straddling the national and supranational realms. Europe's core also exhibits the cost sensitivity and strategic restraint that are characteristic of benign unipolarity. The EU's inability to make progress in forging a common foreign and security policy and its failed efforts to address on its own the war in Bosnia illustrate that the union suffers more from the underprovision of external engagement than from the overprovision and overcommitment characteristic of previous eras.⁵⁷ Finally, the EU promises to remain a club for the wealthy and soon-to-be-wealthy, excluding the poorer states to Europe's south and east.⁵⁸

East Asia

East Asia today resembles Europe prior to its successful experiment with constructed unipolarity.⁵⁹ Suspicion and political cleavage still characterize relations among the area's major powers. Many East Asian states are in the midst of rapid political and economic change, producing differences in domestic structure and wide disparities in growth rates across the region – the same volatile mix that triggered war in Europe twice this century.⁶⁰ A key difference, however, distinguishes today's East Asia from yesterday's Europe: a peacetime American presence. Whereas Europe fell prey to destructive rivalry during its era of multipolarity, America's role as an extraregional balancer keeps in check the competitive jockeying that might otherwise trigger war in East Asia.

Although America's presence in East Asia is indispensable, the particular nature of U.S. engagement also has high costs: it impedes the intraregional integration essential to long-term stability. American might and diplomacy prevent conflict, but they do so by keeping apart the parties that must ultimately

learn to live comfortably alongside each other if regional stability is to endure. A comparison with Europe is again instructive. Throughout the Cold War, Europe took advantage of the security provided by America's protective umbrella to redress the instability intrinsic to its multipolar structure. Germany addressed its darker past and sought reconciliation with its neighbors. Europe integrated itself internally at the same time that it was integrated into the Atlantic community.

In contrast, Asia has not taken advantage of the peace afforded by America's presence to pursue its own political integration.⁶¹ Individual countries have bilateral security alliances with the United States, but not with each other.⁶² Indeed, Washington has generally discouraged regional forums that do not include the United States. Furthermore, Japan's unwillingness to confront its behavior during World War II and to seek reconciliation with its former adversaries continues to stand in the way of more cooperative intraregional relations. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum has formalized an agenda for economic integration in the Asia Pacific region, but the driving force behind APEC is the United States, again making order in East Asia dependent on an extraregional actor. This arrangement may be good for the international economy because it encourages open trade across the Pacific. It may also be good for the United States because it enhances American influence in the Pacific region. It is bad for East Asia in the long run, however, because it impedes the consolidation of a hierarchical regional order capable of providing stability in the aftermath of American hegemony.⁶³

If the benign unipolarity that has brought peace to North America and Europe is to emerge in East Asia, the region must focus on its own internal integration, not on its integration into an American-led global order. The first step would be the consolidation of a Sino-Japanese coalition. Were a Sino-Japanese power center to cohere, it would enjoy uncontested preponderance in East Asia. The combined GDP of China and Japan is today close to three times that of all other East Asian states. Defense expenditures in Japan and China amount to 1.4 times what other regional states combined spend on defense.⁶⁴ These asymmetries will only increase in coming years as Chinese economic and military growth continues. Although a distant prospect, the formation of a pluralistic power center of China and Japan is the essential starting point for constructing a stable regional hierarchy.⁶⁵ As long as balancing rather than consensual bargaining characterizes the relationship between East Asia's two most powerful states, a cooperative regional order will remain out of reach.⁶⁶

Inasmuch as economic integration laid the foundation for Europe's political integration, East Asia is beginning to head in the right direction. Intraregional economic integration increased dramatically after the marked appreciation of the yen in the mid-1980s, giving rise to a hub-spoke pattern of trade and capital flows with Japan at the center.⁶⁷ Unlike in Europe, however, political integration has not followed from deeper economic integration. Increasing trade and investment within East Asia were driven principally by the market and proximity; a multilateral system of management (APEC)

followed from, rather than preceded, *de facto* integration.⁶⁸ Some members of APEC have attempted to institutionalize the forum and to expand the scope of its dialogue beyond trade liberalization to include political and security issues,⁶⁹ but efforts to put security matters on its agenda have thus far been futile. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have had more success in addressing security issues.⁷⁰ They have, however, focused primarily on resolving disputes among Asia's smaller states and on pursuing confidence-building measures, not on forging a cooperative security regime for the region as a whole. And the recent economic turmoil in East Asia has distracted attention from the security agenda.

The main obstacle to deeper political integration is that balancing continues to predominate over bandwagoning, thus preventing both intracore and core-periphery cohesion. It is the quality of power, not the quantity, that is the problem. The asymmetries necessary to construct a hierarchical order exist, but states in the region are not yet confident that power asymmetries will manifest themselves in a benign manner and that a regional order, if one were to emerge, would be consensual. America's presence holds more overt forms of balancing and competition in abeyance, but it does not repair political and ideological cleavages – a task only regional states themselves can perform. For now, historical memories and the absence of reconciliation continue to fuel fear of a more assertive Japan. In addition, China's repressive regime and confrontational rhetoric raise appropriate questions about the purposes to which it will put its increasing power. Indeed, ASEAN countries resisted the establishment of APEC and continue to oppose its institutionalization precisely because of fear that it could become a vehicle for East Asia's dominant powers to impose a regional order of their own making.⁷¹

Peace within Benign Unipolar Regions

Benign unipolarity is in the midst of taking shape in North America and Europe. It is a more distant vision in East Asia. If regional unipolarity is to develop and serve as a source of structural stability as American hegemony wanes, policymakers and scholars alike need to think through how to encourage the construction and maintenance of consensual regional formations. What variables will affect their internal cohesion and determine whether they prosper and deepen or lose momentum and unravel?

The Character and Coherence of Regional Cores

The trajectory of regional cores will be the most important determinant of the evolution of regional formations. Regional cores must exercise power and leadership sufficient to sustain unipolarity. At the same time, they must engage in self-binding and withhold power to ensure that asymmetry produces bandwagoning rather than balancing.

The power centers of North America, Europe, and East Asia each face a different set of challenges. That North America's core consists of a preponderant, unitary state both enhances and impedes cohesion. North America enjoys natural unipolarity and the stability that accompanies it. In addition, the United States provides a level of consistent leadership that a pluralistic core cannot. But the scope of American preponderance means that the core will be less inclined to govern through deal-making; stark asymmetries diminish the need for negotiated outcomes. Moreover, peripheral states, precisely because they fear exposure to the core's unchecked power, still face incentives to balance against rather than bandwagon with the United States. In this sense, the unitary nature of American power and purpose paradoxically stands in the way of consensual integration in North America, and may ultimately leave the region with more fragile and less developed institutions of governance than those in Europe and East Asia.⁷² Especially because the United States lacks the societal commitment to self-binding present in Germany and Japan, its elected leaders must consciously resist the unilateralist option made possible by American preponderance and rely on consensual bargaining to deepen regional order.

The main challenge facing Europe's core is preserving the Franco-German coalition even as the Cold War recedes into the past and France and Germany confront a host of domestic challenges. The most immediate problem stems from lagging economic performance. As the austerity accompanying preparation for monetary union continues and as high unemployment persists, debate over structural adjustment and reform of the welfare system will intensify, and French and German elites will be tempted to blame Europe and each other for the dislocation. Unless both sides resist this temptation, not only the single currency, but also the integrity of the Franco-German coalition, will be pat at risk.⁷³

Generational change will also pose increasing problems for the Franco-German coupling. For younger Germans and French, who have lived through neither the horrors of World War II nor the formidable task of patching together a Europe at peace, escaping the past will no longer serve to legitimize the European enterprise.⁷⁴ Europe's current leaders must therefore generate new arguments to ensure that the next generation retains an abiding appreciation of the Franco-German coalition. The adaptation to global economic change, the inclusion in Europe of the continent's emerging democracies, and the construction of a new political space that allows the national state to exist comfortably alongside a supranational union must now provide the impetus behind integration. But the Germans and the French also need to arrive at a common vision of where the EU is headed, a process that will be more difficult than it appears.

French and German leaders in fact hold incompatible conceptions of the ultimate objectives and character of the union. For Germany, Europe is a construct for moderating and managing power – for ensuring that the continent never again falls prey to the destructive forces of national rivalry. For France, the EU is more about amassing and projecting power, aggregating the union's military and economic resources so that it can assert itself as a

global player. The EU is to do for Europe what the national state is no longer strong enough to do for France.

Melding these competing visions of Europe will require compromise by both parties. The Germans will need to assume greater defense responsibilities within Europe, and the French will have to realize that their vision of the EU is not only politically unattainable, but also strategically undesirable. Pressing the EU to focus on projecting power externally rather than managing power internally risks triggering both discord within Europe and competition between Europe and other regions. Paris should instead seek to strengthen the ability of the Franco-German core to manage security in Europe as America's role on the continent gradually diminishes.⁷⁵

Effecting the coherence of a pluralistic core in East Asia is a far more formidable task than in Europe.⁷⁶ China and Japan have yet to engage in a substantive bilateral dialogue that could serve as a basis for reconciliation and partnership; both prefer to deal with the United States rather than with each other.⁷⁷ The key challenge ahead is to nurture a new coalition between China and Japan that enables them to construct and manage collectively a hierarchical regional order in East Asia.⁷⁸ If the European experience is any indication, this task will require decades of deliberate effort to overcome the past and construct the habits and institutions of partnership.

APEC provides a useful starting point, but only that; America's role is too prominent. Instead, Washington should explicitly seek to facilitate a more substantive Sino-Japanese dialogue. Even if it comes at the expense of trade flows across the Pacific or of American influence in East Asia, the formation of a Sino-Japanese coalition is essential if regional integration is to advance beyond the economic realm. The United States should stay engaged militarily to buy time for this regional power center to cohere, but Washington must ensure that it no longer opposes or stands in the way of direct contact between East Asia's two main powers. Furthermore, Washington should welcome China's call for a pan-regional forum that does not include the United States – as long as the body serves as a vehicle for regional integration, not balancing against U.S. power.⁷⁹

Two factors will play particularly important roles in shaping Sino-Japanese relations. The first concerns Japan's willingness to confront its past in order to close the enormous gap that remains between Japanese behavior and regional perceptions of Japanese intentions. Although Japan's constitution restricts the use of force to self-defense missions and Tokyo actively shuns international leadership and diplomatic unilateralism, neighboring states remain distrustful of Japan.⁸⁰ This gap between behavior and perception is largely the result of Japan's failure to address its wartime actions and to pursue reconciliation with the victims of its aggression.⁸¹ The benign effects of Japan's self-binding will continue to be diluted until the Japanese are ready to hold themselves accountable for their behavior. So too will recent talk of an "Asian way" and the emergence of a regional identity mean little until the Japanese are prepared to acknowledge that their last attempt at community-building – the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere – was part of a darker and predatory past.⁸²

The second key determinant of whether a pluralistic core coheres in East Asia is the manner in which China exercises its increasing power. Chinese behavior will to some extent be shaped by its external environment. As China's power rises, its neighbors should seek to strike the same deal that EU members struck with Germany: a greater say for China in shaping the terms of regional order in return for self-binding and China's willingness to play by the rules of multilateralism. Drawing China into the core of a hierarchical regional order, even if Beijing's intentions are still somewhat uncertain, promises to expose China to the same processes of moderation and liberalization that other developing economies face as they enter the global market. The gradual and cautious embrace of China in a multilateral system of regional governance will by no means ensure that China exercises its growing power in a benign manner. It will, however, encourage self-binding by giving China a voice commensurate with its power. It will also facilitate economic openness, strengthen liberalizing coalitions, and nurture a moderating middle class – all of which make more likely China's peaceful ascendance and the gradual formation of a Sino-Japanese partnership.⁸³

Sustaining the Bargain between Core and Periphery

Benign unipolar formations rely on a sustained consensus between core and periphery, not just on an initial bargain. Each side must hold up its end of this bargain and remain satisfied with the other's performance. Core, periphery, or both can otherwise exit. Existing literature on regionalism underscores the extent to which economic incentive and sustained growth often facilitate integration and regional cohesion.⁸⁴ In this respect, the recent economic downturn in East Asia represents a substantial setback.⁸⁵ What are the other main challenges to the cohesion of unipolar formations?

The Durability of Self-binding

Unlike classical empires, which often foundered as a result of revolts from a periphery seeking greater autonomy, benign unipolar formations are far more likely to fall prey to revolts from the core. It is now the core that accepts limits on its behavior by exercising strategic restraint and subjecting itself to the constraints of a multilateral framework. Self-binding can therefore go only so far before core states will calculate that the gains of sustaining benign unipolarity no longer outweigh the costs of diminished autonomy. This insight calls into question the conventional wisdom that integration must keep moving forward if regional formations are not to unravel.⁸⁶

It is hard to imagine, for example, that France and Germany would as a matter of course submit to the will of their smaller partners in the EU should Paris and Bonn regularly be outvoted on matters of central concern. In North America, taming the unilateralist urges of the United States is a far greater challenge to regional integration than is encouraging the participation of the periphery. Indeed, in Europe and North America alike, an expectant periphery

presses for entry while core states equivocate, fearful of new obligations and constraints. And China's willingness to moderate the scope and character of its regional ambition is the single most important determinant of whether a consensual hierarchy evolves in East Asia. As policymakers shape regional structures of governance, they should seek an equilibrium point along the spectrum of integration – one sufficient to commit the core to engage in self-binding, but not so ambitious that it induces the core to renege on the bargain that underpins regional order.

Security

During past eras, core states often fell prey to their *excessive* concern about security in their peripheries. In contrast, today's major states are more likely to exhibit *insufficient* concern about security in the periphery.⁸⁷ Whether contemporary unipolar formations face unraveling because of the underprovision of security depends primarily on the evolution of strategic thinking within respective cores. Three main pathways exist through which core states could, over time, adopt a more expansive definition of their security interests.

First, economic interdependence between core and periphery could reach levels sufficient to induce cores to make deeper sacrifices in meeting strategic challenges in the periphery. During the 1994–95 economic turmoil in Mexico and the 1997–98 turmoil in East Asia, for example, the international community pursued extraordinary measures to prevent a more widespread financial crisis. In this respect, it is not unimaginable that economic interests would be strong enough to warrant military intervention in the periphery should financial stability be threatened by revolt or internal chaos. Increasing levels of international trade and investment as well as considerable sensitivity among the globe's main financial markets will put pressure on core states to run the risks associated with maintaining economic stability in their respective zones of influence.

Second, as contemporary regional formations mature and core states sink further costs into their development, order-related interests may come to play a more dominant role in motivating core behavior. If regional formations continue to evolve into order-providing unipolar structures, their leading members will have a greater interest in making the sacrifices necessary to maintain them.⁸⁸

Finally, the process of community-building could lead to a sense of shared identity sufficient to contribute to core-periphery cohesion and broaden concepts of self-interest. The history of classical empires is replete with examples of the ability of socialization and ideological convergence to undergird imperial management.⁸⁹ So too have shared identity elements been strong enough to induce states to come to one another's assistance for emotive rather than strategic reasons.⁹⁰ Elites and publics in contemporary regional formations might develop similar extraterritorial allegiances, endowing these groupings with more cohesion and durability than would be predicted by a narrow calculation of material costs and benefits.

Peace among Benign Unipolar Regions

My analysis should not be interpreted as a call for the end of American hegemony and the deliberate devolution of the international system from unipolarity to tripolarity. Instead, I take the eventual waning of American hegemony to be inevitable, making it unavoidable that the international community will have to choose between striving for a benign tripolarity by design or settling for a competitive multipolarity by default.⁹¹ The case for benign tripolarity rests in part on the arguments, outlined above, as to why the formation of three regional blocs would not trigger the security competition traditionally ascribed to tripolarity: the three regional formations would be instruments for managing power, not amassing it; interregional relations would benefit from intra-regional peace; cultural and linguistic barriers would inhibit the political centralization needed to project power externally; and regions would unravel from within if their core states developed predatory intent.⁹² At the same time, the management of interregional relations would rise in importance and necessitate the following amendments to the policy agenda.

Regionalism versus Global Multilateralism

Current U.S. policy is guided by the conventional wisdom that global multilateralism should take precedence over regionalism. The more open regions are to one another, the better relations will be among them. Regional trade arrangements are therefore desirable only if they do not come at the expense of global trade.⁹³ My analysis challenges head-on this conventional wisdom: according to the logic of benign unipolarity, regionalism should take precedence over global multilateralism. Economic and political integration at the regional level are essential building blocks of global integration. Global multilateralism is therefore desirable only if it does not come at the expense of regional integration and the construction of stable regional orders. APEC might ensure vibrant trans-Pacific trade, but it does not serve the interests of international stability if putting America at the center of East Asia's only inclusive multilateral structure impedes the consolidation of a self-sustaining regional order. The same logic applies in reverse to the EU. The EU's protective tariffs may create an irritant in transatlantic relations, but they are well worth this cost if they contribute to the coherence of a stable unipolarity in Europe. Contemporary regional formations are geopolitical structures, not mere trade groupings. The obsession of policymakers with global multilateralism should accordingly give way to a new emphasis on regionalism.⁹⁴

Interregional Institutions

As policymakers and scholars devote increasing attention to deepening and managing regional formations, they will also need to recast institutions for governing relations among regional blocs. Bodies such as the Group of

Seven (G-7), the UN Security Council, and the World Trade Organization provide potential forums for addressing an interregional agenda, but they tend to focus on resolving short-term disputes rather than on facilitating long-term cooperation. Accordingly, a directorate of core countries should be established to develop a set of "rules of the road" and a common vision of how regional groupings will fit into global structures. This directorate, which might replace the G-7, would consist of the United States, France, Germany, Japan, China, and perhaps Russia (for reasons discussed below). The body would serve as a global concert of major powers, monitoring and coordinating relations both within and among regional groupings.

Economic Strains and the Allure of Protectionism

As regional formations deepen and their political saliency in member states rises, the risk increases that economic shock or prolonged periods of lagging performance will lead to protectionism and interregional rivalry. When political leaders turn to protectionism to cordon off their national economies from market disturbances and find a short-term fix to lagging performance, they are likely to favor intraregional over interregional ties, especially if they have already codified regional trade agreements, have high levels of interdependence with their neighbors, and have sunk costs in the maintenance of intraregional cohesion.⁹⁵ Precisely because the logic of my argument privileges regional over global trade arrangements, members of consensual regional formations will have to take special precautions to guard against retreat into protected trade blocs. A directorate of core countries could accordingly be tasked with monitoring interregional tariffs and flows of trade and investment.

The Geopolitics of Exclusion

A major weakness of an international order based on benign unipolarity in North America, Europe, and East Asia is its effect on excluded actors. Contemporary regional formations are clubs for successful states, not failed or poor ones. As a result, they exclude those areas of the globe that are most in need of integration into global markets and councils. The proliferation of weapons technology is also raising the stakes of instability in developing regions. The recent nuclear tests in India and Pakistan underscore the potential for dangerous arms racing among developing states. And assuming that relations among the world's major powers remain cooperative, revisionist states in the developing world, especially those armed with weapons of mass destruction and those whose size and population make them locally dominant powers, will emerge as the principal challengers to the status quo.⁹⁶

Cordoning off privileged regional formations from instability in the developing world, from rogue states, and from the effects of collapsing states will be ineffective and may well backfire. Exclusion tends only to make matters worse by exacerbating economic duress and by breeding resentment and

insecurity. It also reinforces the sense of isolation that fuels revisionist regimes and their claims of encirclement.⁹⁷ Instead, regional formations should seek to include such states in their respective zones of influence, seeking to draw them into the international community through the same centripetal force that pulls the periphery toward the center.⁹⁸ A regional division of labor makes the most sense over the long term, with North American states focusing on Central and South America, European countries concentrating on the Middle East, Africa, and Southwest Asia, and East Asian states focusing on South and Southeast Asia.

The potentially negative consequences of exclusion also apply to Russia, which is falling into a geopolitical no-man's-land between a rising East Asia and a Europe that is expanding toward Russia's borders. Two courses of action deserve consideration. First, Russia could be encouraged to reconstruct its own regional formation by deepening the Commonwealth of Independent States. The key problem is that this formation may prove to be coercive rather than consensual in character. If excluded from preponderant formations to its east and west, Russia may well construct a union aimed at power accretion rather than power management. The preferable alternative is for the EU and NATO to open their doors to Russia and seek to incorporate the former Soviet Union into a broader European construction.⁹⁹ At present, neither the EU nor NATO is keen to extend its reach beyond Central Europe. Both institutions fear the dilution and diminishing effectiveness that accompany large membership.¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, ensuring that Russia is included in Europe should be a central item on the agenda as core states seek to address and redress the geopolitics of exclusion.

Conclusion

America at present arguably has more influence over international politics than any other great power in history. Accordingly, it may seem paradoxical to call upon the United States to begin preparing for the demise of Pax Americana. However, it is precisely because of its preponderant power and the stability it affords that the United States has the ability and the luxury to look beyond the horizon. Preparing for the future entails neither the retrenchment nor the disengagement of American power. On the contrary, the United States should sustain global hegemony for as long as it can. But in the meantime, it should follow three guidelines to ensure that American unipolarity, when its time comes, peacefully gives way to a benign tripolarity.

First, the United States must deepen its commitment to self-binding and ensure that it exercises its preponderant power with restraint and moderation. Doing so means strengthening multilateral institutions and reliance on consensual forms of international governance. As the leading state in the world, the United States, through the benign exercise of its power, will both enable and encourage through emulation others to do the same. More important, the United States needs to buy more time for unipolar regional formations to develop. Behavior that induces balancing against U.S. power

would lead to the untimely demise of American unipolarity, in turn interrupting the processes of regional integration made possible by America's benign leadership. The United States must therefore avoid unilateralism and overbearing behavior, which promise only to squander American preponderance and precipitate premature return to a competitive multipolarity.¹⁰¹

Second, the United States should make the consolidation of pluralistic cores in Europe and East Asia a top priority. Even if Washington loses some of its leverage abroad as a result, it is in America's long-term interest to foster benign centers of power in both regions. The United States should help strengthen Europe's core by dealing with France and Germany collectively rather than individually. A Paris-Bonn-Washington dialogue could be formalized through regular ministerial meetings.¹⁰² The United States should also encourage initiatives such as the joint visit to Moscow in March 1998 of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Jacques Chirac. And to the extent possible, Washington should encourage greater Franco-German cooperation and activism in managing European security.

Moving China and Japan toward partnership is a far more complicated task. The United States must begin simply by making clear that it supports a much more dense and independent bilateral relationship between Beijing and Tokyo. The United States needs to remain engaged to reassure both parties, but must no longer stand in the way of a Sino-Japanese rapprochement. In this respect, the United States should make clear to Japan that its strategic dependence on American power is not a viable solution to its security needs over the long term. To help pave the way for a regional alternative, Washington should encourage Japan to address openly its wartime behavior, the only lasting antidote to the historical memories that continue to poison Sino-Japanese relations. The United States should simultaneously press hard to initiate a meaningful security dialogue between Beijing and Tokyo. The agenda should include regular sharing of information, exchange of military personnel and politicians, and joint exercises, as well as discussion of territorial disputes, theater missile defense, and disposal of chemical weapons. The United States should also facilitate increasing economic cooperation between China and Japan, particularly in the areas of transportation and energy infrastructure. Again, the United States should serve as a catalyst for bilateral programs that then proceed under their own steam.

Third, the United States needs to give regionalism precedence over global multilateralism – even at the expense of global trade flows – and pay greater heed to the geopolitical implications of regional integration. The success of U.S. policies in the Americas, Europe, and East Asia should be measured not by their ability to maximize American influence, but by their ability to promote self-sustaining and peaceful regional orders. President Clinton is right that America is the world's "indispensable nation." But the United States must use that unique station to make itself dispensable and to erect regional structures of order capable of withstanding the demise of American preponderance. The days of Pax Americana are numbered. Now is the time to ensure that the global stability and prosperity it has fostered are not.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank participants in seminars at the following institutions for their thoughtful comments: Hebrew University, Columbia University, University of California at San Diego, Council on Foreign Relations, Georgetown University, University of California at Berkeley, Harvard University, Okazaki Institute (Tokyo), the American Center (Tokyo), and the Danish Institute of International Affairs (Copenhagen). The critiques of Michael Barnett, Richard Betts, Albert Fishlow, Gary Hufbauer, Clifford Kupchan, Joseph Leggold, Gideon Rose, Peter Trubowitz, Ole Waever, Fareed Zakaria, and the reviewers of *International Security* were particularly helpful. For research assistance, I would like to thank Jason Davidson, Delphine Park, and Mira Sucharov.

Notes

1. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5–56.

2. For general analysis of the secular processes through which the locus of preponderant power changes over time, see Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981). During the second half of the twentieth century, U.S. economic output has fallen from roughly one-half to one-quarter of gross world product. See Jeffrey Frankel, *Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997), p. 6.

3. Even if American hegemony lasts for decades more, debate about crafting a posthegemonic order should take place now, while U.S. preponderance is still sufficient to maintain the status quo. It is far more prudent to put in place the foundation of a durable order by design than simply to wait until current arrangements unravel. Many analysts agree that U.S. preponderance will not last, but few have given thought to how the prospect of decline should affect U.S. grand strategy. One exception is Christopher Layne. Layne calls for a U.S. grand strategy of offshore balancing to conserve U.S. resources and to help protect the United States from getting dragged into distant conflicts. He fails to address, however, how to promote peace as the United States withdraws from existing commitments. Instead, he makes the case that the United States should simply stand aloof from the regional conflicts likely to emerge in the wake of an American retrenchment. See Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86–124.

4. On the democratic peace, see Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151–1169. On the declining utility of warfare, see Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); and John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

5. See, for example, Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1911).

6. Important critiques of the democratic peace hypothesis have been collected in two edited volumes: Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996); and Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., *Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer?* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).

7. On the greater stability of bipolarity, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881–909; and Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future." For arguments in favor of multipolarity, see Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (April 1964), pp. 390–406. For general discussion of polarity and stability, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 5–57; and Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist

Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49–88.

8. See the exchange between John Mearsheimer and his critics in "Promises, Promises: Can Institutions Deliver?" *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39–93.

9. The limitations of current thinking about the emerging international system stem in part from the high disciplinary walls that still stand between international political economy and security studies. The study of regionalism and institutions such as the EU, the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) remains primarily the domain of economists and political economists trained to think about exchange and wealth creation. The study of geopolitics, polarity, and institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains primarily the domain of security specialists. A limited degree of fertilization across these disciplinary barriers is occurring, however. Theoretical perspectives traditionally reserved for the study of economic bodies are being used to study security bodies. See, for example, John Duffield, "Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of Regional Security Regimes," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (October 1994), pp. 369–399. And theoretical perspectives traditionally reserved for the study of geopolitics and security are being applied to groupings such as the EU. See, for example, Ole Waever's work on European integration, in particular, "Europe's Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretation of Post-Wall European Security," in Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins, eds., *International Society after the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 220–260. I am indebted to Waever for initially inspiring me to apply the logic of empires to the EU and, consequently, to other regional bodies traditionally viewed primarily as trade groupings. For a contemporary perspective on the geopolitical importance of regional zones of influence, see Charles William Maynes, "A Workable Clinton Doctrine," *Foreign Policy*, No. 93 (Winter 1993), pp. 3–21. For more general works on contemporary regionalism, some of which do touch on geopolitical concerns, see Peter Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraiishi, eds., *Network Power: Japan and Asia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner, eds., *The Political Economy of Regionalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); David Lake and Patrick Morgan, eds., *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 1997); Jeffrey Frankel and Miles Kahler, eds., *Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); and Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds., *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1995).

10. On promoting regional peace as a pathway to global stability, see Joseph S. Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

11. I define the terms "benign" and "self-binding" as follows. Self-binding is the mechanism through which states render their power benign. Self-binding has quantitative, qualitative, and procedural components. In quantitative terms, self-binding entails a state's willingness to withhold power, to refrain from fully exercising its resources and influence. This strategic restraint may be codified, as in the cases of contemporary Germany and Japan, or it may be embodied only in practice. The qualitative component of self-binding concerns the ends to which power is exercised. Benign states seek to manage rather than maximize power, to promote joint gains rather than to behave in an extractive and exploitative manner, and to erect orders based upon the notion that the spread of shared norms and identities and the formation of community at the international level can overcome competitive relations among atomistic state units. The procedural component of self-binding entails a preference for multilateral over unilateral initiative. Benign states favor consensual governance, and resort to unilateral decisionmaking only when multilateralism fails to produce an acceptable outcome.

12. The notion that great powers have character and pursue different types of behavior has firm roots in classical realism. Classical realists regularly distinguish between revisionist and status quo powers. See, for example, Arnold Wolfers, "The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice," in Wolfers, ed., *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); Randall Schweller, "Tripolarity and

the Second World War," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 73-103; Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; and Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment." I am extending this typology to include benign powers. Revisionist states seek to overturn the prevailing system through acquisitive and predatory strategies. Status quo states seek to preserve the prevailing system by pursuing competitive, but not acquisitive, strategies. Benign states seek not just to preserve the status quo, but to deepen its stability and cooperative character by reassuring other states and fostering consensual governance through the withholding as well as the exercise of power. The key difference between a status quo state and a benign state stems from diverging conceptions of the sources of order and stability. Stability in a world of status quo states stems from the absence of strategic rivalry among satisfied – but atomistic and self-regarding – state units still residing in an anarchic environment. The security dilemma does not operate because no revisionist state exists to trigger it. Stability in a world of benign states stems from successful efforts to carve out nonanarchic space through promoting cooperation, trust, and shared values and identities. The security dilemma does not operate because states no longer reside in an anarchic, self-help setting.

13. Consider how important both the structure and character of power are to the stability of the current international system. The asymmetry associated with American preponderance creates structural hierarchy. Other major states are not balancing against U.S. preponderance in part because of stark power asymmetry, but also because they view U.S. intentions as benign, not as exploitative or predatory. Were U.S. behavior to become predatory, its preponderance would trigger the formation of balancing coalitions, such as those formed against Germany and Japan in the 1930s.

14. See Ole Wæver, "Integration as Security," in Charles A. Kupchan, ed., *Atlantic Security: Contending Visions* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998); and Peter J. Katzenstein, "United Germany in an Integrating Europe," in Katzenstein, ed., *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).

15. Daniel Deudney, "The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, circa 1787-1861," *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 191-228.

16. It is the power-checking quality of benign unipolarity that distinguishes it from its main conceptual competitor – hegemony. According to hegemonic stability theory, the stronger the hegemon and the more able it is to provide public goods, the more stable the order. See Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 31-32. In contrast, benign unipolarity emerges not from the hegemon's imposition of order, but through negotiation between the core and its surrounding periphery. The result is a hierarchical order that is more multilateral in spirit and practice than that envisaged in hegemonic stability theory. Furthermore, order emerges through the withholding of power as well as its application. In this sense, and contrary to hegemonic stability theory, a weaker core and one that exercises self-restraint will lead to a more cohesive and durable regional formation than will a stronger and domineering one. The less preponderant and the more benign the core, the more it relies on bargains to establish order and the less fearful smaller states are of exploitation resulting from gross power asymmetries.

The differences between hegemony and benign unipolarity help resolve a long-standing puzzle: why regional institutions in Europe are far more developed than in North America or East Asia. If power asymmetry alone were the main determinant of institutionalized regional order, the reverse should be true. The United States and Japan have been more preponderant in their respective regions than has been either Germany or the Franco-German coalition. For measures of the relative preponderance of the United States, Japan, and Germany in their respective regions, see Joseph Grieco, "Systemic Sources of Variation in Regional Institutionalization in Western Europe, East Asia, and the Americas," in Mansfield and Milner, *The Political Economy of Regionalism*, pp. 173-175.

The notion of benign unipolarity explains why regionalism in Europe is the most advanced. Europe's less stark asymmetries engender greater reliance on consensual governance. If Europe is to construct unipolarity, it must do so through negotiation between core and

periphery. North America's unipolarity comes without trying because of U.S. preponderance. As a result, institutionalized governance is emerging only gradually, as the United States recognizes the advantages associated with withholding power and playing by the rules of multilateralism. In Asia as well, a combination of stark asymmetries and fear about whether the core will exercise its power in a benign manner has inhibited the emergence of institutionalized regional order. Power asymmetry must be pronounced enough to establish hierarchy, but not so pronounced that it inhibits a consensual regional formation. For a similar argument about the extent to which less hegemony may produce more regionalism, see Donald Crone, "Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganization of the Pacific Political Economy," *World Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (July 1993), pp. 501–525.

17. I include both forms of power constraint in the notion of self-binding introduced above. Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry use the term "co-binding" to refer exclusively to external power-constraint devices in which states bind one another. See Deudney and Ikenberry, "Structural Liberalism: The Nature and Sources of Postwar Western Political Order," *Review of International Studies* (forthcoming).

18. The power-constraint devices that moderate external relations among EU members are not as robust as those that govern internal politics within the United States, but they are based on the same underlying logic. Indeed, were European integration to deepen considerably in the years ahead and lead to a federal union, the power-constraint devices that now operate among its individual states would be transformed into constitutional checks operating within a single, amalgamated polity.

19. See G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Summer 1990), pp. 283–315.

20. Recent history has played an important role in bringing about this reevaluation of the benefits of maintaining extensive external commitments. The colonial empires of the early twentieth century collapsed in part because the cores became unable to support the wide range of commitments they had acquired. So too were both great powers of the late twentieth century chastened by costly and futile attempts to maintain order in their respective peripheries.

21. See Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987); Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Charles A. Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).

22. A mildly constructivist perspective informs the analysis throughout this article. A starting assumption is that international structure can be shaped by willful agency and practice and is not simply an immutable product of the distribution of material power among state units. Cooperative interaction among states can shape identities and interests, in turn creating shared understandings of structure that diverge from traditional notions of self-help and competitive anarchy. See Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391–425. My analysis differs from Wendt's in an important respect. Wendt is a structuralist and takes sovereign states to be the key unit of analysis. Interaction between states can alter how states understand the attributes of a given structure, but practice does not change structure – as defined by the distribution of material power. In contrast, I am arguing that certain states – France and Germany are prime examples – engage in practices that pool sovereignty and, in so doing, transform the units that constitute structure, not just the attributes of a given structure.

23. Although France and Germany maintain separate national governments and capitals, they are engaging in practices (joint decisionmaking, a single market and currency, and joint military forces) that pool sovereignty, give the coalition attributes of unitary governance, and therefore endow it with aspects of constituting a single pole. I am relying on the notion of a pluralistic core to capture the type of political unit represented by the Franco-German coalition.

24. An intellectual tension admittedly exists between my claim that strategic restraint is becoming an embedded feature of international politics and my insistence on the need for structural sources of stability. Why bother with constructing order based on structural hierarchy if the exercise of strategic restraint will itself moderate competition? Structural sources of stability for two reasons remain important even in a world of benign states. First, although benign great powers refrain from predatory behavior, they still expect the advantages, influence, and prestige

that accompany superiority. To take seriously the notion of carving out nonanarchic space does not mean denying that power still matters a great deal. Germany, for example, exercises self-restraint in Europe and works hard to embed the national state in a supranational political space, but nonetheless expects to be the EU's most influential actor. To pretend otherwise and resist the hierarchy that devolves from power asymmetries would only alienate major states and provide incentives for them to diverge from benign behavior. Second, structural sources of stability provide insurance against the breakdown of unit-level sources that are more prone to unforeseen shock and rapid change. The Concert of Europe, for example, functioned smoothly as long as the governing regimes in its five members adhered to agreed norms of behavior. The revolutions of 1848, however, led to widespread domestic upheavals that undermined the Concert, rapidly bringing competitive balancing back to a multipolar Europe. Had structural sources of stability also been operative, European peace may well have weathered the unit-level changes that caused the Concert to unravel. See Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161. On the revolutions of 1848 and the end of the Concert, see pp. 142-143, n. 81.

25. See, for example, Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State*; and Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," pp. 14-16. For a contrary view arguing that conquest still pays in the contemporary era, see Peter Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay?* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). For a critique of Liberman's arguments, see Charles Kupchan's review of his book in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 1008-1009.

26. Consider the effect of preparations for monetary union on the political economies of EU member states or the extent to which the international community's intervention in the Asian economic crisis has affected domestic politics and business practices in the region. In addition, peripheral states usually need to meet certain political criteria to gain access to contemporary regional formations, inducing them to carry out domestic reforms. Consider the powerful effect that prospective membership in the EU and NATO has had on reform in Central Europe.

27. See Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*; and Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics."

28. See Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 317-356.

29. John Mueller argues in *Retreat from Doomsday* that this social transformation has been driven by moral change; war has become unthinkable. Edward Luttwak blames declining birthrates and the resultant reluctance to lose children in battle as a major factor changing attitudes toward war. See Luttwak "Where Are the Great Powers?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4 (July/August 1994), pp. 23-28.

30. Compare Russia's indifference toward the prospect of EU enlargement to its staunch opposition to NATO enlargement. Despite the aggregate economic and military power of EU member states, Russia sees the EU as a benign formation that does not threaten its security. How regional groupings perceive the character of each other's power will be far more important than capability itself in determining the tenor of interregional relations.

31. The Common Agricultural Policy and other tariff and nontariff barriers have discriminated against extraregional states, but they have been central to the political deals struck in order to deepen integration and create a unipolar structure. Intra-regional trade as a percentage of total trade is higher in Europe than in North America and East Asia. As of 1990, intraregional exports as a percentage of total exports stood at roughly 60 percent for Europe and roughly 40 percent for North America and East Asia. See Grieco, "Systemic Sources of Variation," p. 172. Interestingly, the United States during the early post-World War II years did not object to European protectionism, precisely because Washington appreciated the geopolitical significance of fostering regional integration. See Frankel, *Regional Trading Blocs*, p. 5.

32. My argument rests on the assumption that an increase in commercial rivalry between regions would not result in security competition. This assumption in turn rests on the hypothesis that commercial rivalries become security rivalries only when for other reasons the parties

come to see each other as geopolitical rivals. For example, economic competition between Britain and the United States could today lead to a security dilemma only if for reasons other than commercial rivalry the two parties no longer held benign images of each other. A perception of threat and malign intent is necessary to transform economic competition into strategic rivalry. How commercial rivalries evolve into violent conflict has received insufficient attention in the scholarly literature. For thoughtful analysis of one case study and initial hypotheses, see Jack Levy and Salvatore Ali, "From Commercial Competition to Strategic Rivalry to War: The Rise of Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, 1609-1652," in Paul Diehl, ed., *The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1988), pp. 29-63. The argument that benign states tend to pursue absolute, as opposed to relative, gains with each other is of direct relevance here. See Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726.

33. For discussion of ascriptive, linguistic, and cultural barriers to amalgamation, see Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 64-73.

34. As Fareed Zakaria has recently documented, the United States did not pursue ambitious external policies until the locus of authority shifted from the individual states to the federal government and from Congress to the executive branch. See Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998). Even though regional blocs would contain enormous power capabilities, their decentralized nature would limit their ability to project power externally. In this respect, the federal aspirations coming from some quarters in Europe should be discouraged because their fulfillment could trigger external ambition and foster interregional security competition.

35. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance, 1997-1998* (London: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 18, 37, 221. In 1990 U.S. GDP was five times that of all of Latin America combined. See Peter Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 224.

36. Andrew Wyatt-Walter, "Regionalism, Globalization, and World Economic Order," in Fawcett and Hurrell, *Regionalism in World Politics*, p. 101.

37. For a succinct overview of the history of American involvement in Central and South America, see Smith, *Talons of the Eagle*.

38. Steady increases in intraregional flows of trade and investment were largely market-driven, with institutions following from and not preceding high levels of economic interdependence. See Albert Fishlow and Stephan Haggard, "The United States and the Regionalization of the World Economy" (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1992), pp. 17, 32.

39. The United States to some degree engaged in the quantitative and qualitative components of self-binding well before the 1980s. Had it not, its preponderance would likely have triggered far more balancing in the periphery. It was not until the 1980s, however, that the United States also began to practice procedural self-binding - that is, to prefer multilateral to unilateral initiative. American power was thus exercised in a relatively benign manner (with some notable exceptions) well before the 1980s, but became more benign with the shift toward regional multilateralism.

40. For discussion of the evolution of consensual strains in U.S. policy, see Augusto Varas, "From Coercion to Partnership: A New Paradigm for Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere," in Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Schoultz, and Augusto Varas, eds., *The United States and Latin America in the 1990s: Beyond the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), pp. 46-63.

41. Fishlow and Haggard, "The United States and the Regionalization of the World Economy," pp. 8, 23.

42. Canada and Mexico have not always dealt with U.S. preponderance by willingly submitting to American power and seeking to modify its conduct. During the Cold War, in part because U.S. attention and power were concentrated elsewhere, Canada in particular attempted to mix balancing and bandwagoning and to resist U.S. influence by developing linkages to extraregional states and multilateral forums. NAFTA represents a considered shift to a policy

of bandwagoning in which both Canada and Mexico have decided to seek leverage over U.S. power rather than to resist it. See Andrew Hurrell, "Regionalism in the Americas," in Fawcett and Hurrell, *Regionalism in World Politics*, pp. 269–273.

43. Wyatt-Walter, "Regionalism, Globalization, and World Economic Order," p. 85.

44. For a concise summary of the motivations behind NAFTA, see Hurrell, "Regionalism in the Americas," pp. 269–273; and Smith, *Talons of the Eagle*, pp. 245–260.

45. The Clinton administration's rescue of the plunging peso in 1994–95, for example, resulted in an extraordinary degree of American intervention in the Mexican economy. In return for U.S. and International Monetary Fund assistance, Mexico was obligated to deposit its oil export revenue at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and to introduce a stabilization plan that covered fiscal and monetary policy, banking reform, and social programs.

46. Hurrell, "Regionalism in the Americas," p. 272.

47. Regionalism in North America lacks the explicit identity-building agenda found in Europe. The scope and character of American preponderance in part explains why. In light of the powerful cultural magnetism of the United States, asserting a distinctive identity and preserving cultural autonomy remain issues of considerable political saliency in both Canada and Mexico. Despite the fear of America's "cultural imperialism" and the absence of more overt identity-building instruments, survey data reveal that the attitudes of Americans, Mexicans, and Canadians are converging around a set of core values. See Ronald L. Inglehart, Neil Nevitte, and Miguel Basañez, *The North American Trajectory: Cultural, Economic, and Political Ties among the United States, Canada, and Mexico* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1996).

48. Schuman quoted in Gregory F. Treverton, *America, Germany, and the Future of Europe* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 104. Even scholars who have focused primarily on the economic implications of the EU acknowledge that the "overriding motivation behind the foundation of the European Economic Community was to bind Germany to France so that there would never be a repeat of the three wars that they had fought over the preceding century." See Frankel, *Regional Trading Blocs*, p. 241.

49. Some analysts contend that the process of integration remains dependent on a U.S. presence and that the EU would be unable to sustain its political coherence were America's strategic role on the continent to wane. See Joseph Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy*, No. 54 (Spring 1984), pp. 64–82; and Robert Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1–39.

50. Katzenstein, "United Germany in an Integrating Europe," p. 15.

51. IISS, *The Military Balance, 1997–1998*, pp. 46–100.

52. Katzenstein, "United Germany in an Integrating Europe," pp. 26–27, 42–43. On decisionmaking and the evolution of EU institutions, see Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); Alberta Sbragia, ed., *Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992); and Andrew Moravcsik, ed., *Centralization or Fragmentation?: Europe before the Challenges of Deepening, Diversity, and Democracy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998).

53. On European monetary union, see Peter Kenen, *Economic and Monetary Union in Europe* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey Frieden, eds., *The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994).

54. Helmut Kohl, speech at the University of Louvain, Belgium, February 1, 1996, as cited in "Kohl Issues New Warning to Britain over EU Reform," Agence France-Presse, February 2, 1996. On the motivations behind monetary union, see also Wayne Sandholtz, "Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht," *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1993), pp. 1–40; and Joseph Grieco, "State Interests and International Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 176–222.

55. For an analysis suggesting that poorer economies in Europe's south do not stand to benefit economically from monetary union, see Erik Jones, "Economic and Monetary Union: Playing with Money," in Moravcsik, *Centralization or Fragmentation?*; and Lloyd Gruber,

"Power Politics and the Transformation of European Monetary Relations," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 1996.

56. The EU has deployed a host of community-building mechanisms, including a flag and soon a common currency, cultural, educational, and media programs, and a European parliament.

57. The incorporation of France as part of a pluralistic European power center facilitates Germany's ability to be an underprovider of security. Germany and France have arrived at a division of labor in which Bonn serves as the engine behind economic integration while Paris focuses more on political-military issues. France's force-projection capabilities, its willingness to use them, and its nuclear weapons make it well suited to this role. Nevertheless, France demonstrates more interest in flexing its muscles in former colonial areas in the Middle East and Africa than in working to deepen the EU's ability to manage security within Europe. The EU's power center thus promises to continue its strategic stinginess and to remain reluctant to take on increased commitments. See Philip H. Gordon, "Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 74-100.

58. Although the EU has formalized its economic relationship with Turkey and has developed a set of informal ties with states in North Africa and the Middle East, these states are not likely candidates for membership.

59. Japan's economic preponderance has in recent decades endowed Asia with aspects of unipolarity. In 1990 Japan's GDP represented over 70 percent of East Asia's total GDP. See Grieco, "Systemic Sources of Variation," p. 174. Japan's economic preponderance does not, however, produce effective regional unipolarity for three reasons. First, Japan does not maintain a military establishment commensurate with its economic capability and in fact shuns regional leadership in the security realm. It relies almost entirely on the United States to manage regional security. Second, the legacy of World War II and the absence of reconciliation with former adversaries, including China, mean that Japan is not viewed as a benign power within the region. Japan's commitment to self-binding therefore does not have the same reassuring effect as Germany's. Accordingly, were Japan to pursue a more ambitious regional role, its neighbors would likely engage in balancing rather than bandwagoning. Third, China's rise and the absence of a Sino-Japanese coalition increasingly dilute Japan's economic predominance. On China's growing economic power and its effect on regional patterns of influence, see Mark Selden, "China, Japan, and the Regional Political Economy of East Asia, 1945-1995," in Katzenstein and Shiraishi, *Network Power*, pp. 306-340.

60. For discussion of the potential sources of instability in East Asia, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; and Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 34-77.

61. Peter Katzenstein contends that regional integration in Asia has proceeded much further than meets the eye; the absence of visible forms of interstate cooperation is in part a product of social and political norms that favor informal political and economic networks over European-style (institutions). See "Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective," in Katzenstein and Shiraishi, *Network Power*, pp. 1-44. I agree with Katzenstein that state-society relations and political norms in East Asia are quite different from those in Europe. Regional integration in East Asia therefore follows its own path and would likely be less institutionalized than in Europe even if further along. But I maintain that political integration in the region is still at a very low level in relative terms, largely because of tensions and rivalries among East Asia's major states and the extent to which the United States remains the main conduit for contact among them.

62. ASEAN is a clear exception, but it does not include, and indeed was formed in part to balance against, the region's major powers.

63. It is of course impossible to prove the counterfactual: that regional integration in East Asia would have proceeded much further if the United States had not discouraged it and insisted on creating a hub-spoke pattern of relations with Washington at the center. Available evidence makes clear, however, that American opposition played a significant role in dissuading Japan and other regional states from pursuing Asia-only multilateral forums. On the evolution of this

hub-spoke pattern of security relations and Washington's efforts to maintain it, see Bruce Cumings, "Japan and Northeast Asia into the Twenty-first Century," pp. 136-168, and Susume Yamakage, "Japan's National Security and Asia-Pacific's Regional Institutions in the Post-Cold War Era," pp. 275-305, both in Katzenstein and Shiraishi, *Network Power: Frankel, Regional Trading Blocs*, pp. 266-267; and Edward Lincoln, *Japan's New Global Role* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993), pp. 186-191. For evidence that fear of U.S. disengagement leads to greater cooperation between Japan and Korea, see Victor Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, forthcoming).

64. Data from IISS, *The Military Balance, 1997-1998*, pp. 173-198. I included in these comparisons all Asian members of APEC, including Australia and New Zealand. Hong Kong's GDP was counted as part of China's, while Taiwan's GDP and defense spending were included as part of the aggregate periphery.

65. I ask skeptical readers to think back to 1945 and question how likely it then seemed that France and Germany would form a coalition that would become the core of a peaceful and integrated Europe. To be sure, France and Germany benefited from conditions not present in Asia: a common external threat and similar levels of economic and political development. Nevertheless, as China continues to modernize, its economy and domestic political environment are likely to follow the same trajectory as other developing states in East Asia. Moreover, as the Concert of Europe demonstrated, similarity of domestic regime type is not necessary for great power cooperation. Britain and France were developing parliamentary institutions, while Prussia, Russia, and Austria were staunch defenders of monarchy.

66. See Susan Shirk, "Asia-Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers?" in Lake and Morgan, *Regional Orders*, pp. 245-270.

67. On the degree to which, and the mechanisms through which, intraregional trade and investment flows have positioned Japan at the center of a regional economy, see Frankel and Kahler, *Regionalism and Rivalry*; and the chapters by T.J. Pempel, Takashi Shiraishi, Richard Doner, and Mark Selden in Katzenstein and Shiraishi, *Network Power*.

68. See Robert Gilpin, "APEC in a New International Order," in Donald Hellmann and Kenneth Pyle, eds., *From APEC to Xanadu* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 30-34. For a thorough description of APEC, see Yoichi Funabashi, *Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1995).

69. Hadi Soesastro, "The Institutional Framework for APEC: An ASEAN Perspective," in Chia Siow Yue, ed., *APEC: Challenges and Opportunities* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994).

70. ASEAN foreign ministers began in 1994 to host consultations with their counterparts from the United States, Japan, Canada, the EU, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea. This multilateral forum became known as the ARF. India and Burma became members of the ARF in 1996. See Yuen Foong Khong, "Evolving Regional Security and Economic Institutions," *Southeast Asian Affairs 1995* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995), pp. 48-60.

71. Soesastro, "The Institutional Framework for APEC," pp. 46-47. See also Fishlow and Haggard, "The United States and the Regionalization of the World Economy," pp. 29-33.

72. This is an important and counterintuitive point. Pluralistic cores, precisely because power resources and authority are divided between two (or more) separate states, may be more conducive than amalgamated cores to the cohesion and durability of regional formations. The states that comprise a pluralistic core need to strike a bargain with each other about power sharing, and thus will be more inclined to negotiate with the periphery about regional governance. In addition, peripheral states will be less likely to balance against the core because neither its resources nor its authority are concentrated in a unitary state.

73. See Roger C. Altman and Charles A. Kupchan, "Arresting the Decline of Europe," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 1-9. For a pessimistic assessment of the long-term consequences of a single currency, see Martin Feldstein, "EMU and International Conflict," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 6 (November/December 1997), pp. 60-73.

74. Younger Germans, including Bundestag members from Kohl's own party, have made clear that they are more at ease with the national state and less intent on sublimating Germany inside a broader Europe. So too are younger French less fearful of rivalry with Germany and thus less intent on holding their neighbors in a tight embrace. See "One Europe, Up to a Point," *Economist*, September 14, 1996, p. 48; and Andy Pollak, "The Attitude to Europe Is Hard-Headed Acceptance," *Irish Times*, May 20, 1996, p. 10.

75. The Labour Party's 1997 victory in Britain raises the novel possibility that London might be able to help Paris and Bonn forge a compromise vision. Prime Minister Tony Blair appears to be pushing Britain toward much deeper engagement in the EU. The first trip of Blair's foreign minister was to Paris and Bonn, not Brussels or Washington, and the Labour government is far more receptive than its predecessor to Britain's eventual participation in monetary union. It is at least conceivable that Britain will over time take on a guiding role in the evolution of the EU. The British share Germany's perception of the EU as an instrument for binding and managing power, but also share France's appreciation of the importance of power projection. In addition, Britain could help define a middle road between Germany's desire to embed the national state in a supranational union and France's Gaullist insistence on preserving a strong national state.

76. For a sober assessment of the trajectory of Sino-Japanese relations during the 1990s, see Michael Green and Benjamin Self, "Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Realism to Reluctant Realism," *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 35–58.

77. As one indicator of these preferences, the number of Chinese and Japanese students studying in the United States far outweighs the number studying in each other's countries. The number of Japanese students in the United States outweighs the number in China by almost six times. The number of Chinese students in the United States outweighs the number in Japan by just over three times. UNESCO, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1996 (Lanham, Md.: UNESCO Publishing and Bernan Press, 1997), section 3, pp. 397–402.

78. For a similar view of the importance of Sino-Japanese partnership, see Robert Manning, "Haunted by a Bitter Past," *Impact 21* (December 1996), pp. 10–13; and Manning, "Burdens of the Past, Dilemmas of the Future: Sino-Japanese Relations in the Emerging International System," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 45–58. See also Akira Iriye, *China and Japan in the Global Setting* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Mark Selden, "China, Japan, and the Regional Political Economy of East Asia, 1945–1995," in Katzenstein and Shiraishi, *Network Power*, pp. 306–340.

79. See James Kynge "China to Embrace ASEAN in Pursuit of New Order," *Financial Times*, August 25, 1997, p. 3.

80. Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Antimilitarism," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119–150.

81. For a thoughtful treatment of the different ways in which Germany and Japan have dealt with their respective pasts, see Ian Buruma, *The Wages of Guilt* (New York: Meridian, 1994).

82. For discussion of an emerging Asian identity, see Yoichi Funabashi, "The Asianization of Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December 1993), pp. 75–85.

83. On the ability of economic openness to foster political and economic reform in China, see Susan Shirk, "Internationalization and China's Economic Reforms," in Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., *Internationalization and Domestic Politics* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 186–206. On the relationship between liberal domestic coalitions and regional cooperation, see Erel Solingen, "Democracy, Economic Reform, and Regional Cooperation," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 1996), pp. 79–114.

84. See, for example, Ipppei Yamazawa, "On Pacific Economic Integration," *Economic Journal*, Vol. 102, No. 415 (November 1992), pp. 1519–1529.

85. Because of the domestic reforms being implemented in the wake of the crisis and because East Asia enjoys savings and investment rates that are 50 percent higher than those in Europe and "North America, many analysts foresee a return to robust growth for the region. See Steven Radeler and Jeffrey Sachs, "Asia's Reemergence," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 6 (November/December 1997), pp. 44–59. Reform of the Japanese economy and the expansion of domestic demand are particularly important to Asia's recovery. Increased Japanese imports from its

weakened neighbors will not only help stimulate growth, but also deepen regional economic integration.

86. See, for example, Waever, "Integration as Security."

87. Compare recent with earlier developments in the Balkans. At the opening of this century, Europe's great powers raced to carve up the region, often decreasing their own security through excessive engagement. At the close of this century, Europe's powers did their best to stay out of the Balkans, decreasing their own security through too little engagement.

88. NATO members, for example, eventually found the will to intervene in Bosnia with sufficient force not because the intrinsic costs of the conflict grew intolerable, but largely because they feared that continued paralysis would have corrosive effects on NATO and transatlantic relations. See speech by President William Clinton, "Peace in Bosnia: A Dividend of American Leadership," December 6, 1995, delivered to the Committee for American Leadership in Bosnia, Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State, *Dispatch Supplement*, Vol. 6, No. 5 (December 1995), p. 22; and William Odom, "Putting Out the Balkan Fire," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 6 (November/December 1995), pp. 152-153.

89. See Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power."

90. During the 1930s, for example, the French came to view the loss of certain imperial possessions as tantamount to losing metropolitan territory. It was emotive attachment, however, not the intrinsic strategic value of the possessions, that shaped these attitudes. See Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire*, p. 258.

91. Christopher Layne argues in favor of multipolarity by default, contending that the return of multipolar competition among Eurasia's major powers will embroil those states in regional rivalries, reducing their ability and inclination to engage in security competition with the United States. Layne does not provide compelling arguments, however, as to why the United States would find major wars in Europe and East Asia any less threatening to its national security than in the past. See Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing."

92. For discussion of the potential for a stable tripolarity, see Schweller, "Tripolarity and the Second World War," esp. pp. 80, 99-100.

93. See, for example, Jagdish Bhagwati, *The World Trading System at Risk* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991); Robert Hormats, "Making Regionalism Safe," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 2 (March/April 1994), pp. 97-108; Fred Bergsten, "APEC and World Trade," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 3 (May/June 1994), pp. 20-26; and Frankel, *Regional Trading Blocs*. Frankel analyzes in detail the circumstances under which regional trading arrangements facilitate global liberalization.

94. Recent experience suggests that greater emphasis on regional trade would not lead to significant decreases in interregional trade. Economic integration within East Asia, for example, has not come at the expense of its extraregional trade. Between 1970 and 1990, East Asia's share of world trade doubled, while its intraregional trade grew from 30 to 41 percent of its total trade. See Peter Petri, "The East Asian Trading Bloc: An Analytic History," in Frankel and Kahler, *Regionalism and Rivalry*, p. 42. See also T.J. Pempel, "Transpacific Torii: Japan and the Emerging Asian Regionalism," in Katzenstein and Shiraishi, *Network Power*, pp. 81-82.

95. The experience of the 1930s provides ample evidence of the allure of retreating into exclusive trading zones in response to external economic shock. The collapse of an open trading order contributed both to the domestic dislocation that fueled fascism and to the "go-it-alone" attitudes that undermined security cooperation among the democracies.

96. See Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul M. Kennedy, "Pivotal States and U.S. Grand Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 1 (January/February 1996), pp. 33-51.

97. On the foreign policies of revolutionary states and how outside powers should deal with them, see Stephen M. Walt, *Revolution and War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).

98. Isolating revisionist states may be appropriate in certain cases, especially when the state in question is deliberately attempting to export instability through terrorism or overt acts of aggression against its neighbors. As recent experiences with Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Cuba demonstrate, however, diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions have not proved effective in bringing about regime change.

99. Including Russia in NATO would further transform it from a collective defense to a collective security organization. This transformation is in turn necessary to ensure that NATO's

continuing enlargement does not draw new dividing lines and trigger balancing among excluded states. For further discussion of Russia's inclusion in a broader Europe, see James Goodby, *Europe Undivided: The New Logic of Peace in U.S.-Russian Relations* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998).

100. In addition, a Europe that includes Russia would find itself with two noncontiguous power centers – a Franco-German coalition and Russia. At least on deductive grounds, this formation could trigger intercore balancing as opposed to cooperation. A pluralistic core of contiguous states should be more stable than one of noncontiguous states. Contiguity forces powerful states to extremes – either to move in lockstep to avoid competition or to be rivals in a search for superiority. Core states that are separated by an expanse of land are more likely to have mixed relations. They will likely compete for dominance in the area between them. But this expanse of land also serves as a buffer, making it unnecessary for the parties to choose between close partnership and open rivalry. From this perspective, Russia's inclusion in Europe would not lead to the union's unraveling, but it would impair its coherence by diluting its core. It is also worth noting that unipolar formations have existed without a geographically fixed core. The Carolingian Empire established by Charlemagne in the late eighth century, for example, was ruled from a court that traveled throughout the imperial realm. It is at least conceivable that Brussels could one day become Europe's effective power center or that Europe could be governed by a mobile core, circumventing some of the problems involved in including Russia in a broader Europe. On the Carolingian Empire, see Louis Halphen, *Charlemagne and the Carolingian Empire*, trans. Giselle de Niec (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1977); and Heinrich Fichtenau, *The Carolingian Empire* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).

101. On the importance of basing U.S. grand strategy on multilateralism, see John Gerard Ruggie, *Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

102. Should Britain continue to deepen its engagement in the EU, London might be included in this dialogue as well as in the global directorate mentioned above.

States of Insecurity: Plutonium and Post-Cold War Anxiety in New Mexico, 1992–96

Joseph Masco

Although it is a historic arena of anthropological inquiry, New Mexico is not often thought of as an important site in which to study global (in)security, or, for that matter, to assess the local costs and consequences of the Cold War. Within security studies, after all, the continental United States has traditionally been imagined to be the one stable entity in an anarchy-filled world, the one territorial space that can remain untheorized in the face of a volatile and dangerous international order (see Campbell, 1992). The end of the Cold War has made this conceptual lacuna visible, however, just as the dissolution of the Soviet Union has powerfully demonstrated the fragility of even “superpowered” nation-states. With this in mind, it is important to examine how the end of the Cold War has affected visions of “security” in the West, and within the United States in particular; for the 1990s revealed that the global, dual-structured, oppositional nation building of the Cold War did not transmute insurgent regional identifications or ethnonationalist desires as perhaps once thought.¹ Local ethnic and regional identities were not necessarily unified or superseded by Soviet – or, as I would like to argue here, U.S. – Cold War policies but were complexly and asymmetrically harnessed to them (see Litzinger, this volume). The end of the Cold War, then, not only has necessitated a radical rethinking of the terms of scholarly inquiry into the nature of global order, but also has left a complicated political and cultural legacy as communities express identities, ambitions, and fears once rendered invisible or subsumed under the Cold War dialectics of the nuclear age.

The end of the Cold War is of particular importance in New Mexico, as it was there that the first atomic bomb, as well as the majority of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile, were designed. In significant ways, New Mexico’s nuclear weapons laboratories might even be said to have coauthored the Cold War with their scientific counterparts in the Soviet Union.

Source: Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds), *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 203–31.

Consequently, this essay investigates how reorganizations in global political and economic structures at the end of the Cold War are influencing regional articulations of self and nation in New Mexico, America's own ethnic borderlands. It does so by examining how the activities of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex are experienced by communities in New Mexico, by examining how, in fact, diverse racial, (ethno)national, and political groups that usually fall under the rubric "U.S. citizens" define and experience "U.S. national security" at home. Thus, this essay explores the social imaginaries where concepts of "national security" meet practices of "national sacrifice," where the interests of the sole remaining global superpower collide with those of marginalized indigenous nations, and where U.S. national identity is complexly negotiated and challenged in the everyday life practices of local citizenry. By looking at how neighboring communities alternately experience the "national security" offered by the U.S. nuclear complex in New Mexico, this essay reveals that the nuclear standoff of the Cold War precluded attention to another set of (inter)national relations internal to the United States; it also shows how the end of the Cold War has made visible new spectrums of insecurity that both exceed, and are produced by, U.S. national security policy in the Southwest.

The essay develops in three parts: first, I (re)introduce New Mexico as a subaltern *international* space, whose populations were complexly harnessed to a Cold War nation-building enterprise through the U.S. nuclear weapons complex; second, I examine how the quintessential commodity of the Cold War – plutonium – continues to generate widespread insecurity in New Mexico; and, in a concluding section, I draw on the New Mexico context to explore the value of expanding, and significantly decentering, concepts of "security" in the post-Cold War era.

Rethinking (Inter)national Relations in the U.S. Southwest

To investigate "national security" in New Mexico requires engaging the complex histories and competing national identities that inform everyday life in the U.S. Southwest, which is among the most politically contested regions in North America. Consider for a moment the diverse claims now made in New Mexico on historical presence, territorial identity, and legal status. The U.S. Southwest is a geographic area first inhabited by the scores of Native American nations that have maintained a territorial sovereignty there "from time immemorial."² The Southwest, it should be remembered, was an (ethno)national borderlands long before the arrival of Europeans, and from an indigenous perspective alone remains a remarkably complex cultural region. Today, seven indigenous languages are spoken by twenty-two tribes in New Mexico. And in just the one hundred-mile stretch of the Rio Grande River roughly bounded by Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos, New Mexico) to the north and Sandia National Laboratory (Albuquerque, New Mexico) to the south, sixteen pueblos maintain territorial sovereignties manifested in their own tribal governments, police forces, courts, and legal codes.

This indigenous reality is complicated by the fact that when the U.S. Declaration of Independence was signed in 1776, much of the Southwest (and notably what is today New Mexico) had already been an established part of the Spanish Empire for nearly two hundred years. After the war of independence with Spain in 1821, the Southwest became the northern half of the United States of Mexico, before falling twenty-seven years later to the United States of America in the Mexican-American War. With the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, the United States gained more than a million square miles, nearly doubling its total territory and thereby securing its control of North America (see del Castillo, 1990; Meinig, 1993). Most important for local communities, the U.S. Southwest was taken in a war of conquest with Mexico, providing ethnic groups in New Mexico, both indigenous and European, with a visceral experience, and an ongoing negotiation, of U.S. colonization. Today, the extensive land grants given by the Spanish and Mexican governments to their citizens, which were reaffirmed by the U.S. government in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, remain in legal dispute in the area and are a perennial source of regional tension.³ For much of the Nuevomexicano (or Spanish-speaking) population, New Mexico is alternately a Hispano homeland, a unique enclave of Spanish cultural identity, or "Aztlán," the sacred homeland of the Aztec empire, and thus the geographic center of an indigenous Chicano nation.⁴ A consistent theme within both contemporary Native American and Nuevomexicano experience is, therefore, the battle to overcome the historical amnesia in American political life and to communicate the continuing social impacts of being forcibly incorporated into the United States.⁵

Remarkably, the same area of the north-central Rio Grande Valley that has been the epicenter of cultural resistance movements in New Mexico from the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 through the Hispano land-grant battles of the 1890s and the Chicano activism of the 1960s, has also been subject to U.S. government appropriations of land under "national security" guidelines since the atomic bomb project came to Los Alamos in 1943 (Rothman, 1992). Today, New Mexico, like much of the Southwest, remains a U.S. military colony: it is the center of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, where the first atomic bomb was developed and tested, home to two of the three U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories (Los Alamos and Sandia), the only permanent repository for U.S. military nuclear waste (the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant), the largest above-ground missile-testing range in the United States (the White Sands Missile Range), and other military installations.⁶ In the post-Cold War period, New Mexico's military role has only expanded in importance, with increasing evidence that the twenty-first-century U.S. nuclear weapons complex might be consolidated along the Rio Grande (U.S. Department of Energy, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force, 1995).

Each of these "national imaginings" – Native American, Nuevomexicano, and U.S. military-industrial – evokes a different sense of territorial identity as well as a different approach to "national security" (Anderson, 1991; cf. Ballinger, this volume). I want to argue here that traditional approaches to U.S. national security policy quickly become problematic if one acknowledges

the complicated, power-laden, and historically suppressed international politics that surround national security institutions in the U.S. Southwest. A close analysis of how "security" issues are elaborated in contested regional spaces such as New Mexico, in fact, demonstrates that the universalistic approaches to "sovereignty," "security," and "citizenship" that have typified Cold War security studies render invisible the political tensions and human experiences that structure everyday life in much of the world. For example, what conceptual space is there in Cold War security studies or international relations theory for the national security of a "domestic, dependent nation" (the official legal definition of Native American territories in the United States)? The ambiguous international legal standing of nations that are "domestic" and/or "dependent" has enabled ongoing violence throughout the Americas toward indigenous populations, yet these kinds of conflicts have rarely entered into the formal debates about foreign policy, international relations, or national security. Similarly, how should we now talk about the "security" of the traditional Spanish-speaking populations in New Mexico, who have periodically taken to armed protest against the U.S. government to assert their ownership of land and to affirm cultural rights validated by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (e.g., see Gardner, 1970; Rosenbaum, 1981; Pulido, 1996)? It is within this ambiguous legal and national context that the U.S. nuclear weapons complex operates in New Mexico, folding the logics of "U.S. national security" back on themselves and requiring a more expansive conceptual approach to the production of (in)security. Today, in fact, New Mexico might best be approached as a *multinational*, multicultural state, an arena of proliferating and contradictory visions of national identity, where the U.S. government is merely the most dominant legal entity.

But how should we approach a territorial space this complex, where the Cold War rhetorics of "communist containment" become eerily resonant with the reservation system in the United States, or where Nuevomexicano residents will sometimes self-identify more with downtrodden Palestinians than with other "U.S. citizens," or where living next to a nuclear facility may present more immediate threats to personal health and safety than the thermonuclear arsenals of countries overseas? In this essay, my approach has been to "decenter" security studies, to explore how neighboring communities alternatively experience danger and risk, and to investigate how they express that danger in relation to one another. More specifically, my method has been to look at how local populations mobilize strategically to forward ethnonational identifications and/or U.S. citizenship in their engagements with federal authorities and with each other, and to search out those areas where contesting "national imaginaries" collide (see Anderson, 1991). This essay stands, then, as a kind of case study, an example of how, by looking at the engagement of cross-cultural/international logics in their local complexity, one can see arenas of insecurity once rendered invisible, or as emerging out of the Cold War. By recognizing indigenous sovereignty rights, investigating subaltern legal formations, and placing cultural logics in a comparative perspective, we can not only discover how these diverse national-cultural imaginings in New Mexico

are mutually dependent and interconnected, but also realize how people occupying the same territorial space can nevertheless live in radically different worlds. To make this case, I follow the path of plutonium as it circulates between communities in northern New Mexico, for to do so allows us to locate viscerally and to identify precisely the complex articulations of security and insecurity that now structure everyday life in the U.S. Southwest.

The Plutonium Economy: Insecurities in Post-Cold War New Mexico

Plutonium is not an arbitrary choice for an analysis of (in)security; it is a material that has been crucial to definitions of U.S. national security since World War II and has been equally instrumental in defining areas of “national sacrifice” within nuclear states (see Kuletz, 1998). In fact, one might argue that the unique capabilities of plutonium enabled the Cold War to take the shape that it did (see Rhodes, 1986, 1995). Plutonium remains instrumental in structuring global relations of power in the post-Cold War era, and will be an ever-increasing presence in New Mexico as the U.S. nuclear complex slowly collapses back to its point of origin and the decades of Cold War nuclear research exact their environmental toll. In fact, by tracing how plutonium, as a material commodity, moves in and out of different “commodity phases” and national “regimes of value” in the Rio Grande Valley, one can identify how competing “national insecurities” are articulated there and begin to appreciate how the legacies of the Cold War will continue to generate insecurity for generations to come (Appadurai, 1986a; see also Beck, 1992).

Consider the social contradictions plutonium evokes: First, plutonium is a material that rarely, if ever, has existed in nature, yet because of its quarter-million-year life span and the effects of atmospheric nuclear testing, it is now, for all practical purposes, a permanent aspect of the global ecosystem. Second, as one of the world’s deadlier poisons, it is a material whose military production (from uranium mining to weapon testing to nuclear waste storage) has inevitably produced ecological devastation, but it has, nonetheless, been the basis for definitions of “national security” since 1945.⁷ Put differently, in the name of protecting territorial borders from attack, nuclear powers have practiced an internal cannibalism in the form of multiplying “national sacrifice zones” – areas that are too contaminated for human habitation. Indeed, nuclear states have pursued the “security” offered by plutonium production to the point of bankruptcy, mutual annihilation, and at an unforeseeable cost to future generations.⁸ This complex articulation of national identity through plutonium has also always hidden a colonial dynamic, for lost in the polarizing logics of the Cold War were the most direct victims of nuclear proliferation, the indigenous nations around the globe who have predominantly borne the physical consequences of radioactive material production, weapons testing, and waste storage in their communities.⁹

This reality was implicitly acknowledged in New Mexico in 1992. As officials at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) watched with some incredulity as the Soviet Union fell apart, they turned their attention toward

the nations within. After a half century of silence and in the context of growing public concerns about local cancer rates and environmental damage, LANL set up formal government to government relations with four neighboring Pueblo nations who by default have been intricately involved in the plutonium economy right from the very beginning of the nuclear age. The Pueblos of San Ildefonso, Santa Clara, Jemez, and Cochiti (who have lived with the sound of explosions echoing off canyon walls and wondered about the toxicity of the clouds that drift over their territories from Los Alamos since 1943) achieved a new, post-Cold War, legal recognition of their sovereign status solely by virtue of their forced entry into the plutonium economy. This was not simply an altruistic move by LANL, however, as new environmental laws suddenly put these Pueblo nations in the legal position to set environmental standards for the air, water, and land they share with the laboratory. Although this is an ongoing process, the United States' premier nuclear weapons facility is now responsible to the environmental regulations of four sovereign Pueblo nations. This has contributed to an entirely new political dynamic in New Mexico, one providing new legal power to some indigenous communities, while energizing others, particularly Nuevomexicano and antinuclear groups, to mobilize in an unprecedented manner formally to engage the national security mission of Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Military-Industrial Insecurities: Los Alamos National Laboratory

The plutonium economy in northern New Mexico begins, of course, with the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and specifically at LANL, an institution with a complicated administrative structure. LANL is owned by the Department of Energy in Washington, D.C., but is managed by the University of California from Oakland; it is funded by Congress, yet it has written its own mission statement since the end of World War II. With its regulatory structures on both coasts, LANL has, until very recently, enjoyed a remarkable autonomy in New Mexico. Perched at 7,200 feet on the Pajarito Plateau above the Rio Grande Valley, LANL's central mission has been to pursue scientific answers to U.S. national security questions. The unique explosive capabilities of plutonium have been the laboratory's *raison d'être*. National security at Los Alamos has meant primarily deterring the Soviet nuclear threat through new and improved nuclear weapons. Thus, national security at LANL has traditionally been something that began first overseas; by the 1980s, for example, a Soviet thermonuclear missile could reach the United States with less than ten minutes' warning. Consequently, Los Alamos scientists developed a uniquely global plutonium-mediated vision: national security issues were everywhere, but the ones of most concern were outside the U.S. territorial borders and far away from New Mexico, requiring a global surveillance system and a militarizing of earth, sea, and sky.

The traditional mission of the laboratory, however, dissolved alongside the Soviet Union. Like any culture that has experienced the loss of a cosmology, elder nuclear bomb designers in the 1990s were worried about how to

preserve their cultural knowledge in the face of a rapidly changing world. Some at the laboratory began to describe designing nuclear weapons as a "folk art." Unable to perform underground nuclear tests since 1991, and with a significant weapons dismantlement project under way around the country, weaponeers began archiving their nuclear weapons "folk" knowledge while pursuing a new set of high-tech facilities that would allow them to continue work on nuclear weapons without ever actually exploding one. Increasingly, nuclear weapon scientists will be working in the virtual worlds of computer simulation and not in the hard world of physical experimentation, an important cultural shift that many see as an end to the nuclear weapons complex of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first (cf. Saco, this volume). Simultaneously, the U.S. nuclear weapons complex is slowly collapsing back into New Mexico, with LANL increasingly positioned to become the United States' centralized design and production facility. In the U.S. nuclear stockpile of the mid-1990s, five of the seven nuclear weapon systems were LANL designs and the laboratory had begun, for the first time since the late 1940s, to produce the plutonium "pits" that are the core components in nuclear weapons. By 1995, national security in Los Alamos was defined less through actual deterrence – who exactly was there to deter? – and more through maintaining the ability to resume nuclear weapons production should a new Cold War arise. LANL's official post-Cold War mission was redefined to "Reduce the Global Nuclear Danger" (Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1995), an expansive mission that recentered the institution on nuclear weapons and materials on a global scale, even though no new weapons are officially being designed, and money for cleanup of Cold War military production sites in the United States has been repeatedly cut back.

This new mission, however, has still not provided the laboratory with a clear-cut task or identity. Weapons scientists say privately that "reducing the global nuclear danger" could mean anything and therefore is an inadequate mission statement, except for those few working directly on the nonproliferation of nuclear materials and technologies (see U.S. General Accounting Office, 1995). They yearn for a giant organizing structure, a scientific project on the scale of the Manhattan Project, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or the technical and strategic targeting problems of the Cold War. These projects presented real technological challenges and required unprecedented financial backing. The Brookings Institute, for example, has estimated the total Cold War costs of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal (including development, delivery systems, and cleanup) at more than \$4 trillion – roughly the total U.S. national debt in 1995 (S. Schwartz, 1995). Security expenditures on this scale were a reaction to the perception of a massive exterior threat to the nation. What could fill this void in the post-Cold War era? In the immediate scramble to justify the laboratory's continued presence, the Soviet nuclear threat was soon replaced in Los Alamos by talk of giant killer space asteroids that might need to be pulverized with thermonuclear weapons to protect the Earth from the kind of catastrophe that ended the dinosaur age. This was, however, merely a transitional effort

in oppositional mission building, for the Persian Gulf War soon provided a more terrestrial threat, that of the now ubiquitous “rogue” or “terrorist” state. This conceptual innovation has proven to be a remarkably successful tactic, effectively institutionalizing Cold War–level military expenditures in the United States (Klare, 1995).

One nuclear weapons scientist described the Post–Cold War challenges to the laboratory to me in this way:

The problem is we’ve overdesigned our weapons for safety reasons. It’s part of the craziness surrounding nuclear weapons and there is a lot of that. For example, we were ordered to take beryllium out of nuclear weapons because it’s a poison. Now think about it, you’re worried about the health effects of a bomb that’s in the megaton range! Today you could shoot a bullet through a weapon, light it on fire, drop it out of a plane, and it still won’t go off or release its nuclear components. We developed a form of high explosive that will just barely go off as well. We also worried about how to prevent a weapon falling into the wrong hands – so we designed elaborate security systems and codes on each device that prevent that. Today these weapons will just barely detonate they’re so complicated. Since the end of the Cold War we have had what you call a paradigm shift. We used to think that all the weapons being designed were as complicated as ours – so you would want to track specific nuclear materials associated with those designs. Now we realize that if you aren’t concerned about the safety of your troops or about containing nuclear fallout, and if you just want one bomb, you can do it very quickly. Now some of us have been thinking about how someone might use fertilizer to set off an atomic yield. We’ve seen what could be done with that in Oklahoma City. We now realize that it’s much easier to build a single bomb than we ever thought before. So the question we are asking about proliferation today is: Do you monitor materials or people? I say people because there is too much nuclear material floating around out there to ever effectively monitor it. You’ve got to track the people with the know-how.

Thus, Los Alamos, a technoscientific community that prides itself on having saved the “Free World” from both fascism and communism, and believes it prevented a third world war by implementing a global targeting system for mutually assured destruction, has been reduced, of late, to trying to figure out just who might have the technical knowledge to set off an atomic bomb with fertilizer. This is a far cry from the heady days of the Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s when, quite literally, weapon designers were working on a geoplanetary scale (see Gusterson, 1996; Broad, 1992; Rosenthal, 1990).

Although the laboratory has developed skills suited to global nuclear threats – those presented by governments with huge military capabilities, or needed to track the spread of nuclear materials and weapons components – it has stumbled in dealing with the concerns of local populations in

New Mexico, for local populations do not fit any of the categories developed during the Cold War for international relations. Local populations include indigenous nations that have no standing army, fewer than a thousand citizens, whose political leadership changes every year, and that have a sudden ability directly to influence research activities at the laboratory. Similarly, the laboratory has struggled to negotiate the activities of local nongovernmental organizations that are part of a global antinuclear and peace movement, and are thus not only unwilling to accept LANL's vision of "security" at face value, but also quite interested in focusing international attention and applying legal pressure on LANL activities. Thus, whereas laboratory officials justify the institution's purpose to Congress by talking about intercontinental threats, this kind of "national security" discourse does not necessarily elicit the support of local communities, who, in some cases, are either diametrically opposed to the laboratory's interests and/or find themselves to be only marginal U.S. citizens.

Indigenous Insecurities: The Nations of San Ildefonso and Pojoaque

A thousand feet below Los Alamos at San Ildefonso Pueblo, national security is a much more immediate business than on "the hill," and of foremost concern is protection against the social and environmental impacts of Los Alamos National Laboratory.¹⁰ Government officials at San Ildefonso Pueblo self-identify as the only Native American nation whose recognized territory borders directly on a Department of Energy site. The Pueblo also has had an aboriginal land claim standing in the courts since 1967 for return of the entire Pajarito Plateau, which Los Alamos has occupied since 1943. For San Ildefonso, national security is a brutally local affair: in addition to the perceived health effects of living next to a nuclear facility and recovering the land lost to the Manhattan Project in 1943, national security for the pueblo involves protecting the local ecosystem as well as the thousands of archaeological and religious sites on the plateau from ongoing laboratory activities. It means engaging the present with a long-term view of the future. Having already outlived the Spanish and Mexican territorial governments, Pueblo leaders assume that their nation will also outlive the United States, and today must wonder about the environmental damage they will inherit when the laboratory closes down. In the future, the most serious environmental impacts may derive from the nuclear waste dump that the laboratory has installed on a plateau directly above the Pueblo. The accumulation of radioactive waste buried in shafts and pits at what is known as "Area G" has made it a "national sacrifice zone": an important unresolved question, however, is, for whose nation? San Ildefonso's forced entry into the plutonium economy now presents a "national security" problem of indefinite longevity for the pueblo. Pueblo leaders are responding to these millennial problems by working to train a new generation of Pueblo youth as environmental scientists. The future of the pueblo will increasingly involve monitoring LANL activities and

mobilizing environmental laws to protect the physical, spiritual, and financial security of the tribe from the local effects of U.S. national security policy.

The unique legal status of Pueblo Nations in North America infuses such negotiations with a complicated international context. Pueblo communities were incorporated into the United States in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. Unlike many indigenous nations, they did not enter into individual treaties with the U.S. government but were incorporated as "Mexican citizens." Their aboriginal status, however, was debated for the next sixty years during which many Pueblo communities lost much of their land base before the U.S. government took up formal trust responsibility in 1913 (Simmons, 1979: 213–15; Ortiz, 1980). Although the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo theoretically made all citizens of Mexico in the ceded territories U.S. citizens in 1848, and the U.S. Congress theoretically granted all Native Americans full citizenship in 1924, Pueblo members did not actually achieve the right to vote in either state or federal elections until 1948 (Sando, 1992: 102). Moreover, Native American nations in the United States are legally designated as "domestic, dependent nations," an ambiguous status that allows state and federal bureaucracies to redefine indigenous sovereignty rights on an issue-by-issue basis (see Cohen, 1941). This relegates Native American communities to the paradoxical position of being, as John Borneman (1995) has insightfully pointed out, entities that are "simultaneously domestic and foreign" to the United States. Today, Pueblo members maintain a dual citizenship with the United States and their respective pueblos.

It is important to acknowledge that the people who arguably paid the most immediate price for the Manhattan Project in the 1940s did not at the time even have the right to vote in New Mexican or federal elections.¹¹ Many of the shrines and pilgrimage sites that Pueblo members identify as having been spiritually important "since time immemorial" were destroyed by laboratory installations, roads, weapons tests, and the town of Los Alamos.¹² Moreover, revelations about LANL's environmental impacts and the amount of nuclear materials on the highways have alerted Pueblo leaders to the frightening fact that one nuclear accident on the highways crossing Pueblo land could potentially destroy their entire nation. I asked one Pueblo member about the environmental justice implications of nuclear weapons work at LANL:

What your people have done here is more than racism or environmental racism. It's genocide against my people. It's part of the system of apartheid in America. South Africa is not the only place with apartheid, you know. It's part of a system where Europeans came to this area and because we didn't have a written system, a written title, took the land and placed us on reservations. Little areas of land that restrict our movement and culture. I thought in the 1940s we were fighting against Nazi experiments on humans and the creation of a Nazi "superman." That's why we helped the government at Los Alamos. But now with all the revelations about human experimentation here, the U.S. government was doing the same things. There's no difference.

The reference to human experimentation is a pointed one. Many in northern New Mexico fear that the laboratory has poisoned the land and the people. This concern is exacerbated by the fact that current epidemiological models are unable to evaluate statistically the cancer rates in the small-scale communities of northern New Mexico, leaving such fears on an ambiguous scientific terrain. LANL's techno-scientific approach also falters when confronted with Pueblo cultural and religious concerns. In response to Pueblo demands to protect the undisturbed religious sites on the forty-three square miles of what is now laboratory territory, LANL officials offered to map these sites and design future construction projects around them. However, the strict prohibitions within Pueblo societies about speaking to the non-initiated about religious matters – a tactic developed to fight the missionary zeal of seventeenth-century Spanish officials and reinforced by the aggressive ethnographic collecting of early twentieth-century anthropologists – makes such an approach impossible. Thus, Pueblo negotiations with LANL and Department of Energy officials have historically faltered over two very crucial national security issues: the health and religious rights of Pueblo nations. In the end, Pueblo governments who believe their health, territorial borders, and spiritual security have been compromised by U.S. national security work at Los Alamos must face the reality of fighting an institution with a \$1 billion annual budget (which is vital to the national security of the world's sole remaining superpower) and of doing so in U.S. courts.¹³

If we follow the plutonium economy one community further to the east in the New Mexico landscape, to Pojoaque Pueblo, which lies immediately adjacent to San Ildefonso and fifteen miles north of Santa Fe, we find a very different articulation of a plutonium-mediated national security. Pojoaque is a pueblo with a difficult history. It has, as its governor says, "died twice" because of epidemics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and was only reconstituted in the 1930s. Pojoaque entered the plutonium economy in 1994 with a public announcement that it was going to pursue nuclear waste storage as a form of economic development. By 1995, Pojoaque had taken only the first steps in this process, a series of conceptual studies, but its national security strategy shows how mediated by nuclear issues indigenous politics in New Mexico has become. In the late 1980s, the Department of Energy began a process of soliciting all indigenous nations about nuclear waste storage projects on tribal lands (Hanson, 1997; Stoffle and Evans, 1988). This was, and is, an explicit attempt to break the gridlock around nuclear waste caused by middle-American fear of living near nuclear materials. For many tribes, new recognition as a "sovereign nation" is quickly followed by invitations from federal bureaucracies and corporations for lucrative nuclear waste storage projects. By 1995, the initial outlines of a transnational Native American nuclear waste storage economy were beginning to take shape in New Mexico: the Mescalero Apache began building a short-term nuclear waste storage facility in southern New Mexico and signed agreements with an association of northern Canadian Cree nations for permanent storage of U.S. nuclear waste. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) explicitly marked radioactive waste as a nontariff item, paving the way for this

kind of transnational indigenous nuclear waste infrastructure (see Hanson, 1994, 1997).

Pojoaque's nuclear waste storage project was, however, also a political tactic designed to underscore what was at stake for the pueblo in debates over casino gaming. National security for the few hundred people that make up Pojoaque Pueblo today means economic independence. The government at Pojoaque Pueblo has been among the most vocal supporters of Indian gaming in New Mexico, and today the pueblo has one of the most successful casinos in the state. Its "City of Gold" casino plays off the ancient myth of the seven golden cities of Cibola that energized the Spanish conquest of the Southwest, and today it extracts money, with almost surgical irony, from the mostly Spanish-speaking counties of northern New Mexico. In 1995, the legality of Pueblo gaming operations in U.S. courts remained in doubt, even though compacts had been signed by the governor of New Mexico and approved by the U.S. secretary of the interior. The consequences of these negotiations could not be more serious; as there are few industries more profitable than casino gaming or nuclear waste, quite literally, millions, and possibly billions, are at stake in these decisions. It is hardly surprising, then, that in response to a steady stream of new legal roadblocks on gaming from state and federal officials, a coalition of nine Pueblo nations in the mid-1990s repeatedly threatened to shut down the highways in northern New Mexico (all of which cross Pueblo lands) if the gaming compacts were not honored.¹⁴

In their public announcement, Pojoaque representatives specifically stated that they were interested in storing plutonium from dismantled U.S. nuclear weapons, precisely the weapons that were designed a few miles up the road at LANL. The plutonium economy has come back to Los Alamos and the role of nuclear materials in defining national security. Pojoaque's leadership played off of fears of nuclear waste in Santa Fe to press claims about tribal gaming. Pojoaque Pueblo's tactical consideration of placing a nuclear waste site on tribal lands, however, not only is an example of the high-stakes international politics that have taken place around nuclear materials in New Mexico since 1943, but also suggests a strategy that privileges an economic-based national security over all other concerns. Thus, as the national security of San Ildefonso is compromised by the environmental and social costs of the laboratory's nuclear waste dump, neighboring Pojoaque, a community that has already "died twice" in its history, can still forward nuclear waste storage as the ultimate means of achieving its own national security. Pojoaque's strategy is, however, a direct consequence of the interior colonial dynamic between Native American communities and the United States. Thus, although no indigenous nation currently produces nuclear waste, all are potential candidates for the disposal of the nuclear materials produced by the U.S. nuclear complex.¹⁵

Postcolonial Insecurities: Nuevomexicanos and the Tri-Ethnic Trap

If we follow our plutonium economy ten miles north from Pojoaque along Highway 68 to the town of Española, a different, but equally charged, set of

security issues is evoked. Española is a majority Spanish-speaking community. Many Española residents are direct descendants of the first Spanish settlers in the region in 1598, and can self-identify as “twentieth-generation New Mexicans.” LANL is the area’s largest single employer, accounting for roughly half of the jobs in greater Rio Arriba County. Before Los Alamos was built in the 1940s, most Nuevomexicano families in the area lived on small-scale farms and spoke primarily Spanish (Weigle, 1975; Forrest, 1989). Many had to work as migrant laborers all across the Southwest to support their families. Currently, there are three generations of men and women from the tiny villages of northern New Mexico who have worked almost exclusively at the laboratory. Traditionally they have been the security guards, laborers, and support staff. Although more Nuevomexicanos are working in technical fields at the laboratory, in the early 1990s very few had careers as scientists or project managers. Thus, an extreme cultural and economic, as well as geographic, divide separates Los Alamos from “the valley.” According to the U.S. Census, Los Alamos County is 94 percent white, with the highest number of Ph.D.s per capita in the nation. Rio Arriba County is 75 percent “Hispanic” (although few in New Mexico recognize this term), with only 10 percent of the population having completed college degrees. The average income in Los Alamos is three times that of Rio Arriba County. Unemployment is 2 percent on “the hill,” but more than 27 percent in “the valley.” In other words, for most people in Rio Arriba County who desire a middle-class lifestyle, Los Alamos National Laboratory is the only game in town.

One Hispano, who recently retired from a thirty-five-year career as a construction foreman at LANL, put it this way, jabbing his finger into my chest for emphasis:

I’ll tell you what to write in your book – you write that the lab saved everybody in this valley! Without Los Alamos, all these little Spanish villages wouldn’t exist. Everybody tries to work at the lab – because its good, steady work. Before the lab, all the men in the valley had to go all over the country trying to find work – they would see their families only once or twice a year. With the lab, we have good jobs that allow us to stay with our families. People drive from all over New Mexico to work at the lab – from Albuquerque, from Tierra Amarilla – because it’s such good work. People from the valley built Los Alamos and there are always big construction projects there, there’s always work.

This narrative of an endless economic security broke down in 1995, however, as the laboratory (for the first time ever) laid off more than a thousand people, predominantly Nuevomexicanos from the valley, and forecast more post-Cold War layoffs to come. Within this political context, Nuevomexicanos began expressing long-standing concerns that LANL holds northern New Mexico hostage economically, that it is more responsible to officials in Washington, D.C., than to local communities. Employees began to talk openly about racism at the laboratory, about a “glass ceiling” in promotions,

and about how Nuevomexicanos do most of the dangerous and dirty work. Outside the laboratory, residents of the valley discussed the long-term effects on Nuevomexicano culture of having to speak English at the laboratory, and, as always, note when LANL employees began pronouncing their Spanish surnames with an English accent. Without the security of employment provided by an endlessly expanding national laboratory, the public sphere surrounding LANL in northern New Mexico in the mid-1990s was being radicalized and racialized, with an increasingly public portrayal of LANL as a colonial institution. The laboratory's layoffs in the fall of 1995, for example, were immediately interpreted by some in Española and neighboring communities as a federal declaration of war on northern New Mexico.

It is important to understand the historical context of such a conclusion. From the Nuevomexicano point of view, the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo has never been honored by the United States (Chavez, 1984; Acuna, 1988). Explicit provisions in that treaty for the protection of the culture and land of Mexican citizens incorporated into the United States were negotiated and then stricken by Congress at the last moment. The Mexican government demanded, and received, further assurances that its citizens' land rights would be protected in the United States (del Castillo, 1990). The land grants that were the basis for both Spanish and Mexican social and economic organizations were, however, quickly broken apart by U.S. territorial judges, who affirmed legal ownership of small plots of land to individuals, but not the large collective landholdings that had traditionally been used for cattle grazing and that were the basis for communal life. Only a fraction of Nuevomexicano land claims were upheld by the U.S. courts in the late nineteenth century, and many were stolen outright by a corrupt legal system. Literally millions of acres changed hands, leaving almost every Nuevomexicano family in northern New Mexico with a story about how the U.S. government or someone manipulating the U.S. legal system took part of their land and impoverished their communities (see Briggs and Van Ness, 1987; Ebright, 1994). Consequently, much of the U.S. national forest land in New Mexico remains hotly contested to this day and is a perennial source of regional tension. In a discussion about California's recently passed Proposition 187, which denied public services (including hospitals and schools) to undocumented Mexican immigrants in California, one Hispano activist summed it up with a casual shrug: "The United States and Mexico never signed the same treaty in 1848 – they are still at war."

For many Nuevomexicanos, and those who do not work at the laboratory in particular, there is bitter irony in the fact that New Mexico is now the center of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. Indeed, the U.S. government saturates everyday life in northern New Mexico, monitoring land and water use through the U.S. Forest Service and the State Engineers Office, housing and welfare through Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and other agencies, and regulating employment through Los Alamos National Laboratory. Thus, although the U.S. nuclear weapons complex provides an important job base in New Mexico, (the third poorest state in the

United States), federal and state officials nonetheless practice a historical amnesia about treaty obligations and the long-standing land claims of Nuevomexicano residents. As one Chicano land-grant activist put it:

The real problem is dealing with white politicians, most of whom came to New Mexico very recently. You go to a public hearing and talk about land grants and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and they look at you like you're from another planet – they don't know what you are talking about. They treat you like you just got off the boat from Juárez and they want to see your green card. We've been here for hundreds of years. The real immigrants are all those people from New York, Boston, and California that come to live here and know nothing about us.

This political dynamic is what anthropologist John Bodine has called a “tri-ethnic trap” (1968), a situation in which the legal and cultural position of Nuevomexicanos is doubly marginalized by white structures of power and by the cultural status of Native Americans as the “first Americans.” Thus, although Pueblos as sovereign governments have gained a new post-Cold War legal discourse with the laboratory, equally impacted Nuevomexicano communities have gained no such legal voice. In this context, Nuevomexicano concerns about the economic and environmental impacts of the laboratory can be dismissed, as they were by the LANL leadership following the 1995 layoffs, as an expression of a “welfare state mentality” and not of legitimate political concern (*Santa Fe New Mexican*, September 12, 1995). Nuevomexicano participation in the plutonium economy is therefore double-edged: it has allowed many access to a middle-class life, but it has also meant participating in an ongoing consolidation of northern New Mexico to Anglo-American and U.S. governmental interests. It is with new post-Cold War anxiety, then, that many Nuevomexicanos continue to look to LANL as the future of northern New Mexico. Others, however, underscore their resistance by referring to the laboratory and town site simply as “Los Alamos, D.C.,” acknowledging that, more than five decades into the Manhattan Project, Los Alamos remains, in their eyes, more properly a suburb of Washington, D.C., than a legitimate part of New Mexico (Romero, 1995).

Nongovernmental Insecurities: Antinuclear Organizations and the New Transnational Imaginary

Our exploration of the plutonium economy concludes in Santa Fe, which is twenty miles equidistant from Española and Los Alamos and is home to several antinuclear nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which have been instrumental in organizing community debates about the laboratory in the post-Cold War era. The membership of these NGOs, notably the Los Alamos Study Group and Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, is mostly Anglo, first-generation New Mexican, and self-identifies as citizens of the

United States. These antinuclear NGOs have become extremely adept at utilizing environmental laws to gain a voice in nuclear weapons policy at LANL. In 1995, for example, they halted construction of the Duel Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT), which the Department of Energy has identified as *the* premier post-Cold War facility for ensuring the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile (U.S. Department of Energy, 1995b). They did so by forcing LANL, through U.S. courts, to do an environmental impact study of DARHT and to justify publicly the need for the project. In the 1990s, these NGOs have provided the first consistent, technically and legally informed, public critique of U.S. nuclear weapons work at LANL. They have also sought to provide technical information about the laboratory and its environmental impacts to a fragile coalition of diverse Pueblo, Nuevomexicano, and Anglo interests.

For many in these organizations, the real achievement of the Manhattan Project was not the atomic bomb but the institutionalization of a system of government secrecy, and with it the curtailing of democratic process when it comes to U.S. national security policy. They view their work as combating the secrecy and public manipulation of an insurgent military-industrial complex and, more specifically, as exposing the environmental, social, and global security impacts of nuclear weapons work at LANL. As one Anglo peace activist put it: "Everything having to do with nuclear weapons is born secret in the United States – and the division between what is secret and what is not secret is also secret." Thus, for antinuclear activists, U.S. citizens are eliminated from the decision-making process because federal authorities can argue that, by definition, citizens never have the information necessary to make informed statements about U.S. national security policy.¹⁶ Consequently, antinuclear NGOs in Santa Fe initiated a new project in 1995, that of lobbying the World Court to outlaw nuclear weapons globally.¹⁷ By appealing directly to a global legal body, NGOs not only call into question the legality of U.S. national security policy in New Mexico, but also dramatically demonstrate that the federal government does not represent their national security interests. This act not only underscores a profound distrust of the United States when it comes to nuclear weapons policy, but also exemplifies how the local is now intersecting with the global, how individuals are beginning to imagine their community as part of a post-nation-state world order. Through such actions, NGOs publicly challenge and reject the state's right to define authoritatively the meaning of "security" and "danger" for their communities.

For members of these groups who fear environmental contamination from the laboratory and/or identify nuclear weapons of any kind as the greatest threat to their personal security, the U.S. government remains the most immediate danger in the region. For many, LANL is both the symbol for, and the realization of, a society in love with violence. As another Anglo Santa Fe peace activist put it, the central question is:

How are we going to put an end to this monstrous development of weapons? How are we going to put an end to an institution which so far

has existed, as far as I can see, primarily as an institution developing means of threat, an institution which works to instill fear in people, an institution basically which has devoted itself for over fifty years now to violence? We're all very aware of the violence that we have around us. What is it like for young people to grow up in this city and to look out and see those lights every night and know what's going on up there, that [LANL.] is an institution devoted to violence ... that Los Alamos is a place of death?

Antinuclear NGOs critique LANL, therefore, on moral and ethical as well as environmental grounds. They point out that the majority of the nuclear weapons in the current U.S. stockpile were designed *after* the United States signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968, in which government leaders promised to "achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament" (*Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, 1968: 1). In the mid-1990s, even as a comprehensive test ban was being negotiated by the Clinton administration, activists feared that the arms race was simply going into a new phase, emphasizing the design and testing of nuclear weapons in virtual reality. This is a major structural change in the nuclear complex, one that will generate few environmental impacts, thus eliminating one of the primary legal tools that NGOs have for influencing U.S. nuclear weapons policy. These are not unfounded concerns, for U.S. weapons laboratories will receive more than \$40 billion in new facilities for their "science based stockpile stewardship programs" from 1996 to 2006 (Zerriffi and Makhijani, 1996). The DOE has proclaimed these facilities necessary to ensure the "safety and reliability" of nuclear weapons in a world without underground nuclear testing, but these programs will also provide a "state-of-the-art" complex (with the world's fastest computers, as well as numerous new aboveground testing facilities) equally capable of designing new nuclear weapons as testing old ones (see Zerriffi and Makhijani, 1995; Gusterson, 1995). Thus, the post-Cold War period has produced unexpected, and new, forms of insecurity for local antinuclear NGOs as the United States has ignored the opportunities for large-scale disarmament, renewed its commitment to a plutonium-mediated national security, and begun retooling for a new generation of nuclear weapons work.

Conclusion: Doing Anthropology in an Insecure State

I have tried to demonstrate in this essay that "national security" in New Mexico is not simply a question of how to defend the territorial borders of the United States; it evokes the contradictory and competing worldviews currently attached to military-industrial, aboriginal, postcolonial, and anti-nuclear subject-positions in North America. Moreover, each of these ideological positions involves a specific constellation of racial, ethnic, national, and territorial identities, while maintaining distinct internal politics as well.

Communities in New Mexico are mobilizing historical identities, and pursuing new forms of subaltern nation building, by challenging U.S. national security policy in international forums, in U.S. courts, and in the everyday context of living next to a major nuclear facility. What does this political fragmentation surrounding the plutonium economy in New Mexico tell us about the new global context or insecurities in the post-Cold War era?

The end of the Cold War inaugurated a reorganization of global political and economic structures, generating new internal and external pressures for some regional populations. New Mexico, for example, is now part of a transnational economic arena in which the sovereignty of Native American nations has become an attractive means through which corporations can manipulate legal restrictions on dangerous substances such as nuclear waste. Current DOE regulations for burying nuclear waste, for example, require that permanent storage facilities have a ten-thousand-year operative plan, an unprecedented legal requirement that is still just a momentary blip in the social life of plutonium. Here, the dilemma of the "national sacrifice zone" is finally revealed: that of designating which nations – past, present, and future – must bear the costs of the Cold War nuclear economy. I have argued here that the Cold War reliance on a plutonium-mediated national security has already surpassed the ability of the United States to control its mutating effects, unleashing materials and social logics that will be generating diverse insecurities for generations to come. Concurrently, the post-Cold War effort in Congress to do away with unifying national programs and policies in favor of individual state programs – what might be called a national *unbuilding* project – promises to put poor states, such as New Mexico, which rely on federal dollars for basic services, at evergreater risk. This dynamic is exacerbated by the marginalizing of local ethnic groups in New Mexico, many of which were instrumental in fighting the Cold War and which are now being targeted by corporate and U.S. national interests. U.S. national security policy has, therefore, produced a wide range of effects in the Southwest over the last half century, leaving many in the post-Cold War era to search out their own forms of security.

To understand these realities, we might consider the advantages of a "decentered" approach to the production of (in)security. *Decentered* means moving beyond the nation-state to nation-state dynamic that has in different ways dominated both security studies and anthropology, to pursue projects that investigate multiple subject-positions and that explore how specific experiences of place are constructed in the tension between the global and the local. As I have tried to demonstrate in this essay, approaching the production of insecurity with universalistic definitions of sovereignty, security, or citizenship means erasing the cultural and political complexity of many geographic spaces in the world, such as northern New Mexico, and rendering invisible areas of ongoing, and potential, conflict. This has been amply demonstrated in the immediate post-Cold War period. Only a few years ago, for example, it was still possible to describe the former Yugoslavia as an example of a working multiethnic, pluralistic society. And who could have predicted that the most significant struggle in recent North American history

would erupt among indigenous communities in Chiapas over the terms of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement? In both of these situations, the relationship of memory to land, race, and ethnicity has combined with historical shifts in geopolitical relations to produce regional volatilities that challenge Cold War assumptions about the foundational bases of security and even national stability.

To understand cross-cultural anxiety and (inter)national conflict in the post-Cold War era, we need to move beyond a model of security studies based primarily on alignments of weapons and armies to include investigations of how people experience insecurity across a broader sphere of relationships, from those of economic exploitation, to environmental degradation, to racial conflict and geopolitical marginalization. This poses several distinct disciplinary challenges. For anthropology it means moving beyond the implicit Cold War emphasis on using one's home nation-state as the ultimate point of reference for identifying difference. As John Borneman has pointed out (1995), anthropology has always been involved in a subtle form of foreign policy, in that, by exploring the boundaries of "otherness," anthropologists have also been implicitly reenforcing national borders. This is most clearly evidenced in the traditional requirement for entry into the field of anthropology as a profession: the completion of an ethnographic project that takes place *outside* the territorial borders of one's own nation-state. From this perspective, anthropology has been involved, however obliquely, in a particular state and nation-building project right from the very beginning. Consequently, it may well be that in the future we will look back on the anthropology of the Cold War as a distinctive global project (see Nader, 1997). Recent interest in examining global processes from an ethnographic point of view has produced a number of innovative efforts to expand the possibilities for ethnographic research (e.g., see Appadurai, 1991; Friedman, 1994; Marcus, 1995a). Because the Cold War provided much of the energy and funding for the development of area studies programs, however, the challenge that remains is to articulate a compelling new understanding of the value of cross-cultural research, one that is not tied to the kind of state and nation-building projects that characterized the Cold War, but one that also does not abandon programs that are, in fact, producing both cross-cultural and international understanding.¹⁸

Decentering security studies is a more profound challenge, given that it is largely a creation of the Cold War, and because of the close interactions that many security scholars maintain with government policymakers. As this essay purports to be a case study, we might locate one conceptual blind spot in Cold War security studies by reviewing institutional responses to the "national security" debates in New Mexico. With few exceptions, security studies agencies in the mid-1990s found the security issues raised in this essay to be simply unrecognizable.¹⁹ Two issues seem to inform readings that positioned the regional debates about Los Alamos outside the purview of security studies: (1) the ambiguous legal standing of indigenous nations within international relations theory, and (2) the absence of an area studies

category devoted to investigating security issues *internal* to the United States. These conversations at times provoked curious results. For example, I was informed by one security studies agency that if I could demonstrate that the political context around Los Alamos had international implications – something that might affect arms-control agreements, for instance – then this project might be considered a contribution to security studies. Then, while readily acknowledging the territorial sovereignty of Pueblo nations in New Mexico, and thus seemingly an international context, that agency concluded that because the Pueblos were unlikely to “break away” from the United States, the regional context surrounding LANL lacked the criteria to be relevant to security studies. A paradoxical vision of sovereignty was revealed in these exchanges, one defined by an ability to threaten the United States within this paradigm. Because Pueblo nations do not have standing armies, and cannot militarily challenge the United States, there are no legitimate security concerns in the region. Consequently, indigenous nations can only enter the world of security studies by taking military action, and even then they can enter it only as a threat to U.S. national security, not as national entities with security concerns unique and valid unto themselves. The broader security implications of building (and, after the Cold War, potentially consolidating) the U.S. nuclear weapons complex in an area of New Mexico that is territorially contested (with sixteen indigenous nations and numerous land-grant controversies), racially and ethnically unique (a majority Nuevomexicano and Native American region), and poor (one in three people around Los Alamos live below the poverty line) were rendered invisible, in this case, by devotion to a specific Cold War-era internationalism.

A vigorous interdisciplinary debate is now taking place over the conceptual and institutional outlines of a post-Cold War global studies. Undoubtedly, the twenty-first century will witness new parameters both for what counts as security as well as for the more ominous issue of whose insecurity it is important to understand. One test of the institutional ability to disengage from Cold War structures, I suggest, is whether North America, and the United States in particular, is included within a revised security studies topography. Certainly, the kinds of issues being debated in New Mexico – which involve state and quasi-state entities, asymmetrical legal structures, territorial memory, alternative definitions of citizenship, and fundamental questions of environmental justice – argue for a move away from a strict focus on state-to-state interactions to enable investigations into how people actually experience insecurity in everyday life. Given the embedded cultural and institutional legacies of the Cold War, however, it may well be that in order to study insecurity at the dawn of the twenty-first century, we may have to embrace it as well.

Notes

Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association on a panel organized by Adriana Petryna and Mariana Ferreira.

and to the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University. I am very grateful for the commentary and discussion received in each of these forums. I would also like to thank Michael Meeker, John Borneman, and Stefan Senders for valued support and criticism. Shawn Smith has been a generous reader and critic of this work.

1. For an analysis of the dual-structured, oppositional nation building in the Cold War Berlins, see Borneman (1992).

2. "From time immemorial" is a legal phrase used in land- and water-rights cases in the United States to designate that Native American claims are prior to any other (see Cohen, 1941).

3. On the history of conflict surrounding Spanish and Mexican land grants in New Mexico, see Briggs and Van Ness (1987); Ehbright (1994); Rosenbaum (1981); Gardner (1970); Nostrand (1992); Ortiz (1980); and Pulido (1996).

4. On the concept of New Mexico as a Hispano homeland, see Nostrand (1992). On "Aztlán" see Anaya and Lomeli (1989); Barrera (1988); and Chavez (1984). This split within the Spanish-speaking community in New Mexico over whether to forward Spanish or Native American ancestry in terms of contemporary identity politics is demonstrated in the conflict over naming in northern New Mexico. In the Spanish-speaking villages of northern New Mexico residents are likely to refer to each other as "Mexicano/a," but probably use "Hispano/a," or "Chicano/a" when speaking in English or to outsiders. "Chicano/a" is more commonly used by Spanish speakers in the larger urban areas, but current usage varies considerably and is politicized. In this essay I use the collective term *Nuevomexicano* to refer to all Spanish-speaking people in northern New Mexico; and I use *Hispano* or *Chicano* only when people self-identified to me that way in conversation.

5. For example, see Ortiz (1980); Jaimes (1992); Churchill (1993); Acuna (1988); Chavez (1984); and Pulido (1996). For detailed studies of the relationship of U.S. nation building to race and territory in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Drinnon (1990) and Horsman (1981).

6. In fact, the state of New Mexico is eclipsed only by Maryland and Virginia in per capita federal dollars. In 1995, this included \$2.7 billion from the Department of Energy (DOE) and more than \$650 million from the Department of Defense (DOD) (see the *Santa Fe New Mexican*, June 18, 1996). Overall, one out of every four workers in New Mexico is employed by the federal government (*Albuquerque Journal*, July 1, 1992), and the DOE is directly responsible for 13 percent of the total economy of the state (see Lansford *et al.*, 1995).

7. I am speaking here specifically about plutonium-239, which was developed for use in nuclear weapons. See International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IPPNW and IEER) (1992) on the physics and health risks of plutonium, and IPPNW and IEER (1991) on the cumulative health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons tests.

8. The DOE has estimated that it will cost \$230 billion over the next seventy-five years to clean up those nuclear production sites that can be cleaned up and simply to stabilize the most serious sites, which remain beyond our capabilities to remediate (see U.S. Department of Energy, 1995b, 1995c).

9. During the Cold War, all nuclear weapons tests by the acknowledged nuclear powers (the United States, Britain, France, China, and the former Soviet Union) took place on contested indigenous lands (see Nietschman and Le Bon, 1987; also Hanson, 1997; LaDuke and Churchill, 1985; and Kuletz, 1998).

10. The Pueblo nations surrounding Los Alamos explicitly articulate their security concerns within a discourse of territorial sovereignty. The difficulty many U.S. officials and security scholars have in accepting this discourse as presented, or in translating the ambiguities around Native American sovereignty into a more familiar discourse of national security, is precisely one of the problems facing indigenous communities in New Mexico, and throughout the Americas.

11. I do not mean to suggest that having the vote would have influenced the Manhattan Project in any way, as it was a top-secret project on which even Vice President Harry Truman was not briefed until after he had been sworn in as president (Rhodes, 1986: 617). I am simply pointing out the legal disparities at work in New Mexico that were instrumental in the development of Los Alamos.

12. On the importance of shrines and pilgrimage sites in Tewa cosmology, see Ortiz (1969).

13. Pueblo governments do have the option of trying to mobilize international opinion and law on their behalf, as several tribes in the Southwest have, in fact, attempted to do. However, there are inherent difficulties in finding international allies that are willing to challenge the United States over internal nuclear weapons policy. Because the United States can evoke the "supreme national interest" clause in any international treaty or agreement to protect the nuclear weapons complex from suit, local Pueblo nations face an uphill battle simply locating an international forum willing to consider their case.

14. Pojoaque Pueblo did, in fact, shut down U.S. highway 84/285, just north of Santa Fe, on March 21, 1996, to protest the lack of progress on gaming issues in the state.

15. See Randy Hanson's pathbreaking analysis of the economics and geopolitical forces behind the Mescalero Apache's decision to initiate a nuclear waste storage project (1994, 1997). On nuclear politics and environmental justice, see Kulerz (1998); LaDuke and Churchill (1985); Eichstaedt (1994); Grinde and Johansen (1995); Stoffle and Evans (1988). On concepts of environmental justice, see Bryant (1995); Bullard (1993); and Pulido (1996).

16. For example, the DARHT lawsuit was ultimately settled in favor of the DOE/LANL only after the DOE provided a classified supplement to the federal judge adjudicating the case. NGOs argued that they should be able to find a representative with a security clearance to review the classified documentation in order to mount an adequate rebuttal, but they were denied that option. Ultimately, NGOs in Santa Fe succeeded in delaying the DARHT project for sixteen months, and put LANL on notice for the first time that the public could significantly influence nuclear weapons projects at the laboratory.

17. In 1996, the World Court in the Hague did rule that using nuclear weapons in a first-strike capacity was against international law; however, judges left room in their decision for a "defensive" use of nuclear weapons.

18. My intent here is only to point out the structural role that the Cold War played in shaping the development of area studies; it is not to make any claim on what individual scholars did within those area studies categories (see Rafael, 1994; Lewontin et al., 1997).

19. The notable exception was the MacArthur Foundation, which supported the conversation leading to this collection of essays.

Human Security and the Interests of States

Astri Suhrke

Introduction

'Human security' is being promoted by the Canadian and Norwegian governments as a new *leitmotif* in foreign policy. The idea was launched during a bilateral meeting in Norway of foreign ministers Lloyd Axworthy and Knut Vollebæk in May 1998, and reaffirmed in a larger forum in May this year. Nine other foreign ministers were invited to this last meeting – a varied group consisting of Austria, Chile, Ireland, Jordan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland and Thailand – and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, gave the keynote address. Given the evident ambition invested in what has come to be known as the Lysøen process – named after the place where the meetings were held – it is appropriate to ask what 'human security' might mean, which interests it serves, and whether it is more than just a positive-sounding slogan.

Serving Which Interests?

To ask which interests the promotion of 'human security' serves signals in itself a neorealist perspective on international relations. In this analytical tradition, norms or ideas are understood as mere ideology: they mask, sustain or advance the power-oriented interests of states. The Norwegian–Canadian support for 'human security' can to some extent be explained in this perspective.

The concept evokes 'progressive values' that are integral to the foreign policy identity of both countries. The specific content has changed over time and context. In the 1960s, Norwegian–Canadian cooperation on UN peace-keeping issues gave rise to what was termed 'the Oslo–Ottawa axis'. In the 1970s and 1980s, both countries participated in the informal grouping of

states called the 'like-minded'. The group saw itself as a friendly intermediary that could help developing countries negotiate their terms of dependence on the Bretton Woods institutions, the United States and the multinational corporations, and make the burden less onerous. In Ottawa, this ideological position underpins efforts to create a space and international role for Canada as a 'middle power', above all in distinction to the United States. In Oslo, a similar line of thinking is reflected in the understanding that, for a very small country like Norway, international 'power' lies above all in the promotion of powerful ideas.

Insofar as the Canadian and Norwegian governments have defined the concept of 'human security', it is associated with the pre-eminent progressive values of the 1990s: human rights, international humanitarian law, and socio-economic development based on equity. Both governments have used the term as an umbrella concept to cover a humanitarian agenda that includes support for the International Criminal Court, the ban on landmines, regulation of light arms trade, and prohibition on child soldiers.

Clearly, the Lysøen process follows a well-established policy trajectory for both countries. In addition to these historical determinants, there are contingent factors. An interest-based interpretation that takes the nation-state as its unit of analysis again seems persuasive.

As a new member on the UN Security Council (UNSC) this year, Canada has used the idea of 'human security' to distinguish itself as a progressive middle power. For instance, when holding the UNSC presidency in February 1999, Canada put the issue of 'human security' on the agenda in the form of a general discussion about transgressions against civilians during violent conflict. The UNSC had earlier addressed the topic with respect to particular conflicts, but this was a rare, general discussion of humanitarian principles in relation to international peace and security.¹ It suggested a widening of the jurisdiction of the Council, from international peace and security in a conventional sense as matters pertaining to the security of states, to include the security of individual persons as well.

The UNSC initiative was part of a general Canadian strategy in the 1990s to elevate humanitarian issues to the sphere of 'high politics'. In this respect, the Rwandan genocide in 1994 was an important motivating factor.² Canada had long been a major donor to Rwanda, and the head of the ill-fated UN peacekeeping force, UNAMIR, was a Canadian (General Romeo Dallaire). The Rwanda experience accentuated Canadian concerns to see the UN function proactively to prevent humanitarian crises (e.g. through early warning), establish a mechanism of rapid intervention (some form of a rapid reaction force), and strengthen socio-economic structures that could prevent conflict as well as repair societies after war. Leading Canadians were promoted as candidates for key positions in the UN system, including Louise Fréchette as Deputy Secretary-General, and Louise Arbor as prosecutor in the UN-appointed International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

Idiosyncratic factors also shaped policy. Foreign Minister Axworthy – once a political scientist and university professor – was an early advocate of

'soft power'. As a member of the opposition in the Parliament, he had favored using economic sanctions rather than military force against Saddam Hussein in the 1990 Gulf conflict. Later, as foreign minister, he called for brutal cuts in the defense budget amounting to a one-third reduction.³

On the Norwegian side, contingent factors reinforced the historical trajectory towards humanitarianism as well. The coalition government that hosted the first Lysøen meetings is led by the Christian Democrats, who have a long tradition of supporting foreign aid and missionary work. Like its Labour predecessor, the government is lobbying for a Norwegian seat on the UNSC for the 2001–2003 period. In this connection, 'human security' has the ring of an entry ticker.

More generally, as the only Nordic country apart from Iceland to remain outside the European Union, Norway faced potential isolation in the international arena in the 1990s. The traditional Nordic caucus no longer operated as before in the United Nations. NATO and OSCE remained important foreign policy fora, but could hardly serve as a caucus of progressive states. By contrast, the concept of 'human security' could be a vehicle for creating a broad but thematically focused international coalition on humanitarian issues – a 1990s version of the 'like-minded'. By initiating a global coalition of states on 'human security issues', Norway could take a step towards what a former foreign affairs official grandly described as 'humanitarian large power status'.⁴

Embedded Humanitarianism

An interest-based approach thus goes some way towards explaining why countries like Norway and Canada might find promoting a concept like 'human security' useful to enhance their own status and influence in the international arena. However, as critics of neorealism have made abundantly clear, the approach has its limitations. In particular, the neorealist perspective does not explain why some ideas rise to prominence while others do not. Why did Canada and Norway select 'human security' as a standard bearer rather than, for instance, a view of 'state security' as a guarantor of human rights and humanitarian benefits?⁵

Critics argue that neorealists do not – indeed cannot – answer this question because they deny the power of ideas in a fundamental sense. We can give a fuller explanation of state behavior if we assume that ideas have, or acquire, a power of their own which cannot be accounted for simply by showing that they are expedient vehicles for promoting national power. As formulated by the most recent critics of neorealism, we must start with the prior question of why states define their interests in certain ways.⁶ Norms shape the interests of states in at least two ways: by influencing the definition of interests, and by influencing their order of priority. Following this line of analysis, it is easier to understand why promoting 'human security' has become a joint foreign policy initiative of Canada and Norway.

However defined in detail, the idea of 'human security' springs from the same values that during the second half of the 20th century led to the greater articulation of norms for securing human rights, civilizing the conduct of war, and protecting the vulnerable. A distinguishing feature of the 1990s is that the structure of international relations created more room for these ideas to come to the fore and be institutionalized. Grouped under the label 'humanitarian', such issues became more visible and acquired the status of 'high politics', for several reasons.

The fundamental transition in the international system marked by the end of the Cold War brought in its wake numerous local conflicts. At the same time, the change in international relations made it easier for the UN to intervene and address the humanitarian consequences of violent conflict. The growing humanitarian role of the UN was strengthened as early as in 1992, with the establishment of a Department of Humanitarian Affairs within the Secretariat. The unit was reorganized in 1997 as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In the same year, Kofi Annan designated humanitarian affairs as one of the four principal work areas of the UN.⁷ Moreover, the higher risk of politico-military approaches to conflicts, and the reduced incentives to do so in areas that, after the demise of the Soviet Union, held little strategic interest for the West, made humanitarian assistance seem a useful substitute strategy. This tendency was recognized early on in both Bosnia and Rwanda.⁸

These structural changes set the stage for efforts to strengthen and expand existing international regimes for promoting human rights, protecting refugees and providing humanitarian assistance. New global institutions were established (such as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights) and resources were magnified (note the spiraling budget of the High Commissioner for Refugees). The growth of private sector humanitarianism by NGOs was boosted by the ideological shift brought about by the collapse of state socialism, which reinforced the appeal of privatization.⁹ Greatly aided by the media, these agencies and organizations formed a powerful set of institutions dedicated to promoting the principles and practices of humanitarianism.

Thus, a combined interest-and-institutional perspective can help to explain the power of particular ideas at a particular historical conjuncture.¹⁰ As the 20th century draws to a close, humanitarian ideas have become a principal normative reference for states and organizations to clarify their international obligations, or against which to hold others responsible. True, the stock of relevant ideas has remained diffuse and manifold, with numerous internal contradictions as well. Foremost among these has been the contradiction between the right of sovereignty and the right of intervention to uphold human rights. Actions undertaken in the name of humanitarian principles, moreover, have often had mixed motives and un-humanitarian results, whether intended or not. It may be useful to think of the structure as an 'embedded humanitarianism', similar to the notion of 'embedded liberalism' that analysts used to characterize the Western world after 1945.¹¹

In both cases, the term 'embedded' suggests that the norms are diffuse, often permitting non-articulated compromises, yet generally understood in a consensual way and invested with much legitimacy.

The idea of 'human security' has been extracted from this embedded stock of ideas. As a 'social construct' the term permits many interpretations, and those who promote it are still struggling to formulate an authoritative and consensual definition. But the idea clearly has roots in the central principle of international humanitarian law – to civilize warfare and to aid its victims. In the modern European tradition, the central rights and duties of the parties concerned in this regard were first codified in the late 19th century, and have since been progressively elaborated in international humanitarian law and by the Red Cross movement. The term 'human security' is readily suggested by this heritage of seeking to save lives and reduce the suffering of individuals during armed conflict.

A more immediate origin of the term is found in the 1994 report of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). 'Human security' appears here as part of a vision for a 'people-oriented economic development'. While offering an imprecise and controversial definition, the starting point for the UNDP was poverty rather than war – but 'security' suggested an escape from both.¹²

Both physical and economic security are incorporated in the definition offered by the Canadian government to the joint policy initiative. At the 1999 meeting (Lysøen II), Axworthy declared that '[i]n essence, human security means safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even their lives.'¹³ He further emphasized that the purpose was not to identify a policy agenda. Rather, '[f]rom a foreign policy perspective, human security is perhaps best understood as a shift in perspective or orientation. It is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or governments.'

If the objective is to marshal a broad coalition of states around various humanitarian causes, then it makes sense to emphasize a common approach rather than a common doctrine. The Canadian–Norwegian initiative has so far sidestepped the trickiest questions which the concept of 'human security' raises: *Who* is going to provide the security? Specifically, what are the limits of humanitarian intervention? *How* is security to be provided? Specifically, how can assistance or sanctions be operationalized so as to minimize rather than increase human suffering? When objectives conflict, *which* interests are to be served? Those of the states promoting the idea, or those of the presumed individual beneficiaries?

These questions have no easy answers. Trying to provide them is tantamount to developing a foreign policy doctrine. But even a relatively modest entrepreneurship to promote norms requires that the ideas have a coherence that can identify key issues and mobilize supporters. Does the concept 'human security' have this potential?

Common Uses of the Term

There are two possible starting points for exploring the substantive core of 'human security'. One is in relation to the security of states, the other in relation to human development. Since contemporary discussion on human security mostly takes the 1994 UNDP report as its starting point, we will follow this latter practice.

The UNDP report examines 'human security' in relation to 'human development', drawing on notions of justice that appeared in the development literature in the early 1970s. At that time, 'human development' served as a counterpoint to economic and growth-oriented concepts of development, where the objective was to produce material goods and humans were viewed mainly as inputs of labor. Critics argued that development must be assessed in terms of its implications for people (hence emphasizing basic human needs, equity and non-exploitative growth). Equally, they held, the development process must be determined by popular participation and autonomous definition of needs and wants (e.g. so that 'thirst' is not defined as 'the need for a Coke', as Ivan Illich wrote in his classic 1970 essay).¹⁴ During the second half of the 1970s, this criticism branched into two main directions: a 'small is beautiful' perspective, and a more theoretically rigorous neo-Marxist criticism of neoclassical paradigms.

By the late 1990s, only the non-Marxist tradition of 'human development' had survived. It was in part a rather woolly notion of 'human-centered development',¹⁵ in part quasi-quantitative, especially as developed with UNDP's human development indicators. The common core was an emphasis on equity and the need to reduce the number of losers in the development process.

The major contribution of the 1994 UNDP report to this literature was its attempt to define human security and human development, and sort out their relationship. The result, however, was confusingly circular. 'Human security' was presented both as an end-state of affairs – 'safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression' – and as a process in the sense of 'protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patters of daily life'. As an end-state, human security was further broken down with respect to sectors such as employment, health, education, and the environment. Human security was seen as essential for human development; without minimal stability and security in daily life, there could be no development – human or otherwise. But the obverse was true as well. Long-term development that improves social and economic life would produce human security, the UNDP report concluded. In this reasoning, there is no difference between human development and human security, or between process and the end-state. Clearly, greater differentiation is needed.

The most critical distinction, it seems, is between (human) *development* and (human) *security*. One useful starting point here is the difference between long-term structural change, and sudden crisis-like disruptions. Let us say that certain long-term, structural changes amount to a process of development.

From a policy perspective, this process involves a vast and complex array of objectives and means that are already familiar. They are quite different from the policy challenges that arise in times of crisis and threaten security in an immediate way. Similarly, from an individual perspective, coping with a situation of long-term socio-economic change is indeed different from being confronted with a sudden crisis or life-threatening violence.

The two situations may shade into each other, but are not identical. Recall the picture drawn by R. H. Tawney when describing rural China in 1931: 'There are districts in which the position of the rural population is that of a man standing permanently up to the neck in water, so that even a ripple is sufficient to drown him.'¹⁶ James Scott used this simple insight to elaborate a view of the moral economy of the peasant; it also suggests a policy-relevant distinction between development and security: To provide *human security* in situations of this kind means protecting that person standing neck-deep in the river from the ripple, either by taking immediate preventive measures to flatten the ripple before it reaches him, or by throwing out a life buoy. *Human development*, by contrast, is a long-term process designed to get the man out of the river, or to lower the water level or undertake equivalent structural change.

Vulnerability as a Defining Characteristic

The defining characteristic of persons who find themselves in mid-river like Tawney's peasant is their vulnerability. Whether the threat is economic or physical violence, immediate protective measures are necessary if longer-term investments to improve conditions can be relevant at all. It follows that the core of human insecurity can be seen as extreme vulnerability. The central task of a policy inspired by human security concerns would therefore be to protect those who are most vulnerable.

Arguably, the vulnerability concept satisfies some of the requirements for the development of public-policy norms. It helps to identify beneficiaries and suggest policy strategies. Obligations can be derived with reference to a structure of vulnerability, as normative political theorists have done. Exploring the implications of vulnerability in this way might lift the concept of 'human security' above the level of a handy slogan, making it a powerful tool of foreign policy. As such, it would lend conceptual coherence and consequent legitimacy to a range of policy initiatives. Individual policies would not appear as items on a rag-tag menu but would spring from the single and compelling moral thought of protecting the vulnerable. An indication of what this exploration would involve is set out below.

Contemporary moral philosophers have looked into the reasons why we are obligated to protect the vulnerable. For scholars like Robert Goodin, the rationale lies in our own responsibility for the misfortune of others, and the ultimately weak distinction between negative and positive duties (i.e. to refrain from doing something harmful, or to do something beneficial).¹⁷

The philosophers do not tell us precisely who the vulnerable are, but it is self-evident that those exposed to immediate physical threats to life or deprivation of life-sustaining resources are extremely vulnerable – neck-deep in water like Tawncy's peasant. They are indirectly identified by human rights law, international humanitarian law, and international refugee law. Other persons can be placed in equally life-threatening positions for reasons of deep poverty or natural disasters. This gives us three categories of extremely vulnerable persons:

- victims of war and internal conflict;
- those who live close to the subsistence level and thus are structurally positioned at the edge of socio-economic disaster; and
- victims of natural disasters.

In this schema, the condition of abject poverty or powerlessness is not qualitatively different from vulnerability to physical violence during conflict. Indeed, it recalls the concept of 'structural violence' developed in the 1970s by Johan Galtung.¹⁸ The three categories are linked in other ways as well. Man-made and nature-made violence often combine to produce so-called complex humanitarian emergencies. In addition, those already living at the margins are often most vulnerable in wars and natural disasters.

As defined above, 'the extremely vulnerable' are most likely to be found in areas experiencing war, poverty or natural disasters. Today the incidence of all these appears high in parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America, as well as the Balkans and some regions of the former Soviet Union. Violence and deprivation – whether caused by man or nature – is not exclusively a phenomenon of the South. There are all kinds of vulnerable groups and individuals also in the North; there are mutual vulnerabilities between and among regions; and common economic and environmental vulnerabilities may well become more severe in the future if globalization continues apace. This being said, we must recognize that the extreme forms of 'human insecurity' that affect large groups of society rather than individuals are most severe or widespread in the regions mentioned above.

A 'Human Security Regime' to Protect the Vulnerable

If the essence of human security is reduced vulnerability, policies to this end could be aggregated into a 'human security regime' designed to protect categories of extremely vulnerable persons. Some parts of such a regime are already in place. Of these, the international systems developed to aid the victims of armed conflict and natural disasters are probably most developed, although incomplete. With respect to armed conflict, for instance, the international community has been much readier to give material assistance than to establish mechanisms to protect the victims of violence. The emphasis on providing relief has sometimes become a substitute for other strategies for

dealing with the problem. To return to Tawney's metaphor, throwing out the life buoy has often been seen as easier than flattening the ripples.

The present international regime to protect and assist victims of war and internal conflict has largely developed since World War II. There is both an international refugee regime (institutionally centered on UNHCR and normatively on the 1951 Convention), and an international humanitarian regime (institutionally centered on the UN humanitarian agencies and the ICRC, and normatively on the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols). Recent years have seen an explosive growth in NGOs and other institutions to help both refugees and victims of internal conflicts *in situ*.

Strategies for further strengthening the international humanitarian regime to protect victims of conflict involve three distinct elements:

- developing norms;
- strengthening institutions (national and international); and
- operationalizing and implementing strategies.

Considerable efforts have been made to develop norms in the name of 'human security', and more could be done. For instance,

- prohibiting anti-personnel landmines and regulating the trade in light arms;
- sustaining current efforts in the UN Commission on Human Rights to formulate basic humanitarian standards. Holding non-state actors accountable for their violations of humanitarian standards is one important area where little progress has yet been made;
- sustaining efforts to protect children in, and from, conflict; and
- securing 'humanitarian space' for protection and assistance of civilians in the midst of armed conflict.

The most difficult task is operationalizing strategies to assist and protect persons against physical violence, whether under conditions of civil war or in the case of government abuse against its citizens. The problems involved are legion. First, there is likely to be resistance by authorities or other forces in the target area. This increases the costs and risks of protective intervention. Second, intervention may be driven by political interests that undermine the professed humanitarian objective. Third, intervention may have unforeseen or unintended negative effects. A spate of recent literature has emphasized the unintended negative consequences of humanitarian action with respect to the provision of material assistance.¹⁹ Similar problems may arise when the intervention is intended to provide physical protection, as the Kosovo conflict has demonstrated.

Developing a human security regime for the victims of natural or man-made disasters is one thing, doing the same for those who live permanently on the edge of a socio-economic disaster is another. If the state authorities in question are working to improve the conditions of their most vulnerable groups, the task is of course made easier. On the international side, there have

been growing efforts to incorporate some basic standards of socio-economic conditions in aid policy. The World Bank, for instance, has specified standards to compensate certain categories of persons who are displaced or who otherwise incur direct losses due to development projects. The policy is a de facto recognition of the need to protect the most vulnerable: those living at the margins have a right to be protected from particular shocks that could push them over the brink to disaster.

These and similar standards form a sort of human *security* regime for those on the edge of socio-economic disaster. Building an internationally supported 'human security regime' for those neck-deep in water may therefore not be as impossible as it seems at first glance. Further norm development might entail:

- the elaboration and codification of rights, as well as standards for compensations that apply to particularly vulnerable people who are negatively affected by development projects;
- the clarification of rights and establishment of safety nets for those most hurt and least able to compensate for losses incurred by structural adjustment policies;²⁰ and
- similar safety nets for 'the very vulnerable' whose income or assets are arbitrarily confiscated by state or local authorities.

'Vulnerability' may be a useful starting point for developing 'human security' as a meaningful policy concept. It remains to be demonstrated if this is the best or the only starting point. What is clear is that 'human security' requires conceptual clarification if it is to be taken seriously as a vision or an instrument of foreign policy. Political leaders who are asked to back up a slogan will want to know what it entails. The concerned public will wonder if it is more than a slogan. Analysts inside and outside government need to assess which interests are being served, and what the likely consequences are – whether intended or not. Failing this, the alternative is the minimalist approach sketched by Axworthy at Lysøen II, where he affirmed that it means 'taking people as [the] point of reference' in international relations. This is a laudable intention – but it hardly amounts to either a vision or an instrument.

Notes and References

1. The Security Council also asked for continuing action, starting with a report from the Secretary-General, to assess the adequacy of existing international humanitarian law (Report from the UN Security Council, 12 February 1999, 'Daily Highlights', www.un.org/News/). The other main occasion when the UNSC discussed humanitarian issues as a general topic was in connection with the *Report of the Secretary-General on Protection for Humanitarian Assistance to Refugees and others in Conflict Situations*, S/1998/883 (22 September 1998).

2. Howard Adelman, 'Canadian Policy in Rwanda', in Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrie, eds, *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire* (New Brunswick, NJ & London: Transaction Publishers, 1999).

3. *Washington Post*, 20 February 1999.

4. The term was frequently used in the early 1990s by Jan Egeland, Deputy Foreign Minister in the Labour government.

5. The notion of states as guarantors of human rights is prominent in international human rights law. The idea is also used more generally in the sense of *sovereignty as responsibility*. For a recent formulation applied to Africa, see Francis Deng, ed., *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1996).

6. For a representative selection from a 'constructivist perspective', see Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and Martha Finnemore, *National Interest in International Society* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

7. *Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization* (New York: United Nations, August 1998, A/53/1).

8. See Rosalyn Higgins, 'The New United Nations and Former Yugoslavia', *International Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 3, 1993; and *Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda* (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996).

9. Thomas Weiss & Leon Gordenker, *NGOs, the UN and Global Governance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996); Alex de Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa* (Oxford: James Currey, 1977).

10. I am here drawing on the neo-institutionalist school. For a recent review of their writings and their critics, see Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane & Stephen D. Krasner, 'International Organization and the Study of World Politics', *International Organization*, vol. 52, no. 4, 1998, pp. 645-685.

11. Analysts argued that a developing compromise between domestic welfare capitalism and an open international market represented an embedded liberalism that served to sustain social stability, although this was not necessarily or explicitly the intention. The term 'embedded liberalism' was coined by John G. Ruggie in an analysis of international regimes, 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 195-232.

12. *Human Development Report, 1994*. (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 1994).

13. 'Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World', Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, April 1999.

14. Ivan Illich, in 'Development as Planned Poverty', *Celebration of Awareness: A Call for Institutional Revolution* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970).

15. Majid Rahnema, ed., *The Post-Development Reader* (London: Zed Books, 1997).

16. Cited in James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977) p. 1.

17. Robert Goodin, *Protecting the Vulnerable* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

18. Galtung's writings on this include 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1971, pp. 81-117; (with Tord Høivik) 'Structural and Direct Violence', *Essays in Peace Research*, vol. I (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1975), pp. 135-139; 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', *Essays...* vol. I, pp. 109-134; 'Feudal Systems, Structural Violence and the Structural Theory of Revolutions', *Essays...* vol. III (1978), pp. 197-267.

19. For a recent example see Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - or War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999). The literature is surveyed in *Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict*. Chr. Michelsen Institute Report 6.2.1997 (Bergen: CMI).

20. In 1998, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights appointed a special rapporteur to look into the consequences of structural adjustment and the debt burden of poor countries.

The Lonely Superpower

Samuel P. Huntington

The New Dimension of Power

During the past decade global politics has changed fundamentally in two ways. First, it has been substantially reconfigured along cultural and civilizational lines, as I have highlighted in the pages of this journal and documented at length in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Second, as argued in that book, global politics is also always about power and the struggle for power, and today international relations is changing along that crucial dimension. The global structure of power in the Cold War was basically bipolar; the emerging structure is very different.

There is now only one superpower. But that does not mean that the world is *unipolar*. A unipolar system would have one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers. As a result, the superpower could effectively resolve important international issues alone, and no combination of other states would have the power to prevent it from doing so. For several centuries the classical world under Rome, and at times East Asia under China, approximated this model. A *bipolar* system like the Cold War has two superpowers, and the relations between them are central to international politics. Each superpower dominates a coalition of allied states and competes with the other superpower for influence among nonaligned countries. A *multi-polar* system has several major powers of comparable strength that cooperate and compete with each other in shifting patterns. A coalition of major states is necessary to resolve important international issues. European politics approximated this model for several centuries.

Contemporary international politics does not fit any of these three models. It is instead a strange hybrid, a *uni-multipolar* system with one superpower and several major powers. The settlement of key international issues requires

action by the single superpower but always with some combination of other major states; the single superpower can, however, veto action on key issues by combinations of other states. The United States, of course, is the sole state with preeminence in every domain of power – economic, military, diplomatic, ideological, technological, and cultural – with the reach and capabilities to promote its interests in virtually every part of the world. At a second level are major regional powers that are preeminent in areas of the world without being able to extend their interests and capabilities as globally as the United States. They include the German-French condominium in Europe, Russia in Eurasia, China and potentially Japan in East Asia, India in South Asia, Iran in Southwest Asia, Brazil in Latin America, and South Africa and Nigeria in Africa. At a third level are secondary regional powers whose interests often conflict with the more powerful regional states. These include Britain in relation to the German-French combination, Ukraine in relation to Russia, Japan in relation to China, South Korea in relation to Japan, Pakistan in relation to India, Saudi Arabia in relation to Iran, and Argentina in relation to Brazil.

The superpower or hegemon in a unipolar system, lacking any major powers challenging it, is normally able to maintain its dominance over minor states for a long time until it is weakened by internal decay or by forces from outside the system, both of which happened to fifth-century Rome and nineteenth-century China. In a multipolar system, each state might prefer a unipolar system with itself as the single dominant power but the other major states will act to prevent that from happening, as was often the case in European politics. In the Cold War, each superpower quite explicitly preferred a unipolar system under its hegemony. However, the dynamics of the competition and their early awareness that an effort to create a unipolar system by armed force would be disastrous for both enabled bipolarity to endure for four decades until one state no longer could sustain the rivalry.

In each of these systems, the most powerful actors had an interest in maintaining the system. In a uni-multipolar system, this is less true. The United States would clearly prefer a unipolar system in which it would be the hegemon and often acts as if such a system existed. The major powers, on the other hand, would prefer a multipolar system in which they could pursue their interests, unilaterally and collectively, without being subject to constraints, coercion, and pressure by the stronger superpower. They feel threatened by what they see as the American pursuit of global hegemony. American officials feel frustrated by their failure to achieve that hegemony. None of the principal power-wielders in world affairs is happy with the status quo.

The superpower's efforts to create a unipolar system stimulate greater effort by the major powers to move toward a multipolar one. Virtually all major regional powers are increasingly asserting themselves to promote their own distinct interests, which often conflict with those of the United States. Global politics has thus moved from the bipolar system of the Cold War through a unipolar moment – highlighted by the Gulf War – and is now passing through one or two uni-multipolar decades before it enters a truly

multipolar 21st century. The United States, as Zbigniew Brzezinski has said, will be the first, last, and only global superpower.

Not So Benign

American officials quite naturally tend to act as if the world were unipolar. They boast of American power and American virtue, hailing the United States as a benevolent hegemon. They lecture other countries on the universal validity of American principles, practices, and institutions. At the 1997 G-7 summit in Denver, President Clinton boasted about the success of the American economy as a model for others. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright has called the United States “the indispensable nation” and said that “we stand tall and hence see further than other nations.” This statement is true in the narrow sense that the United States is an indispensable participant in any effort to tackle major global problems. It is false in also implying that other nations are dispensable – the United States needs the cooperation of some major countries in handling any issue – and that American indispensability is the source of wisdom.

Addressing the problem of foreign perceptions of American “hegemonism,” Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott set forth this rationale: “In a fashion and to an extent that is unique in the history of Great Powers, the United States defines its strength – indeed, its very greatness – not in terms of its ability to achieve or maintain dominance over others, but in terms of its ability to work *with* others in the interests of the international community as a whole. ... American foreign policy is consciously intended to advance *universal* values [his italics].” The most concise statement of the “benign hegemon” syndrome was made by Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence H. Summers when he called the United States the “first nonimperialist superpower” – a claim that manages in three words to exalt American uniqueness, American virtue, and American power.

American foreign policy is in considerable measure driven by such beliefs. In the past few years the United States has, among other things, attempted or been perceived as attempting more or less unilaterally to do the following: pressure other countries to adopt American values and practices regarding human rights and democracy; prevent other countries from acquiring military capabilities that could counter American conventional superiority; enforce American law extraterritorially in other societies; grade countries according to their adherence to American standards on human rights, drugs, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, missile proliferation, and now religious freedom; apply sanctions against countries that do not meet American standards on these issues; promote American corporate interests under the slogans of free trade and open markets; shape World Bank and International Monetary Fund policies to serve those same corporate interests; intervene in local conflicts in which it has relatively little direct interest; bludgeon other countries to adopt economic policies and social policies that will benefit American

economic interests; promote American arms sales abroad while attempting to prevent comparable sales by other countries; force out one U.N. secretary-general and dictate the appointment of his successor; expand NATO initially to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic and no one else; undertake military action against Iraq and later maintain harsh economic sanctions against the regime; and categorize certain countries as "rogue states," excluding them from global institutions because they refuse to kowtow to American wishes.

In the unipolar moment at the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was often able to impose its will on other countries. That moment has passed. The two principal tools of coercion that the United States now attempts to use are economic sanctions and military intervention. Sanctions work, however, only when other countries also support them, and that is decreasingly the case. Hence, the United States either applies them unilaterally to the detriment of its economic interests and its relations with its allies, or it does not enforce them, in which case they become symbols of American weakness.

At relatively low cost the United States can launch bombing or cruise missile attacks against its enemies. By themselves, however, such actions achieve little. More serious military interventions have to meet three conditions: They have to be legitimated through some international organization, such as the United Nations where they are subject to Russian, Chinese, or French veto; they also require the participation of allied forces, which may or may not be forthcoming; and they have to involve no American casualties and virtually no "collateral" casualties. Even if the United States meets all three conditions, it risks stirring up not only criticism at home but widespread political and popular backlash abroad.

American officials seem peculiarly blind to the fact that often the more the United States attacks a foreign leader, the more his popularity soars among his countrymen who applaud him for standing tall against the greatest power on earth. The demonizing of leaders has so far failed to shorten their tenure in power, from Fidel Castro (who has survived eight American presidents) to Slobodan Milošević and Saddam Hussein. Indeed, the best way for a dictator of a small country to prolong his tenure in power may be to provoke the United States into denouncing him as the leader of a "rogue regime" and a threat to global peace.

Neither the Clinton administration nor Congress nor the public is willing to pay the costs and accept the risks of unilateral global leadership. Some advocates of American leadership argue for increasing defense expenditures by 50 percent, but that is a nonstarter. The American public clearly sees no need to expend effort and resources to achieve American hegemony. In one 1997 poll, only 13 percent said they preferred a preeminent role for the United States in world affairs, while 74 percent said they wanted the United States to share power with other countries. Other polls have produced similar results. Public disinterest in international affairs is pervasive, abetted by the drastically shrinking media coverage of foreign events. Majorities of

55 to 66 percent of the public say that what happens in western Europe, Asia, Mexico, and Canada has little or no impact on their lives. However much foreign policy elites may ignore or deplore it, the United States lacks the domestic political base to create a unipolar world. American leaders repeatedly make threats, promise action, and fail to deliver. The result is a foreign policy of “rhetoric and retreat” and a growing reputation as a “hollow hegemon.”

The Rogue Superpower

In acting as if this were a unipolar world, the United States is also becoming increasingly alone in the world. American leaders constantly claim to be speaking on behalf of “the international community.” But whom do they have in mind? China? Russia? India? Pakistan? Iran? The Arab world? The Association of Southeast Asian Nations? Africa? Latin America? France? Do any of these countries or regions see the United States as the spokesman for a community of which they are a part? The community for which the United States speaks includes, at best, its Anglo-Saxon cousins (Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) on most issues, Germany and some smaller European democracies on many issues, Israel on some Middle Eastern questions, and Japan on the implementation of U.N. resolutions. These are important states, but they fall far short of being the global international community.

On issue after issue, the United States has found itself increasingly alone, with one or a few partners, opposing most of the rest of the world’s states and peoples. These issues include U.N. dues; sanctions against Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and Libya; the land mines treaty; global warming; an international war crimes tribunal; the Middle East; the use of force against Iraq and Yugoslavia; and the targeting of 35 countries with new economic sanctions between 1993 and 1996. On these and other issues, much of the international community is on one side and the United States is on the other. The circle of governments who see their interests coinciding with American interests is shrinking. This is manifest, among other ways, in the central lineup among the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. During the first decades of the Cold War, it was 4:1 – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China against the Soviet Union. After Mao’s communist government took China’s seat, the lineup became 3:1:1, with China in a shifting middle position. Now it is 2:1:2, with the United States and the United Kingdom opposing China and Russia, and France in the middle spot.

<p>In the eyes of many countries America is the rogue superpower.</p>

While the United States regularly denounces various countries as “rogue states,” in the eyes of many countries it is becoming the rogue superpower. One of Japan’s most distinguished diplomats, Ambassador Hisashi Owada, has

argued that after World War II, the United States pursued a policy of "unilateral globalism," providing public goods in the form of security, opposition to communism, an open global economy, aid for economic development, and stronger international institutions. Now it is pursuing a policy of "global unilateralism," promoting its own particular interests with little reference to those of others. The United States is unlikely to become an isolationist country, withdrawing from the world. But it could become an isolated country, out of step with much of the world.

If a unipolar world were unavoidable, many countries might prefer the United States as the hegemon. But this is mostly because it is distant from them and hence unlikely to attempt to acquire any of their territory. American power is also valued by the secondary regional states as a constraint on the dominance of other major regional states. Benign hegemony, however, is in the eye of the hegemon. "One reads about the world's desire for American leadership only in the United States," one British diplomat observed. "Everywhere else one reads about American arrogance and unilateralism."

Political and intellectual leaders in most countries strongly resist the prospect of a unipolar world and favor the emergence of true multipolarity. At a 1997 Harvard conference, scholars reported that the elites of countries comprising at least two-thirds of the world's people – Chinese, Russians, Indians, Arabs, Muslims, and Africans – see the United States as the single greatest external threat to their societies. They do not regard America as a military threat but as a menace to their integrity, autonomy, prosperity, and freedom of action. They view the United States as intrusive, interventionist, exploitative, unilateralist, hegemonic, hypocritical, and applying double standards, engaging in what they label "financial imperialism" and "intellectual colonialism," with a foreign policy driven overwhelmingly by domestic politics. For Indian elites, an Indian scholar reported, "the United States represents the major diplomatic and political threat. On virtually every issue of concern to India, the United States has 'veto' or mobilizational power, whether it is on nuclear, technological, economic, environmental, or political matters. That is, the United States can deny India its objectives and can rally others to join it in punishing India." Its sins are "power, hubris, and greed." From the Russian perspective, a Moscow participant said, the United States pursues a policy of "coercive cooperation." All Russians oppose "a world based on a dominant U.S. leadership which would border on hegemony." In similar terms, the Beijing participant said Chinese leaders believe that the principal threats to peace, stability, and China are "hegemonism and power politics," meaning U.S. policies, which they say are designed to undermine and create disunity in the socialist states and developing countries. Arab elites see the United States as an evil force in world affairs, while the Japanese public rated in 1997 the United States as a threat to Japan second only to North Korea.

Such reactions are to be expected. American leaders believe that the world's business is their business. Other countries believe that what happens in their part of the world is their business, not America's, and quite explicitly

respond. As Nelson Mandela said, his country rejects another state's having "the arrogance to tell us where we should go or which countries should be our friends.... We cannot accept that a state assumes the role of the world's policeman." In a bipolar world, many countries welcomed the United States as their protector against the other superpower. In a uni-multipolar world, in contrast, the world's only superpower is automatically a threat to other major powers. One by one, the major regional powers are making it clear that they do not want the United States messing around in regions where their interests are predominant. Iran, for instance, strongly opposes the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf. The current bad relations between the United States and Iran are the product of the Iranian revolution. If, however, the Shah or his son now ruled Iran, those relations would probably be deteriorating because Iran would see the American presence in the Gulf as a threat to its own hegemony there.

Flexible Responses

Countries respond in various ways to American superpowerdom. At a relatively low level are widespread feelings of fear, resentment, and envy. These ensure that when at some point the United States suffers a humiliating rebuff from a Saddam or a Milošević, many countries will think, "They finally got what they had coming to them!" At a somewhat higher level, resentment may turn into dissent, with other countries, including allies, refusing to cooperate with the United States on the Persian Gulf, Cuba, Libya, Iran, extraterritoriality, nuclear proliferation, human rights, trade policies, and other issues. In a few cases, dissent has turned into outright opposition as countries attempt to defeat U.S. policy. The highest level of response would be the formation of an antihegemonic coalition involving several major powers. Such a grouping is impossible in a unipolar world because the other states are too weak to mount it. It appears in a multipolar world only when one state begins to become strong and troublesome enough to provoke it. It would, however, appear to be a natural phenomenon in a uni-multipolar world. Throughout history, major powers have tended to balance against the attempted domination by the strongest among them.

Some antihegemonic cooperation has occurred. Relations among non-Western societies are in general improving. Gatherings occur from which the United States is conspicuously absent, ranging from the Moscow meeting of the leaders of Germany, France, and Russia (which also excluded America's closest ally, Britain) to the bilateral meetings of China and Russia and of China and India. There have been recent rapprochements between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Iran and Iraq. The highly successful meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference hosted by Iran coincided with the disastrous Qatar meeting on Middle Eastern economic development sponsored by the United States. Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov has promoted

Russia, China, and India as a "strategic triangle" to counterbalance the United States, and the "Primakov doctrine" reportedly enjoys substantial support across the entire Russian political spectrum.

Undoubtedly the single most important move toward an antihegemonic coalition, however, antedates the end of the Cold War: the formation of the European Union and the creation of a common European currency. As French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine has said, Europe must come together on its own and create a counterweight to stop the United States from dominating a multipolar world. Clearly the euro could pose an important challenge to the hegemony of the dollar in global finance.

Despite all these antihegemonic rumblings, however, a more broad-based, active, and formal anti-American coalition has yet to emerge. Several possible explanations come to mind.

First, it may be too soon. Over time the response to American hegemony may escalate from resentment and dissent to opposition and collective counteraction. The American hegemonic threat is less immediate and more diffuse than the prospect of imminent military conquest posed by European hegemonies in the past. Hence, other powers can be more relaxed about forming a coalition to counter American dominance.

Second, while countries may resent U.S. power and wealth, they also want to benefit from them. The United States rewards countries that follow its leadership with access to the American market, foreign aid, military assistance, exemption from sanctions, silence about deviations from U.S. norms (as with Saudi human rights abuses and Israeli nuclear weapons), support for membership in international organizations, and bribes and White House visits for political leaders. Each major regional power also has an interest in securing U.S. support in conflicts with other regional powers. Given the benefits that the United States can distribute, the sensible course for other countries may well be, in international-relations lingo, not to "balance" against the United States but to "bandwagon" with it. Over time, however, as U.S. power declines, the benefits to be gained by cooperating with the United States will also decline, as will the costs of opposing it. Hence, this factor reinforces the possibility that an antihegemonic coalition could emerge in the future.

Third, the international-relations theory that predicts balancing under the current circumstances is a theory developed in the context of the European Westphalian system established in 1648. All the countries in that system shared a common European culture that distinguished them sharply from the Ottoman Turks and other peoples. They also took the nation-state as the basic unit in international relations and accepted the legal and theoretical equality of states despite their obvious differences in size, wealth, and power. Cultural commonality and legal equality thus facilitated the operation of a balance-of-power system to counter the emergence of a single hegemon, and even then it often operated quite imperfectly.

Global politics is now multicivilizational. France, Russia, and China may well have common interests in challenging U.S. hegemony, but their very

different cultures are likely to make it difficult for them to organize an effective coalition. In addition, the idea of the sovereign legal equality of nation-states has not played a significant role in relations among non-Western societies, which see hierarchy rather than equality as the natural relation among peoples. The central questions in a relationship are: who is number one? who is number two? At least one factor that led to the breakup of the Sino-Soviet alliance at the end of the 1950s was Mao Zedong's unwillingness to play second fiddle to Stalin's successors in the Kremlin. Similarly, an obstacle to an anti-U.S. coalition between China and Russia now is Russian reluctance to be the junior partner of a much more populous and economically dynamic China. Cultural differences, jealousies, and rivalries may thwart the major powers from coalescing against the superpower.

Fourth, the principal source of contention between the superpower and the major regional powers is the former's intervention to limit, counter, or shape the actions of the latter. For the secondary regional powers, on the other hand, superpower intervention is a resource that they potentially can mobilize against their region's major power. The superpower and the secondary regional powers will thus often, although not always, share converging interests against major regional powers, and secondary regional powers will have little incentive to join in a coalition against the superpower.

The Lonely Sheriff

The interplay of power and culture will decisively mold patterns of alliance and antagonism among states in the coming years. In terms of culture, cooperation is more likely between countries with cultural commonalities; antagonism is more likely between countries with widely different cultures. In terms of power, the United States and the secondary regional powers have common interests in limiting the dominance of the major states in their regions. Thus the United States has warned China by strengthening its military alliance with Japan and supporting the modest extension of Japanese military capabilities. The U.S. special relationship with Britain provides leverage against the emerging power of a united Europe. America is working to develop close relations with Ukraine to counter any expansion of Russian power. With the emergence of Brazil as the dominant state in Latin America, U.S. relations with Argentina have greatly improved and the United States has designated Argentina a non-NATO military ally. The United States cooperates closely with Saudi Arabia to counter Iran's power in the Gulf and, less successfully, has worked with Pakistan to balance India in South Asia. In all these cases, cooperation serves mutual interests in containing the influence of the major regional power.

<p>Most of the World does not want America to be its policeman.</p>

This interplay of power and culture suggests that the United States is likely to have difficult relations with the major regional powers, though less so with the European Union and Brazil than with the others. On the other hand, the United States should have reasonably cooperative relations with all the secondary regional powers, but have closer relations with the secondary regional powers that have similar cultures (Britain, Argentina, and possibly Ukraine) than those that have different cultures (Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan). Finally, relations between major and secondary regional powers of the same civilization (the EU and Britain, Russia and Ukraine, Brazil and Argentina, Iran and Saudi Arabia) should be less antagonistic than those between countries of different civilizations (China and Japan; Japan and Korea; India and Pakistan; Israel and the Arab states).

What are the implications of a uni-multipolar world for American policy?

First, it would behoove Americans to stop acting and talking as if this were a unipolar world. It is not. To deal with any major global issue, the United States needs the cooperation of at least some major powers. Unilateral sanctions and interventions are recipes for foreign policy disasters. Second, American leaders should abandon the benign-hegemon illusion that a natural congruity exists between their interests and values and those of the rest of the world. It does not. At times, American actions may promote public goods and serve more widely accepted ends. But often they will not, in part because of the unique moralistic component in American policy but also simply because America is the only superpower, and hence its interests necessarily differ from those of other countries. This makes America unique but not benign in the eyes of those countries.

Third, while the United States cannot create a unipolar world, it is in U.S. interests to take advantage of its position as the only superpower in the existing international order and to use its resources to elicit cooperation from other countries to deal with global issues in ways that satisfy American interests. This would essentially involve the Bismarckian strategy recommended by Josef Joffe, but it would also require Bismarckian talents to carry out, and, in any event, cannot be maintained indefinitely.

Fourth, the interaction of power and culture has special relevance for European-American relations. The dynamics of power encourage rivalry; cultural commonalities facilitate cooperation. The achievement of almost any major American goal depends on the triumph of the latter over the former. The relation with Europe is central to the success of American foreign policy, and given the pro- and anti-American outlooks of Britain and France, respectively, America's relations with Germany are central to its relations with Europe. Healthy cooperation with Europe is the prime antidote for the loneliness of American superpowerdom.

Richard N. Haass has argued that the United States should act as a global sheriff, rounding up "posses" of other states to handle major international issues as they arise. Haass handled Persian Gulf matters at the White House in the Bush administration, and this proposal reflects the experience and success of that administration in putting together a heterogeneous global posse

to force Saddam out of Kuwait. But that was then, in the unipolar moment. What happened then contrasts dramatically with the Iraqi crisis in the winter of 1998, when France, Russia, and China opposed the use of force and America assembled an Anglo-Saxon posse, not a global one. In December 1998 support for U.S. and British air strikes against Saddam was also limited and criticism widespread. Most strikingly, no Arab government, including Kuwait, endorsed the action. Saudi Arabia refused to allow the United States to use its fighter planes based there. Efforts at rallying future posses are far more likely to resemble what happened in 1998 than what happened in 1990–91. Most of the world, as Mandela said, does not want the United States to be its policeman.

As a multipolar system emerges, the appropriate replacement for a global sheriff is community policing, with the major regional powers assuming primary responsibility for order in their own regions. Haass criticizes this suggestion on the grounds that the other states in a region, which I have called the secondary regional powers, will object to being policed by the leading regional powers. As I have indicated, their interests often do conflict. But the same tension is likely to hold in the relationship between the United States and major regional powers. There is no reason why Americans should take responsibility for maintaining order if it can be done locally. While geography does not coincide exactly with culture, there is considerable overlap between regions and civilizations. For the reasons I set forth in my book, the core state of a civilization can better maintain order among the members of its extended family than can someone outside the family. There are also signs in some regions such as Africa, Southeast Asia, and perhaps even the Balkans that countries are beginning to develop collective means to maintain security. American intervention could then be restricted to those situations of potential violence, such as the Middle East and South Asia, involving major states of different civilizations.

In the multipolar world of the 21st century, the major powers will inevitably compete, clash, and coalesce with each other in various permutations and combinations. Such a world, however, will lack the tension and conflict between the superpower and the major regional powers that are the defining characteristic of a uni-multipolar world. For that reason, the United States could find life as a major power in a multipolar world less demanding, less contentious, and more rewarding than it was as the world's only superpower.

The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School

Lene Hansen

Before Barry Buzan descended on Copenhagen the town's most famous attraction was the Little Mermaid, located less than a ten minute stroll from the home of the Copenhagen School.¹ Her story, in Hans Christian Andersen's pre-Disney original, is one of self-inflicted silence and pain: to get close to her object of desire, the earthly prince, she sacrificed her voice knowing that if the prince married someone else she would die on the next morning. Moving elegantly around the castle, the prince, being perhaps ahead of his time, nevertheless failed to think of a silent woman as proper marriage material, and the Little Mermaid met her destiny as foam on the water and a life amongst the Air Spirits. The tale of the Little Mermaid highlights the importance of voice and body for the construction of subjectivity, and it speaks about the chances, even deadly ones, one might take in the pursuit of desire and happiness. It shows that in the absence of speech, the prince fails to see who the Little Mermaid really is. Her silence prevents her from ever fully materialising as an embodied subject, and it prevents her from letting him know how his construction of her subjectivity fundamentally endangers her.

It never occurred to the prince that the Little Mermaid might have a security problem, nor would the Copenhagen School, had they been present, have run to her rescue. Their latest book, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, argues strongly in favour of grounding the definition of security problems within speech; their epistemological reliance on speech act theory presupposes the existence of a situation in which speech is indeed possible. Those who like the Little Mermaid are constrained in their ability to speak security are therefore prevented from becoming subjects worthy of consideration and protection. But the silent subject is not the only hindrance for a proper reading of the Little Mermaid's plight, a second set of problems concern the emotional complexity of the Little Mermaid's security dilemma. The Little Mermaid did in fact get the chance to kill the prince right before the deadly sunrise, yet even

Source: *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 29(2) (2000): 285–306. This article first appeared in *Millennium*.

as her own survival was at stake she refused to use the weapon provided by her family and sacrificed herself out of her love for him.

The Copenhagen School makes a self-confident claim to have tackled the conceptual security debate,² and this confidence has been affirmed by others. Jef Huysmans argues, for example, that '[t]hey constitute possibly the most thorough and continuous exploration of the significance and the implications of a widening security agenda for security studies'.³ But confidence and praise naturally call for critical scrutiny; if this is the most thorough exploration of the wider security agenda, we should ask if there are important security problematiques excluded from the gaze of the Copenhagen School. Several critics have debated the Copenhagen School's conceptualisation of society and identity, the responsibility of the analyst, and the potential conservative nature of the theory of securitization.⁴ Yet the striking absence of gender has not been a subject of discussion.⁵ The lack of even a consideration of the possible inclusion of a concept of gendered security is particularly noteworthy as post-structuralists and those associated with critical security studies have favoured making gender an indispensable part of security analysis.⁶

The aim of this article is not, however, simply to point out that the Copenhagen School has no concept of gender-based insecurity, but to show through a critical discussion of this absence where the barriers for their construction of a security theory which includes gender lie.⁷ I will argue that the silent security dilemma of the Little Mermaid is indicative of two blank spots in the Copenhagen School's 'speech act' framework which prevent the inclusion of gender. These can be characterised as the 'security as silence' and the 'subsuming security' problems. 'Security as silence' occurs when insecurity cannot be voiced, when raising something as a security problem is impossible or might even aggravate the threat being faced. 'Subsuming security' arises because gendered security problems often involve an intimate inter-linkage between the subject's gendered identity and other aspects of the subject's identity, for example national and religious. As a consequence, 'gender' rarely produces the kind of collective, self-contained referent objects required by the Copenhagen School, and to the extent that gender is included it is mostly as an individual – and less important – security problem.

The article proceeds in three parts, the first introduces the Copenhagen School's theory of securitization and security as a speech act in more detail. The second part argues the importance of the 'security as silence' and 'subsuming security' problems. It confronts the common response to calls for the inclusion of gender in security analysis: that it falls under the category of social security, not 'proper' national security, and that it concerns individual, not collective security. Through a discussion of the case of honour killings in Pakistan, both of these claims are countered, and it is shown that gender insecurity concerns not only social redistribution but fundamental questions of survival, and that the security of particular individuals is deeply embedded in collective constructions of subjectivity and security.⁸ Drawing on the work of Judith Butler, the third part suggests that a theory of gender and security should consider the importance of the body within the speech act. Second,

that the focus on whether to expand the concept of security should be supplemented with a theory of what conditions the construction of 'security problems'. This involves an approach to security which foregrounds the role of practice, in particular how political practices depend upon and reinforce subjectivity, and how practices of security might strive to individualise security problems thereby taking them out of the public and political domain.

The Copenhagen School: Securitization, Referent Objects, and Society

The success of the Copenhagen School stems in part from its willingness and ability to engage the widening-deepening debate in security studies, that is whether the concept of security should be expanded to cover other issues or sectors than the military and secondly, whether entities other than the state should be able to make the claim to have its threats located under the security rubric.⁹ While numerous scholars have been involved in this now familiar debate, the extraordinary impact of the Copenhagen School has been achieved through the formulation of a 'solution'. This allows for widening as well as deepening 'security' without opening it up to an unlimited expansion which would render the concept meaningless for academic and political purposes.

The decisive move, captured by Ole Wæver's concept of 'securitization', is to permit a possible expansion of the concept, but to make the actual definition of security dependent on its successful construction in discourse. Securitization refers to the process of presenting an issue in security terms, in other words as an existential threat:

The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization.¹⁰

It is the discursive power of securitization which brings together actors and objects: *securitizing actors* are defined as 'actors who securitize issues by declaring something – a referent object – existentially threatened'; *referent objects* as 'things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival'.¹¹ The constitution of referent objects, in other words, closely linked to the practice of securitization; they do not exist independently of discursive articulation, it is through discourse that security is defined, and where actors successfully manifest their position and capacity.

This apparently makes for a very open conceptualisation of security, however, the criteria for who can become securitizing actors and what constitutes a successful case of securitization establish the restrictive side of the

Copenhagen School's approach. On the crucial question of how to define securitizing actors, the theory is less specific; it is argued that common securitizing actors are 'political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups', and that their identification depends less on 'who performs the speech than of what logic shapes the action'.¹² The definition of securitizing actors depends in other words on their ability to perform a successful securitization, to get a sufficient acceptance of the threat in question from the relevant audience.¹³

The act of securitization is always related to the claim of the presence of an existential threat, and this leads the Copenhagen School to make a distinction between 'international security' and 'social security'. Within the former, it is argued, 'security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society)'.¹⁴ In contrast, 'social security' concerns questions of 'entitlement and social justice', and problems within this field are not located within the same rhetoric of danger, urgency and survival.¹⁵ Unemployment and crime, for example, 'are threats primarily to individuals (threats *in* society); only if they threaten the breakdown of society do they become societal security issues'.¹⁶ The distinction between social and international security relies less on whether an issue, or potential security problem, is located at the national or the international level, than on the extent to which the situation is successfully presented as one of *collective* survival. The Copenhagen School argues that what constitutes the field of security studies is the concern with 'international security'; problems falling within the realm of 'social security' might be worthy of political consideration and important in their own right, but they should not be confused with those of 'international security'. The key point is not, however, that particular problems carry a certain essential security character, but that they are located within different modes of reasoning.

The differentiation between the two modes of reasoning found within 'international security' and 'social security', and the restriction of security studies to the concern with the former, leads the Copenhagen School to argue that the concept of security can be expanded to areas other than the military, as long as the mode of reasoning resembles the one of 'international security'. The concept of security should therefore be expanded and widened beyond the military sector into the political, environmental, economic, and societal sectors, whereas other sectors, or 'lenses of security' could become politically salient and added to this list in the future.¹⁷ The inclusion of the environmental sector stems for example from a combination of environmental degradation and growing political awareness and mobilisation in the 1970s and 1980s.

'Security', as defined by the Copenhagen School, is not only about survival, it is, as a general rule, about *collective* survival, and to argue that something threatens a group's survival is to engage in a political process: one has to convincingly state that this particular threat is of such a magnitude that action needs to be initiated and 'normal rules' suspended. By its very nature, even in

the rare cases where the threat to a particular individual is securitized, one has to engage in a collective process where the relevant audience needs to be convinced – or coerced – into recognising the ‘threat’ in question. The need for threats to be argued at the collective level has previously led Buzan and Wæver to be very direct in their refusal of conceptualising security in individual terms. In 1993 they wrote that

[w]henver security is defined via individual security there is a high risk that the core of the classical security problematique which one is allegedly trying to redefine, not forget, will be missed. ... This classical logic can neither be studied nor avoided by measuring how secure individuals are.¹⁸

Wæver was even more outspoken in his launching of the concept of securitization in 1995 when he claimed that ‘as concepts, *neither individual security nor international security exist*’.¹⁹ This position was softened somewhat in 1998. In terms of the expansion of the list of referent objects, of *deepening* the concept, the Copenhagen School has moved away from the traditional state-focus to

the middle scale of limited collectivities. ... A main criterion of this type of referent is that it forms an interpretative community – it is the context in which principles of legitimacy and valuation circulate and within which the individual constructs an interpretation of events.²⁰

Security: A New Framework for Analysis is thus more open than previous works to the possibility that systemic and individual referent objects *could* become politically mobilised; however, ‘traditionally, the middle level has been the most fruitful generator of referent objects’.²¹

Gender Insecurity: Honour Killings in Pakistan

Keeping this outline of the key elements of the Copenhagen School’s theory of security in mind, I now turn to a case which illustrates the complexities of how to identify (potential) gender insecurity: honour killings of girls and women in Pakistan.²² The purpose of discussing this case is not to reinstall an objective concept of security outside of discursive and political practice, but to point at one particular instance where gender-related security problems present themselves with great urgency. We might begin by pointing out that the case of Pakistani honour killings does seem to confirm to the delineation of ‘international security’ as argued by the Copenhagen School; honour killings concern existential threats to women’s (and to a lesser extent men’s) *survival*, not ‘only’ the question of equality of ‘social security’. Although honour killings target individuals, these individuals become targets because of their transgression of particular gendered norms. This inter-linkage of threat and

gender implies that one cannot appropriately identify this as a case of individual security: the targeting of *individual* Pakistani women is deeply connected to their inscription within an inferior gendered *collectivity*. Or, put differently, a decision to locate this case within the realm of individual security would seriously diminish our possibilities of grasping its collective aspects.

Recent statistics for 1998, collected by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, identify 286 women killed in Punjab, and 255 deaths (including men and women) in Sindh (the two out of three main regions). The actual number is expected to be much higher and Amnesty International's recent report argues further that the number of honour killings appears to be increasing due to the combination of a widened conception of honour, a growing awareness of women's rights (or resistance to the absence thereof), and the limited, if any, sanctions brought upon the perpetrators.²³ There is, in other words, a polarisation between the forces of Islamic conservatism on the one hand and resistance on the other.

Honour killings should be understood as part of a rigid, patriarchal definition of female transgressive behaviour articulated and sustained by the legal-religious-political establishment.²⁴ The most important legal document, the *Zina* ordinance, which was adopted in 1979 as part of Zia-ul-Haq's Islamification of Pakistan, bans sexual intercourse outside of a properly sanctioned marriage and allows for stoning to death in the case of transgression by married women and one hundred lashes in public in the case of unmarried ones.²⁵ Since *zina* is applicable regardless of the parties' consent, it can be aimed at couples whose family succeed in declaring the marriage void. It even functions in the prevention of prosecution of rape: when a woman accuses a man of rape, she is simultaneously 'admitting' she had sexual intercourse with him, thus if the man is acquitted she can be prosecuted for *zina*. As the burden of proof is further complicated – and gendered – by the requirement that for the maximal punishment to be imposed, four Muslim men of good reputation must have witnessed the actual act of rape, rape is very difficult to prosecute.²⁶

The women's position is exacerbated by the fact that while the judiciary have made rulings to the effect that women might, for example, marry men of their own choice, there are still areas of life which are not part of formal legislation, but left either to local legal systems, or regulated through informal practice.²⁷ This contributes to a lack of transparency in terms of separating the legal and political from the religious, and often facilitates the lenient treatment of those perpetrating honour killings. Human rights activists consistently argue that the police are reluctant in their investigation and prosecution of these crimes.²⁸

While men in illicit relationships in principle face identical consequences – in Sindh, the couple is described as *kari-karo* ('black women' and 'black man') – the persecution is itself gendered in that the woman is murdered first, giving the man the possibility to flee.²⁹ Women's opportunities to flee are also constrained compared to those of men because of their higher level of illiteracy and their lack of access to economic funds, which are usually controlled

by the male members of the family. Furthermore, while in hiding the *karo* has the opportunity to strike a deal with the man whose honour has been injured thereby rescuing himself. Compensation might come in the form of money or material assets and/or a woman from the *karo*'s family. This possibility of trading women as part of 'solving' the crisis illustrates a commodification of women as objects which can be priced and circulated, and it inscribes female subjectivity as fundamentally different from that of men.

The unpredictable character of many accusations and the status of facts and evidence are important elements for understanding the mode of insecurity produced through the threat of honour killings. As argued by Amnesty International, suspicion might be enough to claim a violated honour; whether the accusation is true or not is often of less importance.³⁰ The consequence is an environment where many women live in terror, not only because of the tight regulations they are exposed to, but because of the potentially random nature of the threats directed against them. Another characteristic of honour killings is the premeditation with which they are often conducted. The testimonies, actions, and justifications available suggest that these murders are often legitimated within a discourse of reason rather than emotion, that they are based on the calculation of long-term effects rather than momentary outburst, and that they involve a public enactment rather than the secrecy of the private sphere.

Adopting a security terminology, the situation can be described as one where one group of private actors ('women') are being abused by another group of private actors, but where the state fails, or refuses to protect the formers security. The passive stance of the Pakistani government is criticised by mainly nongovernmental organisations that invoke the international level; they argue that Pakistan should be held internationally responsible for not complying with human rights conventions that it has signed.

Women in Pakistan are exposed to honour killings, attacks with acid, and burning (often explained as caused by exploding stoves): it would thus seem justified to argue that 'they' are facing a security problem which is about 'survival' and which is not solely a question of individual threats. Yet, one needs also to qualify the 'they' constructing 'Pakistani women' as one coherent entity, since some women also voice support for the hegemonic discourse and since differences do exist as to the exposure experienced by different groups of women. Women belonging to the Pakistani elite are less exposed than poor, rural women; as Asma Jahangir, a prominent lawyer and women's rights activist argues, 'I would have been silenced long ago if I did not come from a privileged family'.³¹ One should also be careful not to totalise the 'Pakistani' element either. 'Pakistan' is composed of a set of different political forces, for example women's rights activists like Jahangir and her sister Hina Jilani who is also a lawyer, and groups like Shirkat Gat, who are as much part of 'Pakistan' as are the religious and political right.³² To construct Pakistan as a uniform, repressive entity rather than as a site of contestation would paradoxically be to write out those forces who fight these very currents within their 'own' society.

The Two Problems of the Copenhagen School

It is sometimes suggested that gender security falls outside of 'proper security' and into the category of individual security.³³ But if we take the Copenhagen School's own definition of 'international security', it would seem quite justified to argue that the Pakistani honour killings 'exceed' social and individual security. 'International security' is concerned with survival, 'social security' with entitlement and social justice; 'international security' requires threats to a larger collectivity, 'social security' only to individuals. The case of honour killings would appear to qualify on both accounts: even if the survival of the entire Pakistani female collectivity is not at stake, individuals are being systematically threatened because of their location within a particular gendered collective. Examining the absence of gender within the Copenhagen School, and adopting the School's own definition of individual and collective security it would, in other words, be misleading to explain this absence as a consequence of gender being located under the rubric of individual security. The absence of gender is not simply a matter of oversight, or of misplacing it at the level of individual security, but stems from two theoretical decisions which lead to the 'security as silence' and 'subsuming security' problems.

Security as Silence

The first theoretical delineation of relevance for understanding the absence of gender in the Copenhagen School concerns the securitization approach's speech act epistemology. The focus on the verbal act of speech causes difficulties in coming to terms with what can be called 'security as silence': a situation where the potential subject of security has no, or limited, possibility of speaking its security problem. As the case of Pakistani rapes leading to *zina* convictions, or even honour killings shows, by discursively acknowledging the rape, the woman in question runs a risk of being penalised herself.³⁴ An attempt to securitize one's situation would in these cases, paradoxically, activate another threat posed to these women by their 'own' society. For instance, those who choose to fight the current legal and cultural practices might become subjected to threats. Asma Jahangir and Hina Jilani, were counselling Samia Sarwar, a woman who was shot and killed in Jilani's office on the initiative of her father for seeking a divorce from an abusive husband. Jilani was shot at, but survived; later, however, the local *ulema* (religious authority) issued a *fatwa* against her and her sister, a threat against which the political authorities have failed to react.³⁵ The security strategies chosen by Pakistani women have, as a consequence, often been silence, denial, or if the incident has become known, flight.

I propose to begin the analysis of the absence of gender within the Copenhagen School by asking to what extent these cases could be accounted for inside the School's own framework, or, in other words, how they might read them. The crucial question is whether we are confronting a successful case of securitization, more specifically: to what extent have the honour

killings 'the priority and urgency of an existential threat [where] the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by'?³⁶

The first and most obvious option would be to consider the case a securitization due to the protest of Pakistani individuals and women's groups. While the Copenhagen School framework abstains from an objective – or quantifiable – definition as to when securitization is successful, I would argue that the answer in this case should be a negative one. It would require quite a stretch of the definition of securitizing actors and successful securitization to argue that those relatively few groups and individuals active in the campaign for women's rights fall into the group of 'political leaders' or that they have gained a sufficiently supporting audience to have managed to 'break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by'. It should be remembered that the prevention of unlimited expansion of the concept of security is located in some fairly strict demands on what counts as successful securitization. To consider the Pakistani case as successfully securitized would make it difficult to see precisely how the Copenhagen School had limited the concept of security to the extent they argue is necessary.

Another option for recognising honour killings as a securitized problem would be to move to the international level, where one might argue that organisations like Amnesty International are speaking security on behalf of the threatened Pakistani women. In this case a more complicated picture appears involving a larger set of actors: Pakistani women, the Pakistani government, Amnesty International, and potentially the international community of states. A successful securitization would in this situation presumably involve an international threat issued against the Pakistani government stipulating that if no improvements were made, economic, political, or military sanctions would follow. The problem, however, is that Amnesty International is unable to muster these sanctions on its own, that a *successful* securitization would require the support of a sufficiently powerful group of states. Not discounting the importance of the work of institutions such as Amnesty International, we must conclude that they only rarely, and then indirectly, qualify as securitizing actors within the Copenhagen School framework.

Stretching the possibility of including gender-based security problems further, one might point to the adoption of gender as a ground for seeking political asylum in Canada, the US, New Zealand, and Australia and argue that this constitutes an acknowledgement, at least by some states, of the security problems experienced by women, including those in Pakistan.³⁷ It would, however, only be when an international norm at the state-level started to develop that we could clearly determine that we have a *successful* case of securitization. For 'women' to become a referent object for security they need to find a way into international discourse; as a consequence, the Copenhagen School framework can only identify the threats aimed towards them ex-post facto, not as long as they are 'silent security problems'. Furthermore, while the adoption of gender based prosecution as a

ground for asylum is of course to be applauded, it is also an impossible option for many poor women who lack the economic and social resources to organise a flight, and asylum granting is, ultimately, a less ambitious strategy than securitizing the policy of the Pakistani government to the point where more severe actions were brought against it.

Finally, one might suggest that the discourse of the Pakistani government, or the political-religious-military establishment, could provide the foundation for identifying a securitization of 'women' of a particular (norm-breaking) behaviour. Instead of searching for cases where women securitize their situation, one would, in short, search for the state's construction of 'women' as threats. But this would lead one back to the very problem associated with state security which the Copenhagen School tried to solve by introducing the concept of societal security. They argued that staying with the state was untenable because it 'creates an excessive concern with state stability and largely removes any common sense idea about the security of societies in their own right'.³⁸ Second, even if one took this route, it would not fundamentally solve the silence problem. It is a possibility that the discourse of the establishment securitizes 'women' but it is equally possible that it stays within the realm of a legal discourse which in a non-securitized rhetorical mode lays out the consequences of particular actions. While the official discourse might allow for the identification of gendered security problems, we cannot rely on this being the case.³⁹

In sum, even if a number of possibilities at different levels are considered one does not find that the honour killings have been securitized as defined by the Copenhagen School. This, however, leaves a final question to be considered: the Copenhagen School argues that although one might find tactical advantages in a particular securitization, 'desecuritization is the optimal long-range option'.⁴⁰ It could therefore be argued that searching for a securitization in the Pakistani case implies a positive view of securitization as the solution to the security problems of the women involved, and that this view runs counter to the largely negative connotations associated with the concept inside the Copenhagen School's own framework. This raises complicated questions concerning how to evaluate different strategies: is securitization, or, desecuritization the best choice, and within what particular time horizon? Even if desecuritization is the ultimate goal, should one opt for a securitization of a present situation which one finds manifestly oppressive? My point in this section is not to engage in this normative discussion, but to simply point out that the use of the concept of securitization as the *analytical* criteria for the identification of security problems cannot elucidate the case of the Pakistani honour killings.

Subsuming Security: Society and the Gendered Subject

The inability of the Copenhagen School to account for gender-based insecurities does not, however, only depend on the 'security as silence' problem. The theory of the Copenhagen School argues that securitization takes place

only when a referent object is declared existentially threatened. As a consequence, the definition of the referent object becomes crucial: it can block, or severely limit the qualification of issues as security problems. This section will argue that the second hindrance for the inclusion of gender security in the Copenhagen School framework concerns the delineation of the referent object.⁴¹

The most logical sector to expect gender to figure would be within the societal one, as it is concerned with issues related to the construction of identity, and with collectivities whose security questions are often distinct from, or in opposition to, the political security of the state.

Definitionally, societal security is about large, self-sustaining identity groups; what these are empirically varies in both time and place. In contemporary Europe these groups are mainly national, but in other regions religious or racial groups have more relevance. The concept could also be understood as 'identity security'.⁴²

More specifically, the referent object is defined as

whatever larger groups carry the loyalties and devotion of subjects in a form and to a degree that can create a socially powerful argument that this 'we' is threatened. Since we are talking about the societal sector, this 'we' has to be threatened *as to its identity*.⁴³

These definitions imply that the referent object of security needs to be carefully separated from other referent objects, and gender-based insecurity therefore only comes into the security optic if articulated around a 'self-sustained' gendered community. It needs, in other words, to set itself aside from national, religious, and racial referent objects.

The Copenhagen School mentions briefly that feminists have tried to politicise the private, and that the contemporary US has witnessed a move towards groups defined on the basis of gender: first, radical feminists in the Brownmiller tradition who argue that women are threatened by an essential male proclivity to violence and rape, and second, right-wing groups militantly opposed to homosexuals and homosexuality.⁴⁴ Both of these cases involve clearly distinguished referent objects: Brownmiller feminism pitches, in a dichotomised fashion, 'women' against 'men', and right-wing anti-gay forces argue the radical threat of the homosexual Other.⁴⁵ Radical feminism attempts a securitization building on a 'clear' gendered referent object, namely 'women', but, I would argue, with very limited success.⁴⁶ It offers a political programme which insists on the existence of a feminine, romantic, 'pure voice'.⁴⁷ As a consequence, argues Jean Bethke Elstain, '[t]he repudiated in masculine aspect is projected outwards as a piece of negative identity. As such it becomes a screen behind which the fearsome images of *them* appears, and is then internalized as external reality'.⁴⁸ This

is in other words an attempted securitization which articulates gendered identity as the unambiguously privileged category, but the problem is in the words of Butler that:

If one 'is' a woman, that is surely not all one is; *the term fails to be exhaustive*, not because a pre-gendered 'person' transcends the specific paraphernalia of its gender, but because gender is not always constituted coherently or consistently in different historical contexts, and because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalities of discursively constituted identities. As a result, it becomes impossible to separate out 'gender' from the political and cultural intersections in which it is invariably produced and maintained.⁴⁹

Yet, looking to security studies, there is a difference between gender identity on the one hand, and other collective identities such as ethnic, religious, national, and class on the other. Religion, race, and nationality can form the foundation for self-reproducing political communities; gender as exclusivity, that is a 'women's community', cannot to nearly the same extent. The identity groups that come into focus in the societal security theory are constituted through a *demarkation* from either the state or other competing identity-groups. But gender-based security threats are more often characterised by their *inseparability* from 'national' or 'religious' security, than by a clearly delineated gendered referent object. The Pakistani honour killings, for example, illustrate a case of gender insecurity characterised by an *inter-linkage* with national, state, and religious security. The construction of appropriate gendered norms of behaviour within a highly religious discourse functions to link gender and religion in a way which prevents the articulation of 'gender insecurity', because it would be in opposition to the (constructed) foundational essence of the religious community. The mass rapes in Bosnia provide another good illustration of the inter-linkage between national and gender security: the rapes were subsumed by the Bosnian and Serbian governments in a security debate centred on the nation.⁵⁰ Gender was deemed highly important, but read through a national optic which silenced threats to raped Muslim women coming from their own society.⁵¹ To understand the complexities of these cases we need to take the inter-linkage and ambiguity of the gendered security problem seriously.

Beyond Copenhagen: Butler and the Conditions for Security

I have so far argued that two elements prevent possible gendered security problems from registering within a Copenhagen School analysis: the focus on speech produces problems in situations where the possibilities of speaking security are constrained, and the conditions for becoming a referent object are such that gender security is almost excluded from qualifying. An engagement

with those blind spots within the Copenhagen School requires that we shift our analytical attention from identifying instances of securitizations and towards the question of how security discourses are produced. Why is it, for example, that Pakistani honour killings are not successfully securitized, and what are the constraints involved? Providing a full-fledged theory of the conditions for security would clearly be beyond the scope of this paper. However, by introducing Butler's work on the bodily performance taking place within the speech act, two suggestions for how to investigate gendered security dynamics further can be offered: to include the body as an additional epistemological focus, and to examine the individualising strategies employed in keeping security problems from appearing at the collective level.⁵²

The Copenhagen School defines security according to what is successfully put into language. Yet, one might ask more specifically how 'speech' is defined within this framework; is it a relatively narrow definition equating speech with oral or written words, or is it a broader definition encompassing non-verbal forms of speech/communication? The Copenhagen School's explicit reliance on J.L. Austin's speech act theory as well as the concrete example of an empirical analysis offered at the end of the book points to a narrow definition. Their empirical analysis examines constructions of security within EU institutions, that is the Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament, and the empirical material consists of speeches, declarations, and debates. The identification of securitization is not, however, necessarily dependent upon an explicit articulation of the words 'security' or 'threat'.⁵³

This delineation of discourse is verbal and relatively easily identifiable in its textual form. But it is also a delineation which excludes the potential importance of non-verbal communication. In the context of security politics two forms of non-verbal communication are particularly central: the visual and the bodily. Visual representation has historically involved drawings, photography, and television, but the growth of mass media and real time transmission as well as the advent of the Internet and its interactive possibilities have added to the relative importance of the visual.⁵⁴ Yet, while the 'language' of the visual cannot be reduced to that of the text, and while the relationship between text and image is worthy of serious reflection,⁵⁵ it is the question of the body which pushes the discursive approach most fully to its limits.⁵⁶

If the 'silence problem' of the Copenhagen School is connected to the silence of the written or spoken word, then one possible question to be pursued is whether speech and the body line up unproblematically. Can the body speak security even when the word/text does not? To answer this question we might turn to Judith Butler who, drawing on Shoshana Felman, argues that speech involves a bodily act:

In speaking, the act that the body is performing is never fully understood; the body is the blindspot of speech, that which acts in excess of what is said, but which also acts in and through what is said. That the speech is a bodily act means that the act is redoubled in the moment of

speech: there is what is said, and then there is a kind of saying that the bodily 'instrument' of the utterance performs.⁵⁷

It is important to situate Butler's conception of the acting body within her theory of performativity.⁵⁸ When Butler says that the body acts 'in excess of', 'in' and 'through' speech she does not imply a pre-constituted body which is given prior to speech. There is no ontologically privileged 'pure body' which is or can be invoked, nor is there an intentional body which comes before or determines 'its' speech.⁵⁹ Rather, the notion of performativity underlines that the actions of the body are integral to the constitution of 'its' identity; in her words, 'identity is performatively constituted by the very "expressions" that are said to be its results'.⁶⁰ To say that identity is performatively constituted implies that the same body which acts 'in excess' of the speech act is also simultaneously – due to its performative actions – constituted through the same speech act. The relationship between speech and body, both of which are understood within a logic of performative identity constitution, can thus, to borrow an apt, Derrida-inspired, phrase from Cynthia Weber, be characterised as one of *undecidability*. speech can never fully convey the body, and the body is never constituted outside of speech.⁶¹

The importance of these insights for security studies, in particular the Copenhagen School, is twofold. First, the undecidability between speech and body implies that even in the cases of verbal silence, security might be spoken through the body, so that the 'none-security speech' of Pakistani women might be complemented by the excessive speech of the body. Furthermore, if insecurity can be spoken through the body, it becomes obvious why the body often is a crucial target for those seeking to discipline 'deviant behaviour'.

Secondly, the introduction of the bodily aspect of the speech act allows us to theorise those situations where speech act and state performance do not line up so unproblematically as implicitly assumed by the Copenhagen School. As Butler points out:

a statement may be made that, on the basis of a grammatical analysis alone, appears to be no threat. But the threat emerges precisely through the act that the body performs in the speaking act. Or the threat emerges as the apparent effect of a performative act only to be rendered harmless through the bodily demeanor of the act (any theory of acting knows this).⁶²

Although Butler's focus is primarily on the individual, her observations are of relevance to the case of securitization where the speech act is performed on the behalf of a collective group. Paradoxically, one might in fact argue that the performance of the bodily instrument is particularly clear in the case of state security: as the state 'speaks security' it gives words to performances already undertaken or which will be undertaken in the future.⁶³ But deeds and words do not necessarily communicate the same message as in the situation where 'enemy' tanks cross the border under declarations of

'protecting' the population of the invaded country.⁶⁴ The point here is not to institutionalise tanks as an objective criteria for identifying security, but to argue that if 'security' consists both of what is said and what is bodily performed, then we need to refocus our discussion in the direction of the potential slip between the two.

The undecidable relationship between speech and body and the performative view of identity highlight the importance of the constitution of the subject. In Austin's speech act theory, the starting-point of the Copenhagen School, 'the subject who speaks precedes the speech in question', and thus it cannot account for how the speaking subject is constituted.⁶⁵ Butler turns, therefore, to Louis Althusser's theory of interpellation, which argues that the speech act interpellates the subject into a particular subject formation. Butler's aim is to combine the two in a theory of 'how the subject constituted through the address of the Other becomes then a subject capable of addressing others'.⁶⁶ The key is to consider the subject 'neither a sovereign agent with a purely instrumental relation to language, nor a mere effect whose agency is pure complicity with prior operations of power'.⁶⁷ The advantage of pointing to the constitution of the subject, rather than assuming its existence, is first and foremost that it allows a more explicit concern with the politics of security. If 'security' is no longer considered a speech act taking place between given subjects – usually the state and 'its' citizens – but a practice which *constructs* subjects at both 'ends' of the speech act (the speaker and those spoken to), we open our theory to a consideration of the discursive and bodily practices involved in the formation of subjects.⁶⁸ As argued by Butler, '{e}ven when gender seems to congeal into the most reified forms, the "congealing" is itself an insistent and insidious practice, sustained and regulated by various social means'.⁶⁹ Crucial in terms of explicating the content of 'various social means' are the notions of reiteration, recognition, and authority: the first points to 'the historicity of convention that exceeds and enables the moment of its enunciation', in other words, those discursive structures of a certain permanence which are reproduced and often naturalised through rearticulation.⁷⁰ But reiteration notwithstanding, the interpellation of the speech act does not always work: the subject needs to recognise itself in the interpellation and accept the authority of the interpellating voice.

A focus on how successful speech acts *construct* subjects allows us to return to the question of silence. 'Security, the speech act' relies upon and reinforces a particular demarcation of the political subject, but this demarcation only works through a simultaneous silencing; as Butler notes, 'one can be interpellated, put in place, given a place, through silence, through not being addressed'.⁷¹ If we combine the inclusion of the body with an understanding of the subjects of security as constructed through speech as well as through silence, we arrive at a theory that seeks to understand security as a practice which through discursive and bodily acts inscribe particular subjects as threats or as being threatened.

It should be emphasised that the inclusion of the body and the concern with the construction of subjectivity do not amount to an argument in favour

of a concept of individual security. While each individual dies alone, not every death is inscribed within a collective optic and the question within the specific field of security is therefore not the threat of death itself, but the *signification of death*. The crucial question becomes not whether 'something' is an individual or a collective security problem, but *how* certain deaths are endowed with a collective signification while others are read 'only' as individual.⁷² Even if one speaks security in the name of the individual, claiming the rights, threats, or concern of the individual constitutes an engagement in the public and political field, and 'individual security' is in this respect always collective and political. The security debate would in other words benefit from changing its concern with whether the individual or the collective concept should be privileged to a focus on how political practices *individualises* certain threats, thereby locating them outside of the public, political realm while others are viewed as collective concerns.⁷³

Conclusion

Although a full-fledged analysis of the Pakistani case cannot be accomplished within this article, let me, finally, illustrate how the theoretical insights from Butler's work might be applied more concretely in a security analysis. If we begin by asking what is being embodied through the speech act, not 'to say that there is discursive construction on the one hand and a lived body on the other', but to investigate the discursive constructions of bodies, and the bodily enactment of discourses, there are at least two sets of practices that would be of importance: the dominant political-legal-religious discourse on women and the practices of punishment.⁷⁴ The former discourse is not necessarily what we would describe as a security discourse within the vocabulary of the Copenhagen School. It is quite possible to draft legal documents without resorting to the drama of existential threats, survival, and extra-ordinary measures of security discourses; in other words, reading these texts might not in and of themselves allow us to identify instances of securitization. But if we change the focus to ask how this discourse inscribes subjectivity, we get quite a different picture. While the texts in question might not securitize 'women', they have significant effects in terms of the proscription of appropriate and inappropriate behaviour, and through this proscription they constitute, or arrest the meaning of being a 'woman'. One might, therefore, see this as an instance of how identity is congealed through a particular legal-religious-political practice.

But this discourse does not 'only' operate at the textual level. Although this is perhaps a banal point, practices of punishment such as stoning to death, flogging, bride burning, and various forms of honour killings are targeted against the body. Seen in a larger, societal context the textual discourse is accompanied by bodily threats which 'exceed' the speech act while being connected to it at the same time. The result is a discourse, identifiable at the level of legal-political-religious texts as well as in the formally and informally

sanctioned practices, which simultaneously constitutes and endangers female bodies through the construction of a particular 'proper-improper' subjectivity.

In the case of honour killings in Pakistan, it might be tempting to interpret the gender-based insecurities in individual terms precisely because the strategy chosen by the women themselves appears in most cases to be individual: keeping what occurred 'to oneself, or, constructing oneself as responsible for the situation. But if we approach the security discourse and the bodily threats as instances of *individualising practices*, we see that while these practices are directed at particular individuals they are simultaneously producing, and relying upon, collective fear. The arbitrary nature surrounding these practices implies that numerous women in principle could be targeted, that the women at risk constitute a much larger group than the ones actually punished. Targeting individuals, rather than a collectivity produces not only an environment of fear, it internalises this fear within the individual.⁷⁵ The political-legal-religious establishment's successful construction of women's security in individual terms renders the formulation of a collective response exceedingly difficult. To conclude from this that what we have is a matter of 'individual security' would be to bow to the practices which produce this individualisation in the first place and to fail to see how the 'strategic response' of the silent women is located within a broader social structure.

Current security debate has identity written all over it. Yet it is surprising to find so little engagement with gender outside of the feminist literature. The absence of gender in the Copenhagen School's recent work is symptomatic of this pattern, but it also provides us with a good starting point for an investigation of why even those willing to expand the concept of security do not seem compelled to explore gender-based security conceptually or politically. If we situate this absence within the larger security studies debate, however, it becomes apparent that what is at stake is not simply the question of whether the concept of security should be expanded or not, but how certain threats achieve such a political saliency that they become the subject of security policies.⁷⁶

I have argued that an understanding of gender-based security problems requires a more thorough and critical investigation of the speech act than carried out by the Copenhagen School. 'Security' is not only a speech act, but embedded in the production of particular subjectivities which then form the basis for what can be articulated as threat and threatened. It has to be acknowledged that if security is a speech act, then it is simultaneously deeply implicated in the production of silence: all speech involves an attempt to fix meaning, to define a particular situation and the subjects within it, and any successful speech act implies as a consequence the exclusion of other possible constructions of meaning. Silence is a powerful political strategy that internalises and individualises threats thereby making resistance and political mobilisation difficult. The turn to security as a practice rather than as a concept facilitates a *political* analysis of the way in which security discourses come to gain the authority necessary to define threats and strategies to counter them.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank the following people for their comments on previous drafts of this article: the two anonymous referees and the Editorial Board of *Millennium*, the participants at the conference on 'What Factors Condition the Formation of Threat Perceptions?' at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 15–16 October 1999, Thomas Diez, Ulla Holm, Jef Huysmans, Richard Little, Karen Lund Petersen, Iyer B. Neumann, Cynthia Weber, Michael C. Williams, and in particular the core of the Copenhagen School: Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver.

Notes

1. The article by Bill McSweeney which coined the term 'Copenhagen School' had 'Buzan in Copenhagen' as its top header. See 'Identity and security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School', *Review of International Studies* 22, no. 1 (1996): 81–93.

2. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

3. Jef Huysmans, 'Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe', *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 4 (1998): 480.

4. McSweeney, 'Identity and Security'; Huysmans, 'Revisiting Copenhagen'; and Johan Eriksson, 'Observers or Advocates?: On the Political Role of Security Analysts', *Cooperation and Conflict* 34, no. 3 (1999): 311–30.

5. The only places in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* where gender is mentioned are in a note on how feminists have tried to politicise the private, and in the chapter on societal security which discusses the case of contemporary America arguing that there is a 'trend toward a redefinition of cultural and societal categories in terms of distinct racial and gender groups'. See Buzan, *Security*, 46 and 130.

6. As argued by Ken Booth, 'To talk about security without thinking about gender is simply to account for the surface reflections without examining what is happening deep down below the surface'. See 'Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist', in *Critical Security Studies*, eds. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 101. See also David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 237–39; Simon Dalby, 'Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse', in *Critical Security Studies*, 3–31; R.B.J. Walker, 'Gender and Critique in the Theory of International Relations', in *Gendered States*, ed. V. Spike Peterson (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992); Steve Smith, "'Unacceptable Conclusions" and the "Man" Question: Masculinity, Gender, and International Relations', in *The 'Man' Question in International Relations*, eds. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998); and Craig Murphy, 'Six Masculine Roles in International Relations and Their Interconnection: A Personal Investigation', in *The 'Man' Question in International Relations*.

7. The paper does not carry out a chronological analysis of the development of the School as has been done by Bill McSweeney, 'Identity and Security', and Huysmans, 'Revisiting Copenhagen'. Nor does it engage another key element of the School, namely the concept of security complexes which is central to the forthcoming book by Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*; for a discussion see Huysmans, 'Revisiting Copenhagen', 494–99.

8. This is not an argument in favour of limiting the study of gender and security to the question of deathly threats. As for example Jean Bethke Elshtain's *Women and War* convincingly shows a complete study of gender and security must include a thorough consideration of the gendered subjectivities mobilized in and against war. See *Women and War* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987). Secondly, this should not be taken to imply that only threats to women are at stake in feminist security studies, or as suggested by Adam Jones to make it a body count contest between men and women. See 'Gender and Ethnic Conflict in ex-Yugoslavia', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17, no. 1 (1994): 115–34. The purpose of a feminist/gender analysis is not to measure up which gender has suffered most casualties, but to explore how the killings draw on

and reinforce particular political constructions of gendered subjectivity. See Terrell Carver, Molly Cochran, and Judith Squires, 'Gendering Jones: Feminisms, IRs, Masculinities', *Review of International Studies* 24, no. 2 (1998): 296; Marysia Zalewski, 'Well, What is the Feminist Perspective on Bosnia?', *International Affairs* 71, no. 2 (1995): 339-56; and Lene Hansen, 'Gender, Nation, Rape: Bosnia and the Construction of Security', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, forthcoming.

9. The widening-deepening distinction was introduced by Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, 'Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies? Politics and Method', *Mershon International Studies Review* 40, no. 2 (1996): 229-54.

10. Buzan, *Security*, 25.

11. *Ibid.*, 36.

12. *Ibid.*, 40-41.

13. The relevant audience need not be the entire population; especially in non-democratic countries the audience might well be much smaller and restricted to the power elite.

14. *Ibid.*, 21.

15. *Ibid.*, 21.

16. *Ibid.*, 121.

17. For a discussion of the concept of sectors, see Eriksson, 'Observers or Advocates?', and Ole Wæver, 'Securitizing Sectors?: Reply to Eriksson', *Cooperation and Conflict* 34, no. 3 (1999): 334-40.

18. Ole Wæver, 'Societal Security: The Concept', in *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, eds. Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre (London: Pinter, 1993), 24.

19. Ole Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 48 emphasis in original.

20. Buzan, *Security*, 36-37.

21. *Ibid.*, 39.

22. The article does not make any claim to present a detailed empirical analysis of Pakistani honour killings, nor does it pretend to engage the numerous and complex political, religious, and economic issues involved.

23. Amnesty International, *Pakistan: Honour Killings of Girls and Women*, Report ASA 33/18/99, September 1999. The 255 deaths in 196 *karo-kari* killings in 1998 would seem to imply that 196 women and 59 men were killed.

24. For a general account of feminism and fundamentalism in Pakistan, see Khawar Mumtaz, 'Identity Politics and Women: "Fundamentalism" and Women in Pakistan', in *Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in International Perspective*, ed. Valentine M. Moghadam (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994).

25. Hina Jilani, 'Whose Laws?: Human Rights and Violence Against Women in Pakistan', in *Freedom From Violence: Women's Strategies From Around The World*, ed. Margaret Schuler (New York: United Nations Development Fund for Women, 1992), 71.

26. Amnesty International, *Pakistan: Women's Human Rights Remain a Dead Letter*, Report ASA 33/07/97, March 1997.

27. Farida Shaheed, 'Controlled or Autonomous: Identity and the Experience of the Network, Women Living under Muslim Laws', *Signs* 19, no. 4 (1994): 1000-1003. It is still too early to assess any possible consequences of the change of leadership in October 1999 when general Parvez Musharraf replaced Nawaz Sharif.

28. Amnesty International, *Pakistan: Honour Killings*.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*

31. Quoted from Jan Goodwin, *Price of Honor: Muslim Women Lift the Veil of Silence on the Islamic World* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1994), 70. Some suggest, however, that honour killings are becoming an increasing urban phenomenon. See Ulrikke Moustgaard, 'Æresdrab i Pakistan Skifter Karakter' (Honour Killings in Pakistan are Changing Character), *Information*, 24 May 2000, 6.

32. Durre Sameen Ahmed, 'Changing Faces of Tradition', in *Women's Lifeworlds: Women's Narratives on Shaping their Realities*, ed. Edith Sizoo (London: Routledge, 1997); Shaheed, 'Controlled or Autonomous'; and Mumtaz, 'Identity Politics and Women'.

33. Paradoxically, this is a position which is supported indirectly by those within feminist security studies who argue that one 'should take the individual as the basic unit of analysis', as well as by Critical Security Studies. See J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 92, and 'You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists', *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 4 (1997): 611–32; Buzan, *Security*, 203–7; Ken Booth, 'Strategy and Emancipation', *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 4 (1991): 313–26; and Richard Wyn Jones, "'Message in a Bottle"?: Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies', *Contemporary Security Studies* 16, no. 3 (1995): 299–319.

34. Shaheed, 'Controlled or Autonomous', 1012.

35. Amnesty International, *Pakistan: Government Indifference as Lawyers Defending Women's Rights are Threatened with Death*, News Release ASA 33/06/99, 15 April 1999.

36. Buzan, *Security*, 25.

37. Pernille Stensgaard, 'Mænds Private Ejendom Søger Asyl' (Men's Private Property Seek Asylum), *Weekendavisen*, 28 August–3 September 1998, 3.

38. Wæver, 'Societal Security', 25.

39. A related methodological problem not dealt with explicitly concerns the difference between the word ('security', or 'threat') and the modality; Jacques Derrida argues that 'the so-called "presence" of a quite relative verbal unit – the word – while not being a contingent accident worthy of no attention, nevertheless does not constitute the ultimate criterion and the utmost pertinence'. See *Dissemination* (London: Arblone Press, 1981), 130, quoted in Christopher Norris, *Derrida* (London: Fontana Press, 1987), 44. If one takes Derrida's advice, which the case study on the EU at the end of *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* seems to indicate, the question arises of how to identify securitization in the absence of 'security words'.

40. Buzan, *Security*, 29.

41. The choice of Pakistani honour killings as the illustration of a possible gendered security problem might run the risk of presented gender insecurity as a non-Western problem. While the 'silence problem' is probably less outspoken in the West, the problems concerning the delineation of the referent object apply.

42. Buzan, *Security*, 119–20.

43. *Ibid.*, 123 emphasis in original.

44. *Ibid.*, 46, 130, and lecture by Ole Wæver, 'Københavnerskolen gør Status' (The Copenhagen School Takes Stock), Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Copenhagen, 18 November 1999. Also Susan Brownmiller, *Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape* (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1975).

45. I am not going into a detailed discussion of the homosexual case as the Copenhagen School uses it to point at a situation where a gendered and sexual group is constructed as a threat. What my discussion focuses on are the limits for registering the security problems of those being threatened. See, however, Judith Butler, 'Contagious Word: Paranoia and "Homosexuality" in the Military', in *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (London: Routledge, 1997) and Carol Cohn, 'Gays in the Military: Texts and Subtexts', in *The 'Man' Question*. When even Demi Moore movies feature sympathetic lesbians (*G.I. Jane*, directed by Ridley Scott, 1997) and *International Security* runs articles on the issue, (see Elizabeth Kier, 'Homosexuals in the U.S. Military: Open Integration and Combat Effectiveness', *International Security* 23, no. 2 (1998): 5–39) it seems safe to say that the issue has gained a certain saliency within the American cultural/security mainstream.

46. See, for example, how Elizabeth Wurtzel's recent 'post-radical' feminist bestseller, *Bitch: In Praise of Difficult Women* (London: Quartet Books, 1998) avoids the romanticism and essentialism of Brownmiller.

47. Elshrain, *Public Man, Private Woman*, 225.

48. *Ibid.*, 217 emphasis in original.

49. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (London: Routledge, 1990), 3 emphasis added.

50. It is the construction of 'women' as an integral, although often inferior, element of the national, the religious, and the racial community which provides the basis for the ambiguous location of the gendered subject between national and gendered community. For an introduction to the relationship between gender and nation, see Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender & Nation* (London: Sage, 1997).

51. Hansen, 'Gender, Nation, Rape'.

52. A somewhat similar concern is present in Iver Neumann's argument that a concept of violisation should be included in the Copenhagen School terminology in order to grasp the aspects of action and bodily harm inflicted in warfare which 'exceeds' the speech act. See 'Identity and the Outbreak of War: Or Why the Copenhagen School of Security Studies Should Include the Idea of "Violisation" in its Framework of Analysis', *International Journal of Peace Studies* 3, no. 1 (1998): 18. My argument is, however, aimed at a different situation: the situation of warfare, which is Neumann's focus, is most often accompanied by a speech act declaring the opponent to be an essential threat to ones society.

53. Buzan, *Security*, 179-89. Wouter G. Werner argues, however, that it is doubtful whether this case conforms to the definition of securitization in that 'nowhere in the speeches the alleged need for further integration is related to the need for emergency measures which would free the agents from rules they would otherwise be bound by'. See *Securitisations and Legal Theory*, Working Paper no. 27 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1998), 6.

54. Ronald J. Deibert, *Parchment, Printing, and Hypermedia: Communication in World Order Transformation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), especially 113-36 and 187-94; Jerry Everard, *Virtual States: The Internet and the Boundaries of the Nation-state* (London: Routledge, 2000). To take an example from the field of security politics, NATO has now included a 'virtual visits' possibility to its multimedia link on its homepage. Yet, this is currently limited to two Quicktime VR clips of an empty North Atlantic Council meeting room with no interactive possibilities. See [<http://www.nato.int/multi/>] (7 August 2000).

55. Within IR the two most sustained attempts to theorise the visual and its relationship to text have taken place in the works of Michael J. Shapiro and James Der Derian, see for example Michael J. Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988) and 'From the Halls of Montezuma to the Tube and Silver Screen', in *Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); and James Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), especially chap. 8.

56. The visual eases the move towards the inclusion of the body in that it allows a depiction of the body which the text does not. A 'complete' analysis should thus consider the relationship between the word, the visual, and the body. See also William A. Callahan, 'Visions of Gender and Democracy: Revolutionary Photo Albums in Asia', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 27, no. 4 (1998): 1031-60.

57. Butler, *Excitable Speech*, 11.

58. For an excellent introduction to Butler's understanding of performativity and its relevance to the study of state sovereignty, see Cynthia Weber, 'Performative States', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 27, no. 1 (1998): 77-95.

59. Judith Butler, *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'* (London: Routledge, 1993), 10-11.

60. Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 25.

61. As Weber nicely puts it: 'A performative understanding of state sovereignty suggests that sovereignty is undecidable because its meaning cannot be fixed, for whenever the meaning of sovereignty is stabilised one finds that the meaning of sovereignty has already moved on to something else'. See 'Performative States', 90.

62. Butler, *Excitable Speech*, 11.

63. *Ibid.*, 16.

64. Cynthia Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). The analytical difficulty of providing standards

in the case of a non-foundationalist epistemology is illustrated by Buzan's argument that it is unclear how an objectivist approach could be applied, 'except in cases where the threat is unambiguous and immediate (hostile tanks crossing the border)'. See Barry Buzan, 'Rethinking Security after the Cold War', *Cooperation and Conflict* 32, no. 1 (1997): 18.

65. Butler, *Excitable Speech*, 24.

66. For an introduction to the concept of interpellation in an IR context see Jutta Weldes, 'Constructing National Interests', *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 3 (1996): 275–318.

67. Butler, *Excitable Speech*, 26.

68. This involves, as Butler points out, a revision of Althusser's structuralist understanding of the subject as passively conforming to the subject position which it is interpellated into. See *ibid.*, 32–34.

69. Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 33.

70. Butler, *Excitable Speech*, 33.

71. *Ibid.*, 27.

72. On individuality and death, see William E. Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 16–19.

73. See also Michael C. Williams, 'Identity and the Politics of Identity', *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 2 (1998): 204–25 and Jean Berhke Elshrain, *Public Man, Private Woman*.

74. Irene Costera Meijer and Baukje Prins, 'How Bodies Come to Matter: An Interview with Judith Butler', *Signs* 23, no. 2 (1998): 282.

75. Campbell, *Writing Security*, 253–56.

76. See also Michael C. Williams, 'Modernity, Identity, and Security: A Comment on the Copenhagen Controversy', *Review of International Studies* 24, no. 3 (1998): 435–39.

Nuclear Order and Disorder

William Walker

An immense international ordering problem had to be addressed after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, after nuclear weapons had entered the bloodstream of international politics with the onset of the East–West conflict, and after the engines of technological development and weapon production had been fired up. Although that problem found no sufficient solution, a ‘nuclear order’ of great sophistication and effectiveness was fashioned in response during the Cold War. Essentially a normative order, albeit an order that reflected the interests and the technological and structural features of the time, it rested, I shall argue, upon two linked governmental creations: a *managed system of deterrence*, and a *managed system of abstinence*.¹

In the decade or so which followed the ending (at Reykjavik in 1986) of the nuclear Cold War, many came to believe that the ordering problem presented by nuclear weapons was diminishing and was capable of being cracked once and for all.² Nuclear weapons could be removed from the foreground of international politics, to everyone’s advantage, even if they could not be eliminated in the near-term. Unfortunately, confidence that this marginalization of nuclear weapons could be and was being achieved was undermined by a now familiar list of setbacks including the Indian and Pakistani test explosions; the collapse of the UN inspection efforts in Iraq; North Korea and Iran’s launches of ballistic missiles; the difficulties of ratifying security treaties in Moscow and Washington, culminating in the US Senate’s rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); and the US plans to deploy a national missile defence.³

Some have claimed that these have been more than contingent events – that the inherited order and its presumed successor have been rendered inappropriate by fundamental changes in power structure, in warfare, and in the nature and distribution of technology. According to this view, a different kind of security order *has* to be fashioned. The counterclaim is that no other effective and legitimate nuclear order, let alone security order,

is imaginable or capable of realization. Although the current order needs strengthening, the understandings and bargains and practices embedded in it should not and cannot be replaced. The only alternative is a highly conflictual and destructive disorder. This was the essential message conveyed in the Final Document agreed in May 2000 by States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Keep moving down the familiar ordering track or everything will fall apart.

It is now widely appreciated that the policy choices made by the United States and other governments in these first years of the new century will have momentous consequences (President Clinton's decision in September 2000 on national missile defence defers but does not settle the issue). It is important that these choices should be informed by a clear understanding of what constitutes nuclear order, why the past few years have brought an apparent loss of order, and what amounts to an effective ordering strategy. That understanding has often seemed lacking in recent times: debates that have raged over national missile defence, the CTBT and much else have been marred by implicit if not explicit characterizations of nuclear order that have lacked subtlety and historical perspective.

This article is an attempt to respond to the need for greater clarity in our conceptions of nuclear order. It considers how 'a nuclear order' and an 'ordering philosophy' took shape in the 1960s and 1970s; how the 1980s began and ended with very different efforts to transcend that nuclear order; how a much strengthened order appeared to emerge in the early and mid-1990s, only to dissipate later in the decade; and how the ordering task may be judged today.⁴

The Cold War Nuclear Order: Two Linked Systems

Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought an immediate appreciation of nuclear technology's unique ability to destroy and to mutilate. But by appearing to have hastened the end of a great war, the atomic bomb was attributed an exceptional power of persuasion, a power that nation-states might justifiably use for political and military purposes.

Two competing visions of order emerged in the United States in the months after August 1945. One involved an act of collective negation: members of the newly founded United Nations should join together to kill the nuclear child before it grew into a monster capable of global destruction.⁵ The other entailed the US sustaining its nuclear monopoly and using it to determine behaviour – to coerce the Soviet Union, contain communism and establish a Pax Americana. Neither vision could be realized. The disarmament proposals were already dead by the end of 1946 as the East–West conflict took hold, and the Soviet Union had ended the American monopoly by the early 1950s.

The 'Cold War order' that emerged instead has often been depicted as arising out of a near automatic process of power balancing and mutual restraint as nuclear weapons were introduced to the East–West conflict.

Although containing some truth, such an account underestimates the ordering problem created by three inescapable 'facts' of the nuclear age.⁶

The first 'fact' was that nuclear warfare was unlike any previous kind of warfare.⁷ Once mounted on ballistic missiles, to which there were no plausible defences, nuclear weapons brought a great amplification of war – the ultimate total war – and a tremendous foreshortening of war. Reaction times to surprise attack were reduced to minutes, and world wars would now be conducted in a matter of hours in a frenzy of destruction.

The second 'fact' was that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional states had an exceptional capacity to disrupt power balances and create security dilemmas. Nuclear proliferation implied a constant destabilization of regional and global structures of power. More than that, few military analysts could imagine how strategic stability could be established if nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles became standard issue.

The third 'fact' was that materials, technology and know-how relevant to the manufacture of nuclear weapons were bound to spread internationally. Indeed, some capabilities would *have* to spread if the benefits of civil nuclear power were to be realized. Knowledge would eventually diffuse and with it the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons.

For these three reasons, the arrival of nuclear weapons created an unprecedented *ordering imperative* in international politics. Without a nuclear order there could be neither Cold War order nor any other kind of order. And without it, nuclear weapons would themselves lack political and military utility: using them to prevent war would be little more than a gamble with survival, a rush to the end of time.

To complicate matters further, profound questions of *legitimacy* had to be addressed before an effective nuclear order could be instituted. Why should certain states, and only those states, have rights to defend themselves with nuclear weapons and to inflict final destruction? Should *any* state and *any* political leader be entrusted with those rights? Why should it be *illegitimate* for most states to possess them? How could their possession by the few be squared with the egalitarian principles enshrined in the UN Charter?

A satisfactory response to these predicaments was not found. The Cold War nuclear order was never stable and always dangerous, especially because efforts to stem the development and production of weapons were unsuccessful (the failure to ban explosive testing being a particular failure). But a solution of sorts to the problem of order *did* begin to emerge in the 1960s, especially after the shock of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Fashioned mainly but not exclusively by the US and the USSR, and forged across ideological blocs, it involved two linked systems of cooperative endeavour:⁸

1. *a managed system of deterrence*, whereby a recognized set of states would continue using nuclear weapons to prevent war and maintain stability, but in a manner that was increasingly controlled and rule-bound;

2. *a managed system of abstinence*, whereby other states would give up their sovereign rights to develop, hold and use such weapons in return for economic, security and other benefits.

The *system of deterrence* involved, among other things:

- the nuclear hardware deployed by the major powers together with the command and control systems laboriously built up from the early 1950s;
- a set of understandings and practices, expressed in the 'deterrence theories' of Brodie, Schelling and others and enunciated in nuclear doctrine, of how military forces of various kinds should be deployed and managed to provide mutual vulnerability and restraint;⁹
- the provision of 'hotlines' so that leaders could communicate in sudden crises; and
- the placing of limits on missile deployments through arms control treaties whose negotiation and implementation also served to increase trust amongst political and military elites across the East–West divide.

Central to this managed system of deterrence from the early 1970s onwards was the Anti-Ballistic Missile or ABM Treaty, the one treaty that involved a curtailment of technological innovation. By preventing the US and the USSR from building elaborate defensive systems, this treaty paradoxically ensured that nuclear weapons would not be used *offensively*. States could not attack one another with advantage from behind defensive shields. The ABM Treaty also allowed Britain, China and France some confidence that they could deter adversaries with 'minimum deterrents', thereby lessening pressures to expand their capabilities.

The *system of abstinence* involved, for its part:

- the nuclear umbrellas extended over allies of the US and the USSR, including the two Germanies and Japan, which made them feel reasonably secure without their own nuclear weapons;
- the formation of a non-proliferation regime, with the multilateral Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at its heart. The NPT asserted among other things that the five states that had already acquired nuclear weapons by 1967 *and only those states* had legal rights to possess them.¹⁰ Other states could only join the treaty by renouncing nuclear weapons and having their renunciations fully verified through international safeguards. The NPT sought to draw a line in the sand and to submit states other than the five to a powerful normative pressure to forego the nuclear option.

The precise manifestation of nuclear order varied from region to region. In some regions (such as Europe and East Asia), deterrent relations and patterns of acquisition and abstention were precisely drawn. In others (such as Latin America, the Middle East and South Asia) they were still indistinct.

Nonetheless, the nuclear order was truly global in reach and normative pretension, a globalism that drew strength from US and Soviet desires to project power within a more stable framework and from the broad interest of states and peoples in diminishing the risks posed by nuclear weapons.

A global nuclear order was therefore founded in the 1960s and 1970s upon two mutually supportive cooperative orders: the systems of deterrence and abstinence. But those orders implied two worlds: one where nuclear arms could be deployed and deterrence could operate; the other where nuclear arms and nuclear deterrence were disallowed (only the countries belonging to formal nuclear alliances had feet in both worlds, Germany and Japan being most prominent among them). How could this inherently inequitable order acquire international legitimacy and thereby gain broad allegiance? With great difficulty. Many states, including China, France and India, refused to join the NPT. But the majority did join it, partly because it would bring them greater security within their own regions, partly because of the persuasive powers of the US and the USSR, and partly because of three solemn pledges made by the nuclear weapon States Parties:

- they would help the non-nuclear weapon States Parties to acquire nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes;
- they would not use nuclear weapons to attack or coerce states that renounced them, unless those states attacked them in alliance with other nuclear powers ('negative security assurances' in the jargon);
- they would work to bring the nuclear arms race to an end and pursue complete nuclear disarmament. The language in the famous Article VI of the NPT may have been vague, but its intent was unambiguous.¹¹

The nuclear order's legitimacy therefore rested upon mutual obligation and reciprocity. And it rested heavily upon the notion that the possession of nuclear weapons by the five acknowledged powers was a temporary trust and a trust that could be extended to no other nation-state. By the same token, the political settlement that underpinned the nuclear order implied that only one of its pillars, the system of abstinence, possessed true and lasting legitimacy. All states should work together, over time, to dissolve the system of deterrence – to create an international order in which nuclear weapons would no longer be present.¹² This implied that any future transformation in power structure could not entail, or be precipitated by, the nuclear arming of emergent powers: the nuclear empowerment of aspiring states that had followed the Second World War was a 'once and for all' phenomenon.

Assumptions of Sameness and Exceptionalism

The Cold War cannot be left without two further observations that are important to understandings of recent development.

First, a necessary belief (or faith) in the 'sameness' of actors permeated the nuclear order constructed in the 1960s and 1970s. Despite the Cold War's great schisms, all states and all leaders – of whichever culture, race or ideology – would end up using the same rational calculus and would be guided in their behaviour by the same sense of obligation, the supreme obligation being to avoid nuclear war. I would suggest that this assumption of sameness underpinned *both* the system of deterrence, with its idea of a common rationality and currency of technological power, *and* the system of abstinence insofar as it was founded upon mutual obligation and respect for international law. Given this fundamental sameness of governmental behaviour, there could be trust, and given trust there could be peaceful coexistence.

The instruments of verification that were increasingly built into arms control treaties and the non-proliferation regime reinforced this possibility of trust. Through international inspection and monitoring, through a limited but genuine transparency, through the cooperative system of nuclear safeguards, states could gain confidence that others would not cheat.

The second observation is that, although many states gave shape to this nuclear order, it was seen by the United States as peculiarly *its* creation and responsibility, as the product of *its* exceptional genius, and with some justification. Throughout the nuclear age – this applies to later periods too – most of the *ordering ideas*, and most of the desire and power to realize those ideas, came from the United States. The American attitude towards the nuclear order has therefore always been monarchical, even in periods when its notion of order has been essentially liberal. The United States has unquestioningly conferred upon itself unique rights to decide when the game and its rules should be changed.

And change the game it did, briefly but spectacularly, in the early 1980s when the Reagan administration decided to uproot the 'managed system of deterrence' established by its predecessors.¹³ Suddenly the Soviet Union was an 'evil empire', an irrational actor and an actor that was beyond trust. The assumption of sameness was replaced by an assumption of irreconcilable difference, and the security that lay in mutual deterrence was proclaimed a myth rather than a reality.

Instead, the US government veered towards an earlier discarded model of order – that founded upon supremacy and coercion. And Reagan offered the American people a transcendent vision of invulnerability gained through the construction of a defensive missile shield, the Strategic Defense Initiative or Star Wars.¹⁴ Among his followers, arms control treaties were accorded little respect, the ABM Treaty being held in particular disdain by the Republican right.¹⁵

Many of the instincts, analyses and proposals that formed the Reagan policy of the early 1980s infused the approaches to nuclear ordering among those who gained ascendancy in Washington in the late 1990s.¹⁶ But the important difference, as we shall see later, was that the system of abstinence as well as the system of deterrence came under attack.

The Post-Cold War Marginalization of Nuclear Weapons

In the event, the Cold War order, and the nuclear order underpinning it, was transcended in a different and unexpected way when Gorbachev embarked on a programme of domestic reform and moved to end the East–West conflict. Abandoning his confrontational stance, Reagan joined Gorbachev in bringing to a close the nuclear conflict in 1986 when they discussed radical plans to eliminate the bulk of their nuclear weapons.

Suddenly, a different kind of security order seemed possible (especially to the liberal West) resting not on difference, not even on sameness, but on togetherness. It involved basing international security on the rule of law, the global spread of democracy, conflict resolution, the interdependence and restraint that would follow free trade, and on deliberate avoidance of the bad old practices of military power balancing. In the military sphere, claims that a ‘revolution in military affairs’ was underway – claims that gained credibility from the Gulf war – also encouraged the belief that nuclear weapons belonged in the past.¹⁷

The long expansion of nuclear arsenals was driven into reverse. The two regulatory institutions that supported the systems of deterrence and abstinence – arms control and the non-proliferation regime – seemed capable of merging into a single edifice dedicated to the marginalization of nuclear weapons in international politics. The decade from 1986 to 1995 became a golden age of nuclear threat reduction, to borrow an American phrase. Especially after a number of ‘rejectionists’ (notably Argentina, China, France and South Africa) joined the NPT, and after all new states formed out of the former Soviet Union barring Russia had renounced nuclear weapons, a *de facto* ‘marginalization strategy’ began to take shape with the following components:¹⁸

- *Irreversible arms reductions by the nuclear weapon states*: the numbers of operational warheads in the arsenals of the NWS would be progressively reduced through the US–Soviet/Russian INF, START I and II Treaties which would be followed by deeper reductions in START III. Thereafter, China, France and the UK would be engaged in START IV and its successors as individual arsenals came to be counted in hundreds rather than thousands of warheads. Retired weapons would be dismantled and their components and materials rendered inaccessible to further military use. Simultaneously, further warhead innovation and material production would be curtailed through the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), and steps would be taken to ensure that redundant nuclear *matériel* and expertise could not be acquired by other states or by non-state actors;¹⁹
- *Consolidation of the NPT and its verification system*: the greatest possible number of states would be brought into the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states (universal membership would be striven for).²⁰ Furthermore, compliance mechanisms would be strengthened to ensure that Iraq’s and

North Korea's development of weapon capabilities in violation of their NPT obligations was unlikely to be attempted by other states. This included reform of the IAEA safeguards system which had been shown to be ill-equipped to detect clandestine programmes (negotiations leading to reform were successfully concluded in May 1997);

- *Formation of nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ)*: renunciations expressed through NPT membership would be reinforced by the formation of regional treaty-based NWFZ which would gradually confine the geographical areas in which nuclear weapons were still located;²¹
- *'Capping' the Indian, Pakistani and Israeli weapon programmes*: the three non-NPT countries with active weapon programmes would be discouraged from 'crossing the threshold' by seeking resolution of the conflicts in their regions (through the Middle East peace process in Israel's case) and by gaining their adherence to the CTBT and FMCT if not the NPT;²²
- *Reform and extension of trade controls*: multilateral trade controls would be extended to cover 'dual-use' items; trade with non-NPT countries would be barred unless they accepted international safeguards on all nuclear materials and facilities on their territories; and membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) would be widened, and its provisions strengthened, to help curtail the spread of missile capabilities;
- *Banning chemical and biological weapons*: global bans on the possession and usage of chemical and biological weapons would be instituted through the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and a strengthened Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), partly to deny states the option of substituting such weapons for nuclear weapons.

The crowning event of this period was the Conference held in New York in April–May 1995 to extend the NPT's lifetime (it was initially a 25-year treaty). The obvious option of giving the NPT an indefinite lifetime implied, Article VI notwithstanding, granting the nuclear weapon states indefinite rights to hold nuclear weapons, contravening the temporary trust referred to earlier. Not surprisingly, many states were reluctant to concede this. In addition, there was concern that the NWS would be less inclined to respect their Article VI obligations if anxieties over the Treaty's impermanence were removed.

In the event, the NPT's indefinite extension was secured through agreement on the 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament'. In essence, this document committed *all* States Parties to a further confinement of the system of deterrence and to an extension of the system of abstinence – to a nuclear order that would move progressively towards disarmament. The NWS appeared to support this objective by committing themselves to 'the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally'.

It was a false dawn. Instead of nuclear weapons losing value, they gained value, and dramatically so in some contexts. Instead of strengthening order, there was an enveloping sense of disorder.

Sources of Disorder

Why this happened is hard to pin down. One reason is that the marginalization project rested upon too optimistic a view of the course that international relations would take in the round:

- it assumed that nuclear weapons could be drained out of international politics through multilateral processes of two sorts: the treaty processes which would gradually reduce nuclear arms and confine their usage; and the persuasive processes whereby the international community would ensure that treaties were honoured. Instead, multilateral processes of all kinds became more problematic in the late 1990s, especially as the United States, Russia and China fell out over Bosnia, Iraq and Kosovo;
- it assumed that Russian and US governments had solid political backing at home for the treaties being proposed. Instead, treaties increasingly fell foul of battles between President and Congress, and President and Duma, battles which became more vicious and paralyzing as the 1990s wore on;
- it assumed that as Russia modernized its economy and polity, nuclear deterrence would continue to lose meaning in its relations with the outside world. Instead, its commitment to deterrence stiffened, especially as Russia sought to compensate for its humiliating loss of power and prestige, a loss rubbed in by NATO's expansion; and
- it assumed that the Middle East peace process would bring new opportunities for dealing with the vexed issue of Israel's nuclear weapon programme. Instead, the peace process faltered and no concessions were forthcoming.

All of this was a recipe for frustration and stagnation. But what happened in 1998 and 1999 was much more serious. The nuclear order's foundational norms were suddenly called into question by the actions of India and the United States.

There is no space here to explore the reasons for India's nuclear tests. Suffice it to say that grievance and ambition drove them as much as insecurity.²³ Whatever lay behind the decisions to test and deploy, they were extremely damaging to the nuclear order. India and then Pakistan had crossed the line drawn in the sand, reviving fears of nuclear war as they did so, and had upser the presumption that a permanent and universal shrinkage of nuclear arms was underway. Not surprisingly, governments began asking themselves whether the world might be entering a new age of nuclear expansionism. Furthermore, India's claim to be a nuclear weapon state on a political par with the five acknowledged NWS gave rise to a seemingly intractable problem: how to draw such a state into the nuclear order and meet its grievances over status when the NPT mandated its exclusion.

But these events were still not enough to unhinge a global order. Its perceived destabilization stemmed mainly from shifts in American attitudes and policies, shifts that began in the mid-1990s but gathered pace towards the end of the decade. They culminated in the US Senate's decisive rejection

of the Test Ban Treaty in December 1998; and in the US Congress's passage into law, with presidential support, of the National Missile Defence Act in July 1999 mandating the deployment of missile defences. These and other developments seemed to confirm that a decisive shift had occurred in the US towards unilateralism, against arms control and against any technological constraint.²⁴ While the Clinton administration continued to proclaim its dedication to arms control, in practice it allowed its opponents inside and outside Congress to determine the course of US policy.

Taken together, these developments threatened injury to the system of deterrence, by implying that the US had lost confidence in it; injury to the system of abstinence by implying that the US had diminishing regard for the institutions of multilateral arm control; and injury to the project of marginalization, by implying that the US was not interested in its own technological and strategic restraint. As a consequence, US actions called into question the entire order that the US had itself so painstakingly constructed. 'So be it' was a frequent American response: the inherited order was no longer effective and governments deluded themselves if they thought otherwise.

Reasons for the Shift in US Policy

Why did the United States move in this direction? Again there is no simple reason, but it had much to do with the threat from 'rogue states', and how that threat influenced perceptions of trends in the international system and was played within the American polity.

In a recent book, Richard Litwak observes that:

Throughout history, dissatisfied states – whether revolutionary or revanchist – have rejected international norms and the status quo. This is a normal condition of international relations. Designing effective strategies to deal with such states is a traditional challenge that great powers have faced to maintain the stability of the international system.²⁵

But the 'rogue states', chief among them Iraq, Iran and North Korea, were dissatisfied states with a difference:²⁶

- they had placed weapons of mass destruction (including chemical and biological weapons) at the centre of their strategies for attaining security and leverage, and had begun to acquire ballistic missiles which would allow them to threaten over large distances;
- they were located in regions of vital interest to the United States, regions in which they could exert leverage by threatening some of America's closest allies (such as Israel and Japan) and the military forces deployed for their defence; and
- they had 'cheated from within': they had mounted covert weapon programmes and shown no compunction about violating international

treaties, including the NPT which all had joined. If there were no effective response, the non-proliferation regime would be gravely weakened.

In the early 1990s, broad international support developed around a policy of zero tolerance of these countries' weapon programmes. They *had* to be closed down; compliance with legal undertakings *had* to be enforced. Hence the formation of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq and the various other initiatives which need not be detailed here. The task proved enormously frustrating and contentious. Weapon programmes were certainly blunted, but they were not abandoned despite immense efforts by the United States. The efforts relating to Iraq were thwarted by disputes in the UN Security Council over the terms and means of intervention and by Iraq's own intransigence; thwarted over Iran by difficulties in persuading some other powers to join the US nuclear and missile trade embargoes; and thwarted over North Korea by the difficulties of implementing the Agreed Framework.²⁷

Together, these cases demonstrated a serious deficiency in the nuclear order: the lack of agreed enforcement strategies enabling governments to respond predictably and effectively to breakouts from the system of abstinence. In addition, there was a serious loss of confidence, especially after experience with Iraq, that agreement could be reached in the UN Security Council on appropriate enforcement measures.

The aggravation over rogue states – often mixed in the American mind with the struggles against Islam and Islamic terrorism – fed a radical critique of the previous 'ordering strategy', especially as it involved arms control and reliance upon international law. Helped by right-wing Republican dominance of security discourses in Congress and by the Clinton administration's reluctance to fight its ground, and encouraged by scientific, industrial and military interests, this radical critique began to enter the political mainstream in Washington in the second half of the 1990s. The opinion gained ground that:²⁸

- assumptions of sameness or togetherness no longer applied outside a defined community of Western democratic states. An assumption of irreconcilable difference, most famously expressed in Samuel Huntington's *The clash of civilizations*, increasingly permeated American political culture.²⁹ Further more, China began to be included among the states and civilizations whose interests were bound to collide with those of the US and the liberal West;
- this being the case, arms control – and especially multilateral arms control – could not be trusted to provide security. Even if states joined treaties, some would join to cheat, and the march of technology was all the time making it easier to cheat;
- nor could classical deterrence be relied upon as before. The United States was now faced with myriad irrational actors, actors who might even risk suicide in pursuit of their aims. More than that, the risk-aversion of Western democracies meant that 'rogue states' armed with a handful of

weapons of mass destruction might be better able to deter the US with its thousands of warheads than they could be deterred by the US. The sense of threat was augmented by claims that biological weapons might soon attain the destructiveness and thus deterrent value of nuclear weapons;

- on top of all this, access to the materials and expertise relevant to weapons of mass destruction had become easier after the breakup of the former Soviet Union. However much money the US poured into Russia to tighten security on its facilities, some leakage was probably inevitable. To make matters worse, China appeared to be helping (and not discouraging North Korea from helping) a number of states to acquire missile capabilities (including Pakistan and Iran), and Russia's allegiance to trade controls was weakening as its need for income and employment became more desperate.³⁰

Taken together, this interpretation of the 'risks out there' led American policy-makers down a road towards the downgrading of arms control and upgrading of political and military coercion, to a focusing on the mainly politico-military practice of 'counter-proliferation' rather than the politico-legal practice of 'non-proliferation', and to a search for new technological means of protecting the United States and its allies against blackmail or attack.³¹ This trend was accompanied by a shift in influence in these matters from the Executive to Congress, from State Department to Pentagon, and from non-governmental organizations supporting arms control to those advocating its demise.

The vehemence of America's reactions came in part from a realization of the vulnerability of American power to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Eager not to expose its citizens to mortal danger, the US was coming to rely increasingly on the capacity to project technological power from a distance. An opponent's possession of such weapons would diminish even that capacity, allowing it to strengthen dramatically its bargaining position. This could present the US with unpalatable options: to stay away from regions where weapons of mass destruction were deployed, leaving allies to fend for themselves (a recipe for arms racing and war); or to be prepared to threaten and use massive military force, including nuclear force, preemptively or in retaliation against states acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The persistent bombing of Iraq was already showing how the United States might be drawn into acts of violence and illegality if its power were challenged in this way. At the same time, the high costs of using force against North Korea and Iran showed that military coercion was often not a realistic option.

The reality was that the US was not prepared to accept a relationship of mutual deterrence with minor powers that threatened its vital interests. Mutual vulnerability implied an equality of influence, and a loss of freedom to project power and establish order, that no US politician could endorse. Nor was it prepared to accept that such minor powers could violate their legal undertakings with impunity.

Ballistic Missile Defences

This challenge to American power, to which the established systems of deterrence and abstinence appeared to offer no sufficient response, led directly to the re-emergence of earlier proposals for a defensive shield against missile attack. Theatre missile defences (TMD) giving local protection to American forces and allies, especially in the Middle East, had been discussed for many years. But in July 1998, the Rumsfeld Report to the US Congress claimed that Iran and North Korea would soon be able to threaten the US mainland with missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction. Just one month later, North Korea tested the Taepo-Dong ballistic missile over Japan, lending weight to the assertion. Calls for TMD mutated into calls for a national missile defence (NMD), calls that quickly gathered political momentum and gave birth to the National Missile Defence Act in July 1999. This Act required the President to authorize deployment once he had satisfied himself that the proposals met certain criteria.³² A strong presumption developed in Washington that a national missile defence would eventually be constructed, come what may.

In geopolitical, as in technical, terms, there is a huge difference between TMD and NMD. By seeking to intercept long-range strategic weapons, a national missile defence is bound to affect deterrent relations between established nuclear powers. More than that, the proposed NMD could not be constructed without heavy amendment of the ABM Treaty or, failing that, its abrogation by the United States. Besides altering the ground upon which the system of deterrence had been constructed, the abandonment of this treaty could damage the whole fabric of arms control.

Like Reagan's Star Wars proposals, NMD's effect on the behaviour of states far exceeded the project's technical plausibility.³³ The anxious response was due, one can only assume, to a prudent calculation that NMD *might* work if resources were lavished on it, and that the US could attain a valuable technological advantage even if an effective NMD were not achieved. Russia, China and other states (including NATO allies) knew that they would be unable to come near to matching the capabilities emerging from a US missile defence programme, given the programme's roots in information and systems integration technologies in which the US had an unassailable lead. This added to the temptation for the US: if successful, the NMD programme could open a defensive technology gap that was much less bridgeable than any remaining gap in offensive capabilities (warheads and missiles). At the strategic level, the US might be able to emulate the advantage gained at the conventional military level since the end of the Cold War. The downside was that adversaries might respond by expanding their offensive capabilities, thereby cancelling any US gains especially if NMD proved technically ineffective.

The scope of missile defence therefore had a direct bearing on the scaling of offensive arsenals. The Clinton administration tried to reassure other nuclear powers that the US wished to develop a sufficient capacity to nullify

the threat from 'rogue states' without upsetting existing deterrent relations. Unfortunately, the signals coming from elsewhere in the US body politic were either ambiguous or betrayed a long-term ambition to nullify the Chinese and even the Russian deterrents.³⁴

As Party to the ABM Treaty with the US, Russia holds the keys to the amendment which is required for there to be any possibility of developing an effective NMD. The new Russian government of President Putin adroitly reasserted its position as principal interlocutor with the US by ratifying the START II and Test Ban Treaties early in 2000 and by presenting itself as defender of the ABM Treaty. Although the size of the Russian arsenal would probably remain large enough for Russia to sustain a deterrent of sorts against the US, Putin's government insisted that its cooperation in arms control with any future US government hinged on the Treaty's survival. But Russia would be negotiating from weakness and showed increasing awareness that the era of strategic competition and nuclear parity with the US was drawing to an end.³⁵

For China, US strategic supremacy has always been a reality. This has not prevented it from believing that it had a sufficient nuclear force to protect its vital interests in Asia, and that this sufficiency could be maintained through a programme of gradual modernization. With as few as 20 missiles capable of reaching the US mainland, the Chinese government came to fear that the combination of an American missile defence system and tremendous American conventional military capability – especially in precision bombing – could expose it to a decapitating nuclear strike.³⁶ Armed with this option, an external power could again coerce China, a situation that China had vowed to prevent happening again. In addition, China was keenly aware that Taiwan could be emboldened if protected by a missile defence system. This said, China knew that too aggressive a reaction to US proposals could trigger its worst nightmare – the nuclear arming of Japan – and could encourage India to accelerate its nuclear programme. Caught between the devil and the deep blue sea, Chinese policy-makers have displayed an understandable confusion over how to react to the NMD proposals.

If the next US administration were to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, as George W. Bush has threatened, the Chinese government might feel compelled – whatever the price – to strengthen its offensive nuclear capabilities. It might also seek new ways to frustrate US ambitions in the great abroad, for instance by extending the 'Pakistan tactic' that it has used to balance Indian power.³⁷ The stabilizing effects of bilateral arms control with Russia might also be lost. Alive to these dangers, US allies in Europe and elsewhere would be faced with an unenviable choice. They could accept US actions and begin shifting alliance relations towards some blend of extended deterrence and extended protection, even if doubting that the latter would bring any real gains in security. Alternatively, they could deny the US their cooperation, thereby weakening alliances and putting their own security at risk, especially if the ABM Treaty's abrogation brought forth a

more aggressive China and Russia. Although acceptance of US proposals seemed more likely than rejection, given Europe's heavy reliance on the US in so many fields, alliance cohesion would suffer and there could be a serious loss of trust in the US and its political processes. Among countries upon which the US was counting to provide sites for radar and communications (notably Denmark and the UK), governments might also have to contend with a strong domestic reaction to any complicity with a US policy that threatened arms control.

The NPT Review Conference in 2000

In the late 1990s, the United States therefore edged, despite strong international protest and obvious risks, towards a different conception of order, one entailing:³⁸

1. A system of deterrence augmented by defensive shields against ballistic missiles: in short, a *system of protection* (largely involving *self-protection*) that blended strategic offence and defence;
2. A system of abstinence maintained primarily through the exercise of US economic, political and military power, and secondarily (it has often seemed) through cooperative security, regimes and the rule of law, notwithstanding continuing strong US support for the NPT and insistence on States Parties' compliance with it; in short, towards a system of *enforced* abstinence.

Anxieties over this apparent shift in ordering philosophy were compounded by deep uncertainties over US capacities to deliver protection and enforcement, by the unilateral manner of its decisions, and by an evident lack of concern in Washington for the political legitimacy of whatever order it was trying to construct. Furthermore, the NMD proposals threatened to unsettle the NATO alliance and damage relations between the US, Russia and China. While Russia might be forced to compromise out of weakness, these proposals could even tip China and the US into a confrontational relationship that would have grave and lasting consequences for global politics.

It was against this background of great worry over US intentions, and over the whole drift in international nuclear politics, that States Parties to the NPT met in New York in April–May 2000 to review the condition of the Treaty and its associated instruments and undertakings, prominent among them the NPT Principles and Objectives agreed in 1995. As so much had gone wrong since 1995, little was expected of the Review Conference. The outcome therefore came as a great and welcome surprise. A consensus was reached on a final statement (the Final Document) only for the third time in the history of NPT review conferences. Still more surprisingly, the Final Document was more purposeful, indeed radical, than anyone had imagined possible coming into the Conference, especially where the responsibilities of the five NWS were concerned.

In essence, the NWS committed themselves to honour two principles. The first was the *principle of irreversibility*, whereby inherited arms control, arms reduction and disarmament measures would be fully upheld.³⁹ The second was what may be termed the *principle of completion*, which has two aspects:

- completion of negotiation, ratification and implementation of measures in which there has already been political investment (such as the CTBT, START II and III, and the FMCT);
- completion of the project of nuclear disarmament through a series of steps including arms reductions, increased transparency, the reduced operational status of nuclear weapons systems, and 'the engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons'.

The NWS lent weight to the latter principle by expressing in the Final Document their 'unequivocal undertaking ... to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament'.⁴⁰

Why did the States Parties, including the five NWS, agree on the Final Document and the objectives and measures expounded by it? Skilful and forceful diplomacy, and the emergence of new groupings of states that proved adept at exerting pressure to find compromises, were partly responsible.⁴¹ But the search for consensus was undoubtedly driven by the anxiety felt by all governments – including the US, Chinese and Russian governments – that the conference's failure could bring about a fatal loss of confidence in the NPT and in its associated institutions. However wide the disagreements on nuclear policy, and however deep the misgivings about multilateral arms control in the US, this treaty remained indispensable.

The conference was also conducted in full awareness of the gravity of the decisions that would be taken by the next US administration. The Final Document can be read as a consensual declaration that this was the kind of security order, and the *only* nuclear order, in which the bulk of nation states believed and in which they were prepared to invest. If a future US government wished to move in another direction, it would have to contend with that opinion and that solidarity. To a degree, the Clinton administration was complicit in this quasi-ultimatum. The deep unhappiness of US governmental representatives at the conference over the drift in US policy was no secret.

But was the conference a success? Could a conference be so described that reached agreement only by evading, by sleight of hand, the most contentious and momentous issue of the day – that of missile defence;⁴² which provided China with the means to frustrate the work of the Conference on Disarmament until its concerns about missile defences were satisfied;⁴³ which was reluctant to consider how States Parties should respond to Treaty violations; and which provided no solution to India and Pakistan's claims for NWS status beyond insisting on their continued isolation?

A word that haunted the conference was 'stability'.⁴⁴ The Final Document openly referred to the ABM Treaty 'as a corner stone of strategic stability' and accepted that NWS Parties should pursue nuclear disarmament only 'in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all'. So there was acknowledgement that the disarmament project required the maintenance of 'stability'. For China and Russia, that implied the preservation of deterrent relations in the face of threats from missile defences. For all participants, 'stability' implied that actions should not be taken in pursuit of disarmament that inadvertently increased the likelihood of nuclear arms racing, nuclear proliferation or nuclear war, or that gave a free hand to states to use other weapons of mass destruction as instruments of intimidation.

The implication was that disarmament could not be achieved if deterrent relations were destabilized. Paradoxically, stable nuclear deterrence was a prerequisite for its removal from international politics. While the Final Document therefore goes further than any previous multilateral statement in advocating disarmament and describing the steps required to achieve it, it also comes closer to endorsing nuclear deterrence or, more precisely, the stability of existing deterrent relations. In this respect, the Final Document of 2000 is more pragmatic than the Principles and Objectives of 1995.

Although disarmament remained the NPT's primary goal, the Final Document can therefore be interpreted as asserting that disarmament is above all a goal intended to entrench a trend – a trend towards lower levels of armament and towards a less dangerous deployment of nuclear arms, a trend whose persistence would gradually prepare the ground for the final act of elimination. The insistence on a stronger commitment to disarmament therefore expressed an overwhelming desire to prevent the feared reversal of this trend; a desire that could be shared by all conference participants even in the absence of unanimity on disarmament itself.

Equally, the Final Document can be read as a claim to the inherent superiority of a security politics that placed the achievement of a cooperative order-through-law above a unilateralist order-through-power; and as an implicit if quixotic assertion that the community of NPT Parties, although lacking the political authority or instruments to override the decisions of its most powerful members, has a greater right to determine outcomes than the agencies and factions of individual nation-states.

Conclusion: A Return to Consensual Ordering?

Two lessons above all others can be drawn from this discussion:

- there has to be nuclear order, but that order is much more than a structure of power and a set of deterrent relations, just as it is much more than a security regime rooted in international law.⁴⁵ It is a complex edifice founded

on instruments of *both* power and law which is held together by mutual interest *and obligation*.

- the only nuclear order that we have (it has no *reliable* substitute) is unambiguously dedicated, for practical as well as moral reasons, to the elimination of nuclear weapons. This nuclear order's survival now relies upon contraction: it cannot tolerate another prolonged period of expansion in or refinement of nuclear arsenals, let alone the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nation-states acting in violation of international law. Yet that contraction has to be judicious and its wisdom has to be evident to all.

After a period in which so much went wrong, events in the spring and summer of 2000 suggest that a new and more constructive phase of nuclear ordering *could* lie ahead. In May 2000, agreement was reached on the NPT Final Document discussed above. During the summer, gradual progress was made in the UN Security Council towards reinstating the inspection regime for Iraq; North and South Korea began a dialogue raising hopes that the threat from North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes might soon be lifted; Iran took some steps towards improving its foreign relations; and there was renewed life in the Middle East peace process.⁴⁶ Then on 1 September 2000, President Clinton announced that deployment of a national missile defence would have to await more convincing evidence of its technical feasibility.⁴⁷ Furthermore, his emphasis on the need for consultation with Russia, China and America's allies implied a retreat from unilateralism and an increasing acceptance that the interests of friends and foes in 'strategic stability' would have to be respected.⁴⁸ A week later, the United Nations Millennium Declaration enjoined member states 'to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers'.

It is too early to be optimistic. International nuclear relations remain very unsettled. Many issues need to be addressed, high among them the strategic relations between China and the United States and between China and India. But one senses a change in atmosphere that *could* lead to a recovery of that all-important perception of movement towards the reduction and elimination of nuclear arms. That movement now has to be entrenched through political action and made tangible through progress in treaty ratification and negotiation among other things.

All governments have responsibility for achieving this end. But much will inevitably depend on how the United States uses its hegemonic authority under a new President. Over the past couple of years, national missile defence has gripped the US body politic. If the disorder that everyone fears is to be averted, another much weightier project needs to gain ascendancy in Washington, in the national as well as the international interest: the restoration of international confidence in the nuclear order's health and vitality. A project of restoration has to be wide-ranging, embracing multilateral arms

control, compliance measures and much else besides. Above all, it has to recognize that nuclear order rests upon a plurality of measures and approaches, and that a shared normative commitment to restraint provides the best protection in today's complex international system.

However, a return to confidence-in-order may no longer be feasible without a genuine embrace by the United States and the other nuclear powers of the project of nuclear disarmament. For this to occur, disarmament will have to be brought into the centre of strategic discourses within and between the nuclear powers – it is not enough for disarmament to lie just at the centre of regime discourses.

Is this pie in the sky? It may be less fanciful than current attitudes suggest. Recent events have reminded all governments of the perils of nuclear weapons; and if NMD falls from grace, as is possible, the US may be left with no persuasive ordering ideas other than pressing for complete nuclear disarmament (along with chemical and biological weapon disarmament). An American push for disarmament which mobilized collective support through the commitments contained in the NPT Final Document would transform the outlook. But any push for disarmament would have to be orderly, it would have to deliver security, and it would not succeed amidst fears that great powers would shed the habitual restraint that deterrence brought to their relations.

Establishing an effective non-nuclear order will therefore be as tough and lengthy – and as essential – a task as establishing the nuclear order. Governments will not, however, be starting from scratch: the nuclear order already provides essential building blocks for a non-nuclear order. The efforts of the past forty years, and the renunciation of nuclear weapons by all but a few nation-states, provide an impressive foundation for complete nuclear disarmament.

Acknowledgements

Among the several readers of earlier versions who gave me valuable ideas and comments, I am especially grateful to Paul Schulte (acting in a personal capacity).

Notes

1. I am aware that this terminology may be controversial. In International Relations theory, but not in many other fields, the word 'system' is now commonly used to refer to a structural entity without normative content (especially in the neo-realist concept of an anarchic 'international system'), in contrast to 'order' which has structural *and* normative connotations. The systems of deterrence and abstinence alluded to here certainly contain strong normative elements. I have chosen to use the word 'system' in this broader sense (almost interchangeable with 'order') for two reasons: to avoid the linguistic clumsiness, repetitiveness and ambiguity that would have followed the alternative choice of 'order of deterrence' and 'order of abstinence'; and because the term system implies a rich and strong interconnectedness that is wholly appropriate.

2. Reykjavik was the location of the summit between Gorbachev and Reagan at which dramatic arms reduction and disarmament proposals were discussed. The agreements that quickly

followed applied to strategic (long-range) nuclear weapons which had the greatest political and symbolic importance. There are today still no agreements covering tactical (short-range) nuclear weapons.

3. The Aum Shinrikyo cult's attempts to develop and use chemical and biological agents, brought to light by the Tokyo subway bombing of 1995, were also important in changing perceptions of the range of actors against which societies had to be protected.

4. The account that follows is, of course, an abstraction from a complicated and often messy history. But it is a useful abstraction if it gives us a clearer understanding of the problems that face us and how they arose. Nuclear ordering is also, obviously, only one aspect of global ordering. However, the nuclear order has a degree of autonomy and of 'sharpness' that no other order possesses.

5. These ideas were developed in the Acheson-Lilienthal and Baruch proposals. See John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the origins of the Cold War, 1941-47* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

6. Kenneth Waltz's writings are, for instance, suffused with appreciation of the effects that nuclear weapons have on the behaviour of nation-states within the international system. This applies as much to general theoretical works such as his *Theory of international politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979) as to his more specialized writings on nuclear weapons. But nowhere does he describe how nuclear order is instituted. If he had given this due attention, he might have been less confident with his argument that 'more may be better' in, among other texts, Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, *The spread of nuclear weapons: a debate* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995).

7. Some military analysts recognized this immediately while for others it was a more gradual awakening (perhaps especially in the Soviet Union). The development of the hydrogen bomb and intercontinental ballistic missile in the early 1950s largely dispelled any doubts.

8. Although this endeavour entailed more than developments in law, the resulting systems of deterrence and abstinence (especially the latter) formed part of the growing 'legalization of world politics' discussed (mainly with reference to the economic sector) in the recent special issue of *International Organization*. Kenneth Abbott, *et al.* identify three dimensions of legalization, each of which is present in the nuclear field: obligation (whereby actors are bound by rules and commitments); precision (rules unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize and proscribe); and delegation (whereby third parties, including international organizations, are granted authority to implement). See Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Duncan Snidal, 'The concept of legalization', *International Organization* 54: 3, summer 2000, pp. 401-20.

9. We still know too little about the evolution of Soviet deterrence theory and doctrine. There may be a danger of exaggerating the degree of conformity in Soviet and Western thought and practice in this regard. It also goes without saying that a fully coherent deterrence theory was never developed whether in the US or elsewhere.

10. This was the implication of Article IX, 3 of the NPT: 'for the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967'.

11. Article VI states that 'each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control'.

12. There has been a tradition of thought, however, that the anarchic state-centred international system would itself have to be transcended before there could be escape from the threat of political violence coming from nuclear and other weapons. See, for instance, Ken Booth, 'Security and emancipation', *Review of International Studies* 17: 4, October 1991. A discussion of emancipation and transcendence in International Relations theory, and much else on the subject of international ordering, can be found in Nicholas Rengger, *International relations, political theory and the problem of order* (London: Routledge, 2000), reviewed in this issue of *International Affairs*.

13. An earlier changing of the game, over nuclear trade (the Carter Policy), need not be discussed here.

14. Frances Fitzgerald, *Way out there in the blue: Reagan and Star Wars and the end of the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

15. The commitments made in SALT and other bilateral treaties with the USSR continued, however, to be honoured.

16. This is not to imply that the current proposals share quite the same fantastical qualities as the Strategic Defense Initiative.

17. See Lawrence Freedman, *The revolution in strategic affairs*, Adelphi Paper 318 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 1998).

18. The term 'marginalization' was usually avoided by governments because it lacked the finality and normative status of disarmament. But Camborne and Garrity are correct in asserting that marginalization was the guiding principle, especially in the US government of the time. See S. Camborne and P. Garrity, 'The future of US nuclear policy', *Survival* 76: 4, winter 1994-5, pp. 73-95.

19. This last project entailed, in particular, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program which channelled funds from the US defence budget into rendering secure weapon-related fissile materials and facilities in the former Soviet Union.

20. By 1996, only five states - India, Israel, Pakistan, Brazil and Cuba - remained outside the NPT. Brazil joined the Treaty in 1998.

21. By the late 1990s, NWFZ were in force in Antarctica, Latin America and the South Pacific, and had been negotiated in South-East Asia and Africa.

22. This was the least successful of all these initiatives. In London and Washington, government officials used the prospect of capping these programmes to garner political support for the FMCT and, in some degree, the CTBT. This was a mistake: it detracted from the wider significance of these treaties and made them vulnerable to any failure to convince India, Israel and Pakistan that their programmes should be capped.

23. See George Perkovich's fine study, *India's nuclear bomb: implications for global proliferation* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999).

24. Anxieties that such a shift was occurring were also aroused *inter alia* by the US Senate's reluctance to ratify arms control treaties and agreements with Russia; its unilateral exemption of the US from certain provisions of the CWC; the US government's obstruction of efforts to strengthen the Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention (a multilateral treaty dating from 1972 which had banned these weapons without providing any means of verification) on the grounds that verification could not work and the Convention might damage American commercial interests (a telling statistic is that the US had by June 2000 submitted only six out of the 415 governmental working papers supporting these efforts); and the huge investments to develop alternative testing techniques under the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program, including the National Ignition Facility.

25. Richard Litwak, *Rogue states and US foreign policy: containment after the Cold War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). The manner in which potential threats from rogue states and from biological weapons were used, among other arguments, to discourage a comprehensive review of US deterrence policy in the early 1990s is discussed in Janne Nolan's fascinating *An elusive consensus: nuclear weapons and American security after the Cold War* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

26. Although these states (and Libya) attracted most attention, the challenge was not limited to them. Especially in the Middle East, other states were developing chemical and biological weapon capabilities despite international efforts to prohibit them.

27. The US-North Korean Agreed Framework established a phased programme leading to the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear weapon capability and the submission of its fissile materials to IAEA safeguards.

28. A book that conveys this mood tellingly is Ashton Carter and William Perry, *Preventive defense: a new security strategy for America* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999). How the factors identified in the following indented text underpinned calls for missile defences is very evident in Keith Payne, 'Looming security threats: the case for National Missile Defense', *Orbis* 44: 2, Spring 2000, pp. 187-96.

29. Samuel Huntington, *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order* (London: Touchstone Books, 1997).

30. There were fierce arguments between the Russian and US governments over the Russian decision to help Iran complete its Bushehr nuclear power reactors; and by concluding a sale of power reactors to India in 1998, Russia was retreating from the policy of full-scope safeguards that had been adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (of which it was a member) in 1992. The Russian government claimed in mitigation that negotiation of the deal had begun before 1992.

31. For an interesting attempt to develop an approach that bridges counter- and non-proliferation, see Brad Roberts, 'From non-proliferation to anti-proliferation', *International Security* 18: 1, summer 1993, pp. 139–73.

32. The criteria were technical progress, the threat, system costs and the impact on arms control.

33. A sustained and influential critique of NMD has been provided by Theodore Postol among others. See, for instance, George Lewis, Theodore Postol and John Pike, 'Why national missile defense won't work', *Scientific American* 281: 2, August 1999, pp. 22–7.

34. While this intent was clearest in relation to China, the following extract from an article by Loren Roberts shows that some US analysts also had Russia in mind: 'In the years after the end of the Cold War, defense became both more feasible and more necessary ... some US intelligence analysts believe that the [Russian nuclear] arsenal will deteriorate to less than 1000 usable weapons by 2010. Defense will accordingly be easier, especially if attack comes in the form of a limited – accidental or unauthorized – nuclear launch. But the same internal decay driving down warhead numbers also makes nuclear accidents, security breakdowns and proliferation more likely. With assumed stability of the Cold War era gone, active defense becomes more necessary'. See 'Military supremacy and how we keep it', *Policy Review* 77, October–November 1999.

35. An account of recent debates in Moscow about the orientation of Russian defence policy is provided by Nikolai Sokov, 'The "denuclearization" of Russia's defence policy', *Disarmament Diplomacy* 48, July 2000, pp. 15–18. It is possible that the *Kursk* submarine accident in August 2000 might also convince the Russian political and military elites that the competitive game was becoming too dangerous to play even by the modified rules of the post-Cold War era.

36. On the implications of the NMD proposals for China, see Brad Roberts, Robert Manning and Ronald Montaperto, 'China: the forgotten nuclear power', *Foreign Affairs* 79: 4, July/August 2000, pp. 53–63.

37. Rather than respond directly to the Indian nuclear threat, China has countered it partly by helping Pakistan to build up its deterrent capabilities.

38. Inside and outside government, many Americans were appalled by this trend, but they were unable to arrest it. See, for instance, the impassioned editorials by Spurgeon Keeny in successive issues of *Arms Control Today*, the journal of the Arms Control Association.

39. To be precise, they accepted 'the principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures'.

40. Final Document, Article VI, Paragraph 15.6.

41. For discussions of the Conference, see Rebecca Johnson, 'The 2000 NPT Review Conference: a delicate, hard-won compromise', *Disarmament Diplomacy* 46, May 2000, pp. 2–20; and especially Tariq Rauf, 'An unequal success? Implications of the NPT Review Conference', *Arms Control Today* 30: 6, July/August 2000, pp. 9–16. One should not overlook the importance of the prior meetings held by the US and Egyptian governments to resolve differences over Israel and its responsibilities.

42. In Article VI, Paragraph 15.7 of the Final Document, reference is made to preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty. By using 'strengthening' as a euphemism for 'amendment', the drafters of the Final Document cleverly averted controversy.

43. The Final Document recognizes the necessity of negotiating the FMCT, but effectively makes it conditional upon the Conference on Disarmament (where the treaty would be negotiated) agreeing a programme of work. In recent months, China has insisted that negotiation of a treaty prohibiting the militarization of outer space should be part of this programme, a demand that the US in particular has not been prepared to accept.

44. On 4 June 2000 in Moscow, Presidents Clinton and Putin also highlighted this word when signing a Joint Statement of Principles of Strategic Stability, which was followed in Okinawa on 21 July by their Joint Statement on Cooperation on Strategic Stability.

45. It is sometimes argued that it is no longer appropriate to think in terms of 'nuclear order' when the main task should be to construct an integrated 'WMD order' embracing chemical and biological as well as nuclear weapons. Although this argument has some validity in the Middle East, I am not generally persuaded by it. The political and strategic linkages between the three weapons of mass destruction are now obvious, but there are sufficient differences between the technologies, their effects, control mechanisms and productive systems to justify separate treatment. Their attempted unification in a single order might also hinder what may be the next great task: the construction of a 'biological security order' that would stand alongside, but be significantly different from, the nuclear order. This said, the politics of weapons of mass destruction are bound together by the great but troubling necessity to ensure compliance with treaties affecting their acquisition and usage.

46. For reasons of space, I have been unable to give due attention to regional approaches to nuclear ordering, and to the essential role of conflict resolution (Kashmir and Taiwan being high on the list). Darryl Howlett and his colleagues warn that 'the existence of disparities between geographic areas of high and low nuclear salience is likely to create the potential for retrograde steps in regions where disarmament has been moving forward. One way to help prevent this outcome would be for policy-makers to take a contextual approach to security – one that emphasizes and attempts to understand the regional context of nuclear behaviour'. See Darryl Howlett, Tanya Ogilvie-White, John Simpson and Emily Taylor, *Nuclear weapons policy at the crossroads* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000).

47. See 'Nuclear Missile Defense', Fact Sheet, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Washington DC, 1 September 2000. The Fact Sheet states that 'the NMD program is sufficiently promising and affordable to justify continued development and testing, but ... there is not sufficient information about the technical and operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system to move forward with deployment'.

48. Early September 2000 also saw the collapse of the case against Wen Ho Lee, the Los Alamos scientist accused of transferring warhead design information to China; and the US Senate's decision to cap expenditure on the National Ignition Facility (and submit its programme to independent review) which had aroused concerns that weapons laboratories would use it to develop new warhead designs, thereby undermining the C.TBT's purpose. Together with the predictions that Senator Gore would probably win the coming federal election, the tide was perceptibly if not decisively turning.

Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links

Caroline Thomas

Setting the Scene

Poverty is the ultimate systemic threat facing humanity. The widening gaps between rich and poor nations ... are ... potentially socially explosive ... If the poor are left hopeless, poverty will undermine societies through confrontation, violence and civil disorder. (Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, 2000b)

In a world awash with resources, wealth and technology, global poverty is certainly not the product of bad luck. (Peter Wilkin, 2000)

Pervasive poverty and deepening inequality are distinctive features of the contemporary global social landscape. Powerful global governance institutions are awakening to these fault lines as potential threats to the global order. On 10 January 2000 the United Nations Security Council, the most important global body dedicated to tackling security issues, met to discuss the challenge of HIV/AIDS in Africa. The focus of the meeting was far removed from the traditional concerns of the Security Council, which were mainly military threats to regional and global order. This is indicative of a widening of the global security agenda to encompass non-traditional matters, such as health, environment and poverty issues.

Moreover, for the first time, a World Bank President was invited to address the Security Council. World Bank President James Wolfensohn, in his speech to the meeting, remarked that 'If we want to prevent violent conflict, we need a comprehensive, equitable, and inclusive approach to development'. Development is moving to the centre stage of the global political agenda, largely on account of the realisation of current leaders of global governance agencies that development and security are intimately linked.

HIV/AIDS, a matter that had previously been considered within the UN system as a health issue, was evolving into a global security concern.

The convergence of the development and security agendas is the concern of this article. The focus is selected not in response to the increased level of interest of leaders of global governance institutions, but rather in recognition of the ancient and enduring concerns of humanity. For the overwhelming majority of people on this planet, human security is their primary concern. As Nelson Mandela remarked at the dawn of the new millennium, ordinary people want:

the simple opportunity to live a decent life, to have a proper shelter and food to eat, to be able to care for their children and to live with dignity, to have good education for their charges, their health needs cared for and to have access to paid employment. (Cited by Camdessus, 2000a)

Human insecurity is not some inevitable occurrence. Of course, natural catastrophes such as drought undermine human security, but even within a single locality they do not undermine everyone's security equally. Rather, human insecurity results directly from existing structures of power that determine who enjoys the entitlement to security and who does not. Such structures can be identified at several levels, ranging from the global, to the regional, the state and finally the local level.

Our focus here is the global level. Thus we are concerned directly with the global development agenda and the material polarisation which is unfolding in the wake of its application. The growth of material inequality is evident between states, within states, and also between private corporations (Thomas, 1999). This has a direct impact on the contemporary human experience of security, and on future prospects for enhancing human security.

Regarding future prospects for human security, there is a simple but hugely important question as to whether the mechanisms in place to tackle poverty and to promote wider development are adequate to the task. In 1995 the UN set a target of a 50% reduction in the number of people existing in absolute poverty by 2015. This outcome is to be delivered not by any redistributive mechanism, but rather by the application of the particular neoliberal model of development promoted in the 1980s and 1990s by global governance institutions. This model places its faith in the market rather than the state, and focuses on export-led growth based on free capital mobility. The model represents a significant departure from the earlier embedded liberalism of the post-second world war period. It is even further removed from a critical alternative model of development that places basic needs at the centre.

The neoliberal model requires high and sustained growth to achieve the UN's target for poverty reduction. African economies, for example, would need to grow at an estimated 7% a year on average to reach the target by 2015 (Amoako, 1999). Yet even if such growth is sustained in Africa and elsewhere, can we be confident that it will translate into a 50% reduction in the absolute poor? How will the benefits and the costs be distributed?

Moreover, beyond this initial goal, can the model significantly enhance the human security of the rest of humanity? If not, does the solution lie in reform of the existing model, or transformation of it? These questions matter. The scope, depth and speed of the changes that have been, and continue to be, introduced in development policy are breathtaking. Their legitimacy is open to question, and the futures of billions will be deeply affected by them. (These matters are explored more fully in Thomas, 2000).

The Human Security Challenge

When we think about security, we need to think beyond battalions and borders. We need to think about human security, about winning a different war, the fight against poverty. (James Wolfensohn, World Bank President, addressing the UN Security Council meeting on AIDS/HIV in Africa, 10 January 2000)

The concept of human security involves a fundamental departure from an orthodox International Relations security analysis that has the state as the exclusive primary referent object. Instead, human beings and their complex social and economic relations are given primacy with or over states. In the words of Heinbecker, human security is about 'the ability to protect people as well as to safeguard states' (Heinbecker, 1999: 6). In some human security formulations, such as that of Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, human needs rather than state needs are paramount. Axworthy believes this to be so in the aftermath of the Cold War, when intrastate conflicts have become more prevalent than interstate conflicts. These conflicts are fought with low technology, and in contrast to the very beginning of the 20th century, most of the casualties now – 75% – are civilian (Smith, 1997: 14). Axworthy notes that women and children are disproportionately often the victims of these wars. For Axworthy, 'Human security includes security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental human rights' (Axworthy, 1997: 184).

The concept of human security pursued here differs fundamentally from notions of 'security of the individual', conceived in the currently fashionable neoliberal sense. Human security is far removed from liberal notions of competitive and possessive individualism (ie the extension of private power and activity, based around property rights and choice in the market place). Rather, human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realised. Such human security is indivisible; it cannot be pursued by or for one group at the expense of another.

Therefore, while material sufficiency lies at the core of human security, in addition the concept encompasses non-material dimensions to form a qualitative whole. In other words, material sufficiency is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of human security that entails more than physical

survival. For simplicity we can refer to these different aspects in terms of a quantitative/qualitative distinction, which broadly refers to income poverty and human poverty. This will be further discussed below under UNDP.

The quantitative aspect refers to material sufficiency. In this context, Axworthy remarks that: 'At minimum, human security requires that basic needs are met ...' (Axworthy, 1997: 184). Therefore the pursuit of human security must have at its core the satisfaction of basic material needs of all humankind. At the lowest level, food, shelter, education and health care are essential for the survival of human beings.

The qualitative aspect of human security is about the achievement of human dignity which incorporates personal autonomy, control over one's life and unhindered participation in the life of the community. Emancipation from oppressive power structures, be they global, national or local in origin and scope, is necessary for human security. Human security is orientated towards an active and substantive notion of democracy, one that ensures the opportunity for all to participate in the decisions that affect their lives. Therefore it is engaged directly with discussions of democracy at all levels, from the local to the global.

Human security is pursued by the majority of humankind as part of a collective, most commonly the household, sometimes the village or the community defined along other criteria such as religion, ethnicity, gender or caste. Often it is pursued through a combination of these. At the global level, states have the authority and responsibility to attend to the human security needs of their citizens. Weak state-society relations mean that states often hinder rather than help the achievement of human security by all their citizens. Global governance institutions also play a crucial role. They set global development policy and fix, apply and monitor the global entitlement rules. A consideration of human security in the contemporary era requires us to consider humanity embedded not simply within discrete sovereign states, but within a global social structure, the capitalist world economy that has been developing since the 16th century. In a way, the work of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has lent in that direction. The concept of human security as employed in this study was initially brought to the forefront of the global policy level by that particular UN agency.

The UNDP and Human Security

The late Dr Mahbub Ul Haq first drew global attention to the concept of human security in the UNDP's *Human Development Reports*. In 1994 the *Human Development Report* focused explicitly on human security. The Report argued that:

For too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states. For too long, security has been equated with threats to a country's borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic

world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime, these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world. (UNDP, 1994: 3)

By focusing on human security the 1994 Report sought to influence the UN's 1995 World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen. During the late 1990s the UNDP's annual reports built on and refined this concept. In 1997 the focus was on human development, which refers not simply to the income aspects of poverty, but to poverty as a denial of choices and opportunities for living a tolerable life (UNDP, 1997: 2). Importantly the 1997 report further disaggregated what we referred to earlier as the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of human security. It made a distinction between income poverty (US\$1 a day and below) and human poverty (illiteracy, short life expectancy and so forth). Income poverty and human poverty are often, but not always, linked; for example in the Gulf States people may suffer human poverty without being income poor. These two aspects tally broadly with the quantitative and qualitative aspects of human security discussed above.

The UNDP played a crucial agenda-setting role at an early stage with its focus on human security. It was noted earlier that development and human security are receiving more attention now from the key global governance institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, partly because poverty and inequality are increasingly considered to be national, regional and global security threats. Indeed, there seems to be a correlation between the level of entitlement to human security and the propensity for conflict, defined not in orthodox inter-state arms terms but in the wider sense to include the most frequent form of warfare, intra-state. Over the period 1990–95, 57% of countries experiencing war were ranked low on the UNDP's Human Development Index, while only 14% were ranked high, and 34% were ranked medium. There may be a causal relationship between lack of material entitlement, health and education, and war (figures from Smith, 1997: 48).

One explanation of this tragic outcome may be that fundamental economic and social structures allow a privileged global and national elite to control a disproportionate share of available resources. This directly affects security. In the words of Smith:

When a privileged elite defends its too large share of too few resources, the link is created between poverty, inequality and the abuse of human rights. The denial of basic freedoms – to organise, to express yourself, to vote, to disagree – forces people to choose between accepting gross injustice and securing a fairer share by violent means. As conflict unfolds, the political leaders that emerge often find that the easiest way of mobilising support is on an ethnic basis. Thus do the various causes of conflict weave in and out. War will only end if, and when, and where its causes are removed. (1997: 15)

Smith elucidates the poverty, inequality and security link clearly. With one-sixth of the world's population receiving 80% of global income, and 57%

of the global population consuming only 6% of global income, the concerns about poverty and security expressed earlier by Camdessus and Wolfensohn appear legitimate (*World Bank Development News*, 14 April 2000).

Yet it is important to remember that the issues of poverty and inequality matter to human beings in the most potent way, irrespective of whether global governance organisations categorise them as security issues. It is also worth recalling that the total number of people killed during the first and second world wars is estimated as having been about 30 million. Compare this figure with the number of people who currently die of hunger-related causes each year, that is 15 million. Consequently we can say that every two years the number of people who die of hunger is roughly equivalent to the number killed in 11 years of world war. (Thomas & Reader, 1997: 109).

The fundamental causes at the root of hunger, poverty and inequality must be addressed, or the achievement of human security will be impossible.

Human Security: Looking Forward

The change in the primary referent object of security from state to human being has implications both for understanding the sources of threats to security, and for elucidating strategies to increase security. Importantly the shift in focus from the rights, concerns and needs of states to those of human beings or citizens opens up the state for critical scrutiny. State–society relations come under the spotlight. Fundamental questions arise, such as those about state capacity, state legitimacy and state collapse. Particular issues come to the fore, such as the use of child combatants in intra-state conflicts, and patterns of land tenure, which may help to keep people poor.

But the shift in focus to human security also highlights the importance of scrutinising global processes that may affect, even jeopardise security, and the global governance structures which drive them. A proper understanding of the process of global economic integration and of the distribution of associated costs and benefits is crucial. Armed with this knowledge, an informed debate can take place on global development policy. This is already happening. We can work to reconstruct development policy in the cause of attending to the human security needs of all global citizens, particularly the poorest. Too many people are dying of hunger and disease. This is not the product of bad luck, but rather of existing structures which can be changed.

Poverty and Inequality: A Cause for Concern

Liberal–pluralists who have been influenced by the classical, neoclassical and monetarist approaches in economics, the functionalist and post-industrialist approaches in sociology and the democratic pluralist approaches in political science adopt a relatively compliant approach to the continuation of widespread and severe poverty. (Townsend, 1993: 6)

At the dawn of the 21st century, despite 50 years of official development policies and despite huge advances in science and technology, inequalities between and within states are growing, and almost a third of humanity continues to live in abject poverty. Yet in the economically advanced countries, and among a significant strata in developing countries, there is at best complacency about these issues. This can be attributed to the widespread influence of the neoliberal political ideology (see below). Moreover, these serious matters have received a diminishing amount of attention from the media in the First World.

This diminishing attention is clear in a study commissioned for the UK's leading international aid, development and environment charities. The study revealed a dramatic decline in the quantity and quality of coverage of the developing world over the period 1989–99 (Stone, 2000). Commenting on the report, Vidal remark that: 'The total number of hours of factual programming on developing countries has declined by 50%; ITV has dropped its coverage by 74%; BBC2 by more than a third, Channel 4 by 56%' (Vidal, 2000: 6). In addition, the report notes that 60% of all UK TV programming about poor countries, which house 80% of the global population, are about travel and wildlife. On this aspect, Vidal comments: 'BBC1 is increasingly obsessed with soft wildlife and travel programmes and Channel 5 has commissioned almost nothing from non-western sources since it was set up' (Vidal, 2000: 6–7).

The author of the report, Jenny Stone, argues that the lack of coverage of the developing countries is not simply the result of a lack of interest on the part of the public. It has much to do with other factors such as diminishing budgets, changes in production culture and the advent of new technologies (Vidal, 2000). Vidal concurs with Stone that the emphasis on increasing choice in broadcasting in the 1990s has undermined its public service value. As the main source of information for the British public on the rest of the world is such broadcasting, this is a worrying development (Stone, 2000; Vidal, 2000).

While many people in developed countries may remain in blissful ignorance, it is the case that the post-cold war global landscape is characterised by an intensification and reconfiguration of pre-existing economic, social and political inequalities. The demise of the communist bloc and the associated rejection of 'real existing socialism' as a mode of economic organisation have provided a specific additional filip to the reconfiguration of the Third World. The Second World, the former communist bloc, has joined the Third World rather than the First World. This suggests that, post-1989, the Third World, far from disappearing, is becoming global.

The dynamic of economically driven globalisation is resulting in the global reproduction of Third World problems. Growing inequality, risk and vulnerability characterise not simply the state system, but an emerging global social order. There is a North in the South, just as there is a South in the North. This is part of an historical process underway for five centuries: the expansion of capitalism across the globe. Technological developments speed up the process. Individuals' life chances and the viability of households and communities are

increasingly tied up with their respective positions in the global economy. James Gustave Speth of the UNDP has spoken of ways in which 'An emerging global elite, mostly urban-based and inter-connected in a variety of ways, is amassing great wealth and power, while more than half of humanity is left out' (*New York Times*, 15 July 1996: 55). Two-thirds of the global population seem to have gained little or nothing from the economic growth that has occurred as a result of globalisation to date. Moreover, even in the developed world, 'the lowest quartile seems to have witnessed a trickles up rather than a trickle down' (*Financial Times*, 24 December 1994).

Despite significant improvements over the 1990s in global social indicators such as adult literacy (from 64% to 76%), access to safe water (40% to 72%) and infant mortality rates (from 76 to 58 per 1000 live births) global deprivation continues (see Table 1) (UNDP, 1997: 22).

These indicators of human security have declined in the face of the promise of the peace dividend. Expectations have been raised that deprivation and material inequalities would be ameliorated, as more resources freed up from the arms race would be diverted to accelerate development. This has not happened. Global military spending declined over the period 1987-94 at about 3.6% per annum, yielding a cumulative dividend of US\$935 billion. Yet 'there has been no clear link between reduced military spending and enhanced

Table 1: Global Deprivation, 1997

Health

- HIV/AIDS infections increased from fewer than 15 million in 1990 to more than 33 million in 1997
- 880 million people lack access to health services
- 2.6 billion lack access to sanitation
- 1.5 billion will not survive to the age of 60

Education

- Over 850 million illiterate adults
- Over 260 million children are out of school at the primary and secondary levels

Nutrition

- 840 million people are malnourished

Poverty

- 1.3 billion live on less than US\$1 per day
- 1 billion cannot meet basic consumption requirements

Women

- 340 million women are not expected to survive to the age of 40
- A quarter to a half of all women have suffered physical abuse by an intimate partner

Children

- 160 million children are malnourished
- 250 million children are working as child labourers

Environment

- 3 million people a year die from air pollution – more than 80% of them indoor air pollution
- More than 5 million die per annum from diarrhoeal diseases caused by water contamination

Security

- 12 million people are refugees
-

Source: Adapted from UNDP (1997: 22).

spending on human development' (UNDP, 1994: 8). What's more, even if the hoped for peace dividend had materialised, its impact would have been tempered by the constraints of the workings of the global economy. Yet the failure to deliver even on the promise of the peace dividend represents a significant indication of the lack of genuine commitment by agents of global power to work towards the achievement of human security.

The associated material challenges for the achievement of human security in the new century are immense: the reduction of global poverty, the reduction of inequality between states and between human beings; and the harnessing of scientific advancement for the benefit of the majority of humankind. The rapid technological advances underway have the potential to decrease or increase existing inequalities, depending on how they are used and which rules determine the distribution of the benefits. These challenges require a fundamental shift in how we think about development and in the methods for its achievement.

Neoliberal Development

Neoliberalism is not a force like gravity, but an artificial construct. (George, 1999)

Conceptions of development in the last two decades of the 20th century were heavily influenced by what may be loosely termed as the 'new right backlash'. The 1980s, and more particularly the 1990s since the demise of communism, have witnessed the near-universal mainstreaming of a particular brand of liberal ideology referred to hereafter as neoliberalism. Neoliberal ideology attributes universal legitimacy to a conception of freedom based on private power. It places a premium on individual choice in the market place. It attacks the public realm and associated ideas of collectivity and society. Neoliberal ideology presents a set of essentially local, Western norms as universal.

These norms have been shared and adopted by public institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, other multilateral development banks, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the majority of governments. This has provided an important legitimisation for the business of private lenders and transnational corporations (TNCs), whose vision and behaviour in most cases are underpinned by these norms. The neoliberal ideology has thus come to be promoted around the globe as the proper approach to development. Neoliberalism supports global economic integration and presents it as the best, the most natural and the universal path towards economic growth, and therefore towards development, for all humanity. Critics, on the other hand, see its expansion across the globe as hegemonic.

Global economic integration is to be promoted through the liberalisation of trade, investment and finance that will ensue alongside the reform of national economies. These policy prescriptions of a growing number of global governance institutions form a blueprint which has been marketed with the powerful language of 'There Is No Alternative' or TINA.

The appeal of neoliberalism lies in its promises of increasing an individual's control over or consumption of the products which capitalism is generating. Furthermore, its proponents have sought to legitimise it further by incorporation of the language of competing ideas and values. The terminology of sustainable development, transparency and accountability that have been incorporated into the neoliberal development model exemplify this tendency. Thus, the dominant world-view is bolstered and lent false legitimacy.

This false legitimacy is clear given the discrepancy between its theoretical prescriptions and practical outcomes. In the wake of its practical application as a global development policy, we have seen a deepening of existing inequalities between and within states. Neoliberals may normatively legitimate even these rising inequalities. Within their vision, inequality can be seen as unproblematic. It may even be desirable, as it is expected to unleash entrepreneurial abilities that will contribute to maximising global wealth creation. Ultimately, therefore, everyone will benefit. The words of Prime Minister Thatcher are recalled here: 'It is our job to glory in inequality, and see that talents and abilities are given vent and expression for the benefit of us all' (Thatcher, 1996: 52). Therefore this particular brand of liberalism not only increases global social divisions, but more dangerously it is legitimising global inequalities of life-chance, legitimising a situation where inequalities are greater than at any period in history.

We are witnessing and we are part of the process whereby the ideology of dominant groups, presented as universal, is used to legitimate the marginalisation and neutralisation of competing visions and values. This is evident across a wide range of issues and areas, encompassing development, finance, trade, aid and economic policy generally, as well as ecology, human rights, law and so forth. This particular brand of liberalism may not, however, be as universal as is often suggested. The global power structure favours a Western knowledge and a Western representation of events and processes.

Since the process is not truly universal or comprehensive, counter-hegemonic groups are able to continue offering alternative visions and practices. This was evident in the November–December 1999 Ministerial meeting of the WTO in Seattle. High-profile street protests by civil society groups, the rejection by developing country governments of the agenda of the developed countries, and disagreement between developed countries themselves all contributed to the collapse of the meeting. This eroded the façade of legitimacy and universality surrounding global governance institutions and their policies.

Global Governance: In Whose Interest?

The debate on globalisation and its effects on the poor is legitimate and necessary. No-one has a monopoly on the truth. Everyone should have

a voice, particularly the poor themselves. (James Wolfensohn, *World Bank Development News*, 22 February 2000)

The post-cold war period has seen the move from a bipolar world in which the two superpowers governed separate spheres of influence, to a world in which global governance flourishes. But with what authority, and in whose interest? Who has a voice in global governance? Third World states have long been distinguished by, among other factors, their perception of themselves as vulnerable to external factors beyond their control, and in particular to decisions and policies – primarily economic – which they do not own. Do these Third World states, which now include the former Second World states within their ranks, perceive themselves as having a say in global governance? Or is someone speaking for them?

In this section most attention is paid to the public agencies of global governance, especially the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. The reason for this focus on public agencies is simple: they are supposed to be representing the interests of global citizens and promoting global public goods. (See Table 2 for an overview of global economic governance institutions and their respective memberships and remits.)

However, this should not be taken to suggest the lesser importance of private groupings that operate alongside states and international institutions in the global governance fraternity. TNCs, for example, have a powerful influence on global economic agenda setting. They work with a range of private business interests through fora such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the annual World Economic Summits (WES) at Davos. Moreover, Gill notes that:

At the heart of the global economy there is an internationalisation of authority and governance that not only involves international organisations (such as the BIS, IMF, and World Bank) and transnational firms, but also private consultancies and private bond-rating agencies ... (Gill, 1995: 418)

Sinclair (1994) and Van der Pijl (1998) develop ideas about the roles of private bond-rating agencies and management consultancies respectively in global governance. Indeed, Sinclair refers to these as 'private makers of global public policy' (1994: 448).

Increasingly, business interests are co-operating not only with individual governments but also with international organisations. This is seen in UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's Global Compact, for example. The rise in collaboration between agencies mandated to provide public goods with private interest-based agencies is clearly visible. For example, even international organisations such as the UNDP increasingly seek collaboration and funding from private businesses. This closeness between the private and public spheres raises important issues, especially about the democratic process. The work of Sharon Beder on corporate influence on environmental policy is indicative

Table 2: Major Agencies of Global Economic Governance (With Membership Figures as of the Mid-1990s)

BIS	Bank of International Settlements. Established in 1930 with headquarters in Basle. Membership of 40 central banks. Monitors monetary policies and financial flows. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, formed through the BIS in 1974, has spearheaded efforts at multilateral regulation of global banking.
G7	Group of Seven. Established in 1975 as the G5 (France, Germany, Japan, UK and USA) and subsequently expanded to include Canada and Italy. The G7 conducts semi-formal collaboration on world economic problems. Government leaders meet in annual G7 Summits, while finance ministers and/or their leading officials periodically hold other consultations.
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Established in 1947 with offices in Geneva. Membership had reached 122 states when it was absorbed into the WTO in 1995. The GATT coordinated eight 'rounds' of multilateral negotiations to reduce state restrictions on cross-border merchandise trade.
IMF	International Monetary Fund. Established in 1945 with headquarters in Washington, DC. Membership of 182 states. The IMF oversees short-term cross-border money flows and foreign exchange questions. Since 1979 it has also formulated stabilisation and systemic transformation policies for states suffering chronic difficulties with transborder debt or transitions from communist central planning.
IOSCO	International Organisation for Securities Commissions. Established in 1984 with headquarters in Montreal. Membership of 115 official securities regulators and (non-voting) trade associations from 69 countries. The IOSCO develops frameworks for transborder supervision of securities firms.
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Founded in 1962 with headquarters in Paris. Membership of 29 states with advanced industrial economies. Drawing on a staff of 600 professional economists, the OECD prepares advisory reports on all manner of macroeconomic questions.
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Established in 1964 with office in Geneva. Membership of 187 states. UNCTAD monitors the effects of cross-border trade on macroeconomic conditions, especially in the South. It provided a key forum in the 1970s for discussions of a New International Economic Order.
WBG	World Bank Group. A collection of five agencies, first established in 1945, with head offices in Washington, DC. The Group provides project loans for long-term development in poor countries. Like the IMF, the World Bank has since 1979 become heavily involved in structural adjustment programmes in the South and former East.
WTO	The World Trade Organization. Established in 1995 with headquarters in Geneva. The WTO is a permanent institution to replace the provisional GATT. It has a wider agenda and greater powers of enforcement.

Source: Scholte (1997: 431).

(Beder, 1997). Here, however, our focus is primarily the contributions and implications of public institutions in global governance.

Turning to public global governance, it is noteworthy that a recurrent theme on the liberal agenda is the presentation of a picture of a unified global necessitating and legitimising a common response in terms of management. Thus in the 1980s we heard UN-inspired think-tanks talk of 'Our Common Future', 'Common Security' and so forth. In the 1990s we heard references to a number of global crises, including the environment, refugees and population, each requiring global management. Also in the 1990s we witnessed a series of UN-organised, partly privately funded, global conferences. These included: the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), or Earth Summit, at Rio, 1992; the World Summit on Social Development in

Copenhagen, 1995; the 1995 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo; the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing; the 1996 Human Settlements Conference in Istanbul, and in the same year the Rome Food Summit.

The inclusive language of such conferences, and their associated declarations, raise some important questions. Whose globe are we talking about? Who is to manage it? With what authority? In whose interest? Global management assumes a common understanding of a particular problem and agreement about how it is to be addressed. These global conferences have undoubtedly played an important and positive role in raising awareness of pressing problems, and have helped to create the space in which debate can occur. Yet the debate has been neatly circumscribed. These conferences have lent legitimacy to a broad neoliberal framework for understanding development, and thus they have a direct bearing on human security. The liberal ideology espoused by powerful states and institutions, and accepted by the majority of governments, has offered a blueprint for global development. This model of development, with its associated methods and objectives, is assumed to be in the interest of all humanity, and it is assumed to have unquestionable authority as it is presented as common sense.

Global governance is increasingly reflected in a conscious co-ordination of policies between the IMF, the World Bank, other regional multilateral development banks, the WTO and a growing number of other arms of the UN system. Recently it has been seen in aspects of the work of the UNDP and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The most recent of all these policy co-ordinations is evident in the integration of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). To different degrees and in different ways, these key institutions have been adapting their general orientation, and their respective institutional structures and policies, to facilitate movement towards a world in which for capital, if not for citizens, national economic sovereignty is an anachronism.

Influence within the public institutions of global governance directly reflects the material inequality of states. Only a handful of states exert meaningful influence in institutions such as the IMF, World Bank or WTO. While the Group of 7 (G7) has been transformed into the Group of 8 (G8) with the addition of Russia, it is the case that G7 sets the norms and rules of global economic policy. As Sachs points out:

The G7 countries, plus the rest of the European Union, represent a mere 14 per cent of the world's population. Yet these countries have 56 per cent of the votes in the IMF Executive Board ... The rest of the world is called upon to support G7 declarations, not to meet for joint problem solving. (Sachs, 1998: 2)

Whence does it derive the authority and legitimacy to do so? Particularly given that the G7 is not very representative in terms of global population or indeed number of states (see Table 3). This is striking when compared with the Group of 77 (G77).

Table 3: Global Economic Governance, 1997

Title	Institutional Grouping	Membership	% World GDP	% World Pop
G7	Western economic powers	Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, USA	64.0	11.8
G77	Developing and some transition countries (not Russian Fed or Poland)	143 members	16.9	76.0

Source: Adapted from UNDP (1999: 109).

In this context, it is interesting to ponder for a moment the source of democratic legitimacy of the IMF and the World Bank. As key institutions pushing the neoliberal development model that favours the private rather than the public sector, they are not models of democratic representation. This is evident in Table 4.

Table 4: Formal Distribution of Voting Power in the IMF, 2000

Country	Pop (millions)	% IMF Executive Vote
USA	276	17.68
UK	59	5.1
Germany	82	6.19
France	59	5.1
Japan	126	6.33
Saudi Arabia	21	3.27
Total of above	623	43.67
Other countries (c 190)	5.4 billion	56.33

Source: Compiled from IMF data, April 2000, IMF website, and UN Population Division, Charting the Progress of Populations, 2000, <www.undp.org/popin/wdtrends/chart/15/15.pdf>.

The thoughts of the former Managing Director of the IMF on this matter are interesting and revealing. Just before leaving his post, Camdessus was asked during a videoconference with journalists in three African countries whether he felt the IMF was in the hands of the big powers. His answer is quoted at length:

The IMF is in the hands of its membership. As you know each country has a voting power that is in proportion to its quota, its share of IMF capital, which is itself determined more or less by the size of the country's economy. On that basis, the United States has 17.4 per cent of the voting power. That means that the rest of the world has 82.6 per cent. If my countrymen, our friends, our brothers in Europe, were united, it would be even more, something like 30 per cent of the capital of the IMF. Nobody says that Europe is controlling the IMF, even if it's a European who is sitting in this chair.

No, depending on the issues, the decisions go in one direction or another. But it's true that the developing countries, when they sit together and they join their forces in what we call here the G-11 group, represent an extremely important part of our membership.

The fact is that, in general, our decisions are not taken by a vote where a majority imposes its solutions on a minority ... [but] ... by consensus after a long process where people in a dialogue try to understand each other's views and see where the best solution lies. At the end of the day, all of them coincide in supporting that. (Camdessus, 2000a)

The following statement, made at the end of his answer, may vindicate critics who charge the key institutions of global governance with hegemonic behaviour: 'Frequently, the Americans suggest good solutions. After all, they are present in many parts of the world. They are familiar with international life. But it is not always the case ...'

Camdessus's remarks, while factually accurate, only illuminate part of this picture. The USA is the only country in the IMF with enough votes to exercise a unilateral veto power. The very existence of this veto is itself enough to ensure that the USA doesn't need frequent recourse to it. The potential veto power in itself is an effective deterrent, and can be an influential factor in effecting a predetermined outcome in the form of a 'consensus'.

It is not surprising that many countries perceive a lack of distance between IMF policy and US policy. The handling of the financial crises in the late 1990s in East Asia, Russia and Brazil further eroded the trust of developing countries in the independence of the IMF. South Korea, for example, perceives congruence between IMF and US policy agendas. It regards the USA as having taken advantage of the crisis to work via the IMF to push through its pre-existing trade and investment agendas (Feldstein, 1998: 32). This criticism comes from a country perceived by many to be a traditional US ally, which is also a member of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). IMF restructuring of East Asian economies has enabled First World companies to take advantage of bargain basement priced East Asian companies. In 1998 European and US companies mounted over US\$30 billion in take-overs of Asian companies – a fourfold increase on 1997 (Bello, 1999). One commentator has described this as 'the greatest global asset swindle of all time' (Hahnel, 1999). The Asian crises have also heightened awareness of the ability of a handful of relatively new private financial actors such as hedge funds to exert massive leverage. They can force currency devaluation at a breathtaking pace, undermine national economic policy, erode national development and throw literally millions below the poverty line. Global governance does not work to restrain these actors; indeed it often seems to support them.

Another important forum for global economic governance is the OECD. In reality, this is a negotiating body for the industrialised democracies, though membership during the 1990s extended to South Korea, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Mexico. (Interestingly, Turkey was a founding member in 1961.) The overwhelming majority of developing countries

do not belong to the OECD, and therefore a question arises as to its legitimacy as the negotiating forum for policies and agreements of global reach. The choice of the OECD as the negotiating forum for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment comes to mind here.

The scepticism and cynicism of developing countries and global citizens regarding global governance is understandable. From their vantage points, global governance has all the hallmarks of being 'organised under US hegemony and the international institutional structure that conforms to the interests of, broadly speaking, the G7 core capitalist states and their corporations' (Wilkin, 2000). Democratic potential at all levels, from the local to the global, is diminished by placing key decisions over policy making in the hands of ever further removed officials and institutions. It is also reduced by the influence of private interests on the public process, referred to above.

Conclusion

This article has provided an overview of the relationship between global governance, development and human security, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. At the beginning of the 21st century the globalisation of inequality at the inter-state, intra-state and private company levels seems to be entrenched. This will affect security from the human to the intra-state, inter-state, regional and ultimately global levels. IMF and World Bank managing directors are right to be concerned about the link between development and security. The globalisation process is resulting in highly uneven distribution of gains and, without concerted action, inequality may deepen further, with all its attendant implications. Alternative pathways for the pursuit of human security must be explored. Mindful of this, and especially of the threat thus posed to continued global economic integration, champions of neoliberal global development policies are in the process of articulating modified development policies. So far this represents business as usual, but with slight modifications. Ultimately human security requires different developmental strategies from those currently favoured by global governance institutions, strategies that have redistribution at their core. It also requires a different type of global governance, one that better reflects the concerns of the majority of the world's states and citizens.

Note

The ideas explored in this article can be found in expanded form in Thomas (2000).

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Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?

Roland Paris

Human security is the latest in a long line of neologisms – including common security, global security, cooperative security, and comprehensive security – that encourage policymakers and scholars to think about international security as something more than the military defense of state interests and territory. Although definitions of human security vary, most formulations emphasize the welfare of ordinary people. Among the most vocal promoters of human security are the governments of Canada and Norway, which have taken the lead in establishing a “human security network” of states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that endorse the concept.¹ The term has also begun to appear in academic works,² and is the subject of new research projects at several major universities.³

Some commentators argue that human security represents a new paradigm for scholars and practitioners alike. Despite these claims, however, it remains unclear whether the concept of human security can serve as a practical guide for academic research or governmental policymaking. As Daniel Deudney has written in another context, “Not all neologisms are equally plausible or useful.”⁴ Two problems, in particular, limit the usefulness of the human security concept for students and practitioners of international politics. First, the concept lacks a precise definition. Human security is like “sustainable development” – everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means. Existing definitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being, which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing policy goals and academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied.

Second, the most ardent backers of human security appear to have an interest in keeping the term expansive and vague. The idea of human security is the glue that holds together a jumbled coalition of “middle power” states, development agencies, and NGOs – all of which seek to shift attention and resources away from conventional security issues and toward goals that have traditionally fallen under the rubric of international development.

As a unifying concept for this coalition, human security is powerful precisely because it lacks precision and thereby encompasses the diverse perspectives and objectives of all the members of the coalition. The term, in short, appears to be slippery by design. Cultivated ambiguity renders human security an effective campaign slogan, but it also diminishes the concept's usefulness as a guide for academic research or policymaking.

This is not to say that human security is merely "hot air" or empty rhetoric. The political coalition that now uses human security as a rallying cry has chalked up significant accomplishments, including the signing of an anti-personnel land mines convention and the imminent creation of an international criminal court. The alliance of some states and advocacy groups has altered the landscape of international politics since the end of the Cold War, as Richard Price and others have shown.⁵ But to say that human security has served as an effective rallying cry is different from claiming that the concept offers a useful framework for analysis, as some of its proponents maintain.⁶ Campaign slogans can be consequential without being well defined. The impact of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society rhetoric, for example, was arguably significant – serving as a focal point for political supporters of his reformist social agenda – but the exact meaning of the term "great society" was obscure. Similarly, one can support the political goals of the human security coalition while recognizing that the idea of human security itself is a muddle.

This article proceeds as follows. First, I examine existing definitions of human security. Second, I explore the limits of human security as a practical guide for academic research and policymaking. Third, I examine recent efforts to narrow the definition of human security. Fourth, I consider ways in which the concept might, despite its limitations, make a contribution to the study of international relations and security.

What is Human Security?

The first major statement concerning human security appeared in the 1994 *Human Development Report*, an annual publication of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). "The concept of security," the report argues, "has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. ... Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives."⁷ This critique is clear and forceful, but the report's subsequent proposal for a new concept of security – *human* security – lacks precision: "Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities."⁸ The scope of this definition is vast: Virtually any kind of unexpected or irregular discomfort could conceivably constitute a threat to one's human security.

Perhaps anticipating this criticism, the authors of the report identify seven specific elements that comprise human security: (1) economic security (e.g., freedom from poverty); (2) food security (e.g., access to food); (3) health security (e.g., access to health care and protection from diseases); (4) environmental security (e.g., protection from such dangers as environmental pollution and depletion); (5) personal security (e.g., physical safety from such things as torture, war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, drug use, suicide, and even traffic accidents); (6) community security (e.g., survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups as well as the physical security of these groups); and (7) political security (e.g., enjoyment of civil and political rights, and freedom from political oppression). This list is so broad that it is difficult to determine what, if anything, might be excluded from the definition of human security. Indeed the drafters of the report seem distinctly uninterested in establishing any definitional boundaries. Instead they make a point of commending the "all-encompassing" and "integrative" qualities of the human security concept, which they apparently view as among the concept's major strengths.⁹

Today the UNDP's 1994 definition of human security remains the most widely cited and "most authoritative" formulation of the term,¹⁰ although different members of the human security coalition have customized the definition to suit their own particular interests. According to the government of Japan, for example, the concept of human security "comprehensively covers all the measures that threaten human survival, daily life, and dignity – for example, environmental degradation, violations of human rights, transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, refugees, poverty, anti-personnel land mines and ... infectious diseases such as AIDS – and strengthens efforts to confront these threats."¹¹ Other states, such as Canada, have promoted a more restrictive definition of human security as "freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, safety or lives."¹² But even this slightly narrower conceptualization of human security is sweeping and open-ended: Among other things, the Canadian formulation includes safety from physical threats, the achievement of an acceptable quality of life, a guarantee of fundamental human rights, the rule of law, good governance, social equity, protection of civilians in conflicts, and sustainable development.¹³ Meanwhile the human security network – which, in addition to Canada, Norway, and Japan, includes several other states and a broad assortment of international NGOs – has committed itself to the goal of "strengthening human security with a view to creating a more humane world where people can live in security and dignity, free from want and fear, and with equal opportunities to develop their human potential to the full."¹⁴ The sentiments embodied in these statements are honorable, but they do little to clarify the meaning or boundaries of the human security concept.

Some academic writings on the subject have been similarly opaque. Many works amount to restatements or revisions of the UNDP's laundry list of human security issues. Jorge Nef, for example, devises a fivefold classification scheme, arguing that human security comprises (1) environmental,

personal, and physical security, (2) economic security, (3) social security, including “freedom from discrimination based on age, gender, ethnicity, or social status,” (4) political security, and (5) cultural security, or “the set of psychological orientations of society geared to preserving and enhancing the ability to control uncertainty and fear.”¹⁵ Laura Reed and Majid Tehranian offer their own list of human security’s ten constituent elements – including psychological security, which “hinges on establishing conditions fostering respectful, loving, and humane interpersonal relations,” and communication security, or the importance of “freedom and balance in information flows.”¹⁶ Other scholars avoid the laundry list approach, but offer equally expansive definitions. According to Caroline Thomas, human security refers to the provision of “basic material needs” and the realization of “human dignity,” including “emancipation from oppressive power structures – be they global, national, or local in origin and scope.”¹⁷ For Robert Bedeski, human security includes “the totality of knowledge, technology, institutions and activities that protect, defend and preserve the biological existence of human life; and the processes which protect and perfect collective peace and prosperity to enhance human freedom.”¹⁸ Again, if human security is all these things, what is it *not*?

A Guide for Research and Policymaking?

Policymakers and scholars face different, but related, problems in attempting to put these definitions of human security into practical use. For policymakers, the challenge is to move beyond all-encompassing exhortations and to focus on specific solutions to specific political issues. This is a difficult task not only because of the broad sweep and definitional elasticity of most formulations of human security but also – and perhaps even more problematically – because the proponents of human security are typically reluctant to prioritize the jumble of goals and principles that make up the concept. As noted above, part of the ethic of the human security movement is to emphasize the “inclusiveness” and “holism” of the term, which in practice seems to mean treating all interests and objectives within the movement as equally valid. Reed and Tehranian, for instance, after presenting their list of ten constituent categories of human security, conclude with this caveat: “It is important to reiterate that these overlapping categories do not represent a hierarchy of security needs from personal to national, international, and environmental rights. On the contrary, each realm impinges upon the others and is intrinsically connected to wider political and economic considerations.”¹⁹ The observation that all human and natural realms are fundamentally inter-related is a truism, and does not provide a very convincing justification for treating all needs, values, and policy objectives as equally important. Nor does it help decisionmakers in their daily task of allocating scarce resources among competing goals: After all, not everything can be a matter of national security, with all of the urgency that this term implies. To put it simply,

human security “is too broad and vague a concept to be meaningful for policymakers, as it has come to entail such a wide range of different threats on one hand, while prescribing a diverse and sometimes incompatible set of policy solutions to resolve them on the other.”²⁰

For those who study, rather than practice, international politics, the task of transforming the idea of human security into a useful analytical tool for scholarly research is also problematic. Given the hodgepodge of principles and objectives associated with the concept, it is far from clear what academics should even be studying. Human security seems capable of supporting virtually any hypothesis – along with its opposite – depending on the prejudices and interests of the particular researcher. Further, because the concept of human security encompasses both physical security and more general notions of social, economic, cultural, and psychological well-being, it is impractical to talk about certain socioeconomic factors “causing” an increase or decline in human security, given that these factors are themselves part of the definition of human security. The study of causal relationships requires a degree of analytical separation that the notion of human security lacks.²¹

To illustrate these problems, consider John Cockell’s efforts to apply the human security concept to the phenomenon of international peacebuilding operations in countries at risk of slipping into, or just emerging from, civil war.²² After embracing the open-ended UNDP definition of human security, Cockell states that “peacebuilding is a sustained process of preventing internal threats to human security from causing protracted, violent conflict.”²³ Yet because the UNDP definition of human security includes safety from violence as a central component of human security, Cockell is effectively saying that peacebuilding seeks to prevent a decline in human security from causing a decline in human security, which makes little sense. He then identifies “four basic parameters,” based on the principles of human security, for the conduct of peacebuilding operations: Peacebuilders should focus on root causes of conflicts, pay attention to the differences in local conditions from one operation to the next, seek sustainable and durable results, and mobilize local actors and resources in support of peace. Although these guidelines seem reasonable, the sprawling concept of human security could support many more – and quite different – principles for peacebuilding. Indeed Cockell himself acknowledges that his policy prescriptions are “arbitrary,” which belies the notion that human security entails a particular “orientation” toward peacebuilding, as Cockell claims.²⁴ More generally, if human security means almost anything, then it effectively means nothing.²⁵

Attempts to Narrow the Concept

One possible remedy for the expansiveness and vagueness of human security is to redefine the concept in much narrower and more precise terms, so that it might offer a better guide for research and policymaking. This is the approach that Gary King and Christopher Murray have adopted in their

ongoing project on human security.²⁶ King and Murray offer a definition of human security that is intended to include only “essential” elements, meaning elements that are “important enough for human beings to fight over or to put their lives or property at great risk.”²⁷ Using this standard, they identify five key indicators of well-being – poverty, health, education, political freedom, and democracy – that they intend to incorporate into an overall measure of human security for individuals and groups. Similarly, another scholar, Kanti Bajpai, proposes construction of a “human security audit” that would include measures of “direct and indirect threats to individual bodily safety and freedom,” as well as measures of different societies’ “capacity to deal with these threats, namely, the fostering of norms, institutions, and ... representativeness in decisionmaking structures.”²⁸ Although both projects are still in the early stages of development, they represent welcome efforts at operationalizing the concept of human security with a more precise definition of the term. A clear measure or audit of human security would allow scholars to assess the factors that lead to declines or increases in the human security of particular groups or individuals.²⁹

Both of these projects, however, face problems that seem endemic to the study of human security. First, they identify certain values as more important than others without providing a clear justification for doing so. Bajpai, for instance, proposes inclusion of “bodily safety” and “personal freedom” in his human security audit, and argues that this audit would draw attention to the fact that “threats to safety and freedom are *the most important*” elements of human security.³⁰ He does not explain, however, why other values are not equally, or perhaps even more, important than the values he champions. What about education? Is the ability to choose one’s marriage partner, which is one of Bajpai’s examples of personal freedom, really more important than, say, a good education? Perhaps it is, but Bajpai does not address this issue. Similarly, King and Murray state that their formulation of human security includes only those matters that people would be willing to fight over. But they neglect to offer evidence that their five indicators are, in fact, closely related to the risk of violent conflict. In other words, they favor certain values as representative of human security without offering a clear justification for doing so. Additionally, their decision to exclude indicators of violence from their composite measure of human security creates a *de facto* distinction between human security and physical security, thereby purging the most familiar connotation of security – safety from violence – from their definition of human security. Under the King Murray formulation, individuals could find themselves in the strange position of enjoying a high level of human security (low poverty, reasonable health care, good education, political freedom, and democracy), while facing a relatively high risk of becoming victims of deadly violence. One need only think of residents of certain neighborhoods in Belfast, who might not consider themselves very “secure.” Thus the challenge for these scholars is not simply to narrow the definition of human security into a more analytically tractable concept, but to provide a compelling rationale for highlighting certain values.

This raises another problem. Defining the core values of human security may be difficult not only because there is so little agreement on the meaning of human security, but because the term's ambiguity serves a particular purpose: It unites a diverse and sometimes fractious coalition of states and organizations that "see an opportunity to capture some of the more substantial political interest and superior financial resources" associated with more traditional, military conceptions of security.³¹ These actors have in effect pursued a political strategy of "appropriating" the term "security," which conveys urgency, demands public attention, and commands governmental resources.³² By maintaining a certain level of ambiguity in the notion of human security, moreover, the members of this coalition are able to minimize their individual differences, thereby accommodating as wide a variety of members and interests in their network as possible.³³ Given these circumstances, they are unlikely to support outside calls for greater specificity in the definition of human security, because definitional narrowing would likely highlight and aggravate differences among them, perhaps even to the point of alienating certain members and weakening the coalition as a whole.

Why, then, should scholars bother trying to transform the concept of human security into a serviceable analytical tool at all? Why embark on what could well be a quixotic quest to wrest the definition of human security away from those who have an interest in keeping it vague and expansive? Perhaps a more sensible alternative would be to employ a less politically encumbered terminology, or to think about other ways in which the concept of human security could contribute to the field of security studies.

Human Security as a Category of Research

To recapitulate my argument so far: Human security does not appear to offer a particularly useful framework of analysis for scholars or policymakers. But perhaps there are other avenues by which the idea of human security can contribute to the study of international relations and security. I would like to suggest one such possibility: Human security may serve as a *label* for a broad category of research in the field of security studies that is primarily concerned with nonmilitary threats to the safety of societies, groups, and individuals, in contrast to more traditional approaches to security studies that focus on protecting states from external threats. Much of this work is relatively new, and our understanding of how such research "fits" within the larger field of security studies is still limited. In other words, even if the concept of human security itself is too vague to generate specific research questions, it could still play a useful taxonomical role in the field by helping to classify different types of scholarship. Using human security in this manner would be compatible with the *spirit* of the term – particularly its emphasis on nonmilitary sources of conflict – while recognizing that there is little point in struggling to operationalize the quicksilver concept of human security itself.

Despite resistance from some scholars, such as Stephen Walt, the field of security studies has developed beyond its traditional focus on the “threat, use and control of military force” primarily by states.³⁴ Since the end of the Cold War, in particular, the subject matter of security studies has undergone both a “broadening” and a “deepening.”³⁵ By broadening, I mean the consideration of nonmilitary security threats, such as environmental scarcity and degradation, the spread of disease, overpopulation, mass refugee movements, nationalism, terrorism, and nuclear catastrophe.³⁶ By deepening, I mean that the field is now more willing to consider the security of individuals and groups, rather than focusing narrowly on external threats to states.³⁷ These efforts have been prompted in part by the contributions of “critical” theorists – including feminists, postmodernists, and constructivists – who have probed the assumptions and political implications of the term “security” itself.³⁸

Using the notions of broadening and deepening, it is possible to construct a matrix of the security studies field, as illustrated in Figure 1. The matrix contains four cells, each representing a different cluster of literature in the field. I assume that a “security threat” connotes some type of menace to survival. The top half of the map includes works that focus on security threats to states; the bottom half comprises works that consider security threats to societies, groups, and individuals. The left side of the matrix shows literature that focuses on military threats, and the right side on military or nonmilitary threats, or both. These divisions produce the following fourfold typology of the field:

- Cell 1 contains works that concentrate on military threats to the security of states. Conventional realists tend to adopt this perspective, which has traditionally dominated academic security studies, particularly in the

Figure 1: A Matrix of Security Studies

		What Is the Source of the Security Threat?	
		Military	Military, Nonmilitary, or Both
Security for Whom?	States	<p><u>Cell 1</u></p> <p>National security (conventional realist approach to security studies)</p>	<p><u>Cell 2</u></p> <p>Redefined security (e.g., environmental and economic security)</p>
	Societies, Groups, and Individuals	<p><u>Cell 3</u></p> <p>Intrastate security (e.g., civil war, ethnic conflict, and democide)</p>	<p><u>Cell 4</u></p> <p>Human security (e.g., environmental and economic threats to the survival of societies, groups, and individuals)</p>

United States.³⁹ Most of the articles published in *International Security*, for example, fall into this category.

- Cell 2 contains works that address nonmilitary threats (instead of, or in addition to, military threats) to the national security of states, including environmental and economic challenges. Jessica Tuchman Mathews's much-cited 1989 article, "Redefining Security," is typical of this category. Mathews argues that foreign security policies should incorporate considerations of environmental destruction, among other things, but she still considers the state, rather than substate actors, to be the salient object of security.⁴⁰ Other examples of such work include the Palme Commission's 1982 report, *Common Security*, which argued that nuclear weapons posed a threat to the survival of all states;⁴¹ investigations into the relationship between environmental degradation and international armed conflict;⁴² and studies of foreign economic policy and international security.⁴³
- Cell 3 includes works that focus on military threats to actors other than states: namely societies, groups, and individuals. The prevalence of intrastate violence since the end of the Cold War has given rise to a large literature on intrastate conflicts, in which substate groups are the principal belligerents.⁴⁴ In addition, studies of "democide," or the intentional killing by a state of its own citizens, also fall into this category.⁴⁵
- Cell 4 is concerned with military or nonmilitary threats – or both – to the security of societies, groups, and individuals. Does poverty, for example, fuel violence within societies?⁴⁶ Are certain types of domestic political institutions more conducive to domestic peace?⁴⁷ Is the degree of urbanization of a society, or access to medical care, associated with the occurrence of civil violence?⁴⁸ What other societal conditions pose a particular danger to the survival of groups and individuals? All of these questions would fall into the category of research that I label "human security."

Using the term "human security" to describe this type of scholarship has several advantages. First, the contents of cell 4 echo many of the concerns of the human security coalition, so it makes intuitive sense to use this terminology. Second, employing human security as a label for a broad category of research eliminates the problem of deriving clear hypotheses from the human security concept itself – a concept that, I have argued, offers little analytical leverage because it is so sprawling and ambiguous. Consequently, scholars working in the "human security branch" of security studies would not need to adjudicate the merit or validity of human security per se, but rather they would focus on more specific questions that could be clearly defined (and perhaps even answered). Third, and relatedly, although many scholars in this branch of security studies may be interested in normative questions as well as empirical ones, the advantage of using human security as a descriptive label for a class of research is that the label would not presuppose any particular normative agenda.⁴⁹

Fourth, mapping the field in this manner – with human security as one branch – helps to differentiate the principal nontraditional approaches to

security studies from one another. With the broadening and deepening of security studies in recent years, it is no longer helpful or reasonable to define the field in dualistic terms: with the realist, state-centric, military-minded approach to security studies at the core and a disorderly bazaar of alternative approaches in the periphery. These alternative approaches actually fall into broad groupings and have become sufficiently important to merit their own classification scheme. Mapping the field in new ways can help us to understand how these approaches relate to more traditional approaches to security studies, and to one another. Finally, the very fashionability of the label “human security” could benefit scholars by drawing attention to existing works within cell 4 and opening up new areas of research in this branch of the field.

Of course, the boundaries between these four quadrants are not absolute. Environmental degradation, for example, may simultaneously pose a threat to the survival of states and substate actors, and could thus fall into either cell 2 or cell 4.⁵⁰ The permeability of these boundaries, however, is not a significant problem for scholars because each quadrant represents a broad category of research – or a cluster of issues and questions, rather than a distinct causal hypothesis or theory – which would need to be more clearly specified.

Conclusion

Human security has been described as many different things: a rallying cry, a political campaign, a set of beliefs about the sources of violent conflict, a new conceptualization of security, and a guide for policymakers and academic researchers. As a rallying cry, the idea of human security has successfully united a diverse coalition of states, international agencies, and NGOs. As a political campaign, the human security coalition has accomplished a number of specific goals, such as the negotiation of the land mines convention. But as a new conceptualization of security, or a set of beliefs about the sources of conflict, human security is so vague that it verges on meaninglessness – and consequently offers little practical guidance to academics who might be interested in applying the concept, or to policymakers who must prioritize among competing policy goals. Efforts to sharpen the definition of human security are a step in the right direction, but they are likely to encounter resistance from actors who believe that the concept’s strength lies in its holism and inclusiveness. Definitional expansiveness and ambiguity are powerful attributes of human security, but only in the sense that they facilitate collective action by the members of the human security coalition. The very same qualities, however, hobble the concept of human security as a useful tool of analysis. On the other hand, human security could provide a handy label for a broad category of research – a distinct branch of security studies that explores the particular conditions that affect the survival of individuals, groups, and societies – that may also help to establish this brand of research as a central component of the security studies field.

Acknowledgements

My thanks to Michael Barnett, Francis Beer, Stephen Brooks, Steve Chan, Claudio Cioffi, Daniel Drezner, Colin Dueck, Natalie Goldring, Ian Hurd, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, David Leblang, Daniel Lindley, Michael Lipson, and Thomas Weiss for comments on previous drafts. An earlier version of this article was presented to the joint meeting of the International Security and Arms Control section of the American Political Science Association and the International Security Studies section of the International Studies Association in Denver, Colorado (November 9–11, 2000), and at the annual conference of the International Studies Association in Chicago, Illinois (February 20–24, 2001).

Notes

1. Other states in the network include Austria, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland, and Thailand. See "Chairman's Summary," Second Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Lucerne, Switzerland, May 11–12, 2000, [http://www.dfait-macchi.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/Chairman summary-e.asp](http://www.dfait-macchi.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/Chairman%20summary-e.asp) (accessed on February 14, 2001).

2. For example, Yuen Foong Khong, "Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?" *Global Governance*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (July–September 2001); Oliver Richmond, "Human Security, the 'Rule of Law,' and NGOs: Potentials and Problems for Humanitarian Intervention," *Human Rights Review*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (July–September 2001); Astri Suhrke, "Human Security and the Interests of States," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (September 1999), pp. 265–276; Peter Stöckl, *Human and Global Security: An Exploration of Terms* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999); Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin, eds., *Globalization, Human Security, and the African Experience* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999); Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: The Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment*, 2d ed. (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1999); Majid Tehrani, ed., *Worlds Apart: Human Security and Global Governance* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999); Heather Owens and Barbara Arneil, "The Human Security Paradigm Shift: A New Lens on Canadian Foreign Policy? Report of the University of British Columbia Symposium on Human Security," *ibid.*, pp. 1–12; Ramesh Thakur, "The United Nations and Human Security," *ibid.*, pp. 51–60; and Tatsuro Matsumae and L.C. Chen, eds., *Common Security in Asia: New Concept of Human Security* (Tokyo: Tokai University Press, 1995).

3. These include Harvard University's Program on Human Security, the University of Denver's Graduate School of International Studies, the University of New South Wales's Asia-Australia Institute, and the University of British Columbia's Institute of International Relations.

4. Daniel Deudney, "Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April 1991), p. 23.

5. Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 613–644; and Craig Warkentin and Karen Mingst, "International Institutions, the State, and Global Civil Society in the Age of the World Wide Web," *Global Governance*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (April–June 2000), pp. 237–257.

6. Laura Reed and Majid Tehrani, "Evolving Security Regimes," in Tehrani, *Worlds Apart*, p. 35.

7. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report, 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 22.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

10. John G. Coakley, "Conceptualising Peacebuilding: Human Security and Sustainable Peace," in Michael Pugh, ed., *Regeneration of War-Torn Societies* (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 21.

11. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Bluebook*, 1999, chap. 2, sec. 3. See also "Statement by Director-General Yukio Takasu at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World," Ulan Bator, May 8, 2000. Both documents are reproduced on the Japanese foreign ministry's web site at <http://www.mofa.go.jp> (accessed on February 14, 2001).

12. Canadian foreign ministry web site: <http://www.dfa.it-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/ menu-e.asp> (accessed on February 14, 2001). See also the statement by former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership," *International Journal*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 183–196. Since leaving his post as foreign minister in 2000, Axworthy has continued to espouse the concept of human security; see Lloyd Axworthy, "Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First," *Global Governance*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January–March 2001), pp. 19–23.

13. Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security," p. 184.

14. "Chairman's Summary," Second Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network.

15. Net, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability*, p. 25.

16. Reed and Tehranian, "Evolving Security Regimes," pp. 39 and 47.

17. Caroline Thomas, "Introduction," in Thomas and Wilkin, *Globalization, Human Security, and the African Experience*, p. 3.

18. Robert Bedeski, "Human Security, Knowledge, and the Evolution of the Northeast Asian State," Centre for Global Studies, University of Victoria, February 8, 2000, <http://www.globalcentres.org/docs/bedeski.html> (accessed on February 14, 2001).

19. Reed and Tehranian, "Evolving Security Regimes," p. 53.

20. Owens and Arneil, "The Human Security Paradigm Shift," p. 2.

21. Sührke makes a similar point in "Human Security and the Interests of States," pp. 270–271.

22. Cockell, "Conceptualising Peacebuilding."

23. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 21.

25. On the problem of "conceptual stretching," see Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64, No. 4 (December 1970), pp. 1033–1053.

26. Gary King and Christopher Murray, "Rethinking Human Security," Harvard University, May 4, 2000, <http://gking.harvard.edu/files/hs.pdf> (accessed on February 14, 2001).

27. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

28. Kanti Bajpai, "Human Security: Concept and Measurement," Kroc Institute Occasional Paper No. 19:OP:1 (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, August 2000), http://www.nd.edu/~krocinst/ocpapers/op_19_1.PDF (accessed on February 14, 2001).

29. In addition to these projects, on January 24, 2001, the United Nations and the government of Japan announced plans to establish a Commission on Human Security, which will be cochaired by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Sadako Ogata. See "Independent Panel on 'Human Security' To Be Set Up," Agence France-Press, January 24, 2001.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 53 (emphasis added).

31. King and Murray, "Rethinking Human Security," p. 4. See also Mahbub ul Haq, *Reflections on Human Development*, exp. ed. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998). On the strategic use of the term "security" as a tool for changing policy or obtaining resources, see Emma Rothschild, "What Is Security?" *Dædalus*, Vol. 124, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 58–59.

32. On the urgency that is automatically associated with the concept of national security, see David E. Sanger, "Sometimes National Security Says It All," *New York Times*, Week in Review, May 7, 2000, p. 3.

33. The communiqués of the human security network, for example, describe the concept of human security more vaguely than do Canadian or Japanese government documents on the subject. Compare "Chairman's Summary," Second Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, to the Government of Canada's "Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World," Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, May 1999, and the "Statement

by Director-General Yukio Takasu." Bajpai also discusses some of these differences in "Human Security: Concept and Measurement," as does Fen Osler Hampson, "The Axworthy Years: An Assessment," presentation prepared for delivery to the Group of 78, National Press Club, Ottawa, October 31, 2000, <http://www.hri.ca/partners/G78/English/Peace/hampson-axworthy.htm> (accessed on February 14, 2001).

34. Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (March 1991), p. 212. For a critique of Walt's traditionalism, see Edward A. Kolodziej, "Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December 1992), pp. 421-438.

35. I borrow these terms from Richard Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

36. See, for example, Richard H. Ullmann, "Redefining Security," *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983), pp. 129-153; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 162-177; and Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995).

37. See, for example, Robert L. Rothstein, ed., *After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999); Barbara F. Walter, "Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace," *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 127-155; Krishna Kumar, ed., *Rebuilding Societies after Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1997); and Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

38. See, for example, Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity, and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); and Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

39. See, for example, Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies"; Richard K. Betts, "Should Strategic Studies Survive?" *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 7-33; Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coré, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *America's Strategic Choices*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000); David A. Baldwin, "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War," *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (October 1995), pp. 117-141; and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field," *International Security*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 5-27.

40. Mathews, "Redefining Security." See also Ullmann, "Redefining Security"; and Joseph J. Romm, *Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993).

41. Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).

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Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease

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Migration is increasingly interpreted as a security problem. The prism of security analysis is especially important for politicians, for national and local police organizations, the military police, customs officers, border patrols, secret services, armies, judges, some social services (health care, hospitals, schools), private corporations (bank analysts, providers of technology surveillance, private policing), many journalists (especially from television and the more sensationalist newspapers), and a significant fraction of general public opinion, especially but not only among those attracted to “law and order.” The popularity of this security prism is not an expression of traditional responses to a rise of insecurity, crime, terrorism, and the negative effects of globalization; it is the result of the creation of a continuum of threats and general unease in which many different actors exchange their fears and beliefs in the process of making a risky and dangerous society. The professionals in charge of the management of risk and fear especially transfer the legitimacy they gain from struggles against terrorists, criminals, spies, and counterfeiters toward other targets, most notably transnational political activists, people crossing borders, or people born in the country but with foreign parents.

This expansion of what security is taken to include effectively results in a convergence between the meaning of international and internal security. The convergence is particularly important in relation to the issue of migration, and specifically in relation to questions about who gets to be defined as an immigrant. The security professionals themselves, along with some academics, tend to claim that they are only responding to new threats requiring exceptional measures beyond the normal demands of everyday politics. In practice, however, the transformation of security and the consequent focus on immigrants is directly related to their own immediate interests (competition for budgets and missions) and to the transformation of technologies they use (computerized databanks, profiling and morphing, electronic phone tapping). The Europeanization and the Westernization of the logics of control and

surveillance of people beyond national polices is driven by the creation of a transnational field of professionals in the management of unease. This field is larger than that of police organizations in that it includes, on one hand private corporations and organizations dealing with the control of access to the welfare state, and, on the other hand, intelligence services and some military people seeking a new role after the end of the Cold War. These professionals in the management of unease, however, are only a node connecting many competing networks responding to many groups of people who are identified as risk or just as a source of unease.¹

This process of securitization is now well known, but despite the many critical discourses that have drawn attention to the securitization of migration over the past ten years, the articulation of migration as a security problem continues. Why? What are the reasons of the persistent framing of migration in relation to terrorism, crime, unemployment and religious zealotry, on the one hand, and to integration, interest of the migrant for the national economy development, on the other, rather than in relation to new opportunities for European societies, for freedom of travel over the world, for cosmopolitanism, or for some new understanding of citizenship?² This is the question I want to address in this essay.

Some “critical” discourses generated by NGOs and academics assume that if people, politicians, governments, bureaucracies, and journalists were more aware, they would change their minds about migration and begin to resist securitizing it. The primary problem, therefore, is ideological or discursive in that the securitization of migrants derives from the language itself and from the different capacities of various actors to engage in speech acts. In this context, the term “speech act” is used not in its technical Austinian sense, but metaphorically, to justify both the normative position of a speaker and the value of their critical discourse against the discourses of the security professionals. This understanding of critique reinforces the vision of a contest between ideas and norms, a contest in which academics can play a leading role.³

This essay tries to be critical in a rather different sense. It seeks to avoid presenting the struggle as an ideological one between conservative and liberal positions, or even as an “intertextual competition” between agencies in which academics have a key role. It examines why the discourses of securitization continue to be so powerful even when alternatives discourses are well known, and why the production of academic and alternative discourses has so little effect in either the political arena or in daily life. It emphasizes the work of politicization, of the mobilization of groups and technologies enabling some agents, especially political actors, the media, the security professionals and some sectors of the general population, to create a “truth” about the link between crime, unemployment, and migration, even when academics, churches, NGOs and some social policy-oriented institutions have made powerful claims to the contrary for many years.

My hypothesis is that the securitization of immigration is not only an effect of, even if it contributes to, the propaganda of the far right political parties, the rise of racism, a new and more efficient rhetoric convincing the

population of a danger, or successful “speech acts” performed by actors coming from the state or from the society.⁴ Securitization of the immigrant as a risk is based on our conception of the state as a body or a container for the polity. It is anchored in the fears of politicians about losing their symbolic control over the territorial boundaries.⁵ It is structured by the *habitus* of the security professionals and their new interests not only in the foreigner but in the “immigrant.” These interests are correlated with the globalization of technologies of surveillance and control going beyond the national borders.⁶ It is based, finally, on the “unease” that some citizens who feel discarded suffer because they cannot cope with the uncertainty of everyday life.⁷ This worry, or unease, is not psychological. It is a structural unease in a “risk society” framed by neoliberal discourses in which freedom is always associated at its limits with danger and (in)security.

The securitization of migration is, thus, a transversal political technology, used as a mode of governmentality by diverse institutions to play with the unease,⁸ or to encourage it if it does not yet exist,⁹ so as to affirm their role as providers of protection and security and to mask some of their failures.¹⁰ The securitization of immigration then emerges from the correlation between some successful speech acts of political leaders, the mobilization they create for and against some groups of people, and the specific field of security professionals (which, in the West, and despite many differences, now tend to unite policemen, gendarmes, intelligence services, military people, providers of technology of surveillance and experts on risk assessments). It comes also from a range of administrative practices such as population profiling, risk assessment, statistical calculation, category creation, proactive preparation, and what may be termed a specific *habitus* of the “security professional” with its ethos of secrecy and concern for the management of fear or unease.¹¹

The Success of Securitization of Immigration in the Political Realm

For a majority of antiracist and Human Rights associations, as well as for many scholars linked to these associations, the force of the securitization of migration comes from the “spontaneous” spread of intolerance and racist prejudice over large groups of people. The popular classes are “contaminated” by “law and order” visions about foreigners and accept them. Ignorance of the broader stakes combined with a populism calculated to please frustrated people creates a potential for security-oriented behavior against foreigners.¹² This analysis of the susceptibility of populations to populist rhetoric may be accurate in some respects. However, the ineffectiveness of critical discourses is not a consequence of a simple blindness on the part of politicians, the electorate, security professionals, and media.¹³ Success will not come by repeating again and again reasoned argument about how useful foreigners could be for a society. So the refusal to take into account the critical discourses can be characterized not as a lack of knowledge but as a policy of forgetting, or as a denial.¹⁴

As Ayse Ceyhan and Anastasia Tsoukala show in this issue, claims that increases in insecurity can be attributed to the responsibility of migrants for crime, delinquency, and deviance have been successfully challenged by critical analysis without much effect on the prevailing political rhetoric. Analytical accuracy has not really undermined the consensus among political leaders and bureaucracies. It is not directly by arguing for migrants and against securitization that critical discourses can change the situation.¹⁵ Details of the negative effects of government policies or international institutions will not change the situation for immigrants. They will still be framed in relation to statist practices of rejection or integration. Effective challenges can only be indirect, by analyzing the conditions under which the authority of truth is given to a discourse that creates the immigrant as an “outsider, inside the State.”¹⁶

Security and Immigration: Seeing Like a State

Policies of denial, of active forgetting about migration role and status, draw their strength from the way the state is conceived by the main actors of these discourses of securitization of immigrants.¹⁷ For journalists, bureaucrats, and lawyers, but also for most political scientists of Western societies, *state* is often confused with *state apparatus and government*. Governants in representative democracies, they argue, derive their legitimacy from their citizens, so they associate *state* and *democracy* without much sense of the limits of and contradictions between these two notions. Citizens are then conceived as nationals, understood by opposition to foreigners, and, migrants are framed through various cultural discourses as foreigners, or as citizens of a different national origin, who do not fit the “national standard” of norms and values. So, migration is always understood, through the categories of the national and the state, as a danger to the “homogeneity of the people.” The activation of the term *migrant* in *in-migrant* is by definition seen as something destructive. The metaphor of the body politic embedded in the sovereignty myth – in the need to monitor borders to reassure the integrity of what is “inside,” in the practice of territorial protection, in the technologies of surveillance – creates an image of immigration associated with an outsider coming inside, as a danger to the homogeneity of the state, the society, and the polity.¹⁸

The genealogy of the Western state, in relation to both its strongest myths and its institutionalization, has been analyzed in the sociologies of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens.¹⁹ They have shown how, in Bourdieu’s terms, “states conceptualise us more than we, as academics, conceptualise the State.” The studies in international-relations theory by John Ruggie, Thomas Biersteker, Richard Ashley, and R.B.J. Walker have similarly emphasized the capacity of states to impose themselves as a frame of mind.²⁰ They obliged IR theorists to analyze the territorial dimension of the Westphalian state, a topic that has also been examined by Bertrand Badie, Richard Mansbach, and

Martin Heiser.²¹ I will not develop this aspect here: I just want to emphasize that, even if all these concepts were arms in symbolic and political struggles between different groups, the concepts of sovereignty, security, and borders always structure our thought as if there existed a “body” – an “envelope,” or “container” – differentiating one polity from another. The state justifies itself as the only political order possible as soon as it is accepted that sovereignty, law and order, and a single body are the prerequisite for peace and homogeneity. It justifies the “national” identity that the state has achieved through a territorialization of its order, by a cutting up of borders.

The strength of this symbolic order has been analyzed so many times that it is not necessary to expand on the subject, but it is important to remember this way of thinking because too many economists or sociologists working on migration “forget” this political element. They actively work to forget the central illusion of power as a body, through homogeneity, sovereignty, and law, that prevents an understanding of the global social transformations concerning movement of people and identity politics. Furthermore, politicians, lawyers, and some sociologists can hardly admit that power cannot be analyzed through legitimate and steady forms – that it is not coming from the top and going downward; that, in Michel Foucault’s terms, “it cannot be analyzed in its intentions; but on the contrary where it is in direct relationship with its targets, where it moves, where, at its extremities, power goes beyond the Law, where the techniques and tactics of domination can be analyzed.”²² Foucault long ago proposed this alternative to a description of power relationships in terms of sovereignty that challenges the premise of the rhetoric of a body politic, but this framing continues to be marginal. Even in academic circles, there is a refusal to analyze sovereignty and security as objects of research, and a continuing insistence that they can be used as if they were tools for understanding the relationship between state and society.²³

Sovereignty and security cannot be conceived merely as analytical tools of social reality; they must be seen as categories demanding genealogical analysis and linked to a particular way of governing – that of the so-called Westphalian state and its modern (Hegelian or Weberian) variations. The contemporary revival of sovereignty in political debate is thus to be understood as the deployment of a narrative, with the specific purpose of playing with positions of symbolic authority so as to force social practices to bend in a required way. Sovereignty implies a recognition of these positions; but when they are contested, the authority effect cannot survive for long. The authority effect does not assert itself, but is established inter-subjectively. The same goes for the argument about security. Practices of security are not given by nature but are the outcome of political acts by politicians and specialists on threat management.

Security and Immigration: Seeing Like a Politician

The framing of the state as a body endangered by migrants is a political narrative activated for the purpose of political games in ways that permit each

politician to distance himself or herself from other politicians, but within the same rules of the game. It is a social construction useful for the politicization of migration. Murray Edelman has explained how the social construct of the political spectacle works.²⁴ He has demonstrated how the construction of situations as problems is useful for politicians: the politicians can manage them in order to justify their own authority. It enables them, for example, to negate other problems or to transform structural difficulties into easy targets. All these elements and practices are important to explain the securitization of immigrants. Michael Rogin – to cite one example – has developed the idea that in various countries, and especially in the United States, political rhetoric works as a political demonology through which politicians construct a figure of the enemy to generate a countersubversive discourse and a law-and-order program.²⁵

Neither Edelman nor Rogin adequately examines a further dynamic, one that Paul Veyne has developed in another context – a dynamic arising from the ways in which politicians believe in their own myths, even if they consciously and cynically activate them themselves. They are not mystifiers and jokers. Despite the differences expressed in and generated by political struggles, national traditions, professional interests, and the cynicisms apparent in the leadership of police or defense ministries, politicians live in the myths about polity, sovereignty, and state. They participate in this illusion of the political field. These myths structure their space, their way of thinking and acting concerning a “political problem,” and explain to some degree the homogeneity of their reaction to the “immigration problem” in the diversity of Western states.

This does not mean that politicians necessarily *believe* in the myths they disseminate regarding immigrants, or Islamists, or border transgression: they know the limits of their “fable” as well as the Greeks knew that their gods were part of the fairy tale.²⁶ Nonetheless, they cannot call into question those myths about state, about the integrity of the people, because the myths are the way they frame their everyday explanation of the political and social world and the way they see their own struggles and values. Even the most cynical among them do not have another framework in which to speak about the state and security. This is why the metaphor of the penetration of something foreign into a body is so powerful, even if national trajectories modify the framing of this use so that, for example, the arrival of migrants is expressed as a tidal wave (as in Britain), a hole in the Dutch dikes, or a barbarian invasion (as in France).²⁷

These figures of discourse concerning immigration as a “penetration” are created by the professionals of politics and based on a central presupposition made by politicians about their own capacity of governance in relation to the state: the presupposition that it is possible to control the flow of individuals at the borders of the state.²⁸ It assumes that professional politicians have a power that they do not want to lose concerning their right to accept or to refuse the everyday movement of people from other countries. This assumption is now even more important for them given that they know they have less and less importance in decision making concerning money and credit.²⁹

It implies, in mind of the politician, the possibility of managing in practice, through law and its implementation, the freedom of circulation of individuals over whom the politicians consider they have a right of control if necessary.³⁰ Consequently, when these discourses and myths of the professionals of politics are confronted with the social practices of transborder activities, and the impossibility of managing millions of decisions taken by individuals, they conflict with the security professionals who are in charge of effectively controlling the borders – who yet know that, practically speaking, they cannot seal the frontiers.

This “will to mastery” on the part of the politicians has only one effect, but an important one. They change the status of persons by opening or restricting the conditions of travel and stay (at the national – or, in the contemporary European context, Schengen – borders), declaring legal or illegal the arrival and the stay on the country, but they know that a person who wants to enter will succeed anyway. Thus, in an illegal situation, the immigrant becomes, for the politician (and particularly for the local politicians, the mayors, who have to live a face-to-face relationship with the migrants whom they wanted to reject) the personal enemy. Politicians see themselves as insulted by the incapacity to enforce the integrity of the national body they represent. The “migrant” is seen as both a public enemy breaking the law and a private enemy mocking the will of the politician.

Nevertheless, even if the political professionals of those countries where migration is problematized as a political issue are frustrated by the confrontation between their self-images and their effective power in relation to social practices, it is no mean power that they have – to be able to define and categorize who is a migrant and what a migrant is. Their symbolic power is not at all an absence of power.³¹ The political game in each country delineates the figure of the migrant by inverting the image of the good citizen. In France, laïcité and centralization create the migrant image as that of a religious fanatic – a member of a community committed to destroying the principles of republicanism. In Germany, social control and partnership create the migrant as a revolutionary and a deviant. In the United Kingdom, traditional and community rules construct the migrant as a rioter with no respect for everyday rules and decent social behavior.

The incarnation of the figure may change, but the matrix grows stronger. In the mid-1920s, in France, the migrants were Polish and Italians, while now they are primarily Algerians or their children born in France. *Migrant*, as a term, is the way to designate someone as a threat to the core values of a country, a state, and has nothing to do with the legal terminology of foreigners. The word *immigrant* is a shibboleth.³² Here lies an apparent paradox: if each national image of migration is different, how can security services work together, even at the European level. It is there that the plasticity of the terminology is so important. If the French want to use the word *Algerian* to designate their unnamed enemy, they will have difficulties with the United Kingdom because of the difference in policies concerning Islam. Similarly, if Germany speaks of Kurdish people as terrorists in front of French representatives, they

may be challenged. Yet if each security service uses the word *immigrant* as a sign of danger, a consensus is possible – because such a word can designate a foreigner as an Algerian (a member of an ethnic minority that may already have citizenship) or as other kinds of foreigner. Each country can then sell its fear to the other country (hence, Algerians come under surveillance in Britain and Germany, and Kurds in France and Britain) in what amounts to a stock exchange of security, which is exactly the role of Europol in competition with Interpol and now some confidential circles of NATO.

The political work of the political professionals, then, is at the heart of the relation between *security* and *migration*. Neither of those two words are natural; neither describes “phenomena.” They do not stem from societal problems coming up toward the state via politicians. The relation between security and migration is fully and immediately political. The wording is never innocent. Both migration and security are contested concepts,³³ and they are used to mobilize political responses, not to explain anything. Immigration is now problematized in Western countries in a way that is very different from the distinction between citizen and foreigner. It is not a legal status that is under discussion but a social image, concerning, to quote Erickson, the “social distribution of bad.”

Migration is seen as a political problem because it enters into the political arena in a way that contests the premises of polity and state. Immigration is always seen as problematic, a problem that cannot be solved by law making. For some, it is a problem that might be solved through compromise and a clear view of national interests in which migrants could be an asset for the “receiving country.” For others, coming from the particular point of view of the security professionals, especially the intelligence service and the military, migrants are not a political dilemma but a national-security problem.³⁴ From this perspective, migrants were a problem in the past and they continue to be an insidious danger: the term *immigrant* is politically meaningful only in a discourse of “struggle against illegal immigrants,” or in a discourse of “regulation,” but in any case in a rhetoric of cultural nationalism creating citizenship by difference with these outsiders inside the state.³⁵

Often, the discourses “against” securitization (such as speaking of Fortress Europe or criticizing the immigration/invasion metaphors) themselves use the basic presuppositions of the discourses they criticize (sovereignty, state, body politic). They contest the content but rarely the formulation of questions – and almost never on the basis of an analysis of discursive formation rules, even though it is there that the security process draws part of its symbolic strength.³⁶

The Europeanization of politics has created new fora in which different politicians (whether from Right or Left) map out a program on “law-and-order reestablishment” on behalf of the control of migratory flows (in order either to exclude or for better integration) but to safeguard their idea of their own power. These politicians always ask (with some success at the electoral level) for more controls, more monitoring, more private participation from business and citizens in order to consolidate a security threatened at the

borders and at home. They mobilize security agencies of ever greater scope, call for help from citizens, and build a fantasy figure of an internal-security state (participative through vigilantism, police-made, with a proactive surveillance dimension, and punitive with its penal sprawl) whose monitoring powers have never been so mighty since the state was declared to be weakening.³⁷ And yet this is a state that they are completely unable to implement in the program they propose.³⁸

Security is here considered by the more traditional groups as the peak of a political problem where “exceptional measures,” “measures beyond law,” need to be taken. Thus the security process itself is the result of mobilization of the work of political discourses and of practices of security agencies based on the argument of danger and emergency. Many studies of security forget this primary work of political mobilization leading to securitization. They reproduce at the analytical level the discourses of the “hard-liners” or security professionals.³⁹ They analyze security as being a different realm from politics, or as being “a particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues.”⁴⁰ They consider that security is like a “sphere” placed under the responsibility of the army and other experts on security, a sphere that is the mirror of existential threats concerning survival but that could come eventually from separate sectors.⁴¹ By so doing, they validate the view of the security professionals that security is an “explanation” of the security process and not a discourse to be challenged.

By neglecting this, the critical vision of security developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde introduces into the academic field the military discourses on societal or internal security. They repeat the discourses of a part of the military working on low-intensity conflict – discourses that, after the end of the Cold War, seek to explain that immigration is an existential threat to national identity, even if migrants do not directly threaten the state. They accept the “truth” about what security is not in the way they agree with the military (Wæver in particular is critical of the existential character of the threat), but do so by accepting the framing of a different domain of security beyond the political – one linked with emergency and exception.⁴² In doing so, they agree with the idea of an “exceptionalization,” or a “beyond the law” politics, and come back to “cynicism and realism,” forgetting “democracy.” Sharing the *illusio* of the field they analyze, they do not really understand the “field effect” of the struggle between the managers of unease, imposing, despite their resistance, the vision of the professionals as the “truth,” and their coercive means as “solutions.”

Some of the actors in the academic field and the security professionals, then, participate in an active strategy of legitimization of their role concerning migration through this political game of the integrity of the body of people, society and state.⁴³ They refuse the heterogeneity of life and always try to reduce it to homogeneity and hierarchy between different categories.⁴⁴

The distinction between state and societal security is not a useful analytical tool. It reproduces the discourses in the field of the security professionals and their struggle to establish a hierarchy of dangers that legitimizes

their struggle for resources. Securitization is not usefully characterized as a discursive practice creating "exceptionalization," even though it may find its origins in this practice. Authors like Buzan have little sense of the routines, the day-to-day practices, of the bureaucracies that are necessary to understand how discourses work in practice. Securitization works through everyday technologies, through the effects of power that are continuous rather than exceptional, through political struggles, and especially through institutional competition within the professional security field in which the most trivial interests are at stake.⁴⁵

Securitization of immigration is the result and not the cause of the development of technologies of control and surveillance. It is linked to computerization, risk profiling, visa policy, the remote control of borders, the creation of international or nonterritorial zones in airports, and so on.⁴⁶ The analysis of the Securitization of a referent object within a field or a sector (environmental, economic, or societal) is interesting not simply as a speech act but when speech acts are correlated with the structural positions of the speaker.⁴⁷ In this perspective, securitization results from power positions, not from individuals creating new frames, new roles for differences and repetitions in different contexts;⁴⁸ it results from struggles inside institutions and between institutions for what is to count as the legitimate truth. To focus only on the role of political discourse in the securitization process is to underestimate the role of the bureaucratic professionalization of the management of unease.

Security and Immigration: Seeing Like a Professional Manager of Unease

The dialectical relationship between political professionals and the professional managers of unease implies that the institutions working on unease not only respond to threat but also determine what is and what is not a threat or a risk. They do that as "professionals." Their agents are invested with the office of defining and prioritizing threats. They classify events according to their categories. While car accidents are currently classified as a misfortune rather than a threat to be fought, some subjects are constructed by the security professionals as threats or risks that they have to control. Of course, some "amateurs" of the security process (associations, churches, parties not integrated in the decision-making process, ad hoc spokesmen of social movements) can intervene in this game of security and insecurity, challenging the framing of migrant or asylum seekers as a risk, but professionals have the advantage of exercising authority.⁴⁹ They are invested with the institutional knowledge about threats and with a range of technologies suitable for responding to these threats. They benefit from the belief that they know what "we" (nonprofessionals, amateurs) do not know and that they have specific modes of action of a technical nature that we are not supposed to know about.

Consequently, one of the most significant characteristics of the field effect is the lack of precision required for threats identified by the professionals who know some “secrets.” Amateurs always need to “prove” their claims, whereas professionals, whether public or private, international, national, or local, corporate or public, can evoke without demonstrating. They often generalize from only one case, thereby encouraging people to believe that a threat is more widespread than they suspect. This ethos of a shared knowledge between the professionals, a knowledge beyond the grasp of people who do not have the know-how about risk assessment and proactivity, is also an ethos of secrecy and confidentiality. It creates a community of mutual recognition and governs a logic of implicit acceptance of claims made by other professionals, not only with respect to the substance of these claims but also to the forms and technologies of knowledge acquisition. The technology (such as the satellite information provided by Echelon or the databanks maintained by Europol and Interpol) provides the guarantee of truth to the data they store. The ethos thereby generated implies specific modes of trust and mistrust. The professional “threat-management universe” thereby becomes less like the use of force against an individual and more and more like a bank as it manages credit through customer profiling.⁵⁰

The notion of *habitus* is very suggestive in this context. It helps to make sense of this way of anticipating time through morphing technologies as a way of anticipating the movement of targeted groups in space, as well as the evolution of their behavior, together with the possibility of managing a “stock exchange” of fears at the transnational level while maintaining secrecy from outsiders. This habitus brings together all the members of services as diverse as customs, police, intelligence services, bankers engaged in risk assessment, and suppliers of new technologies of surveillance. They share a specific kind of the “sense of the game.” They have an *illusio* in common. They believe and act/react in a similar way even if they are always in competition. The security professionals have all become managers of unease. They have created considerable autonomy for their own field – the management of fear. They have succeeded in creating “security” as their object (rather than the object of national politicians). They have created security as the “legitimate” object of their discourses by investing manpower, time, statistical apparatus, and other routines that give shape to political labels.

Moreover, this field of the security professionals is increasingly organized transnationally. It links different bureaucracies by specifying specific threats or risks that can be managed together: immigration to regulate, an environment to protect, a terrorism to fight, and in the end a population worried by the encircling barbarians and the idea of the decline of civilization.⁵¹ This internationalization is especially important for the European Union, where the professional managers of unease have created their own fora and networks, sometimes against their national politicians; in some domains, however, these networks also have a transatlantic dimension.

Securitization, then, is generated through a confrontation between the strategies of political actors (or of actors having access to the political stage

through the media), in the national political field, the security professionals at the transnational level (public and private bureaucracies managing the fear), and the global social transformations affecting the possibilities of reshaping political boundaries (by legitimizing, or not, the transformation of technologies of control and surveillance). The security process is thus the result of a field effect in which no actor can be the master of the game but in which everyone's knowledge and technological resources produce a hierarchy of threats. The security process involves the imposition of a claim about security understood as a "truth" of institutions and "independent experts," relayed and supported by the practical know-how of various security agencies (be they public or private) and by prevailing discourse in the media.⁵² Securitization is then the conversion operator by which the struggle of political discourses (within the political field, which adds or subtracts value) is validated as a truth process by professionals of threat management, according to the violent transformations they observe and their interests as institutions.

Contrary to so many explanations concerning securitization of migration, immigration does not bluntly become a security problem with the appearance of, for example, the economic crisis in 1974 or because of the end of bipolarity; rather, it becomes a security issue when it is presented as such by some professionals of threat management in their struggle to maintain their position and when particular forms of institutional knowledge (military, police, intelligence services) converge in order to give "one" meaning to the migration referent in structuring a network of meanings with security concerns, allowing each bureaucracy to sell to the others its own fears and to try to prioritize this fear upon the others. In other words, *immigration* appears as a catchword, a shibboleth, permitting the convergence on a focal point of institutional statements regarding security norms (at the internal and external level) and fears. Immigration is then important for the continuum of security threats because it determines a concentration stirring up competition and justifying the convergence of missions among the police, the army, the custom officers, and intelligence officers in their struggle against a wide range of "new threats" that could all be linked to immigrants.⁵³

The present period is interesting in this sense. Inside and outside no longer have clear meanings for the professionals of threat management. A Möbius ribbon has replaced the traditional certainty of boundaries.⁵⁴ It destabilizes the figures of threats as well as the borders of activities between the institutions. During the Cold War, the military threat was identified with the Soviet Union and the police threat with serious crime. Movements of people, which was an issue in the 1920s, did not seem to be problematic during the bipolar period. Ideology and the circulation of people were not correlated, except in discourses about the fifth column of Communists infiltrating Western governments. Within Europe, the creation of the European Union, the implementation of the Schengen agreement, and the delocation of control from state borders changed the situation. After the end of bipolarity, because of the crisis for the military world, the idea of the enemy continued to evolve. Military organizations needed other enemies than the Soviet Union. At the

same moment, some policemen invented at the EU level the notion of internal security so as to promote collaboration between police organizations and to include the surveillance of people crossing borders within the scope of policing against crime. Some military people, using their technologies for other purposes, invented a Southern threat against the West in order to include in their task the surveillance of people from abroad, together with their children if they live together in specific areas.⁵⁵

As Pierre Bourdieu has shown, it is when beliefs and norms are transformed because of the inner struggles inside a field, and when creativity is important – even if creativity is simply a regression toward an established *habitus* and a rewriting of familiar stories using old grammars⁵⁶ – that it is possible to understand the autonomization of a field as such. This analysis of security shows that the merging of internal and external security has created the condition of possibility whereby the migrant is, par excellence, the object of securitization because it comes from both sides. The “security field” where policemen and gendarmes now meet secret service and military people and structure a new and wider conception of security is created by the focal point of the immigrant as a threat internally and externally. It is not that the space of the inside and the outside is changing, or that international security is extending inside through a “societal” sector; it is that they are now intertwined by the convergence toward the same figure of risk and of unease management, the immigrant.

But what is an immigrant for the professionals of security? If migration as a movement of people or as a category consisting of foreigners who want to stay in the country of arrival has an academic significance, it is not one given by the political discourses over immigration. For the managers of unease, immigration is immediately seen as a useful target for the use and experimentation of their technologies, and only secondarily as an aggression toward a boundary they need to protect (a polity, a group, a supposed identity). And here, it has no sense to delineate one figure of the immigrant as a specific phenomenon giving existence to the situational fantasies of the different actors. It depends on the creativity of different fearmongers and the links they have among them. Experts from the military insist on the existence of rogue states, failed states, and the link between diasporas and their countries of origin. Intelligence services suspect that terrorism from abroad is supported by immigrants. Police explain the rise in crime by the activities of immigrants and their children who are not well socialized in the host country. Journalists evoke the feeling of insecurity among “autochthonous people.” Economists assess the danger for the welfare state of a new burden. Health-care specialists accuse immigrants of being a threat because they import with them old and new viruses. Academics intertwine these different fears in a tapestry of “cultural danger,” even if they cannot define precisely in their examples why the category of migrant varies so much from one fear to another one.

At the heart of a “scientific discourse of migration” lies a discourse on immigration that spreads migration as a danger and threat. And the more the

threats are ill-defined, considered as invisible and diffuse, the more they appear to be “coming from nowhere” and the more they catalyze various fears and generate misgivings (about, for example, transnational organized crime, a global Mafia, and illegal immigration) that justify the vigilance of institutions. In this context, it is particularly meaningful that the word *immigration* covers heterogeneous situations – such as short-stay foreigners and long-stay foreigners as well as national citizens born to foreign parents. Because *immigration* is a catchword, it includes several aspects of “threat” that are at once heterogeneous but designated by the same word.⁵⁷ The context is thus important. In other configurations, circulation of people is accepted as a fact of life. In some Western countries, to consider a young national citizen as an immigrant because his parents were born abroad (especially if this was Algeria) as happens all too frequently in France is considered to be “outrageous.” But in a context of moral panic, with a backlash of the penal state against the welfare state and the development of narratives about zero-tolerance narratives, it is considered as normal and self-evident because divergences from normal behavior are understood by professionals as an attack against whatever it is that defines a polity as a political community.

Trapped by these norms, migration is then defined in such a way that heterogeneous elements (like the circulation of movement or life in poor areas of cities) are recontextualized as a matter of immigration. The securitization of migration is then a process that creates continuous unease and uncertainty, focusing general fears and the “social distribution of bad” on the specific category of the immigrant.⁵⁸

Security and Migration: Techniques for the Management of Unease

The programmatic rationale of unease, to use the distinction drawn by Ewald between programmatic and diagrammatic rationalities, structures the discursive formation concerning migration. Yet the program is not the diagram. The diagram works through institutions, through the panopticon of modern societies and their resistances. But it is, first, important to analyze the program, the rationale linking securitization and liberalism. For these are not opposites, as one is encouraged to believe, but the same process. The securitization program integrates the social construction of threats and various misgivings under the designation of problems concerning state, borders, cities, democracy, and citizenship as if they were the consequences of immigration.⁵⁹ The internal debates within this program between securitarian discourses (about blockades, expulsions, deterrence, and surveillance) and humanitarian discourses (about the necessity for a welfare state, low birthrates, and human rights for asylum seekers) hide these general conditions of securitization. Indeed, the second type of discourse – the humanitarian – is itself a by-product of the securitization process.

For example, discourses concerning the human rights of asylum seekers are de facto part of a securitization process if they play the game of differentiating

between genuine asylum seekers and illegal migrants, helping the first by condemning the second and justifying border controls.⁶⁰ It is within this rationality of program (for which the term *moral panic* has been used, though only to look at its repressive side) that the word *immigration* becomes a term for catalyzing fears or misgivings about the economic, social, and political development of Western countries. It becomes a fixer of frights and confusions about national cultural identities as well as of weaknesses of solidarity mechanisms. It is the terminology within which is produced an articulation, or even a fusion, permitting a highly generalized discourse about global security rather than an urgent analysis of highly diversified processes like globalization, cities, unemployment, and birthrates.⁶¹ It is within this generalized "discursive formation" that unemployment is reduced to a simple causality: a surplus of immigrants taking jobs from native populations, requiring, in turn, the invention of binary categories of natives and immigrants.⁶² It is also within this formation that the circulation of individuals (which includes tourism, the pleasure of traveling, the possibility to do so, and even a sense of a citizenship beyond the national within the European Union) is reduced to problems involving the circulation of third-country nationals, and to risks of terrorism, drug trafficking, or organized crime, risks expected of third-country nationals.⁶³

The techniques for managing fear and the social distribution of "bad" mobilize the term *immigrant* for every weakness of the political public policies. It is through this label of immigrant, for example, that religious traditions and their place in secular modernity are reduced to the issue of an emergence of an intolerant and radical Islam, connecting some authoritarian regimes to individuals living in the European territory.⁶⁴ It is also there, in this "site," that the crucial issue of geographical segregation appears: cities are linked to capitalist structures and to real-estate speculation as well as to solidarity conceptions regarding public transportation, urban safety, environment, and welfare in general. This issue is tied to others, like "inner-cities and communitarianism" or "suburban unrest," which are assimilated very rapidly to the issue of "second-generation youth."⁶⁵ The evocative power of naming the immigrant figure is a consequence of the fact that many unresolved structural questions converge here in a space lacking political solutions (unemployment, urbanism, demography, the North/South gap, and so on). Paradoxically, it is also a consequence of the fuzziness of the definition of collective political identities in Europe that leads to the definition of Europeans as a homogeneous body only in relation to "third-country" nationals or "migrants" and allows Europeans to forget that they, too, are migrants.

So who, now, remembers the fears of the United Kingdom or France ten years ago concerning the pressure of Greek migrants and the risk they brought? The creation of the distinction between EU and non-EU citizens has changed the relation to identity by creating an association of immigrant only with third-country nationals or "colored people." *Immigrant* designates the other by the process of an identity border of a "between-us."⁶⁶ He or she is the insider that gives form to a European governmentality beyond the state.

Does the fuzziness surrounding belonging and the shifting political membership of Europe necessarily require the fuzzy figure of the immigrant? Borders of statehood are at stake and are liable to a reconfiguration according to these relations.⁶⁷ However, the complexity of the social and the game of limits is forgotten or denied by discourses on securitization favoring the designation of a culprit whose fuzziness permits instrumentalization on an ad hoc basis.

Fears, unrest, misgivings originating in those shortcomings of polity, local and national as well as European, toward fulfillment of its duties, are used, in reverse, in order to legitimate the polity again by naming an adversary, and even an internal enemy. However, this very polity is an extreme polity, a degenerated Schmittian vision in which polity is the continuation of war by other means and in which discourses are unfurled claiming that "society must be defended" – one that Michel Foucault has demonstrated in the case of racism. It is a "war-based polity," a condition of generalized confrontation that is no longer able to distinguish between private and public enemies. Because it is based on claims about the need for survival at any price, on a real and permanent struggle anchored in an eschatology of the worst kind, it generates a distress policy, a misgiving policy, that transforms any change and any risk into an intentional threat or enemy. Here is the main technique of securitization, to transform structural difficulties and transformations into elements permitting specific groups to be blamed, even before they have done anything, simply by categorizing them, anticipating profiles of risk from previous trends, and projecting them by generalization upon the potential behavior of each individual pertaining to the risk category.

This misgiving-based security process becomes a political technology of ruling that concentrates fears on an adversary who is always opaque and difficult to catch, while, at the same time, pursuing a policy of forgetting the (often unintentional) consequences of structural public policies implemented twenty or thirty years ago. This security process based on misgiving is added to disciplinary technologies and strengthens the legitimacy of a permanent surveillance supposedly intended only for "others," for bad citizens. Their social invisibility induces in some cases (when action signs must be shown) a "visibility" strategy through forms of xenophobia in order to invent criteria (skin color, religious practices, culinary practices) by which to differentiate between Them and Us. Giving a face to crime is therefore giving the migrant a face.

This technology of power plays with the innermost devices of misgiving and uncertainty that are implanted in today's risk society in order to strengthen them, whether at the level of nations, intermediary collective groups, or individuals. This technology of power unifies internal and external, individual and collective security, and tries to recapitalize trust in the state not by reassuring but by worrying individuals about what is happening both at the external and internal levels. The resulting picture of the world is one of chaos and urban insecurity.

As a result of this hypothesis concerning immigration, I would suggest, in an extension of Michel Foucault's work, that the securitization of immigration, the setting of some ever more restrictive norms, the rejection and

detention practices at borders, the strengthening of an “internal security state” to the detriment of the welfare state, constitute signs of a more general transformation in which a form of governmentality based on misgiving and unrest is substituted for a reassuring and protective pastoral power.⁶⁸ The form of governmentality of postmodern societies is not a panopticon in which global surveillance is placed upon the shoulders of everybody, but a form of ban-opticon in which the technologies of surveillance sort out who needs to be under surveillance and who is free of surveillance, because of his profile.⁶⁹ This form of pre- and post-Hobbesian state seems, most emphatically, to renounce notions of a social contract and to transform misgiving into a mode of ruling. The emphasis is no longer on curing or promoting individual development but on playing with fears by designating potentially dangerous minorities. Neither reducible to sovereignty and punishment nor to biopolity and power over life, this political technology is based on proactive, anticipative, and morphing techniques and aims at mastering a chaotic future with minimalist management focusing only on risky groups (so-identified) or groups at risk.⁷⁰

This does not mean that this program of the ban-opticon (which is chiefly but not only the program of dominant actors, who are struggling among themselves in order to define threats and measures to counter them) can be implemented without arousing local resistances (either collective or individual). There is a substantial distance between the myth of a power that saturates the social and controls society completely and the multiple and complex practices of “power effects.” These power effects are always more unsteady and reversible than people believe because of the “microphysics” of struggles between the dominants, the experts, and so on. The program of a secure immigration where the objective of presenting a determination to achieve real control can itself generate unprecedented resistances crossing boundaries (in terms of class or nation) among the “subordinates” – as has been demonstrated by the struggle of undocumented migrants in France (*les sans papiers*) and by the struggles against deportation in international zones of airports. These zones that the state refuses to recognize as parts of its territory but wants to maintain within its sovereignty are now a major point of tension between globalization and the territorialized devices of control. The will to maintain sovereignty can work only through transnational technologies that destroy a little bit more of this vision of polity as a body. The consequences exceed “local” struggles and include the creation of a networking of social resistances at the global level.

Nonetheless, while modifying the norms and practical conditions of democracy, this governmentality based on misgivings has concentrated the means to conduct other people’s conduct within the hands of the very individuals who have an administrative-management knowledge of threats and risks. This governmentality has captured for its quasi-exclusive benefit the disciplinary and surveillance techniques that allow it to “lead behavior” and that modify the structure of states themselves. This governmentality

has discarded some actors, like parliaments, which, for a long time, have benefited from this concentration. It modifies old liberal techniques of governing and modifies the discourse on checks and balances. Nowadays, it is governments and their bureaucracies (and not the territorial form of states) that strengthen their control of society and that extend further than before, even to the subcontracting of sovereign activities to the private sector (as, for example, with identity checking in semipublic places or in luggage and other checks at borders).

In Europe, this governmentality unfolds at the national as well as the European level, and it even has a transatlantic level. It strengthens international collaboration between the different bureaucracies, maintaining a rhetoric about the danger in any weakening of territorial and sovereign technologies while being less interested in practice in the control of territory than in the control of population.⁷¹ It transnationalizes itself in a “beyond” the borders, and it structures relationship frameworks between administrations, between the “executive powers” of each country. It strengthens security services to the detriment of services managing social issues by transforming these very services into security auxiliaries. This cannot be done without new competitors, and the struggle between governmental administrative knowledge holders and international organizations is indeed becoming stronger, as is shown by muffled fights between the European Commission and the governments in the Council of the Union. But it is always administrative power that wins and procedures of public deliberation that are defeated.⁷²

Even when NGOs intervene, they can do so only by turning professional, by producing this kind of knowledge. The transnational mobilization of administrative knowledge thus proceeds faster than mobilizations coming from alternative sources, such as parliaments or associations. In this respect, it is particularly difficult to talk about “governance without government,”⁷³ as some internationalists do. Governance is actually a stretching of government practices and of administrative knowledge beyond the “public.” It must be analyzed as a mechanism of domination and not as a new word enabling theses on polyarchy to be revived. This is what induces me to avoid the word *governance* and prefer *governmentality* – meaning the art of governing, as a strategy of action or conduct in relations.

Governmentality through misgivings, be it national or transnational at the European level, modifies the internal balances between security and freedom and widens the area of controls. Consequently, forms of domination change, but not the dominating actors, even if (on the margins) the global reconfiguration of a transnational field of security disadvantages some agencies (strategists, conventional soldiers) and some places (parliaments) and promotes others (places of lobbying, antiterrorist police agencies, intelligence services, customs, and gendarmeries). As Hamit Bozarslan has shown, it can happen that executives perpetuate themselves through the destruction of state forms (rule of law) that also favor some resistances (legal and international norms, and resort to them).⁷⁴ Defending the judicial

against the administrative (i.e., places of deliberation against speed or “dromocracy,” or procedures of trust against procedures of systematic suspicion) is not insignificant.⁷⁵ Inventing different emancipation norms is also crucial, as commentators like Ken Booth and R.B.J. Walker have emphasized in different ways.⁷⁶ Coproduction of security, necessary in the struggle against crime, should be disconnected from migratory issues and should be accompanied by a coproduction of freedoms and guarantees in order that the weak and the newcomers on a territory are not the quasi-exclusive targets of a policy against delinquency. Security should thus have another meaning independent from interest of the politicians and professionals of unease. Scholars cannot present themselves as spectators. Their analyses, including the most critical, are used by some actors of the social and political interplay. They participate, *volens, nolens*, in the production of the history of the securitization of immigration, when they are not describing the modification of agencies practices. A withdrawal into pure theory is not possible, but at the same moment, academics are not key actors in the process of (de)securitization.

In conclusion, the structure of political and bureaucratic interplay must be analyzed on a dialectical basis in order to understand better the “political spectacle” that is taking place through the securitization of immigration.⁷⁷ Multiple discursive practices must be understood, as well as the heterogeneity of the nondiscursive practices as part of the same “dispositif” (legal devices, political rhetoric, police practices, surveillance technologies, discourses on human rights, resistances of actors, and so on) in order to understand the articulation of knowledge and power relations.⁷⁸ The discursive transversality of the immigrant figure needs to be plotted, through all the twists, turns, and meanings that link this figure with different structural problems and the figure of the sovereign state itself.

The reasons for a discourse on “regulation” and the shift from a protective, enabling discourse to one about a rise of insecurity that is intended to be disturbing and worrying needs research along the lines of Foucault and Ericson, Bourdieu and Wacquant. This is possible only through a detailed analysis of the positions of authority of those who promote a threat definition in each bureaucracy, whether public or private. The consequences of the existence beyond the national of such a transversal and transnational field of unease management linking the practices and the knowledge of the diverse agencies in Europe also needs to be analyzed. And one should ask what this governmentality is establishing, and how it historically articulates itself with the figure of the state. This analysis, based on sociological constructivism, requires a reflection about discursive interaction – about the positions of authority of the enunciators, the spokespersons, of the institutions. It must analyze the internal logic of the field of professionals in the management of unease – the logic that structures the speakable and the unspeakable concerning immigration and the practices of security agencies. To paraphrase Alexander Wendt, “security is what the professionals of unease management make of it.”⁷⁹

Notes

1. This is now well known from more than ten years in political sociology; see Didier Bigo, *L'Europe des polices, et de la sécurité intérieure* (Bruxelles: Complexe, 1992); Malcolm Anderson and Monica Den Boer, *Policing across National Boundaries* (London: Pinter, 1994); Malcolm Anderson, Monica Den Boer, Peter Cullen, R. C. Gilmore, and Neil Walker, *Policing the European Union* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996); Bigo Didier, *Polices en réseaux: L'expérience européenne* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1996); Salvatore Palidda, *Polizia post moderna* (Roma: Feltrinelli, 1999); Richard Ericson, *Policing the Risk Society* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1999). But it seems that it is still a novelty for IR theory.

2. Zygmunt Bauman, *Le coût humain de la mondialisation* (Paris: Hachette, 1999).

3. And it could explain why so many academics love this explanation. On the *illusio* of the academics concerning their own role, see Pierre Bourdieu, *Homo academicus* (Paris: Minuit, 1984).

4. Barry Buzan *et al.*, *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993) and the many articles quoting the "Copenhagen school of IR."

5. See Malcolm Anderson, *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996); Anderson and Den Boer, note 1, *Policing across National Boundaries*; Paul Ganster *et al.*, *Borders and Border Regions in Europe and North America* (San Diego: Institute for Regional Studies of the Californias, 1997); Didier Bigo, "Le champ européen des professionnels de la sécurité et l'État," paper presented at the IPSA Quebec 2001 panel "Transnationalization of Bureaucracies and Emergence of a Corporate World: The End of the Weberian State?"; Elspeth Guild, "Transnationalization of Movement of Persons and Labour Forces: The Work Permit Delivery and the Changing Relations between Governments and Companies," Quebec IPSA panel, 2001, discussing critically the Susan Strange thesis that states nevertheless manage security even if they have lost control over credit, finance, production, and even knowledge.

6. For Bourdieu's account of *habitus*, see Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*, trans. Matthew Adamson (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford UP, 1990). On the notion of the field of security professionals, see the article by Didier Bigo in James Sheptycki, ed., *Issues in Transnational Policing* (London: Routledge, 2000); Thomas Mathiesen, "Globalization of Surveillance," *Stawatch Report*, 2000.

7. Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (London: Sage, 1992); Beck, "World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society?" *Theory, Culture, and Society* 13, no. 4 (1996): 1-32; Zygmunt Bauman, "Survival as a Social Construct," *Theory, Culture, and Society* 9, no. 1 (1992): 1-36; Pierre Bourdieu, ed., *La misère du monde* (Paris: Seuil, 1993); Didier Bigo, "Sécurité et immigration, vers une gouvernementalité par l'inquiétude?" *Cultures & Conflits*, nos. 31, 32 (fall/winter 1998), trans. in Italian, 1999, "Sicurezza e immigrazione Il governo della paura," pp. 213-231, in *I confini della globalizzazione*, ed. Sandro Mezzadra and Agostino Petrillo; Ericson, note 1; Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans, course on "(In)security, Migration, and the Enemy Within," MS, University of Wales, Aberystwith, June 2000.

8. Concerning *unease*, the French terminology, *inquiétude*, *malaise*, has connotations not found in English: it especially goes beyond psychological and individualistic levels. As to *governmentality*, in this article it is understood according to Foucault's definition: all the practices by which it is possible to constitute, to define, to organize, to instrumentalize strategies that individuals, in their constitutive freedom, could have in relations with others. I resist the term *governance*, which is always a top-down view of relations of obedience, even if it is a multilevel one.

9. An issue of *Cultures & Conflits* in 2002 will be on the theme of "fearmongers." It will discuss the environment, sex trafficking, global organized crime, and so on, and the role of fearmongers as "experts" in our societies.

10. Jean Delumeau, *Rassurer et protéger: Le sentiment de sécurité dans l'Occident d'autrefois* (Paris: Fayard, 1989). This book is central for a genealogy of the competition between the church and the state on the management of security.

11. So, if securitization is correlated with the use of performatives, with symbolic struggles and symbolic politics, as Ole Wæver, shows, these elements are the surface of an iceberg, not the

core; see Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework of Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); see also Didier Bigo, "Rise and Fall of the 'Copenhagen School'" (forthcoming).

12. Some discourses, supposed to be critical, presuppose, at the end of the reasoning, an overwhelming xenophobic public opinion that explains securitarian thesis success. They also often glorify a virtual "people" made of good citizens, including themselves, with the consequences of scorning the actual and real population in a too-well-known disjunction between them as elite and the popular masses; see Michel Wieviorka, *La France raciste* (Paris: Seuil, 1992), and André Pierre Taguieff, ed., *Face au racisme 2: Analyses, hypothèses, perspectives* (Paris: La Découverte, 1991), pp. 167-178. Xenophobia is indeed playing a role, but explaining that xenophobia is a cause of the securitization when it is one of the results of this securitization of migration is another thing.

13. The critical discourses concerning securitarian discourses are very well known to security professionals and politicians. Those people are seldom if ever fooled by their own arguments. They use them to bring electoral benefits and to answer to their own fears concerning their role in a globalized capitalism that endangers the function of the national political class on the decision-making process. The traditional difference between Left and Right is here under pressure. Among some recent books, the one by Adrian Favell demonstrated how the securitarian discourse, in France and in Britain, has thrown border lines between right-wing and left-wing parties into confusion and how their positioning with respect to extreme parties governed ideas on crime and migrants. Analyses of racism and a "fortress Europe" have also demonstrated that such discourses are far from being unavoidable during crisis periods: Favell, *Philosophies of Integration: The Theory and Practice of Ethnic Minorities Policies in France and Britain* (IUP, 1998); Andrew Geddes, *The Politics of Immigration and Race* (Manchester: Baseline, 1996); Andrea Rea, *Immigration et Racisme en Europe*, Complexe, Avril 1998; Charlotte Lessana, "Loi Debré: La fabrique de l'immigré," *Cultures et Conflits*, note 7; Laurent Bonelli, *La machine à punir*, L'esprit frappeur, 2000.

14. Michel Foucault, "La politique de l'oubli et du déni," in *Dits et Ecrits*, vols. 2 and 3, 1976-1979 (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque des sciences humaines, 1994).

15. It is a quite pessimistic view of the political role of critical sociology, I know. But I prefer that position to the new-fashioned messianism of some NGOs or intellectuals claiming for transnational citizenship and confusing what they see and what they hope. The role of critical sociologists is not to invent new slogans but to challenge at the collective level the positions of the so-called experts and to reopen a way of thinking that they actively try to forget.

16. See the important research of Sayad Abdelmalek, esp. "Immigration et pensée d'Etat," in *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* (Sept. 1999): 5-15.

17. The section heading above is in loose reference to James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (Yale UP, 1999).

18. For a Foucauldian framework, see Didier Bigo, Jean Paul Hanon, Laurent Bonelli, and Anastasia Tsoukala, *La notion de protection, de la protection du territoire à la protection des individus*, report for CPGN, 2000. For a more traditional framing, see Peter Andreas, *Border Games: Policing the U.S. Mexico Divide* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UP, 2001).

19. Pierre Bourdieu, *Raisons pratiques: Sur la théorie de l'action pratique* (Paris: Seuil, 1994); Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Cambridge: Polity, 1984).

20. John Gerard Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization* (London: Routledge, 1998); R.B.J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., *Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990); Richard Ashley and R.B.J. Walker, "Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (1990): 367-416; Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996).

21. Bertrand Badie, *La fin des territoires* (Paris: Seuil, 1996); Richard Mansbach, *The State, Conceptual Chaos, and the Future of International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989); Martin Heisler, "Now and Then, Here and There, Migration and the Transformation of

Identities, Borders, and Orders," in Albert Mathias, David Jacobson, and Lapid Yosef, eds., *Identities, Borders, and Orders* (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2001).

22. Michel Foucault, *Il faut défendre la société*, course at Collège de France, 1976 (Paris: Seuil, 1996). For a practical application of this method, see "Circular, enfermer, éloigner," in *Cultures et Conflits*, note 7.

23. It confronts academics who want to be critical to a normative dilemma (as demonstrated by Jef Huysmans) that emerges when notions of security and immigration are criticized but nevertheless continue to be used as terms, thus risking contributing to the security process; see Jef Huysmans, "Migrants as a Security Problem," in Robert Miles and Dietrich Ihrhahrdt, eds., *Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (London: Pinter, 1995); see also the Huysmans article in this issue.

24. Murray Edelman, *Pièces et règles du jeu politique* (Paris: Seuil, 1991), a translation of his *Constructing the Political Spectacle* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), with a specific and important foreword.

25. Michael P. Rogin, *Ronald Reagan, the Movie, and Other Episodes of Political Demonology* (Berkeley: U of California Press, 1998). I thank Yves Viltard for having stressed the importance of Rogin to me.

26. Paul Veyne, *Les Grecs ont-ils cru à leurs mythes? Essai sur l'imagination constituante* (Paris: Seuil, 1983).

27. Rémy Leveau, "The Green Peril," in Cyril Buffet and Béatrice Hauser, eds., *Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations* (Oxford: Berghahn, 1998); see also at a more pragmatic level the manner of some elites to use Europeanization in order that some liberal measures come into force – measures supposed to be ineluctable.

28. Didier Bigo, "L'illusoire maîtrise des frontières," *Le Monde diplomatique*, Oct. 1996.

29. Susan Strange, *States and Markets*. 2d ed. (London: Pinter, 1994).

30. John Torpey, "Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate Means of Movement," *Sociological Theory* 16, no. 3 (1998).

31. Edelman, note 24.

32. See Pierre Bourdieu, *Contre feux: Propos pour servir à la résistance contre l'invasion neo-libérale* (Paris: Raison d'agir, 1998).

33. Barry Buzan explains this for security in *People, State, and Fears* (Brighton: Harvester, 1983), but he forgets to do the same for migration, which is considered as a uncontested concept. On the contrary, even the very good book by Robin Cohen explains in detail the different and heterogeneous view of migration but views security as quite unproblematic and transforms the question of migration into one of balancing inclusion and exclusion; see Cohen's introduction to Cohen and Zig Layton-Henry, *The Politics of Migration* (Northampton: Elgar, 1997).

34. Inside the field of the security professionals, competition arises between those from police and justice, who try to deal at the individual level of each migrant, and others who want to deal in large numbers, through generalization of behaviors (ethnicity, religion, cultural factors). More on this below. See also Didier Bigo, "When Two Become One," in Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams, eds., *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security, and Community* (London: Routledge, 2000).

35. Bigo, *Polices en réseaux*, note 1.

36. For development of that subject, see Andrea Rea, *Immigration et Racisme en Europe*, *Complexes*, Apr. 1998; Ali Rattansi and Sallie Westwood, *Racism, Modernity, Identity on the Western Front* (Cambridge: Polity, 1994).

37. Patrick Weil, *The Transformation of Immigration Policies: Immigration Control and Nationality Laws in Europe* (IUE, 1998); Virginie Guiraudon, *Denationalizing Control* (IUE, June 1998).

38. It is by monitoring diagrams that one can understand the efficiency of the rationale of migration, not by taking the positions of those who read programs as practices. There are always inefficiencies and resistances. Power and resistance are indivisible.

On this point, it is important to discuss the stimulating theses of Tony Bunyan and Statewatch and theses from Loïc Wacquant in "De l'État social à l'État pénal," *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* (Sept. 1998). They overemphasize the power of the politicians

and do not analyze the resistances of people and of some professionals of unease management who want a lighter, but more subtle and efficient, surveillance; see Didier Bigo, "Police and Pro-active Logics: How to Identify, Categorize, and Control Poverty in an Age of Freedom of Movement," paper given at the International Studies Association (ISA), Chicago, February 2001.

39. In the professional security field, one can distinguish the positions of the "heirs" (military or intelligence services that have long been at the top of the hierarchy) and the "suitors" (police with military status, customs officers, and finance brigades) that try to compete to impose their way of dealing with the threat as well as their view of the hierarchy of "most important" threats: see Bigo, note 34.

40. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, note 11, intro.

41. Buzan, note 33.

42. Some IR academics who wanted more or less to follow the path of Wæver but with less self-irony have justified the widening of military activities to other "security" areas. They have distinguished between national security and societal security as if these were two realms, justifying the extension of security to the movement of people through the discourse on migration. For them it is a way to continue the study of the security professionals at the moment they change their scope of activities and try to enlarge it, fearing the possibility that war and deterrence were not sufficiently dangerous for people to accept the budget for "protection"; see Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James, and Patrick M. Morgan, *Security Studies Today* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), and Charles-Philippe David, *La guerre et la paix: Approches contemporaines de la sécurité et de la stratégie* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, Paris, 2000).

43. To cite just some of the fearmongers, experts on (in)security writing from the beginning of the 1990s, see Richard Clutterbuck, *Terrorism, Drugs, and Crime in Europe after 1992* (London: Routledge, 1990); J. Lodge, "Internal Security and Judicial Cooperation beyond Maastricht" (Hull: University of Hull, 1992); Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorist, Target, and Tactics," *Conflict Studies*, no. 236 (Dec. 1990); R. Latter, "Crime and the European Community," Wilton Park, November 1990; A. Jamieson, "Drug Trafficking after 1992," *Conflict Studies*, no. 250 (Apr. 1992); Horchem, "The New Mass Migrations and Internal Security," *Democracy and Security* 1 (Apr. 1995); P. Migaux, "Sécurité intérieure et menaces extérieures," *CASE*, no. 1 (May 1993): 10. Raufier, *Les superpuissances du crime* (Paris: Plon, 1993). The list continues and expands after 1995.

44. Paul Veyne, *Comment on écrit l'histoire: Essai d'épistémologie* (Paris: Seuil, 1971).

45. On the security process as a performative action, as a language action, or as a field, see Michael Williams, *Institutions of Security* (1999); see also Didier Bigo, "Internal and External Security(ies): The Möbius Ribbon," in Mathias, Jacobson, and Yosef, note 21.

46. On the role of technologies and routines, see Thomas Mathiesen, "The Globalisation of Controls," *Statewatch Bulletin* (1999); Didier Bigo, "L'illusoire maîtrise des frontières," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Oct. 1996, and the major article by Gary E. Marx, "Civil Disorders and the Agents of Social Control," in Marx, ed. *Muckraking Sociology: Research as Social Criticism* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1972).

47. Ole Wæver, *Concepts of Security* (University of Copenhagen, 1997). I owe a lot to my discussions with Ole Wæver, whose research results can also be found in Anne Marie Le Gloanec, *Entre Union et Nation, l'État en Europe*, and *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Even if I disagree with his Derridean framework, I think his own work is slightly different and more interesting than the so-called collective works of the Copenhagen school, which, in my view, is a patchwork and not at all a school of thought.

48. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Capitalisme et schizophrénie: L'anti-oedipe* (1972; Paris: Critique, 1980); also Judith Butler, "Presentation at Seminar with Pierre Bourdieu on 'The Future Role of Intellectuals,'" University of California, Berkeley, April 1996.

49. On this point, see the decisive critique of John Austin by Pierre Bourdieu, *Ce que parler veut dire: L'économie des échanges linguistiques* (Paris: Fayard, 1982); partial trans. in Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1991).

50. Local and national police organizations are increasingly subject to a split between community policing (still operating under the logic of the control of individuals and territory) and a smaller, but powerful, group of remote and computerized police. The latter are adopting the

ethos of the intelligence services, branches of the military, and branches of banking institutions concerned with proactive anticipation and surveillance.

51. I understand here, with a different meaning, the topic developed by Pierre Hassner on the bourgeois/barbarian dialectic in "Par delà la guerre et la paix," *Études* (Sept. 1996).

52. On the problematization of the security process and the entanglement between internal and external security, see Bigo, note 34.

53. On norms and security, see Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UP, 1996).

54. Bigo, note 45.

55. See, for example, the transformation of justification of the surveillance sounding balloon created by some corporations from "Reagan's Star Wars" to the "immigrant threat at the Mexican border"; see also the evolution of the argument of some companies selling armaments in Milpol.

56. For example, the matrix of an infiltrated enemy who "informs" Huntington discourse owes a lot to a certain reading of McCarthyism.

57. Didier Bigo, "L'immigration au carrefour des sécurités," *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* 1 (1998).

58. On the scarcity and shearing of statements, see Michel Foucault, *L'archéologie du savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1969); and Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault* (Paris: Mmuit, 1986).

59. See François Ewald, *Histoire de l'État Providence* (Paris: Grasset, 1996).

60. Didier Bigo, "Europe passoire. Europe forteresse, la sécurisation humanitarisation de l'immigration," *op. cit.*

61. For more information on notions of articulation and fusion, see Michel Wiewiorka, *Sociétés et terrorismes* (Paris: Fayard, 1988).

62. Hervé Le Bras, *Le démon des origines: Démographie et extrême-droite* (Paris: Editions de l'Aube, 1998).

63. Didier Bigo, *L'Europe des polices et de la sécurité intérieure* (Paris: Complexe, 1992).

64. Jocelyne Césari, *Faut-il avoir peur de l'Islam?* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1997).

65. Sophie Body-Gendrot, *Villes et violences: L'irruption de nouveaux acteurs* (Paris: PUF, 1995); cf. Ayse Ceyhan, "Migrants as a Threat," paper given at ISA annual meeting, Toronto, 1997, and forthcoming in V. Gray, ed., *A European Dilemma: Immigration, Citizenship, and Identity in Western Europe*.

66. See Riva Kastoriano, ed., *Quelle identité pour l'Europe: Le multiculturalisme à l'épreuve* (Paris: Presses de Sciences-Po, 1998), particularly the articles by Remy Leveau and Riva Kastoriano.

67. John Crowley, "Where the State Actually Starts?" – paper given at the ISA annual meeting, Minneapolis, March 1998.

68. Cf. Jean Delumeau, *Rassurer et protéger: Le sentiment de sécurité dans l'Occident d'autrefois* (Paris: Fayard, 1989). In "Le sujet et le Pouvoir," Michel Foucault discusses the modern state as a form of pastoral power differing from Christianity because it secularizes salvation and gives to the police the power to take care of individuals: in Foucault, *Dits et Écrits*, note 14, 4: 230.

69. See Bigo, "Discipline and Punish beyond the Borders: The Social Practices of Controls and Their Locus," ISA, March 2000, where I develop the differences and similarities between panopticon and ban-opticon.

70. On proactivity, see *Deviance et Société* 1 (1997).

71. Bigo, *Police en réseaux*, note 1.

72. Nonetheless, struggles for a more democratic Europeanization (with an empowered European parliament, a larger role for judges, and a desecurization of asylum and border crossing) show that conjunctural reversals are possible (even if that was not the case with the Amsterdam Treaty despite the hopes of some people; to the contrary, in France the Weil draft bill and the Chevènement act on asylum have inflected the trend, at least symbolically).

73. K.J. Holsti, "Governance without Government: Polyarchy in Nineteenth-century European International Politics," in J.N. Rosenau, and E.O. Czempiel, eds., *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992).

74. Hamit Bozarslan, "L'État et la violence au Moyen-Orient," article to be published in *Les Annales*.

75. A forthcoming issue of *Cultures et Conflits* will be concerned with justice in networks.

76. Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 4 (1991); R.B.J. Walker, "The Subject of Security," in Keith Krauss and Michael C. Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies* (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1997), 61–82.

77. Edelman, note 24.

78. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, eds., *Michel Foucault: Un parcours philosophique, au delà de l'objectivité et de la subjectivité* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984).

79. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425.

Power and Weakness

Robert Kagan

It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power – the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power – American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant's "Perpetual Peace." The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. That is why on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less. And this state of affairs is not transitory – the product of one American election or one catastrophic event. The reasons for the transatlantic divide are deep, long in development, and likely to endure. When it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways.

It is easier to see the contrast as an American living in Europe. Europeans are more conscious of the growing differences, perhaps because they fear them more. European intellectuals are nearly unanimous in the conviction that Americans and Europeans no longer share a common "strategic culture." The European caricature at its most extreme depicts an America dominated by a "culture of death," its warlike temperament the natural product of a violent society where every man has a gun and the death penalty reigns. But even those who do not make this crude link agree there are profound differences in the way the United States and Europe conduct foreign policy.

The United States, they argue, resorts to force more quickly and, compared with Europe, is less patient with diplomacy. Americans generally see

the world divided between good and evil, between friends and enemies, while Europeans see a more complex picture. When confronting real or potential adversaries, Americans generally favor policies of coercion rather than persuasion, emphasizing punitive sanctions over inducements to better behavior, the stick over the carrot. Americans tend to seek finality in international affairs: They want problems solved, threats eliminated. And, of course, Americans increasingly tend toward unilateralism in international affairs. They are less inclined to act through international institutions such as the United Nations, less inclined to work cooperatively with other nations to pursue common goals, more skeptical about international law, and more willing to operate outside its strictures when they deem it necessary, or even merely useful.¹

Europeans insist they approach problems with greater nuance and sophistication. They try to influence others through subtlety and indirection. They are more tolerant of failure, more patient when solutions don't come quickly. They generally favor peaceful responses to problems, preferring negotiation, diplomacy, and persuasion to coercion. They are quicker to appeal to international law, international conventions, and international opinion to adjudicate disputes. They try to use commercial and economic ties to bind nations together. They often emphasize process over result, believing that ultimately process can become substance.

This European dual portrait is a caricature, of course, with its share of exaggerations and oversimplifications. One cannot generalize about Europeans: Britons may have a more "American" view of power than many of their fellow Europeans on the continent. And there are differing perspectives within nations on both sides of the Atlantic. In the U.S., Democrats often seem more "European" than Republicans; Secretary of State Colin Powell may appear more "European" than Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Many Americans, especially among the intellectual elite, are as uncomfortable with the "hard" quality of American foreign policy as any European; and some Europeans value power as much as any American.

Nevertheless, the caricatures do capture an essential truth: The United States and Europe are fundamentally different today. Powell and Rumsfeld have more in common than do Powell and Hubert Védrine or even Jack Straw. When it comes to the use of force, mainstream American Democrats have more in common with Republicans than they do with most European Socialists and Social Democrats. During the 1990s even American liberals were more willing to resort to force and were more Manichean in their perception of the world than most of their European counterparts. The Clinton administration bombed Iraq, as well as Afghanistan and Sudan. European governments, it is safe to say, would not have done so. Whether they would have bombed even Belgrade in 1999, had the U.S. not forced their hand, is an interesting question.²

What is the source of these differing strategic perspectives? The question has received too little attention in recent years, either because foreign policy intellectuals and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have denied

the existence of a genuine difference or because those who have pointed to the difference, especially in Europe, have been more interested in assailing the United States than in understanding why the United States acts as it does – or, for that matter, why Europe acts as it does. It is past time to move beyond the denial and the insults and to face the problem head-on.

Despite what many Europeans and some Americans believe, these differences in strategic culture do not spring naturally from the national characters of Americans and Europeans. After all, what Europeans now consider their more peaceful strategic culture is, historically speaking, quite new. It represents an evolution away from the very different strategic culture that dominated Europe for hundreds of years and at least until World War I. The European governments – and peoples – who enthusiastically launched themselves into that continental war believed in *machtpolitik*. While the roots of the present European worldview, like the roots of the European Union itself, can be traced back to the Enlightenment, Europe's great-power politics for the past 300 years did not follow the visionary designs of the philosophers and the physiocrats.

As for the United States, there is nothing timeless about the present heavy reliance on force as a tool of international relations, nor about the tilt toward unilateralism and away from a devotion to international law. Americans are children of the Enlightenment, too, and in the early years of the republic were more faithful apostles of its creed. America's eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century statesmen sounded much like the European statesmen of today, extolling the virtues of commerce as the soothing balm of international strife and appealing to international law and international opinion over brute force. The young United States wielded power against weaker peoples on the North American continent, but when it came to dealing with the European giants, it claimed to abjure power and assailed as atavistic the power politics of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European empires.

Two centuries later, Americans and Europeans have traded places – and perspectives. Partly this is because in those 200 years, but especially in recent decades, the power equation has shifted dramatically: When the United States was weak, it practiced the strategies of indirection, the strategies of weakness; now that the United States is powerful, it behaves as powerful nations do. When the European great powers were strong, they believed in strength and martial glory. Now, they see the world through the eyes of weaker powers. These very different points of view, weak versus strong, have naturally produced differing strategic judgments, differing assessments of threats and of the proper means of addressing threats, and even differing calculations of interest.

But this is only part of the answer. For along with these natural consequences of the transatlantic power gap, there has also opened a broad ideological gap. Europe, because of its unique historical experience of the past half-century – culminating in the past decade with the creation of the European Union – has developed a set of ideals and principles regarding the utility and morality of power different from the ideals and principles of

Americans, who have not shared that experience. If the strategic chasm between the United States and Europe appears greater than ever today, and grows still wider at a worrying pace, it is because these material and ideological differences reinforce one another. The divisive trend they together produce may be impossible to reverse.

The Power Gap: Perception and Reality

Europe has been militarily weak for a long time, but until fairly recently its weakness had been obscured. World War II all but destroyed European nations as global powers, and their postwar inability to project sufficient force overseas to maintain colonial empires in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East forced them to retreat on a massive scale after more than five centuries of imperial dominance – perhaps the most significant retrenchment of global influence in human history. For a half-century after World War II, however, this weakness was masked by the unique geopolitical circumstances of the Cold War. Dwarfed by the two superpowers on its flanks, a weakened Europe nevertheless served as the central strategic theater of the worldwide struggle between communism and democratic capitalism. Its sole but vital strategic mission was to defend its own territory against any Soviet offensive, at least until the Americans arrived. Although shorn of most traditional measures of great-power status, Europe remained the geopolitical pivot, and this, along with lingering habits of world leadership, allowed Europeans to retain international influence well beyond what their sheer military capabilities might have afforded.

Europe lost this strategic centrality after the Cold War ended, but it took a few more years for the lingering mirage of European global power to fade. During the 1990s, war in the Balkans kept both Europeans and Americans focused on the strategic importance of the continent and on the continuing relevance of NATO. The enlargement of NATO to include former Warsaw Pact nations and the consolidation of the Cold War victory kept Europe in the forefront of the strategic discussion.

Then there was the early promise of the “new Europe.” By bonding together into a single political and economic unit – the historic accomplishment of the Maastricht treaty in 1992 – many hoped to recapture Europe’s old greatness but in a new political form. “Europe” would be the next superpower, not only economically and politically, but also militarily. It would handle crises on the European continent, such as the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, and it would reemerge as a global player. In the 1990s Europeans could confidently assert that the power of a unified Europe would restore, finally, the global “multipolarity” that had been destroyed by the Cold War and its aftermath. And most Americans, with mixed emotions, agreed that superpower Europe was the future. Harvard University’s Samuel P. Huntington predicted that the coalescing of the European Union would be “the single

most important move" in a worldwide reaction against American hegemony and would produce a "truly multipolar" twenty-first century.³

But European pretensions and American apprehensions proved unfounded. The 1990s witnessed not the rise of a European superpower but the decline of Europe into relative weakness. The Balkan conflict at the beginning of the decade revealed European military incapacity and political disarray; the Kosovo conflict at decade's end exposed a transatlantic gap in military technology and the ability to wage modern warfare that would only widen in subsequent years. Outside of Europe, the disparity by the close of the 1990s was even more starkly apparent as it became clear that the ability of European powers, individually or collectively, to project decisive force into regions of conflict beyond the continent was negligible. Europeans could provide peacekeeping forces in the Balkans – indeed, they could and eventually did provide the vast bulk of those forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. But they lacked the wherewithal to introduce and sustain a fighting force in potentially hostile territory, even in Europe. Under the best of circumstances, the European role was limited to filling out peacekeeping forces after the United States had, largely on its own, carried out the decisive phases of a military mission and stabilized the situation. As some Europeans put it, the real division of labor consisted of the United States "making the dinner" and the Europeans "doing the dishes."

This inadequacy should have come as no surprise, since these were the limitations that had forced Europe to retract its global influence in the first place. Those Americans and Europeans who proposed that Europe expand its strategic role beyond the continent set an unreasonable goal. During the Cold War, Europe's strategic role had been to defend itself. It was unrealistic to expect a return to international great-power status, unless European peoples were willing to shift significant resources from social programs to military programs.

Clearly they were not. Not only were Europeans unwilling to pay to project force beyond Europe. After the Cold War, they would not pay for sufficient force to conduct even minor military actions on the continent without American help. Nor did it seem to matter whether European publics were being asked to spend money to strengthen NATO or an independent European foreign and defense policy. Their answer was the same. Rather than viewing the collapse of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to flex global muscles, Europeans took it as an opportunity to cash in on a sizable peace dividend. Average European defense budgets gradually fell below 2 percent of GDP. Despite talk of establishing Europe as a global superpower, therefore, European military capabilities steadily fell behind those of the United States throughout the 1990s.

The end of the Cold War had a very different effect on the other side of the Atlantic. For although Americans looked for a peace dividend, too, and defense budgets declined or remained flat during most of the 1990s, defense spending still remained above 3 percent of GDP. Fast on the heels of the Soviet empire's demise came Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the largest American military

action in a quarter-century. Thereafter American administrations cut the Cold War force, but not as dramatically as might have been expected. By historical standards, America's military power and particularly its ability to project that power to all corners of the globe remained unprecedented.

Meanwhile, the very fact of the Soviet empire's collapse vastly increased America's strength relative to the rest of the world. The sizable American military arsenal, once barely sufficient to balance Soviet power, was now deployed in a world without a single formidable adversary. This "unipolar moment" had an entirely natural and predictable consequence: It made the United States more willing to use force abroad. With the check of Soviet power removed, the United States was free to intervene practically wherever and whenever it chose – a fact reflected in the proliferation of overseas military interventions that began during the first Bush administration with the invasion of Panama in 1989, the Persian Gulf War in 1991, and the humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992, continuing during the Clinton years with interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. While American politicians talked of pulling back from the world, the reality was an America intervening abroad more frequently than it had throughout most of the Cold War. Thanks to new technologies, the United States was also freer to use force around the world in more limited ways through air and missile strikes, which it did with increasing frequency.

How could this growing transatlantic power gap fail to create a difference in strategic perceptions? Even during the Cold War, American military predominance and Europe's relative weakness had produced important and sometimes serious disagreements. Gaullism, *Ostpolitik*, and the various movements for European independence and unity were manifestations not only of a European desire for honor and freedom of action. They also reflected a European conviction that America's approach to the Cold War was too confrontational, too militaristic, and too dangerous. Europeans believed they knew better how to deal with the Soviets: through engagement and seduction, through commercial and political ties, through patience and forbearance. It was a legitimate view, shared by many Americans. But it also reflected Europe's weakness relative to the United States, the fewer military options at Europe's disposal, and its greater vulnerability to a powerful Soviet Union. It may have reflected, too, Europe's memory of continental war. Americans, when they were not themselves engaged in the subtleties of *détente*, viewed the European approach as a form of appeasement, a return to the fearful mentality of the 1930s. But appeasement is never a dirty word to those whose genuine weakness offers few appealing alternatives. For them, it is a policy of sophistication.

The end of the Cold War, by widening the power gap, exacerbated the disagreements. Although transatlantic tensions are now widely assumed to have begun with the inauguration of George W. Bush in January 2001, they were already evident during the Clinton administration and may even be traced back to the administration of George H.W. Bush. By 1992, mutual recriminations were rife over Bosnia, where the United States refused to act

and Europe could not act. It was during the Clinton years that Europeans began complaining about being lectured by the “hectoring hegemon.” This was also the period in which Védrine coined the term *hyperpuissance* to describe an American behemoth too worryingly powerful to be designated merely a superpower. (Perhaps he was responding to then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s insistence that the United States was the world’s “indispensable nation.”) It was also during the 1990s that the transatlantic disagreement over American plans for missile defense emerged and many Europeans began grumbling about the American propensity to choose force and punishment over diplomacy and persuasion.

The Clinton administration, meanwhile, though relatively timid and restrained itself, grew angry and impatient with European timidity, especially the unwillingness to confront Saddam Hussein. The split in the alliance over Iraq didn’t begin with the 2000 election but in 1997, when the Clinton administration tried to increase the pressure on Baghdad and found itself at odds with France and (to a lesser extent) Great Britain in the United Nations Security Council. Even the war in Kosovo was marked by nervousness among some allies – especially Italy, Greece, and Germany – that the United States was too uncompromisingly militaristic in its approach. And while Europeans and Americans ultimately stood together in the confrontation with Belgrade, the Kosovo war produced in Europe less satisfaction at the successful prosecution of the war than unease at America’s apparent omnipotence. That apprehension would only increase in the wake of American military action after September 11, 2001.

The Psychology of Power and Weakness

Today’s transatlantic problem, in short, is not a George Bush problem. It is a power problem. American military strength has produced a propensity to use that strength. Europe’s military weakness has produced a perfectly understandable aversion to the exercise of military power. Indeed, it has produced a powerful European interest in inhabiting a world where strength doesn’t matter, where international law and international institutions predominate, where unilateral action by powerful nations is forbidden, where all nations regardless of their strength have equal rights and are equally protected by commonly agreed-upon international rules of behavior. Europeans have a deep interest in devaluing and eventually eradicating the brutal laws of an anarchic, Hobbesian world where power is the ultimate determinant of national security and success.

This is no reproach. It is what weaker powers have wanted from time immemorial. It was what Americans wanted in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the brutality of a European system of power politics run by the global giants of France, Britain, and Russia left Americans constantly vulnerable to imperial thrashing. It was what the other small powers of Europe wanted in those years, too, only to be sneered at by Bourbon kings

and other powerful monarchs, who spoke instead of *raison d'état*. The great proponent of international law on the high seas in the eighteenth century was the United States; the great opponent was Britain's navy, the "Mistress of the Seas." In an anarchic world, small powers always fear they will be victims. Great powers, on the other hand, often fear rules that may constrain them more than they fear the anarchy in which their power brings security and prosperity.

This natural and historic disagreement between the stronger and the weaker manifests itself in today's transatlantic dispute over the question of unilateralism. Europeans generally believe their objection to American unilateralism is proof of their greater commitment to certain ideals concerning world order. They are less willing to acknowledge that their hostility to unilateralism is also self-interested. Europeans fear American unilateralism. They fear it perpetuates a Hobbesian world in which they may become increasingly vulnerable. The United States may be a relatively benign hegemon, but insofar as its actions delay the arrival of a world order more conducive to the safety of weaker powers, it is objectively dangerous.

This is one reason why in recent years a principal objective of European foreign policy has become, as one European observer puts it, the "multilateralising" of the United States.⁴ It is not that Europeans are teaming up against the American hegemon, as Huntington and many realist theorists would have it, by creating a countervailing power. After all, Europeans are not increasing their power. Their tactics, like their goal, are the tactics of the weak. They hope to constrain American power without wielding power themselves. In what may be the ultimate feat of subtlety and indirection, they want to control the behemoth by appealing to its conscience.

It is a sound strategy, as far as it goes. The United States *is* a behemoth with a conscience. It is not Louis XIV's France or George III's England. Americans do not argue, even to themselves, that their actions may be justified by *raison d'état*. Americans have never accepted the principles of Europe's old order, never embraced the Machiavellian perspective. The United States is a liberal, progressive society through and through, and to the extent that Americans believe in power, they believe it must be a means of advancing the principles of a liberal civilization and a liberal world order. Americans even share Europe's aspirations for a more orderly world system based not on power but on rules – after all, they were striving for such a world when Europeans were still extolling the laws of *machtpolitik*.

But while these common ideals and aspirations shape foreign policies on both sides of the Atlantic, they cannot completely negate the very different perspectives from which Europeans and Americans view the world and the role of power in international affairs. Europeans oppose unilateralism in part because they have no capacity for unilateralism. Polls consistently show that Americans support multilateral action in principle – they even support acting under the rubric of the United Nations – but the fact remains that the United States can act unilaterally, and has done so many times with reasonable success. For Europeans, the appeal to multilateralism and international

law has a real practical payoff and little cost. For Americans, who stand to lose at least some freedom of action, support for universal rules of behavior really is a matter of idealism.

Even when Americans and Europeans can agree on the kind of world order they would strive to build, however, they increasingly disagree about what constitutes a threat to that international endeavor. Indeed, Europeans and Americans differ most these days in their evaluation of what constitutes a tolerable versus an intolerable threat. This, too, is consistent with the disparity of power.

Europeans often argue that Americans have an unreasonable demand for "perfect" security, the product of living for centuries shielded behind two oceans.⁵ Europeans claim they know what it is like to live with danger, to exist side-by-side with evil, since they've done it for centuries. Hence their greater tolerance for such threats as may be posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq or the Ayatollahs' Iran. Americans, they claim, make far too much of the dangers these regimes pose.

Even before September 11, this argument rang a bit hollow. The United States in its formative decades lived in a state of substantial insecurity, surrounded by hostile European empires, at constant risk of being torn apart by centrifugal forces that were encouraged by threats from without: National insecurity formed the core of Washington's Farewell Address. As for the Europeans' supposed tolerance for insecurity and evil, it can be overstated. For the better part of three centuries, European Catholics and Protestants more often preferred to kill than to tolerate each other; nor have the past two centuries shown all that much mutual tolerance between Frenchmen and Germans.

Some Europeans argue that precisely because Europe has suffered so much, it has a higher tolerance for suffering than America and therefore a higher tolerance for threats. More likely the opposite is true. The memory of their horrendous suffering in World War I made the British and French publics more fearful of Nazi Germany, not more tolerant, and this attitude contributed significantly to the appeasement of the 1930s.

A better explanation of Europe's greater tolerance for threats is, once again, Europe's relative weakness. Tolerance is also very much a realistic response in that Europe, precisely because it is weak, actually faces fewer threats than the far more powerful United States.

The psychology of weakness is easy enough to understand. A man armed only with a knife may decide that a bear prowling the forest is a tolerable danger, inasmuch as the alternative – hunting the bear armed only with a knife – is actually riskier than lying low and hoping the bear never attacks. The same man armed with a rifle, however, will likely make a different calculation of what constitutes a tolerable risk. Why should he risk being mauled to death if he doesn't need to?

This perfectly normal human psychology is helping to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe today. Europeans have concluded, reasonably enough, that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is more tolerable

for them than the risk of removing him. But Americans, being stronger, have reasonably enough developed a lower threshold of tolerance for Saddam and his weapons of mass destruction, especially after September 11. Europeans like to say that Americans are obsessed with fixing problems, but it is generally true that those with a greater capacity to fix problems are more likely to try to fix them than those who have no such capability. Americans can imagine successfully invading Iraq and toppling Saddam, and therefore more than 70 percent of Americans apparently favor such action. Europeans, not surprisingly, find the prospect both unimaginable and frightening.

The incapacity to respond to threats leads not only to tolerance but sometimes to denial. It's normal to try to put out of one's mind that which one can do nothing about. According to one student of European opinion, even the very focus on "threats" differentiates American policymakers from their European counterparts. Americans, writes Steven Everts, talk about foreign "threats" such as "the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and 'rogue states.'" But Europeans look at "challenges," such as "ethnic conflict, migration, organized crime, poverty and environmental degradation." As Everts notes, however, the key difference is less a matter of culture and philosophy than of capability. Europeans "are most worried about issues ... that have a greater chance of being solved by political engagement and huge sums of money." In other words, Europeans focus on issues – "challenges" – where European strengths come into play but not on those "threats" where European weakness makes solutions elusive. If Europe's strategic culture today places less value on power and military strength and more value on such soft-power tools as economics and trade, isn't it partly because Europe is militarily weak and economically strong? Americans are quicker to acknowledge the existence of threats, even to perceive them where others may not see any, because they can conceive of doing something to meet those threats.

The differing threat perceptions in the United States and Europe are not just matters of psychology, however. They are also grounded in a practical reality that is another product of the disparity of power. For Iraq and other "rogue" states objectively do *not* pose the same level of threat to Europeans as they do to the United States. There is, first of all, the American security guarantee that Europeans enjoy and have enjoyed for six decades, ever since the United States took upon itself the burden of maintaining order in far-flung regions of the world – from the Korean Peninsula to the Persian Gulf – from which European power had largely withdrawn. Europeans generally believe, whether or not they admit it to themselves, that were Iraq ever to emerge as a real and present danger, as opposed to merely a potential danger, then the United States would do something about it – as it did in 1991. If during the Cold War Europe by necessity made a major contribution to its own defense, today Europeans enjoy an unparalleled measure of "free security" because most of the likely threats are in regions outside Europe, where only the United States can project effective force. In a very practical sense – that is, when it comes to actual strategic planning – neither Iraq nor

Iran nor North Korea nor any other “rogue” state in the world is primarily a European problem. Nor, certainly, is China. Both Europeans and Americans agree that these are primarily American problems.

This is why Saddam Hussein is not as great a threat to Europe as he is to the United States. He would be a greater threat to the United States even were the Americans and Europeans in complete agreement on Iraq policy, because it is the logical consequence of the transatlantic disparity of power. The task of containing Saddam Hussein belongs primarily to the United States, not to Europe, and everyone agrees on this⁶ – including Saddam, which is why he considers the United States, not Europe, his principal adversary. In the Persian Gulf, in the Middle East, and in most other regions of the world (including Europe), the United States plays the role of ultimate enforcer. “You are so powerful,” Europeans often say to Americans. “So why do you feel so threatened?” But it is precisely America’s great power that makes it the primary target, and often the only target. Europeans are understandably content that it should remain so.

Americans are “cowboys,” Europeans love to say. And there is truth in this. The United States does act as an international sheriff, self-appointed perhaps but widely welcomed nevertheless, trying to enforce some peace and justice in what Americans see as a lawless world where outlaws need to be deterred or destroyed, and often through the muzzle of a gun. Europe, by this old West analogy, is more like a saloonkeeper. Outlaws shoot sheriffs, not saloonkeepers. In fact, from the saloonkeeper’s point of view, the sheriff trying to impose order by force can sometimes be more threatening than the outlaws who, at least for the time being, may just want a drink.

When Europeans took to the streets by the millions after September 11, most Americans believed it was out of a sense of shared danger and common interest: The Europeans knew they could be next. But Europeans by and large did not feel that way and still don’t. Europeans do not really believe they are next. They may be secondary targets – because they are allied with the U.S. – but they are not the primary target, because they no longer play the imperial role in the Middle East that might have engendered the same antagonism against them as is aimed at the United States. When Europeans wept and waved American flags after September 11, it was out of genuine human sympathy, sorrow, and affection for Americans. For better or for worse, European displays of solidarity were a product more of fellow-feeling than self-interest.

The Origins of Modern European Foreign Policy

Important as the power gap may be in shaping the respective strategic cultures of the United States and Europe, it is only one part of the story. Europe in the past half-century has developed a genuinely different perspective on the role of power in international relations, a perspective that springs directly from its unique historical experience since the end of World War II. It is a perspective that Americans do not share and cannot share,

inasmuch as the formative historical experiences on their side of the Atlantic have not been the same.

Consider again the qualities that make up the European strategic culture: the emphasis on negotiation, diplomacy, and commercial ties, on international law over the use of force, on seduction over coercion, on multilateralism over unilateralism. It is true that these are not traditionally European approaches to international relations when viewed from a long historical perspective. But they are a product of more recent European history. The modern European strategic culture represents a conscious rejection of the European past, a rejection of the evils of European *machtspolitik*. It is a reflection of Europeans' ardent and understandable desire never to return to that past. Who knows better than Europeans the dangers that arise from unbridled power politics, from an excessive reliance on military force, from policies produced by national egoism and ambition, even from balance of power and *raison d'état*? As German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer put it in a speech outlining his vision of the European future at Humboldt University in Berlin (May 12, 2000), "The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648." The European Union is itself the product of an awful century of European warfare.

Of course, it was the "hegemonic ambitions" of one nation in particular that European integration was meant to contain. And it is the integration and taming of Germany that is the great accomplishment of Europe – viewed historically, perhaps the greatest feat of international politics ever achieved. Some Europeans recall, as Fischer does, the central role played by the United States in solving the "German problem." Fewer like to recall that the military destruction of Nazi Germany was the prerequisite for the European peace that followed. Most Europeans believe that it was the transformation of European politics, the deliberate abandonment and rejection of centuries of *machtspolitik*, that in the end made possible the "new order." The Europeans, who invented power politics, turned themselves into born-again idealists by an act of will, leaving behind them what Fischer called "the old system of balance with its continued national orientation, constraints of coalition, traditional interest-led politics and the permanent danger of nationalist ideologies and confrontations."

Fischer stands near one end of the spectrum of European idealism. But this is not really a right-left issue in Europe. Fischer's principal contention – that Europe has moved beyond the old system of power politics and discovered a new system for preserving peace in international relations – is widely shared across Europe. As senior British diplomat Robert Cooper recently wrote in the *Observer* (April 7, 2002), Europe today lives in a "postmodern system" that does not rest on a balance of power but on "the rejection of force" and on "self-enforced rules of behavior." In the "postmodern world," writes Cooper, "*raison d'état* and the amorality of Machiavelli's theories of

statecraft ... have been replaced by a moral consciousness" in international affairs.

American realists might scoff at this idealism. George F. Kennan assumed only his naïve fellow Americans succumbed to such "Wilsonian" legalistic and moralistic fancies, not those war-tested, historically minded European Machiavels. But, really, why shouldn't Europeans be idealistic about international affairs, at least as they are conducted in Europe's "postmodern system"? Within the confines of Europe, the age-old laws of international relations have been repealed. Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of perpetual peace. European life during the more than five decades since the end of World War II has been shaped not by the brutal laws of power politics but by the unfolding of a geopolitical fantasy, a miracle of world-historical importance: The German lion has laid down with the French lamb. The conflict that ravaged Europe ever since the violent birth of Germany in the nineteenth century has been put to rest.

The means by which this miracle has been achieved have understandably acquired something of a sacred mystique for Europeans, especially since the end of the Cold War. Diplomacy, negotiations, patience, the forging of economic ties, political engagement, the use of inducements rather than sanctions, the taking of small steps and tempering ambitions for success – these were the tools of Franco-German rapprochement and hence the tools that made European integration possible. Integration was not to be based on military deterrence or the balance of power. Quite the contrary. The miracle came from the rejection of military power and of its utility as an instrument of international affairs – at least within the confines of Europe. During the Cold War, few Europeans doubted the need for military power to deter the Soviet Union. But within Europe the rules were different.

Collective security was provided from without, meanwhile, by the *deus ex machina* of the United States operating through the military structures of NATO. Within this wall of security, Europeans pursued their new order, freed from the brutal laws and even the mentality of power politics. This evolution from the old to the new began in Europe during the Cold War. But the end of the Cold War, by removing even the external danger of the Soviet Union, allowed Europe's new order, and its new idealism, to blossom fully. Freed from the requirements of any military deterrence, internal or external, Europeans became still more confident that their way of settling international problems now had universal application.

"The genius of the founding fathers," European Commission President Romano Prodi commented in a speech at the Institute d'Etudes Politiques in Paris (May 29, 2001), "lay in translating extremely high political ambitions ... into a series of more specific, almost technical decisions. This indirect approach made further action possible. Rapprochement took place gradually. From confrontation we moved to willingness to cooperate in the economic sphere and then on to integration." This is what many Europeans believe they have to offer the world: not power, but the transcendence of power.

The “essence” of the European Union, writes Everts, is “all about subjecting inter-state relations to the rule of law,” and Europe’s experience of successful multilateral governance has in turn produced an ambition to convert the world. Europe “has a role to play in world ‘governance,’” says Prodi, a role based on replicating the European experience on a global scale. In Europe “the rule of law has replaced the crude interplay of power ... power politics have lost their influence.” And by “making a success of integration we are demonstrating to the world that it is possible to create a method for peace.”

No doubt there are Britons, Germans, French, and others who would frown on such exuberant idealism. But many Europeans, including many in positions of power, routinely apply Europe’s experience to the rest of the world. For is not the general European critique of the American approach to “rogue” regimes based on this special European insight? Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya – these states may be dangerous and unpleasant, even evil. But might not an “indirect approach” work again, as it did in Europe? Might it not be possible once more to move from confrontation to rapprochement, beginning with cooperation in the economic sphere and then moving on to peaceful integration? Could not the formula that worked in Europe work again with Iran or even Iraq? A great many Europeans insist that it can.

The transmission of the European miracle to the rest of the world has become Europe’s new *mission civilisatrice*. Just as Americans have always believed that they had discovered the secret to human happiness and wished to export it to the rest of the world, so the Europeans have a new mission born of their own discovery of perpetual peace.

Thus we arrive at what may be the most important reason for the divergence in views between Europe and the United States. America’s power, and its willingness to exercise that power – unilaterally if necessary – represents a threat to Europe’s new sense of mission. Perhaps the greatest threat. American policymakers find it hard to believe, but leading officials and politicians in Europe worry more about how the United States might handle or mishandle the problem of Iraq – by undertaking unilateral and extralegal military action – than they worry about Iraq itself and Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. And while it is true that they fear such action might destabilize the Middle East and lead to the unnecessary loss of life, there is a deeper concern.⁷ Such American action represents an assault on the essence of “post-modern” Europe. It is an assault on Europe’s new ideals, a denial of their universal validity, much as the monarchies of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe were an assault on American republican ideals. Americans ought to be the first to understand that a threat to one’s beliefs can be as frightening as a threat to one’s physical security.

As Americans have for two centuries, Europeans speak with great confidence of the superiority of their global understanding, the wisdom they have to offer other nations about conflict resolution, and their way of addressing international problems. But just as in the first decade of the American republic, there is a hint of insecurity in the European claim to “success,” an evident

need to have their success affirmed and their views accepted by other nations, particularly by the mighty United States. After all, to deny the validity of the new European idealism is to raise profound doubts about the viability of the European project. If international problems cannot, in fact, be settled the European way, wouldn't that suggest that Europe itself may eventually fall short of a solution, with all the horrors this implies?

And, of course, it is precisely this fear that still hangs over Europeans, even as Europe moves forward. Europeans, and particularly the French and Germans, are not entirely sure that the problem once known as the "German problem" really has been solved. As their various and often very different proposals for the future constitution of Europe suggest, the French are still not confident they can trust the Germans, and the Germans are still not sure they can trust themselves. This fear can at times hinder progress toward deeper integration, but it also propels the European project forward despite innumerable obstacles. The European project must succeed, for how else to overcome what Fischer, in his Humboldt University speech, called "the risks and temptations objectively inherent in Germany's dimensions and central situation"? Those historic German "temptations" play at the back of many a European mind. And every time Europe contemplates the use of military force, or is forced to do so by the United States, there is no avoiding at least momentary consideration of what effect such a military action might have on the "German question."

Perhaps it is not just coincidence that the amazing progress toward European integration in recent years has been accompanied not by the emergence of a European superpower but, on the contrary, by a diminishing of European military capabilities relative to the United States. Turning Europe into a global superpower capable of balancing the power of the United States may have been one of the original selling points of the European Union – an independent European foreign and defense policy was supposed to be one of the most important byproducts of European integration. But, in truth, the ambition for European "power" is something of an anachronism. It is an atavistic impulse, inconsistent with the ideals of post-modern Europe, whose very existence depends on the rejection of power politics. Whatever its architects may have intended, European integration has proved to be the enemy of European military power and, indeed, of an important European global role.

This phenomenon has manifested itself not only in flat or declining European defense budgets, but in other ways, too, even in the realm of "soft" power. European leaders talk of Europe's essential role in the world. Prodi yearns "to make our voice heard, to make our actions count." And it is true that Europeans spend a great deal of money on foreign aid – more per capita, they like to point out, than does the United States. Europeans engage in overseas military missions, so long as the missions are mostly limited to peacekeeping. But while the EU periodically dips its fingers into troubled international waters in the Middle East or the Korean Peninsula,

the truth is that EU foreign policy is probably the most anemic of all the products of European integration. As Charles Grant, a sympathetic observer of the EU, recently noted, few European leaders "are giving it much time or energy."⁸ EU foreign policy initiatives tend to be short-lived and are rarely backed by sustained agreement on the part of the various European powers. That is one reason they are so easily rebuffed, as was the case in late March when Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon blocked EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana from meeting with Yasser Arafat (only to turn around the next day and allow a much lower-ranking American negotiator to meet with the Palestinian leader).

It is obvious, moreover, that issues outside of Europe don't attract nearly as much interest among Europeans as purely European issues do. This has surprised and frustrated Americans on all sides of the political and strategic debate: Recall the profound disappointment of American liberals when Europeans failed to mount an effective protest against Bush's withdrawal from the ABM treaty. But given the enormous and difficult agenda of integration, this European tendency to look inward is understandable. EU enlargement, the revision of the common economic and agricultural policies, the question of national sovereignty versus supranational governance, the so-called democracy deficit, the jostling of the large European powers, the dissatisfaction of the smaller powers, the establishment of a new European constitution – all of these present serious and unavoidable challenges. The difficulties of moving forward might seem insuperable were it not for the progress the project of European integration has already demonstrated.

American policies that are unwelcome on substance – on a missile defense system and the ABM treaty, belligerence toward Iraq, support for Israel – are all the more unwelcome because for Europe, they are a distraction. Europeans often point to American insularity and parochialism. But Europeans themselves have turned intensely introspective. As Dominique Moisi noted in the *Financial Times* (March 11, 2002), the recent French presidential campaign saw "no reference ... to the events of September 11 and their far-reaching consequences." No one asked, "What should be the role of France and Europe in the new configuration of forces created after September 11? How should France reappraise its military budget and doctrine to take account of the need to maintain some kind of parity between Europe and the United States, or at least between France and the UK?" The Middle East conflict became an issue in the campaign because of France's large Arab and Muslim population, as the high vote for Le Pen demonstrated. But Le Pen is not a foreign policy hawk. And as Moisi noted, "for most French voters in 2002, security has little to do with abstract and distant geopolitics. Rather, it is a question of which politician can best protect them from the crime and violence plaguing the streets and suburbs of their cities."

Can Europe change course and assume a larger role on the world stage? There has been no shortage of European leaders urging it to do so. Nor is the weakness of EU foreign policy today necessarily proof that it must be weak tomorrow, given the EU's record of overcoming weaknesses in other

areas. And yet the political will to demand more power for Europe appears to be lacking, and for the very good reason that Europe does not see a mission for itself that requires power. Its mission is to oppose power. It is revealing that the argument most often advanced by Europeans for augmenting their military strength these days is not that it will allow Europe to expand its strategic purview. It is merely to rein in and “multilateralize” the United States. “America,” writes the pro-American British scholar Timothy Garton Ash in the *New York Times* (April 9, 2002), “has too much power for anyone’s good, including its own.” Therefore Europe must amass power, but for no other reason than to save the world and the United States from the dangers inherent in the present lopsided situation.

Whether that particular mission is a worthy one or not, it seems unlikely to rouse European passions. Even Védrine has stopped talking about counterbalancing the United States. Now he shrugs and declares there “is no reason for the Europeans to match a country that can fight four wars at once.” It was one thing for Europe in the 1990s to increase its collective expenditures on defense from \$150 billion per year to \$180 billion when the United States was spending \$280 billion per year. But now the United States is heading toward spending as much as \$500 billion per year, and Europe has not the slightest intention of keeping up. European analysts lament the continent’s “strategic irrelevance.” NATO Secretary General George Robertson has taken to calling Europe a “military pygmy” in an effort to shame Europeans into spending more and doing so more wisely. But who honestly believes Europeans will fundamentally change their way of doing business? They have many reasons not to.

The U.S. Response

In thinking about the divergence of their own views and Europeans’, Americans must not lose sight of the main point: The new Europe is indeed a blessed miracle and a reason for enormous celebration – on both sides of the Atlantic. For Europeans, it is the realization of a long and improbable dream: a continent free from nationalist strife and blood feuds, from military competition and arms races. War between the major European powers is almost unimaginable. After centuries of misery, not only for Europeans but also for those pulled into their conflicts – as Americans were twice in the past century – the new Europe really has emerged as a paradise. It is something to be cherished and guarded, not least by Americans, who have shed blood on Europe’s soil and would shed more should the new Europe ever fail.

Nor should we forget that the Europe of today is very much the product of American foreign policy stretching back over six decades. European integration was an American project, too, after World War II. And so, recall, was European weakness. When the Cold War dawned, Americans such as Dean Acheson hoped to create in Europe a powerful partner against

the Soviet Union. But that was not the only American vision of Europe underlying U.S. policies during the twentieth century. Predating it was Franklin Delano Roosevelt's vision of a Europe that had been rendered, in effect, strategically irrelevant. As the historian John Lamberton Harper has put it, he wanted "to bring about a radical reduction in the weight of Europe" and thereby make possible "the retirement of Europe from world politics."⁹

Americans who came of age during the Cold War have always thought of Europe almost exclusively in Achesonian terms – as the essential bulwark of freedom in the struggle against Soviet tyranny. But Americans of Roosevelt's era had a different view. In the late 1930s the common conviction of Americans was that "the European system was basically rotten, that war was endemic on that continent, and the Europeans had only themselves to blame for their plight."¹⁰ By the early 1940s Europe appeared to be nothing more than the overheated incubator of world wars that cost America dearly. During World War II Americans like Roosevelt, looking backward rather than forward, believed no greater service could be performed than to take Europe out of the global strategic picture once and for all. "After Germany is disarmed," FDR pointedly asked, "what is the reason for France having a big military establishment?" Charles DeGaulle found such questions "disquieting for Europe and for France." Even though the United States pursued Acheson's vision during the Cold War, there was always a part of American policy that reflected Roosevelt's vision, too. Eisenhower undermining Britain and France at Suez was only the most blatant of many American efforts to cut Europe down to size and reduce its already weakened global influence.

But the more important American contribution to Europe's current world-apart status stemmed not from anti-European but from pro-European impulses. It was a commitment to Europe, not hostility to Europe, that led the United States in the immediate postwar years to keep troops on the continent and to create NATO. The presence of American forces as a security guarantee in Europe was, as it was intended to be, the critical ingredient to begin the process of European integration.

Europe's evolution to its present state occurred under the mantle of the U.S. security guarantee and could not have occurred without it. Not only did the United States for almost half a century supply a shield against such external threats as the Soviet Union and such internal threats as may have been posed by ethnic conflict in places like the Balkans. More important, the United States was the key to the solution of the German problem and perhaps still is. Germany's Fischer, in the Humboldt University speech, noted two "historic decisions" that made the new Europe possible: "the USA's decision to stay in Europe" and "France's and Germany's commitment to the principle of integration, beginning with economic links." But of course the latter could never have occurred without the former. France's willingness to risk the reintegration of Germany into Europe – and France was, to say the least, highly dubious – depended on the promise of continued American involvement in Europe as a

guarantee against any resurgence of German militarism. Nor were postwar Germans unaware that their own future in Europe depended on the calming presence of the American military.

The United States, in short, solved the Kantian paradox for the Europeans. Kant had argued that the only solution to the immoral horrors of the Hobbesian world was the creation of a world government. But he also feared that the "state of universal peace" made possible by world government would be an even greater threat to human freedom than the Hobbesian international order, inasmuch as such a government, with its monopoly of power, would become "the most horrible despotism."¹¹ How nations could achieve perpetual peace without destroying human freedom was a problem Kant could not solve. But for Europe the problem was solved by the United States. By providing security from outside, the United States has rendered it unnecessary for Europe's supranational government to provide it. Europeans did not need power to achieve peace and they do not need power to preserve it.

The current situation abounds in ironies. Europe's rejection of power politics, its devaluing of military force as a tool of international relations, have depended on the presence of American military forces on European soil. Europe's new Kantian order could flourish only under the umbrella of American power exercised according to the rules of the old Hobbesian order. American power made it possible for Europeans to believe that power was no longer important. And now, in the final irony, the fact that United States military power has solved the European problem, especially the "German problem," allows Europeans today to believe that American military power, and the "strategic culture" that has created and sustained it, are outmoded and dangerous.

Most Europeans do not see the great paradox: that their passage into post-history has depended on the United States not making the same passage. Because Europe has neither the will nor the ability to guard its own paradise and keep it from being overrun, spiritually as well as physically, by a world that has yet to accept the rule of "moral consciousness," it has become dependent on America's willingness to use its military might to deter or defeat those around the world who still believe in power politics.

Some Europeans do understand the conundrum. Some Britons, not surprisingly, understand it best. Thus Robert Cooper writes of the need to address the hard truth that although "within the postmodern world [i.e., the Europe of today], there are no security threats in the traditional sense," nevertheless, throughout the rest of the world – what Cooper calls the "modern and pre-modern zones" – threats abound. If the postmodern world does not protect itself, it can be destroyed. But how does Europe protect itself without discarding the very ideals and principles that undergird its pacific system?

"The challenge to the postmodern world," Cooper argues, "is to get used to the idea of double standards." Among themselves, Europeans may "operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security." But when dealing with the world outside Europe, "we need to revert to the rougher methods

of an earlier era – force, preemptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary.” This is Cooper’s principle for safeguarding society: “Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle.”

Cooper’s argument is directed at Europe, and it is appropriately coupled with a call for Europeans to cease neglecting their defenses, “both physical and psychological.” But what Cooper really describes is not Europe’s future but America’s present. For it is the United States that has had the difficult task of navigating between these two worlds, trying to abide by, defend, and further the laws of advanced civilized society while simultaneously employing military force against those who refuse to abide by those rules. The United States is already operating according to Cooper’s double standard, and for the very reasons he suggests. American leaders, too, believe that global security and a liberal order – as well as Europe’s “postmodern” paradise – cannot long survive unless the United States does use its power in the dangerous, Hobbesian world that still flourishes outside Europe.

What this means is that although the United States has played the critical role in bringing Europe into this Kantian paradise, and still plays a key role in making that paradise possible, it cannot enter this paradise itself. It mans the walls but cannot walk through the gate. The United States, with all its vast power, remains stuck in history, left to deal with the Saddams and the ayatollahs, the Kim Jong IIs and the Jiang Zemins, leaving the happy benefits to others.

An Acceptable Division?

Is this situation tolerable for the United States? In many ways, it is. Contrary to what many believe, the United States can shoulder the burden of maintaining global security without much help from Europe. The United States spends a little over 3 percent of its GDP on defense today. Were Americans to increase that to 4 percent – meaning a defense budget in excess of \$500 billion per year – it would still represent a smaller percentage of national wealth than Americans spent on defense throughout most of the past half-century. Even Paul Kennedy, who invented the term “imperial overstretch” in the late 1980s (when the United States was spending around 7 percent of its GDP on defense), believes the United States can sustain its current military spending levels and its current global dominance far into the future. Can the United States handle the rest of the world without much help from Europe? The answer is that it already does. The United States has maintained strategic stability in Asia with no help from Europe. In the Gulf War, European help was token; so it has been more recently in Afghanistan, where Europeans are once again “doing the dishes”; and so it would be in an invasion of Iraq to unseat Saddam. Europe has had little to offer the United States in strategic military terms since the end of the Cold War – except, of course, that most valuable of strategic assets, a Europe at peace.

The United States can manage, therefore, at least in material terms. Nor can one argue that the American people are unwilling to shoulder this global burden, since they have done so for a decade already. After September 11, they seem willing to continue doing so for a long time to come. Americans apparently feel no resentment at not being able to enter a "postmodern" Utopia. There is no evidence most Americans desire to. Partly because they are so powerful, they take pride in their nation's military power and their nation's special role in the world.

Americans have no experience that would lead them to embrace fully the ideals and principles that now animate Europe. Indeed, Americans derive their understanding of the world from a very different set of experiences. In the first half of the twentieth century, Americans had a flirtation with a certain kind of internationalist idealism. Wilson's "war to end all wars" was followed a decade later by an American secretary of state putting his signature to a treaty outlawing war. FDR in the 1930s put his faith in non-aggression pacts and asked merely that Hitler promise not to attack a list of countries Roosevelt presented to him. But then came Munich and Pearl Harbor, and then, after a fleeting moment of renewed idealism, the plunge into the Cold War. The "lesson of Munich" came to dominate American strategic thought, and although it was supplanted for a time by the "lesson of Vietnam," today it remains the dominant paradigm. While a small segment of the American elite still yearns for "global governance" and eschews military force, Americans from Madeleine Albright to Donald Rumsfeld, from Brent Scowcroft to Anthony Lake, still remember Munich, figuratively if not literally. And for younger generations of Americans who do not remember Munich or Pearl Harbor, there is now September 11. After September 11, even many American globalizers demand blood.

Americans are idealists, but they have no experience of promoting ideals successfully without power. Certainly, they have no experience of successful supranational governance; little to make them place their faith in international law and international institutions, much as they might wish to; and even less to let them travel, with the Europeans, beyond power. Americans, as good children of the Enlightenment, still believe in the perfectibility of man, and they retain hope for the perfectibility of the world. But they remain realists in the limited sense that they still believe in the necessity of power in a world that remains far from perfection. Such law as there may be to regulate international behavior, they believe, exists because a power like the United States defends it by force of arms. In other words, just as Europeans claim, Americans can still sometimes see themselves in heroic terms – as Gary Cooper at high noon. They will defend the townspeople, whether the townspeople want them to or not.

The problem lies neither in American will or capability, then, but precisely in the inherent moral tension of the current international situation. As is so often the case in human affairs, the real question is one of intangibles – of fears, passions, and beliefs. The problem is that the United States must sometimes play by the rules of a Hobbesian world, even though in doing so it violates

European norms. It must refuse to abide by certain international conventions that may constrain its ability to fight effectively in Robert Cooper's jungle. It must support arms control, but not always for itself. It must live by a double standard. And it must sometimes act unilaterally, not out of a passion for unilateralism but, given a weak Europe that has moved beyond power, because the United States has no choice *but* to act unilaterally.

Few Europeans admit, as Cooper does implicitly, that such American behavior may redound to the greater benefit of the civilized world, that American power, even employed under a double standard, may be the best means of advancing human progress – and perhaps the only means. Instead, many Europeans today have come to consider the United States itself to be the outlaw, a rogue colossus. Europeans have complained about President Bush's "unilateralism," but they are coming to the deeper realization that the problem is not Bush or any American president. It is systemic. And it is incurable.

Given that the United States is unlikely to reduce its power and that Europe is unlikely to increase more than marginally its own power or the will to use what power it has, the future seems certain to be one of increased transatlantic tension. The danger – if it is a danger – is that the United States and Europe will become positively estranged. Europeans will become more shrill in their attacks on the United States. The United States will become less inclined to listen, or perhaps even to care. The day could come, if it has not already, when Americans will no more heed the pronouncements of the EU than they do the pronouncements of ASEAN or the Andean Pact.

To those of us who came of age in the Cold War, the strategic decoupling of Europe and the United States seems frightening. DeGaulle, when confronted by FDR'S vision of a world where Europe was irrelevant, recoiled and suggested that this vision "risked endangering the Western world." If Western Europe was to be considered a "secondary matter" by the United States, would not FDR only "weaken the very cause he meant to serve – that of civilization?" Western Europe, DeGaulle insisted, was "essential to the West. Nothing can replace the value, the power, the shining example of the ancient peoples." Typically, DeGaulle insisted this was "true of France above all." But leaving aside French *amour propre*, did not DeGaulle have a point? If Americans were to decide that Europe was no more than an irritating irrelevancy, would American society gradually become unmoored from what we now call the West? It is not a risk to be taken lightly, on either side of the Atlantic.

So what is to be done? The obvious answer is that Europe should follow the course that Cooper, Ash, Robertson, and others recommend and build up its military capabilities, even if only marginally. There is not much ground for hope that this will happen. But, then, who knows? Maybe concern about America's overweening power really will create some energy in Europe. Perhaps the atavistic impulses that still swirl in the hearts of Germans, Britons, and Frenchmen – the memory of power, international influence, and national ambition – can still be played upon. Some Britons

still remember empire; some Frenchmen still yearn for *la gloire*; some Germans still want their place in the sun. These urges are now mostly channeled into the grand European project, but they could find more traditional expression. Whether this is to be hoped for or feared is another question. It would be better still if Europeans could move beyond fear and anger at the rogue colossus and remember, again, the vital necessity of having a strong America – for the world and especially for Europe.

Americans can help. It is true that the Bush administration came into office with a chip on its shoulder. It was hostile to the new Europe – as to a lesser extent was the Clinton administration – seeing it not so much as an ally but as an albatross. Even after September 11, when the Europeans offered their very limited military capabilities in the fight in Afghanistan, the United States resisted, fearing that European cooperation was a ruse to tie America down. The Bush administration viewed NATO's historic decision to aid the United States under Article V less as a boon than as a booby trap. An opportunity to draw Europe into common battle out in the Hobbesian world, even in a minor role, was thereby unnecessarily lost.

Americans are powerful enough that they need not fear Europeans, even when bearing gifts. Rather than viewing the United States as a Gulliver tied down by Lilliputian threads, American leaders should realize that they are hardly constrained at all, that Europe is not really capable of constraining the United States. If the United States could move past the anxiety engendered by this inaccurate sense of constraint, it could begin to show more understanding for the sensibilities of others, a little generosity of spirit. It could pay its respects to multilateralism and the rule of law and try to build some international political capital for those moments when multilateralism is impossible and unilateral action unavoidable. It could, in short, take more care to show what the founders called a “decent respect for the opinion of mankind.”

These are small steps, and they will not address the deep problems that beset the transatlantic relationship today. But, after all, it is more than a cliché that the United States and Europe share a set of common Western beliefs. Their aspirations for humanity are much the same, even if their vast disparity of power has now put them in very different places. Perhaps it is not too naïvely optimistic to believe that a little common understanding could still go a long way.

Notes

1. One representative French observer describes “a U.S. mindset” that “tends to emphasize military, technical and unilateral solutions to international problems, possibly at the expense of co-operative and political ones.” See Gilles Andreant, “The Disarray of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy,” *Survival* (Winter 1999–2000).

2. The case of Bosnia in the early 1990s stands out as an instance where some Europeans, chiefly British Prime Minister Tony Blair, were at times more forceful in advocating military action than first the Bush and then the Clinton administration. (Blair was also an early advocate of using air power and even ground troops in the Kosovo crisis.) And Europeans had forces

on the ground in Bosnia when the United States did not, although in a UN peacekeeping role that proved ineffective when challenged.

3. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," *Foreign Affairs* (March-April 1999).

4. Steven Everts, "Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe?: Managing Divergence in Transatlantic Foreign Policy," Centre for European Reform working paper (February 2001).

5. For that matter, this is also the view commonly found in American textbooks.

6. Notwithstanding the British contribution of patrols of the "no-fly zone."

7. The common American argument that European policy toward Iraq and Iran is dictated by financial considerations is only partly right. Are Europeans greedier than Americans? Do American corporations not influence American policy in Asia and Latin America, as well as in the Middle East? The difference is that American strategic judgments sometimes conflict with and override financial interests. For the reasons suggested in this essay, that conflict is much less common for Europeans.

8. Charles Grant, "A European View of ESDP," Centre for European Policy Studies working paper (April 2001).

9. John Lambertson Harper, *American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean C. Acheson* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3. The following discussion of the differing American perspectives on Europe owes much to Harper's fine book.

10. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940* (Harper Bros., 1952.), 14.

11. See Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrensdoerf, *Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace* (University Press of Kansas, 1999), 200-201.

Feminist Responses to International Security Studies

J. Ann Tickner

In his book, *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*, sociologist Anthony Giddens asks what we should make of the fact that “propagation of military violence has always been a resolutely male affair.” While acknowledging that there is a relation between war, military power, and masculinity, Giddens claims that war is not a manifestation of male aggression; rather, it is associated with the rise of the state. In a rather different book, *War and Gender*, international relations scholar Joshua Goldstein asks why we have not been more curious about the fact that, while virtually all societies throughout history have engaged in war, overwhelmingly they have been fought by men. Although Goldstein reaches a conclusion somewhat similar to Giddens, that war is not due to males’ inherent aggression, he devotes his entire book to examining evidence about the association of war with men and masculinity.

In this essay, I will first discuss the gendering of war, the state, and citizenship in the context of the discipline of international relations (IR). Then I will say something about gender studies and its silences with respect to war and international security. I will suggest some reasons why these two disciplines, or transdisciplines – IR and gender studies – have a hard time communicating with each other. I will then describe some of the recent feminist scholarship in IR that has begun to bridge this divide and some contributions IR feminists have made to our understanding of war, peace, and international security. Most IR feminists are closer to what in IR is called “critical security studies” than they are to more conventional IR security scholarship. In the end, I want to offer some thoughts on possible convergences between IR feminist scholarship and critical security studies.

Giddens is undoubtedly correct in faulting the state system rather than the individual for international wars. Most IR scholars have criticized reductionist arguments that attribute warfare to male aggression. But, to paraphrase Goldstein, should we not also be more curious about the fact that

state decision makers charged with constructing and implementing military and security policies have generally been men? In today's world of about 190 states, less than 1 percent of presidents or prime ministers are women. The Greek model of the heroic citizen-warrior, which equated manliness with citizenship, has been replicated in many polities since. To die for one's country in battle is a patriotic duty that, until very recently and in only a very few states, has been denied to virtually all women. In the U.S., military service has been a mark of first class citizenship and was an important rationale for the National Organization for Women's support for allowing women into combat positions in the military.

But it is not only state decision making and militaries that have been mostly populated by men. The discipline of international relations, which was founded at the beginning of the twentieth century by scholars searching for explanations for the causes of war, has also been a field largely populated by men – although this is changing somewhat today. In the last twenty years, in the U.S. at least, IR has been heavily influenced by rational choice theory, which is modeled on the behavior of individuals in the market, behavior that, historically, is more typical of men than women. Power, autonomy, self-reliance, and rationality are all attributes that realism – the approach in IR that has had the most influence on security studies – deems desirable for state behavior if states are going to survive and prosper in a dangerous “anarchical” international system. All of these attributes are ones we associate with a socially constructed “ideal-type” masculinity.

The goal of theory building for conventional IR, which includes most realists, has been to generate propositions that are testable and that can help explain the security-seeking behavior of states in the international system. Neorealism, the devolution of realism committed to scientific methods, believes that theory should be explanatory and separated, to the greatest extent possible, from norms and political practice. While to feminists this view of theory appears thoroughly gendered – and gendered masculine – most international theorists would deny that their theories have anything to do with gender, since gender is usually assumed to be synonymous with women.

Conversely, and in spite of the presence of some women in foreign and defense policy leadership positions, the term “woman” is still antithetical to our stereotypical image of a “national security specialist.” War and national security are areas where it has been presumed that women have little important to say. And it may also be that women are complicit in perpetuating this stereotype. According to feminist political scientist Judith Stiehm, since men (and she is talking specifically about the United States) have been given a near monopoly on the application of state violence, and most women have been exempt from first-hand experience of war, women tend to exhibit what Stiehm calls “a civilian mind,” a certain ostrich-like obliviousness when it comes to matters of national security and war. This can also be said for gender studies in the United States. I have sometimes found that in women's studies departments, audiences tend to be small when military or national security matters are on the agenda.

The distance and lack of understanding between international theory and feminist theory is something about which I have become increasingly concerned in my efforts to introduce a feminist perspective into international relations. I am convinced that the difficulties these two bodies of knowledge have in conversing with one another stem as much from epistemological differences as they do from the incompatibility of subject matter. Whereas international theory builds on an ontology of inter-state relations that sees states as unitary rational actors operating in an asocial international environment, feminist theory is sociological. It comes out of an ontology of social relations, particularly gender relations, which starts at the level of the individual embedded in hierarchical social, political, and economic structures.

Feminist theory seeks to better understand women's subordination in order to prescribe strategies for ending it. Unlike IR theory, feminist theory is explicitly normative and often emancipatory. Believing that claims of objectivity and universality that rest on knowledge primarily about men must be questioned, feminists seek to develop what they call "practical knowledge" or knowledge developed out of the everyday practices of peoples' lives. Preferring bottom-up rather than top-down knowledge, feminists believe that theory cannot be separated from political practice.

Feminist IR, an approach that dates back to the late 1980s, has attempted to bring feminist theory into the discipline of international relations. It has questioned IR's assumptions and concepts and asked new questions, such as the questions about states and citizens that I mentioned earlier. While much of this work has been in areas such as the global economy, development, and human rights, there is also an emergent literature on gender, war, and international security. Whereas conventional security studies have generally looked at conflict from a top-down or structural perspective, feminists have generally taken a bottom-up approach analyzing the impact of war at the micro level. Feminists have been particularly concerned with what goes on during wars, especially the impact of war on women and civilians more generally. They have challenged the myth that wars are fought to protect women, children, and others stereotypically viewed as "vulnerable."

Feminist scholar Carol Cohn has analyzed the strategic language of national security planners involved in planning high-tech warfare. High-tech weapons that kill from great distances increase the impersonality of warfare and decrease the sense of personal responsibility among soldiers – this is one way the military deals with the problem that most men do not like to kill. On the other hand, we are also seeing patterns of increased intimacy of war being especially prevalent in ethno-national conflicts. The targeting of victims' identity is an integral part of this type of war; the destruction of viable economies and civil societies, and the suffering this inflicts on entire populations, defies the rationalist explanations typical of IR theory. Feminism, with its focus on identity and social relations, has been shedding new light on today's ethno-national wars.

For example, feminists have shown that wartime rape, as witnessed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, is now being used as a strategy of war; it not only terrorizes women but also contributes to male humiliation when men fail to protect "their women." Feminists have brought issues such as wartime rape and military prostitution onto the security agenda. They have questioned the role of the state as a security provider, suggesting that, in many of today's wars, states may actually be threatening to their own populations, either through direct violence or through tradeoffs that tend to get made between warfare and welfare. And feminists are beginning to investigate whether there is a link between domestic violence and highly militarized societies. Feminists seek to understand how the security of individuals and groups is compromised by violence, both physical and structural, at all levels. Hierarchical social, political, and economic structures of inequality can contribute to the oppression of certain groups of people; how these structures are legitimated and maintained is also a subject of feminist research.

Feminist research on security has employed quite different methods from conventional IR security studies. Consistent with feminist approaches more generally, IR feminist Katharine Moon has used ethnographic methods to examine prostitution camps around U.S. military bases in South Korea in the 1970s. Moon links these women's life stories to U.S.-Korean security relations at the highest level. She demonstrates how the security of the South Korean state translated into insecurity for these women. Carol Cohn has used discourse analysis to help us understand the limitations placed on the ability to think fully and well about security when defense intellectuals are constrained in what they say by masculine discourse. From her ethnographic research among defense intellectuals engaged in strategic nuclear planning during the Cold War, Cohn concludes that the fear of sounding like a woman constrained the options that could be raised.

These methods, ethnography and discourse analysis, are ones not often used in conventional security studies. Feminists' focus on issues such as prostitution is sometimes dismissed as not relevant or important to the "real business" of national security and war. And there is always the fear, linked to the question of male aggression, that feminists are raising the specter of good women and bad men. Yet, most feminists are very reluctant to embrace essentialist and reductive notions of peaceful women and aggressive men. Many believe that the unproblematic association of women with an idealized and passive definition of peace has worked to devalue both women and peace.

Different questions, different assumptions, and threats to gender identity are all issues that contribute to the gulf between conventional IR and feminist approaches to peace and security. But the deeper divides are epistemological. International relations theorists expect that research programs will generate testable hypotheses about war and international security. Feminists counter that their research comes out of very different epistemological positions, which question claims about human intention built on models from the natural sciences and the claim to universality of a knowledge tradition built largely on the experiences of men, usually elite men. The judging of quite different epistemological traditions according to the scientific standards of one body of

literature, in this case the dominant one, is problematic. It becomes even more so when issues of power are involved. Therefore, bridging this divide may prove difficult. But feminism and critical security studies – an approach that is gaining increasing influence in IR – have more in common.

Like feminists, critical security studies scholars have suggested that issues they consider important for understanding security cannot be raised within a rationalist framework that depends on an ontology based on rational actors in a state-centric world. Their belief that state and other actors cannot be understood without examining their identities as well as the identities they attribute to others demands more interpretive modes of analysis that can investigate how these identities, which may lead to conflict, are constructed and maintained. Similarly, feminist theorists investigate how oppressive gender hierarchies that, they believe, decrease the security of individuals are constructed and maintained. More radical versions of critical security studies claim that when knowledge about security is constructed in terms of the binary metaphysics of Western culture – such as inside versus outside, us versus them, and community versus anarchy – security can be understood only within the confines of a domestic community whose identity is constructed in antithesis to external threat. Feminists have pointed to similar binaries that, they claim, are gendered; frequently, those living on the outside of one's own state's boundaries are seen as feminized, less rational, and more unpredictable than those on the inside.

Critical security studies is also emancipatory. For example, critical security scholar Ken Booth has defined security as freeing individuals and groups from the social, physical, economic, and political constraints that prevent them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do. Perspectives on security that begin with the security of the individual provide an entry point for feminist theorizing. Claiming, as they do, that gender hierarchies are socially constructed allows feminists, like critical security scholars, to pursue an emancipatory agenda and postulate a world that could be otherwise.

Let me end with some examples. Joshua Goldstein concludes his study by suggesting that the socialization practices of boys and girls motivates men's participation in combat and women's exclusion from it. And practices can be changed. Feminist IR scholar Charlotte Hooper sees in the West some softening of what she terms "hegemonic masculinity," as we move away from warrior heroes to a masculinity linked to processes of globalization and capitalist restructuring. (I would argue, however, that this shift has been somewhat compromised by the post-9/11 security agenda.) The 1990s emphasis on the caring humanitarian side of military duties, found in certain peacekeeping operations, and the increasing visibility of women and gay men in American and European militaries lend support to the idea that the military may be becoming detached from hegemonic masculinity.

Recent research has also suggested that those who oppose military solutions to conflict, women and men, are among those most likely to support feminist goals. Mark Tessler and Ina Warriner's 1997 article in *World Politics*, which

described a study of Israeli, Egyptian, Palestinian, and Kuwaiti attitudes toward the Arab/Israeli conflict, reported that men and women in these societies did not have significantly different attitudes toward the conflict and there was no evidence of women being less militaristic than men. There was a strong positive correlation, however, between those who supported equality of women and those who supported diplomacy and compromise.

If women become warriors, it reinforces the war system. If women are seen only as peacemakers, it reinforces both militarized masculinity and women's marginality with respect to the national security functions of the state. Since the way we construct knowledge cannot be separated from the way we act in the world, perhaps these feminist attempts to try to get beyond gendered dichotomies that support militarism and war can help us all to construct more robust definitions of peace and security.

Author's Note

This article is derived from a paper originally presented at the MacArthur Consortium Workshop, "Gender, the Military, and War," Stanford University, April 2001.

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On the Pedagogy of 'Small Wars'

Tarak Barkawi

'The United States [has] gone down to Mexico to serve mankind'.
President Woodrow Wilson after the US bombardment of Vera Cruz in
1914.¹

War is a harsh teacher. At the outset of each of the great conflagrations of the twentieth century, few of the participants had any real idea just how violent, widespread and destructive they would become.² It really is worth remembering that in August 1914 many of those who went off to fight expected to be home by Christmas. Few could have imagined in 1939 how far into the realms of human barbarity and mechanized killing the world would venture. The same holds true for the early days of the Cold War, and not only in relation to the future perils of the nuclear contest. It is easily forgotten that the East–West struggle was by no means 'cold' in the Third World, where millions died in Cold War-related and other violence in the years after 1945. During the world wars as before them, in the non-European world a 'North–South' struggle rumbled on alongside the clash of great powers. What is new is that, in Condoleezza Rice's words, an 'existential threat' to the western powers now emanates from what were the 'small wars' to the South.³

In order to understand the nature of security relations in a post-9/11 world, we must revisit the most basic issues concerning war and armed conflict. Elemental changes in the social and political context of the use of force are apparent, as they were to Clausewitz reflecting on revolutionary France. The old rule was that mass violence was the preserve of states with their military, industrial and technological resources. Today, 'instruments of mass effect' can be wielded by men armed with box-cutters and pilots' manuals. Yet, the US and UK military establishments are not unrecognizable to Second World War eyes. What are the US and the UK to do to defend their liberal democratic character and the very fabric of their societies from new threats which originate from a transnational network enterprise in the global South?

However one apportions blame and responsibility for the present situation, there is now a growing worldwide, if only loosely articulated, Islamic resistance movement capable of inflicting grievous harm on the West. At this crucial juncture, present approaches to the 'war on terror' risk inflaming this movement and setting in train spirals of violence, much of the costs of which ultimately may be borne by western civilians. It is imperative that we take stock of ourselves and our enemies before deciding how to prosecute the many-sided war in which we are now involved.

Two factors dominate contemporary security relations. The first is the ways in which the new threats have arisen from, and develop in and through, long histories of interaction between the West and other parts of the world. The second is how these threats interact with the societies and politics of the West, not least by fostering a self-perception that prevents full understanding of the situation.

For it is western illusions, primarily about ourselves and our past and present role in the world, that deny us and our leaders the clarity of vision necessary to understand this conflict. This luxury could be afforded, perhaps, when the global South was but a mirror reflecting the West's commitment to the civilizing mission or humanitarian intervention, or merely a testing ground for the free market theories of its professors of economics. But such illusions have often led, particularly for the US, to the adoption of disastrous strategies for 'small wars'. In the current situation, the costs of these mistakes will be borne not only by soldiers, the elected leaders who send them to far-flung corners of the globe and the populations found there; now it is the citizens of the West's great cities, its economics, its basic political values, and ultimately its power and prestige that are at stake.

Lack of perspective is evident in basic conceptions of international politics and strategic studies prevalent in the West. In an article recently published in this journal, a distinguished commentator and former policy-maker observed that from 'the beginning of the twentieth century, the international system was based largely on two epochal events in European history: the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the Congress of Vienna of 1814-15'⁴ – epochal because they established the nation-state and the balance of power as primary features of international politics. This is a wholly unremarkable statement, and reflects what students are being taught in many Anglo-American departments of international relations, as well as the basic vocabulary employed by academics and decision-makers. Unless one seriously reflected on the slippage between 'European' and 'international' in the above quote, one would never suspect that it was in fact the imperial state, the empire and, latterly, the international blocs of the Cold War and the western 'international state' that were the dominant political entities in world politics from the sixteenth century.⁵ While a 'balance of power' may have been evident in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century, most people on the planet, and particularly non-European peasantries, would have been far more aware of a major *imbalance* that had come into existence since 1815. In that year, the living standards of the remaining English yeomen farmers and those,

say, of Punjabi peasants were relatively similar, as were those of their respective betters. Less than a century later, when the major non-European peasantries had been incorporated into the world economy by imperial action, primarily as producers of cheap commodities for export, this was no longer the case. 'By the end of Victoria's reign ... the inequality of nations was as profound as the inequality of classes. Humanity had been irrevocably divided'.⁶ Theories of international politics which fail to reflect the realities in which most of the world's population are and have been living are not of much use, especially when some of them decide to take up arms in rather effective fashion.

Similar myopia is evident elsewhere. So focused were analysts on 'Northern' Great Power relations that when the Soviet Union collapsed many prominent scholars predicted peace, not just in our time but for all time. The 'end of history' was upon us, characterized by the peaceful worldwide spread of free markets and liberal democracy.⁷ Western militaries, to go by much of the literature of the 1990s, were to prepare for nothing beyond peacekeeping and the occasional swatting of a rogue state armed with outdated Soviet equipment.

In conventional accounts, each era has had its own version of what C.E. Callwell quaintly termed 'small wars'⁸ – that is, wars that occurred as a result of intervention in, and conquest of, non-European countries. Wars of empire were 'small' because so few Europeans were involved, not because of their consequences for the countries they were fought in, nor even in terms of their effects on the European balance of power, which were considerable. With decolonization and Cold War, these became 'revolutionary guerrilla wars' or communist insurgencies; and after 1989 they became 'complex humanitarian emergencies' that occurred in 'failed' or 'collapsed' states.

What has happened since 1989 is that the axis of threat has shifted, from great power and superpower contests to a much older struggle: that between North and South, between the powerful and the weak. For the first time, a resistance movement from the non-European world has inflicted wounding strikes on a metropolitan homeland. More are likely to follow.

'Small wars' have been seen as simply derivative of what was happening in the First World, denying the global South its own dynamics and agency. During the Cold War, many persisted in seeing events in the Third World as a direct outgrowth of the East–West contest, and usually Soviet-inspired. Yet Vietnamese nationalists, Iranian republicans, Afghani *Mujahedin*, and peasants in Central and South America imagined themselves to be involved in a quite different struggle: that for political independence and autonomy, for the right to determine their own fate and manage their own affairs, and for a just share of resources and distribution of wealth and opportunity. They very often understood these struggles to be of long provenance, dating back well beyond the division of the world between western and Soviet spheres of influence. The Vietnamese began preparing for their war of independence in the 1890s. In the videotaped statement released on 7 October 2001, Osama bin Laden declared that for over eighty years Islam had been

'tasting ... humiliation and contempt ... its sons ... killed, its blood ... shed, its holy places... attacked'.⁹ The reference to 'eighty years' has little resonance in the West, but is a clear reference to the break-up of the Ottoman Empire and the passing of the territories of the old caliphate to the control of western mandates and thereafter, in many cases, to regimes friendly to the West.

Learning about the Enemy

Many in the West prefer to think of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates as a 'fanatical strain of religious extremism', in the words of Prime Minister Tony Blair, rather than as a hybrid form of anti-colonial resistance.¹⁰ President George W. Bush refers simply to the 'terrorist threat to civilization'.¹¹ Such language serves to vilify the enemy and may mobilize support in the West, but it does not aid understanding. There is a strong tendency to imagine that Islam and the histories of western imperialism are separate matters, that really what is at issue is the violent manifestation of particular strands of Islamic belief. In fact, the root causes of the current situation lie in the working out of long-term histories of western expansion and their dynamic interaction with the Islamic world. A brief visit to a minor front of the war on terror, the island of Mindanao in the Philippines, is instructive in this regard.

Long before what we now call 'globalization' and imagine as the 'inevitable' spread of western culture, Islam was already a world religion. 'The classical *dar al-islam* [land of Islam] was ... a "trans-hemispheric civilisation" and probably the most successful, long-lasting and far-reaching example of archaic globalization'.¹² When the Spanish arrived in the Philippines in the sixteenth century, they discovered two well-developed Muslim sultanates and identified their subjects as 'Moors', transplanting to East Asia Spain's own experience of a 700-year struggle at the other, western end of Islamic globalization. War broke out, with the sultan of Maguindanao urging his 'Moros' to resist as their only hope of retaining freedom. For 300 years, resistance continued in one fashion or another. When Spain turned the Philippines over to the US in 1898, Mindanao was still not pacified and became a major site of US anti-guerrilla operations which by 1902, in the Philippines as a whole, had claimed around a quarter of a million lives – no small conflict by any measure. (By comparison, total UK civilian and military deaths in the Second World War were around 388,000.) Never fully pacified, many Moros greatly resented being integrated by fiat into the new state of the Philippines when the US granted it independence in 1946. They have carried on fighting; and now the Moro National Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front find themselves caught up in a new western wartime construction, the 'war on terror', and once again US advisers are engaged in counterinsurgency operations.

A literate Moro fighter might well imagine modern history very differently from how it is seen in the West. After all, he is the inheritor of a once great and proud world civilization, trodden underfoot by Spanish and American

barbarians and their local cronies. He is also the product of a very different military tradition, that of the weak against the strong. We may fulminate about hostage-taking, bombings, ambushes and other 'cowardly' and 'terroristic' tactics, as President Bush characterized the militias opposing the invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003. But it takes only a moment's reflection to realize that Moro fighters and those like them would stand no chance if they played by the rules established by the strong, standing up to be shot down by the superior firepower the powerful are always able to employ. Theirs is necessarily a war of the shadows, and westerners do no differently in similar situations: in the American Revolutionary War and the French resistance in the Second World War, for example. This military tradition was intimately familiar with clandestine network organization long before computers provided the analogy.

What might 9/11 have meant for this fictional Moro fighter? Watching those towers fall on some satellite television deep in the bush, or perhaps viewing some gloating Al-Qaeda video of the events of that day, he might well have realized that something had just happened to his own little war, making it part of something bigger. There is an important sense in which Third World resistance movements, even while skilfully developing a distinctive military tradition, have been less resourceful politically, playing a game set up by the West and its system of international relations. Ever since the French Revolution, they have sought independent statehood as legal equals with the Europeans, mutually recognized by other sovereign states. At the same time, they have accepted the European notion that the title to statehood is rooted in the nation, setting Arab against Muslim, Zulu against South African. Their struggles were primarily local and national in purpose, whatever support they and their opponents may have drawn from abroad.

At a stroke, Osama bin Laden changed this far more effectively than decades of Soviet and Chinese pronouncements about communist internationalism. Bin Laden is no respecter of sovereign borders. For him, dividing up the Islamic world into separate countries is a tool of western control, the classic tool: divide and rule. As the Al-Qaeda website noted with reference to Afghanistan's president, hand-picked by the US, 'A "Karzai" regime exists officially in all the Muslim countries. All rulers are crowned in the Karzai way.'¹¹ The point is bombastically put; but consider the origins of many Middle Eastern countries, carved out by the Turks, the British and the French, centred on specially selected sheikhs, sustained by oil money and military and police assistance, supplemented by the occasional covert operation when someone untoward makes it to a position of power or threatens to. There is more than a little truth in Al-Qaeda's comment. President Karzai even has a foreign bodyguard.

A Moro fighter could now well imagine himself as a participant not in a local struggle, but in a transregional war designed to bring about a new caliphate in the old *dar al-islam*. He might not do so; he might carry on in the old way; but equally he might decide to join the new struggle. It is this new possibility that Al-Qaeda, and its various loosely affiliated organizations,

networks and individuals, have put on the table. A potentially global resistance movement has been called into existence, made possible by the centuries-old spread of Islam around the world. The presence of Islam in the West as well as in all the poor regions of the world, with the exception of Latin America, means that the histories of colonialism and neo-colonialism, of western wealth and of poverty in the global South, are all in dynamic interaction with Islam and its growing militant resistance. The world stands now at the threshold of a long struggle. Given the relative success of current efforts to clamp down on terrorist finances, communications and movements, it is most likely the case that the resistance movement centred on Al-Qaeda is in its very early stages of organization and development. It is also likely that Al-Qaeda is set on a long-term strategy, vital to which will be the mobilization and organization of Islamic militants around the world.

The key to mobilizing this popular base is the increasing belief that the West is truly engaged in a war against Islam, that the West is fighting Islam everywhere. Might it not seem to our Moro that this is indeed the case, as he catches sight of US special forces on patrol in his backyard, hears of the Palestinian struggle, watches the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and discovers that the Americans have even remembered to include some obscure Muslim brothers in remote parts of China on their lists of enemies? Might he not decide to start returning the favour, and begin establishing transnational connections with other, like-minded groups, coordinating operations and orientating them towards the larger, global struggle? Al-Qaeda again: 'It must also be noted that in its war with America, the Al-Qa'ida organization adopted the strategy of expanding the battle arena ... This strategy has priceless advantages; the enemy who had only his country to defend realized that he now must defend his enormous interests in every country'.¹⁴ Here we have a glimpse of this conflict's potential for widespread and long-term destruction, very far from fully realized as yet.

It suits the interests of Al-Qaeda to imagine the developing conflict as a clash of civilizations. In Samuel Huntington's influential formulation, civilizations are clearly delineated on maps, although they may have dangerous borderlands, and they persist through world historical time as distinct cultural essences.¹⁵ Huntington's idea is that conflicts of belief can lead civilizations to make war on one another. This is to conceive the relationship between war and culture the wrong way round. War is a great engine which both transforms the content of national identity and inculcates it in individuals. It is during and after conflicts that the sense of common purpose and identification with the nation reaches fever pitch, for it is wartime sacrifice that creates the sense that there *must* be an entity greater than the individual, which pursues higher purposes demanding so many lives. Blood sacrifice both feeds and shapes the cause for which one fights. 'It is', as John Comaroff remarks, 'in situations of struggle and times of trouble that the content of ethnic self-consciousness is (re)fashioned.'¹⁶

The conclusion is inescapable: it is war that makes and remakes civilizations. Bin Laden is seeking to make *his* vision of Islamic civilization a reality

through the medium of war. He seeks to constitute an Islamic nation at war through his acts of violence and those of his enemies, and through the particular interpretations he and his allies place on them and popularize through various media. US officials regularly aid him in this task, by articulating Islam with terror and local resistance struggles with a global threat in practice and in rhetoric. Vice-President Dick Cheney refers to 'terrorists' who struck 'Riyadh, Casablanca, Mombasa, Bali, Jakarta, Najaf and Baghdad' as if they were one 'network' against which the US could conduct a 'global campaign'.¹⁷ This is precisely what Al-Qaeda hopes to achieve one day. The West should be seeking to fuel the opposite dynamic, disarticulating local and global struggles. By conflating Islam and terror with any kind of armed resistance, we are in danger of repeating the mistakes of the early Cold War, where obvious fault-lines in the communist bloc were ignored, for example in Yugoslavia and China, in the name of constructing a unitary, global image of the threat. The tensions caused by the ethnic Arab hierarchy within global Islam can be exploited, as can the various local roots of activists' motivation for resistance, by addressing each conflict at its particular source, rather than as an instance of some imaginary whole. Many of these conflicts, however, have systemic sources, often deriving from the structure of the global economy. The popularity of the Islamic madrassi schools in Pakistan and elsewhere, for example, stems in part from IMF structural adjustment programmes that forced retrenchments in public education.

Learning about Ourselves

Learning to see the war through our enemies' eyes is a vital first step. But Sun Tzu reminded us that 'knowing thyself' is just as important to victory, and there is one final lesson for us on Mindanao – the hardest of all. In his speech to the American Enterprise Institute before the war in Iraq, President Bush remarked that the world 'has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed ideologies of murder'.¹⁸ There would have been no question in his mind that 'democratic values', as well as 'liberty' and 'freedom', emanated from the West and from America in particular, and from there spread to the rest of the world. 'Americans', he told another audience, have sacrificed themselves in wartime 'missions of rescue and liberation on nearly every continent'.¹⁹ He told some graduating university students after Saddam's fall that he had 'a great goal for this nation. We will use our influence and idealism to replace old hatreds with new hopes across the Middle East'.²⁰ Lately, he announced the US has adopted a 'forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East'.²¹ These remarks should not be dismissed as mere rhetoric. On the contrary, they reveal the most deeply held, most cherished beliefs the West has about itself: what John Gray has termed the 'recurring utopianism of western civilisation'.²² For President Bush, the 'advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country'.²³

The Moros on Mindanao, and many, many others in the global South, would not characterize what has come to them from the West as 'freedom' and 'liberty'. However one ultimately adjudicates the West's contribution to human flourishing and human suffering, it has to be accepted that in the world outside the Euro-Atlantic community the West appears very different from its own self-image. The West generally sees itself as civilized, modern, developed and rational, while often viewing other parts of the world as barbaric, atavistic, undeveloped and in the grip of passions rather than reason.²⁴ The West likes to think that colonialism, on balance, was a civilizing mission. But this is not generally how the imperial era is remembered by those who were subjugated. For most of them, the arrival of the Europeans was an unprecedented calamity. They suffered war, conquest, epidemics, genocide, famine and other disasters, and were exposed to new vulnerabilities such as dependence on world commodity prices.²⁵ What the West got up to in the global South was the very antithesis of western ideas about itself, it was violent, rapacious and dominating. As Frantz Fanon remarked, when speeches are made about western values, the 'native' is likely to pull out his knife, or at least 'makes sure it is within reach'.²⁶

More recently, since 1989, the West, and the US in particular, set out to remake the world once again in its own image, in a Utopian effort to spread democracy and free markets everywhere. With astonishing arrogance, Francis Fukuyama and others spoke of liberal democracy in its particularly American embodiment as the 'final form of human government', indeed the 'end point of mankind's ideological evolution'.²⁷ Seemingly without considering the possibility that someone, somewhere would stand up and resist effectively, Fukuyama argued that as the US was the world's sole remaining superpower, it is 'inevitable that Americanization will accompany globalization'.²⁸

For many in the global South, the era of free market globalization has been one not of peace and prosperity, but of increasing inequality, collapsing states and endemic violence.²⁹ When it was a matter of ensuring debt repayments or opening Third World markets to western exports and investment, the West insisted that free market logic was the only possible way forward. But when it came to opening the West's own markets, or cutting agricultural subsidies, then different rules applied, as seen most recently at the collapse of the WTO ministerial meeting in Cancún in September 2003. 'While the EU gives very generously with one hand through its aid policies, its trade policies destroy the livelihoods of poor farmers'.³⁰ It is not unreasonable, given their devastating effects, to consider the EU's Common Agricultural Policy or US farm subsidies as something approaching humanitarian crimes. Similarly, what of the West's preferential commitment to patent rights over human rights, to the point where it values the profits of its pharmaceutical corporations above the lives of millions suffering from disease in the global South? As bin Laden points out, while western slogans 'call for humanity, justice, and peace, the behaviour of their governments is

completely the opposite'.³¹ In many parts of the world, Muslim peasants bear the burden of these and other western policies.

Enormous and growing economic inequality between and among peoples, and an international economic regime that systematically favours the rich nations, are basic features of the contemporary world.³² As Paul Rogers remarks, 'the atrocities of September 11 and the mass murder of 3,000 people may have represented real human tragedies but took place in a world in which 5,000 children die every day from diarrhoea and related causes'.³³ Even deaths from terrorism outside the US routinely exceeded 3,000 year after year as the post-colonial world struggled with a political inheritance of partitions and resentments. Yet the West too often persists in seeing only its own beneficence, and imagines that everyone else does too, even in the face of obvious evidence to the contrary. Michael Mandelbaum, senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, has recently published a book arguing that 9/11 'did not usher in a new world'.³⁴ The reason, he argues, is that three western ideas have already 'conquered' the world: peace, democracy and free markets: 'The market-centered international order of the twenty-first century command[s] almost universal allegiance'.³⁵ One has to ask what world Mandelbaum is living in, as not even in Europe, much less in the global South, is this view 'universally shared'. According to his panglossian logic, 9/11 demonstrated not that the West is vulnerable to a new form of warfare, but that it 'had no serious rival in the world of the twenty-first century'. The perpetrators of 9/11, as he saw it, 'proposed nothing in place of what they sought to destroy'.³⁶ Presumably, Al-Qaeda has a different view: 'I ... fight until the Americans are driven out of all the Islamic countries'.³⁷ Whatever is made of Al-Qaeda's political project, it should be remembered that although the Goths lacked a programme of reform, they nonetheless managed to sack Rome.

These points are not made for purposes of self-flagellation. Western illusions, and the inability of western elites to see themselves as others see them, stand directly in the path of a clear-sighted appreciation of the nature of the current conflict and of the enemy. This is particularly evident in the vast amount of ink recently spilled in newspapers and other publications over the question of what could possibly motivate suicidal terrorists. A culture which freely expended its sons in the trenches of Flanders suddenly cannot understand the impulse to sacrifice for cause and comrades. How many western soldiers have set off on missions knowing there was small likelihood they would return? How many patriots have laid down their lives with joy in their hearts? Yet, when a Muslim does this, analysts reach for the Qur'an and develop elaborate theories of fanaticism and Islamic attraction to violence, despite the fact that of 188 suicide bombings between 1988 and 2001, 75 were carried out by the avowedly secular Tamil Tigers.³⁸ Should it not just be accepted that suicide bombers are fighters in a cause, a cause with which one may disagree and against which one may fight, but one that nonetheless can be recognized, with just a small dose of empathy, as a response to historic injustice?

Learning about 'Small Wars'

Only by granting one's enemies a full and unqualified humanity can one ever hope to understand them. Western leaders will never manage this feat as long as they stay locked in delusions about their own rationality, beneficence and civilization while denying Muslims and Arabs the same. This is doubly important in the struggle against 'terrorism'. For the military tradition of the weak against the strong has always had to make use of unconventional tactics and ruses, precisely because the weak lack the wherewithal to fight in conventional fashion. This does not make them evil; rather, it is a sign of strategic sophistication. In an earlier small war in which the British empire was fighting for the right to export opium to China, the Chinese on Hong Kong island resorted to poisoning the bread they baked for the Europeans. Luckily for the British, they rather overdid it, putting in too much arsenic, which induced vomiting before the poison could work. One afflicted British trader wrote home, 'This mode of warfare is hard to deal with'.³⁹ At least he had the honesty to call it 'warfare' rather than barbarity or terrorism. The Chinese armies were opposing bladed weapons to gunpowder, war junks to steamships. Opening a new front in the bakeries was a rational and creative response to such a situation. To expect any less is to imagine your enemies are stupid.

Yet many persist in seeing in 'terrorist acts' some kind of innate barbarity rather than classic weapons of the weak. As uses of force, many of Al-Qaeda's bombings and other operations have had great strategic effect in return for lives and resources expended, not least on 9/11 itself. Nonetheless, an American military spokesman characterized a recent bombing in Iraq as 'heinous' and 'an act of pure brutality with no possible aim except to cause destruction and death'.⁴⁰ This officer needs to be reminded that all acts of war involve destruction in pursuit of political aims. He might also reflect on the fact that suicide bombings have been an enormously effective tool in resisting military occupation, as the recent acceleration of the US timetable for handing over sovereignty to the Iraqis attests.⁴¹ A young Palestinian woman remarked of the choice of suicide bombs, 'This is the only weapon we have'.⁴² In the three weeks following the invasion of Iraq, between 3,500 and 6,000 Iraqi civilians were killed and perhaps 20,000 more injured, yet this is thought of as 'collateral damage' suffered in the course of legitimate military operations.⁴³ 'The Islamic nation must also know that the US version of terrorism is a kind of deception. Is it logical for the United States and its allies to carry out this repression, persecution, plundering and bloodletting over these long years without this being called terrorism, while when the victim tries to seek justice, he is described as terrorist?'⁴⁴ The point is not that one side is a terrorist and the other is not. Rather, both sides are at war and making use of available instruments in the most effective way they know how. Planning must proceed on this basis rather than on that of the specious moralizing which all too easily informs strategic thinking in the West.⁴⁵ '[W]e in the West call the few casualties we suffer from terrorism and surprise "cowardly", the frightful losses we inflict through open and direct assault "fair"'.⁴⁶

Perhaps the greatest illusion the West has about itself concerns the nature of its strength and the enemy's weakness. US academics have lately been wont to emphasize the magnitude of American power as compared to that of the British or the Romans in their day. Statistics are adduced concerning how many countries' entire annual defence budgets it would take to buy a single aircraft carrier battle group, what portion of the world's total military spending is controlled by the Pentagon, and so on. When not dwelling on the size of US forces, such commentators emphasize their technological prowess, which is indeed impressive. But the US was forced to withdraw from Vietnam by men armed, in large measure, with infantry weapons and a few handfuls of rice. Now it hurls million-dollar cruise missiles against an enemy who took down its great buildings with fewer than twenty men. Neither expenditure nor technical sophistication guarantees victory. Where *does* power reside in these contests?

In the topsy-turvy world of wars fought between North and South, it has often been the case that leaders of the most powerful countries on earth have been brought low by 'savages' and peasants, as President Lyndon Johnson discovered in the weeks following the Tet offensive, despite the fact that it proved a battlefield disaster for the Vietnamese communists. Volatile democratic publics in the West encourage both precipitate intervention, sometimes inspired by humanitarian impulses, *and* precipitate withdrawal, when they discover that interventions rarely work out as planned and often require large amounts of blood and treasure to see through. Benjamin Disraeli came to power in 1874 promising imperial adventures, an electoral strategy that appealed to the newly enlarged British electorate. Despite the absence of television news, his government collapsed in 1880, in part as a result of William Gladstone's denunciations of the Afghan and Zulu wars. 'Remember the rights of the savage!' Gladstone told his audiences.⁴⁷ Gladstone himself came a cropper in the Sudan, and the Italian prime minister Francesco Crispi was forced to step down following the near-annihilation of an Italian army by the Ethiopians at Adowa in 1896. Jimmy Carter saw his presidency crumble in Iran, while even Ronald Reagan stumbled into a major constitutional crisis through his efforts to defeat tiny Nicaragua.

The interactions between democratic publics in the West and military intervention in the non-European world are complex, and yet simple nostrums often substitute for serious analysis in this area. The US was willing to suffer over 56,000 killed (and inflict, with its allies, over a million military and civilian deaths) in a country few Americans had heard of prior to 1965. As a result of defeat, the idea of a 'Vietnam syndrome' – a lack of willingness to intervene for fear of casualties – was subsequently assumed to afflict the US. The real dynamics at work were considerably different, and expose how it is that western illusions and identity constructions hobble its strategies for the conduct of 'small wars'.

The strategy the US pursued in Vietnam reflected its basic conception of the Cold War. The world was seen as divided between two blocs, one slave, one free. It went without question that the denizens of the free world *wanted*

to be free. Subversion emanated from the Soviet bloc countries and infected the free world. Insurgencies were therefore read as evidence of external attack, rather than as consequences of the social and political upheaval that gripped the Third World in the wake of the Second World War.⁴⁸ 'What Chairman Khrushchev describes as wars of liberation and popular uprisings', Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara remarked, 'I prefer to describe as subversion and covert aggression'.⁴⁹ In both elite and popular understandings of Vietnam, America was trying to help a 'free people' defend itself from external attack.

It is in this context that the real surprise of the Tet offensive can be grasped. It was not only that the claims of steady American progress beforehand now seemed hollow. Tet appeared on television screens as a general uprising against the Saigon regime and its American backers. It was no longer possible to evade the fact that 'the people' were against the 'freedom' the US was offering. The initial framing of the conflict, as one primarily about 'communist subversion' from outside, led to the adoption of an overly militarized and counterproductive strategy, one pregnant with the possibility of battlefield reverses. Precisely because of the heavy implication of American identity in its Vietnam venture, such defeats can become more general crises for the body politic. They challenge the identity relations and ideological constructs which inspired intervention in the first place.

The real 'Vietnam syndrome' in American culture is the process by which the verdict of Tet – that the US was not on the side of 'the people' – was erased and America reinstated as the defender of the oppressed everywhere, willing to use its military power to liberate them. Thus what was not so in practice is achieved in imagination. In both political ideology and popular culture, the history of the war was radically rewritten, in ways which served to re-empower the militarized American internationalism so evident today in Iraq. The neo-conservative clique that exercises such profound influence over the Bush administration fled the Democratic Party during the Vietnam era, because the party had become less willing to use force in the service of American values abroad. Their view was that whatever went wrong in Vietnam, it was right for America to use force to pursue its values, which are synonymous with liberty and freedom around the world. After Vietnam, two of the most prominent neo-conservatives argue, 'The suspicion of American power inherent in contemporary liberalism now became a reflexive opposition to the exercise of American power around the world'.⁵⁰ Perhaps more important are the ways in which the Vietnam War was rewritten in films, television series and novels, for that is where most Americans have learned their 'history' of the war.⁵¹ Broadly speaking, the rewriting of the war is a movement from the world of *The Deer Hunter* (dir. Michael Cimino, 1978) to that of the recent Mel Gibson vehicle *We Were Soldiers* (dir. Randall Wallace, 2002). By the time of the latter, as Marilyn Young remarks, 'Vietnam [had] become a war of which Americans [could] feel proud'.⁵²

This kind of imaginative work was crucial to politically enabling the conquest and occupation of Iraq for purposes of liberating the oppressed Iraqi

people. The rewriting of the Vietnam War provides an answer to a key question: How was it possible that President Bush and his learned advisers came to the conclusion that the US would be received as a liberator in Iraq? Anyone with even the most basic understanding of Iraqi history and of perceptions of the US in the Middle East suspected strongly that only trouble awaited the Americans in Iraq. Nonetheless, as late as October 2003 President Bush was surprised to discover the extent of anti-American feeling in the Islamic world. 'Do they really believe that we think all Muslims are terrorists?' he asked his staff, some of whom conceded the President 'has only begun to discover the gap between the picture of a benign superpower that he sees and the far more calculating, self-interested, anti-Muslim America the world perceives'.⁵³ This is stark evidence of the fantasy land from which the highest levels of political leadership are conducting the war on terror. President Bush, however, is fully *au fait* with the 'history' of the Vietnam War. In his recent speech about bringing democracy and freedom to the Middle East, he cited Vietnam as one place where 'Americans have amply displayed [their] willingness to sacrifice for liberty'.⁵⁴ The Vietnamese, of course, sacrificed far more.

Given the tremendous imbalances in power between the West and the global South, it is difficult to appreciate just how significant the South is for western identity, especially in wartime. The entire panoply of orientalist constructions is at stake on imperial and neo-imperial battlefields, including civilization/barbarism, reason/passion, and strength/weakness. It is for this reason that western defeats must be strenuously explained away. After losing a large portion of an invading column to Zulu attack at Isandhlwana in 1879, the British resorted to over-emphasizing the defensive victory at Rorke's Drift as proof of the superiority of British arms. So shocked were the Italians that the Ethiopians could annihilate their army at Adowa, that they subsequently 'discovered' that Ethiopians were in fact Caucasians darkened by exposure to the equatorial sun, in order to recoup in imagination the ignominy of being defeated by black men.⁵⁵ As can be seen, the problem is that often the 'natives' do not play their assigned role in western identity constructions.

Such is the case in Iraq today. The role of the Iraqi people is to want to be free, for only then can the US understand itself as a liberator. Accordingly, the growing resistance to US occupation must be represented as somehow not emanating from 'real' Iraqis. It is very important that the fiction that the resistance in Iraq is mounted only by 'Saddam loyalists' and 'foreign terrorists' be maintained, for to admit otherwise is to switch from discourses of liberation to those of occupation. 'We're working hard with freedom-loving Iraqis to help ferret these people out before they attack', President Bush has said.⁵⁶ The US administrator in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, referred to those behind a series of bombings in Baghdad in October 2003 as 'cold-blooded killers ... a handful of people who don't want to live in freedom'.⁵⁷ The main goal of the 'killers' is 'to intimidate Iraqis from building a free government and to cause America and our allies to flee our responsibilities'.⁵⁸

Nothing less than the very identity of 'America' is at stake in these representations of the Iraqi resistance. Soon, however, the US will have to add the category of Iraqi 'bad apples' to 'Saddam loyalists' and 'foreign terrorists' to account for the growing number of Iraqis picking up arms.

This framing of the situation in Iraq, despite its resonances with American elite and popular self-perception, is dysfunctional in strategic terms. The implication is that the sources of resistance are to be found *not* in a complex political, cultural and social context fuelled by totalitarianism, conquest and occupation, but rather in an identifiable group of 'cold-blooded killers', who must be 'ferreted out' and destroyed. As in the Cold War, subversion is seen as coming from the 'outside', not from the people the US seeks to free, when in fact it is the US which has invaded Iraq. When the 'ferreting out' comes in the form of heavy-handed use of military force, it contains the potential to generate further popular Iraqi resistance. 'After the Americans are attacked', one Iraqi who has lost grandchildren to American fire commented, 'they shoot everywhere. This is inhuman – a stupid act by a country always talking about human rights.'⁵⁹ Despite its compatibility with American identity, the framing of the conflict in Iraq, as in Vietnam, holds the promise of military reverses, because it inspires counterproductive strategies. As one Iraqi resistance fighter noted of the aggressive American response to recent attacks, '[t]he American army is our best friend. We should be giving them medals.'⁶⁰

Past and Present

Part of imagining you are strong is to think you have the power to control events. When such imaginings are based more on illusions about the West and its role in history than on hard analysis, the outcome is unlikely to match expectations. As Rosemary Hollis wrote before the invasion of Iraq, 'those coming from outside the [Middle East], with even the best intentions, will most likely fail to impose their agendas on those within it, and vice versa ... [T]he more hawkish elements in the US administration think they can impose a new Pax Americana on the Middle East, starting with Iraq, they may well succeed in shaking up the existing regional order, but the outcome will not be exactly as they envisage'.⁶¹ In the quicksand of the non-European world western policy-makers have often believed they could control the direction of events with minimal expenditure of resources. It is not surprising that with all those aircraft-carrier battle groups, fighter and bomber wings, heavy divisions, and nearly bottomless financial resources, President Bush thought he could shape Iraq's future according to his wishes. Unintended consequences are, however, the regular outcome of such efforts. In the early part of the Cold War, the US resorted to cheap and apparently effective covert operations to 'switch regimes' when those perceived as leftists or communists came to power through the ballot box. This had the effect of shutting down legitimate avenues for the expression of dissent and created conditions for

the rise of insurgencies and guerrilla warfare, which proved far more costly to fight, quite aside from the price in lives and broken futures.

Nowhere has the illusion that events in other people's countries can be manipulated to suit western ends backfired more spectacularly than in the Middle East. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, there was a brief opening in US public discourse over the question of why it was that some Muslims and Arabs might hate America as much as they evidently did. While this debate continues in Europe, it has largely been shut down in the US itself as Al-Qaeda and its followers were vilified and the idea that America had brought the attacks on itself seen as at best tasteless and probably unpatriotic. This is profoundly unfortunate, for the history of US foreign policy in the Middle East is a history of tragedy and folly, which at each stage laid the groundwork for the next crisis. The only thing different about 9/11 is that it is now the US as well as others who are bearing the costs. It is worth briefly reviewing some episodes in this history before concluding, as they exemplify much that has been written above.

In the early 1950s, in an effort to head off Soviet influence in the Middle East and to reverse the nationalization of Iranian oil, the US derailed a republican and nationalist experiment in Iran by helping to overthrow the Mosaddeq government in a CIA-supported coup. The US then sought to arm and support the shah of Iran as its policeman in the Persian Gulf. 'In retrospect it is apparent that the policy of making the shah surrogate guardian of US interests in the Gulf backfired badly insofar as it helped fuel the forces of revolution against the Pahlavi dynasty and identified the United States with the shah's overweening ambitions and profligate spending.'⁶² The shah's rule helped to radicalize Shi'a Islam, which after its victory in Iran began exporting radical Islam around the Middle East. The US experience in Iran was a good example of how efforts to head off unwanted political developments in the Third World through resort to covert action and support of repressive authoritarian regimes spawned greater, long-term problems. In the Middle East in particular, the repression of secular political movements, and the closing down of civil society as an avenue for expressing dissent, meant that rebellion and discontent increasingly took on religious, specifically Islamic fundamentalist forms.

Washington, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were all concerned about Shi'i fundamentalist Iran, and in varying degrees encouraged Iraq to invade it in late 1980. They provided a great deal of assistance to Iraq during the ensuing war. Iraq borrowed \$95 billion from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and imported \$42 billion worth of arms, and the US provided approximately \$5 billion in aid.⁶³ After the war, Kuwait increased its output of oil, which of course lowered the price of Iraqi oil, and started demanding repayment of loans from war-torn Iraq, setting the stage for Saddam's invasion, which he mistakenly thought he had cleared with Washington. A decade of sanctions was to follow Saddam's defeat in Kuwait and, whatever the other issues involved, this was a humanitarian disaster for the Iraqis that was deeply felt in the Arab world.

But while the US found radical Islam problematic in Iran, it found it very useful in Afghanistan. Some \$3 billion in aid was provided to the *Mujahedin* to assist their war against the Soviet Union, including approximately 1,000 shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, hundreds of which remain unaccounted for and some of which may be in Al-Qaeda's inventory.⁶⁴ This was the largest CIA covert operation ever. With Washington's blessing, Saudi intelligence poured in another \$2 billion worth of aid, and the chief of Saudi intelligence picked a man named Osama bin Laden to lead the foreign legion of Arab fighters in Afghanistan.⁶⁵ When the Soviet forces withdrew, the US simply walked away from a country in which it had fuelled the flames of war and had lavishly supported a political and religious movement profoundly antithetical to its overall interests and values. The rest of this story need not be repeated here.

It is difficult to see the invasion of Iraq as anything other than the next stage in this ever more violent embrace between the West and the Islamic world. As Clausewitz knew all too well, war is generative of ever more war unless it is kept limited by achievable political aims. The US aims in Iraq were anything but limited, involving the entire restructuring of society, culture and politics. War and occupation are blunt instruments for such goals. A relatively small number of guerrillas, regardless of where they come from, have now created a nearly insoluble 'chicken and egg' problem: reconstruction and development cannot begin in earnest until there is security; but achieving security requires effective rebuilding and restoration of services, because of the need to earn the support rather than enmity of the population in order to defeat the guerrillas. On the West Bank and the Gaza Strip the Israelis, with one of the most effective security establishments in the world, very experienced, well-equipped, well-stocked with Arab translators and informers, utterly ruthless, have been unable to stop suicide bombers who have some degree of support in Palestinian civil society. What chance have the Americans of achieving security in the 'Sunni triangle' of Iraq?⁶⁶

In his last book, written before 9/11, the late Paul Hirst warned his readers that, given the fundamental inequalities of power and wealth in the world, 'new powers' would emerge 'to challenge the beneficiaries of the present system and their dominance of its institutions'. Prophetically, he suggested that '[t]his challenge would be nothing like the actions of the revanchist powers in the 1930s, but [those in the West] ... are complacent if they think it will not happen at all'.⁶⁷ That challenge is now here. The combination of modern technology, its uncontrollable diffusion, and a potentially vast transnational network of angry and disaffected Muslims confronts the West. Perhaps some solace can be taken in the corridors of power that an Islamic movement will never be able to tap fully into other Third World sources of resistance. Despite the novelty of the current situation, and the transnational and network nature of the opponent, the western response so far has involved invading two sovereign states with heavy forces. Far more civilians were killed in these operations than died on 9/11 itself, and many have argued that the UN and international law are among the casualties. The only conclusion the world outside can draw is that, notwithstanding all its universalist and humanitarian

rhetoric, western lives matter more than those of others. Can such actions do anything other than generate even more destructive responses? '[W]ar is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, therefore, compels its opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must lead, in theory, to extremes'.⁶⁸

Given the extreme vulnerability of western societies to determined terrorist attack, it is a matter of utmost urgency that this spiral of violence be headed off. Doing so demands first and foremost that we give up the illusions by which we have distinguished the West from the rest of humanity, as more humane, more rational, more 'free', more willing to undertake sacrifices for the good of others. This is what the history of 'small wars' has to teach us. When the great French sociologist Emile Durkheim set out to discover the elementary role of religion in human societies, he did so among the aborigines of the Australian outback. He believed that even the most savage of the 'savages' had something to teach us about humanity *qua* humanity: 'The most barbarous and the most fantastic rites and the strangest myths translate some human need, some aspect of life, either individual or social'.⁶⁹ We need to find the requisite empathy to understand why men dedicated to the betterment of their peoples and willing to sacrifice their lives, found it necessary to fly jet aircraft into buildings or to blow themselves up in the compounds of humanitarian organizations. After all, we do not find it so perplexing that we ourselves resorted to the obliteration and atomic bombing of civilian populations in the Second World War. If we can make this difficult leap of imagination into our enemy's minds, we will be able to fight them far more effectively. We might also learn an even more invaluable lesson: how to live in peace with people different from ourselves, people who may not choose to live as we do or to organize their societies along western lines, but who are nonetheless fully human and deserving of respect and dignity.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Duncan Bell, Rosamary Hollis, Charles Jones, Mark Laffey, Yezid Sayigh and the International Politics Reading Group, Department of Politics, Bristol University for comments on earlier versions of this paper. It was originally written for the Report on the Cambridge Security Seminar, 30–31 July, 2003, organized by the Cambridge Programme for Security in International Society.

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Knowledge as Power: Science, Military Dominance, and U.S. Security

Robert L. Paarlberg

Can the United States maintain its global lead in science, the new key to its recently unparalleled military dominance? U.S. scientific prowess has become the deep foundation of U.S. military hegemony. U.S. weapons systems currently dominate the conventional battlefield because they incorporate powerful technologies available only from scientifically dominant U.S. weapons laboratories. Yet under conditions of globalization, scientific and technical (S&T) knowledge is now spreading more quickly and more widely, suggesting that hegemony in this area might be difficult for any one country to maintain. Is the scientific hegemony that lies beneath U.S. weapons dominance strong and durable, or only weak and temporary?

Military primacy today comes from weapons quality, not quantity. Each U.S. military service has dominating weapons not found in the arsenals of other states. The U.S. Air Force will soon have five different kinds of stealth aircraft in its arsenal, while no other state has even one. U.S. airborne targeting capabilities, built around global positioning system (GPS) satellites, joint surveillance and target radars, and unmanned aerial vehicles are dominating and unique.¹ On land, the U.S. Army has 9,000 M1 Abrams tanks, each with a fire-control system so accurate it can find and destroy a distant enemy tank usually with a single shot. At sea, the U.S. Navy now deploys Seawolf nuclear submarines, the fastest, quietest, and most heavily armed undersea vessels ever built, plus nine supercarrier battle groups, each carrying scores of aircraft capable of delivering repeated precision strikes hundreds of miles inland. No other navy has even one supercarrier group.²

Such weapons are costly to build, and the large relative size of the U.S. economy (22 percent of world gross domestic product [GDP]) plus the even larger U.S. share of global military spending (43 percent of the world total in 2002, at market exchange rates) have been key to the development and deployment of these forces. Yet economic dominance and spending dominance would not suffice without knowledge dominance. It is a strong and

rapidly growing S&T capacity that has allowed the United States to move far ahead of would-be competitors by deploying new weapons systems with unmatched science-intensive capabilities.

It was in the middle of the twentieth century that the global arms race more fundamentally became a science race. Prior to World War II, military research and development (R&D) spending absorbed on average less than 1 percent of total major power military expenditures. By the 1980s, the R&D share of major power military spending had increased to 11–13 percent.³ It was precisely during this period, as science became a more important part of military might, that the United States emerged as the clear global leader in science. During World War II, the military might of the United States had come more from its industrial capacity (America could build more) than from its scientific capacity (Europe, especially Germany and the United Kingdom, could still invent more). As that war came to an end, however, a fortuitous migration of European scientists to the United States plus wartime research investments such as the Manhattan Project gave the United States the scientific as well as the industrial lead.

During the Cold War, the U.S. lead grew stronger. Scientists from the Soviet Union briefly challenged the United States in space, but then decisively lost the race to the moon. The United States responded to the Soviets' successful launching in 1957 of the world's first earth-orbiting satellite, *Sputnik I*, with much larger investments in its own science education and weapons R&D programs. By the later stages of the Cold War, U.S. weapons had attained a decisive quality advantage over Soviet weapons. This first became fully apparent to U.S. intelligence in 1976, when a Soviet pilot flew his mach-3 MiG-25 Foxbat jet interceptor to Japan in search of asylum. Upon inspection the Foxbat was found to be virtually devoid of any next-generation technologies; it was little more than a "rocket with a window." Following the defeat of U.S. forces in Vietnam, some popular critics questioned the military advantage of high-technology ("gold plated") weapons systems, and suggested that the United States might be better off investing in quantity rather than quality.⁴ But the U.S. decision, post-Vietnam, to move away from a large conscript army and toward a smaller and better-trained all-volunteer force became a reason to increase rather than decrease science investments in weapons quality. During President Ronald Reagan's administration, U.S. military R&D expenditures doubled, leaving Soviet weapons scientists even further behind and contributing in some measure to the final demoralization of the Soviet leadership.⁵

The U.S. weapons quality advantage was in full view for the first time during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when stealth aircraft, lasers, infrared night vision, and electronics for precision strikes gave U.S. forces a decisive edge.⁶ Iraqi forces using Soviet equipment were easily broken and expelled from Kuwait at a total cost of 148 U.S. battle deaths. In the 1999 Kosovo conflict, the United States conducted (this time with no battle deaths) an air campaign so dominating that the Serb air force did not even attempt to fly. By the time of the Afghanistan war in 2001, the United States was using GPS satellite-guided bombs capable of striking with devastating precision in

any weather, as well as in the dark. From a safe altitude, the U.S. Air Force now could destroy virtually any target on the surface of the earth, if that target had fixed and known geographic coordinates.

In the second Persian Gulf War launched against Iraq in March 2003, the U.S. qualitative edge was even more prominent. U.S. forces were able to go all the way to Baghdad using only half the number of troops deployed in 1991 and only one-seventh as many (but far more precise) air-launched munitions, and without a thirty-eight-day bombing campaign (as in the first Gulf War). Only 105 U.S. battle deaths were suffered during the assault itself; there were fewer unintended civilian casualties (one civilian died for every thirty-five munitions dropped), plus far less damage to Iraqi buildings, bridges, and roads.⁷ U.S. strike aircraft flying up to 1,000 sorties a day were able, even through a blinding sandstorm, to destroy the tanks and infantry vehicles of the Republican Guard.⁸ Pervasive GPS capabilities, new sensor systems, near real-time "sensor to shooter" intelligence, and computer-networked communications allowed U.S. forces to leverage the four key dimensions of the modern battlespace – knowledge, speed, precision, and lethality – and to prevail quickly at minimal cost.⁹

The key to this revolution in military affairs (RMA) has been the application of modern science and engineering – particularly in fields such as physics, chemistry, and information technology (IT) – to weapons design and use. It is the international dominance of the United States in these fields of science and technology that has made possible U.S. military dominance on the conventional battlefield.¹⁰ It thus becomes important to judge the magnitude and durability of U.S. scientific hegemony. In the sections that follow, I first measure the U.S. lead in S&T relative to the capabilities of potential rival states by using a variety of science output and resource input indicators. By every indicator, the current lead of the United States is formidable. Then I judge the durability of the U.S. lead by examining two possible weaknesses within its foundation. The first is the greater speed with which scientific knowledge can diffuse (perhaps away from the United States) in the modern age of globalization. The second is the poor science preparation still provided by so many U.S. public schools in grades K-12.

Upon examination, these two factors need not present a significant threat to the U.S. global lead in science and technology, assuming the United States can remain a large net importer of scientific talent and knowledge from abroad. Preserving this vital net inflow of scientific assets has been made more difficult, however, by the homeland security imperatives arising from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It should be the policy of the United States to devise a homeland security strategy that does not impair the nation's access to foreign science talent. One part of this strategy should be to contain the further growth of terrorist threats by avoiding conventional military campaigns that create determined new political adversaries abroad. Victories that bring resentment will breed resistance, most easily expressed in the form of asymmetric threats against soft targets, including homeland targets. Another part of this strategy should be a more effective mobilization

of the nation's massive S&T capacity when responding to the asymmetric threats that do arise. The United States is uniquely capable of innovating new "smart" technologies to protect soft homeland targets against unconventional threats. The current Fortress America approach risks undercutting the nation's lead in science by keeping too many talented foreigners out.

How Large is the U.S. Lead in Science and Technology?

The U.S. lead in science and technology can be measured in terms of either final scientific output or R&D input. Scientific and technical output is most often measured by counting numbers of scientific papers published, numbers of papers cited in other published papers, numbers of registered patents, or numbers of prizes won. By all such measures, the United States holds a commanding global lead.

The Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) has maintained since 1981 a database of scientific citations from roughly 9,000 indexed journals published worldwide from all scientific fields, excluding mathematics, social sciences, and the humanities. From 1992 to 2002, scientists working in the United States led other nations by a large margin in both numbers of papers published and numbers of citations. Table 1 reveals that scientists working in the United States have been publishing roughly four times as many papers as scientists in Japan, the second-ranking country, and papers published by U.S. scientists have received roughly five times as many citations as papers from the second-ranking U.K. scientists. This wide U.S. lead in scientific papers and citations has been diminishing over time. Over the period 1981-94, while worldwide scientific paper output increased 3.7 percent per year, U.S. output increased only 2.7 percent per year. Scientific paper growth rates above 10 percent per year were registered by China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, yet these were higher growth rates from a much smaller base.¹¹

Table 1: Top Ten Countries, Published Papers by Scientists, and Citations to Papers, January 1992–June 2002

Rank by Papers/ Citations	Country	Papers	Citations
1/1	United States	2,618,154	30,765,049
2/4	Japan	672,308	4,591,831
3/3	Germany	619,323	5,186,228
4/2	England	570,667	5,628,105
5/5	France	459,963	3,777,753
6/6	Canada	346,126	3,259,935
7/7	Italy	288,763	2,245,050
8/17	Russia	255,548	665,442
9/10	Australia	198,006	1,523,844
10/20	China	193,006	494,157

Source: *ISI Essential Science Indicators*, <http://www.in-cites.com/countries/2002allfields.html>.

The U.S. scientific lead also can be measured in numbers of patented invention. During the mid-1980s, the large U.S. share of patents awarded in the United States began to decline, reinforcing worries about a supposedly diminished U.S. competitiveness *vis-à-vis* Japan and other rising economies in Asia. In 1970 American inventors had accounted for 66 percent of U.S. patents, but by 1989 that share had fallen to just 52 percent. Even Joseph Nye, who was otherwise confident in his 1990 book *Bound to Lead* of the continued strength of the United States, viewed this patent trend as a "cause for concern."¹² Nye need not have been concerned. Patenting by U.S. inventors revived in 1990 and began growing more rapidly than patenting by foreign inventors once again. By 1999 the U.S. share of new patents was back up to 54 percent.¹³ U.S. inventors have also continued to lead in patenting within foreign countries, registering more patents than local competitors in Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and numerous other countries.¹⁴

Prize winnings are another output indicator of relative science strength, albeit a lagging indicator because science prizes are usually awarded years or even decades following the moment of scientific achievement. A count of winners of all internationally recognized science prizes worth more than \$200,000, including Nobel Prizes and the Fields Medal in mathematics, reveals that German scientists won most of the awards early in the twentieth century, with American scientists entering the winning ranks in large numbers only in the 1930s. In the decades around World War II, proportionately fewer German and French scientists won, and American scientists began to establish a commanding lead, winning roughly half of all prizes given. This is a lead that has continued into the twenty-first century. Of the seven 2003 Nobel Prize laureates in physics, chemistry, physiology, and medicine, five were living and working in the United States.¹⁵

A more derivative indicator of the U.S. lead in S&T is the country's share of world production of technology-intensive manufactured goods, known as "high-technology manufactures." Throughout the 1980s the U.S. share of global high-technology production remained at a strong 33 percent. It then declined to 30 percent from 1988 to 1995, while Japan's share grew from 20 percent in 1980 to 26 percent in 1991. Concerns spread that Japan might be emerging as a technological challenger at least in commercial manufacturing, but more careful thinkers argued that the U.S. lead was still strong.¹⁶ Popular concerns were laid to rest when the U.S. share of global high-technology production subsequently revived to reach an unprecedented 36 percent by 1998, while the Japanese share fell back down to its 1980 level of just 20 percent.¹⁷

In addition to papers, citations, patents, prizes, and high-technology production, it is also possible to count numbers of highly productive scientists. The ISI has used its citation database to generate a list of the world's 1,222 most "highly cited scientists," working at 429 different institutions in twenty-seven different countries around the world. Two-thirds of these scientists (815) worked at institutions in the United States. The next four countries in rank order are the United Kingdom (with 100 of these top scientists), Germany

with 62, Canada with 42, and Japan with 34. Russia has 2, India 2, and Taiwan 1; the People's Republic of China has none.¹⁸

These ISI database results also indicate that highly cited scientists tend to work in tight geographic clusters. In the area of Boston, for example, all of the institutions that house ISI's highly cited scientists lie within a two-mile radius of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Such geographic clusters of scientists can grow into highly productive "innovation hubs" if they feature the right mix of both public- and private-sector laboratories, several competing first-class universities, close contacts with nonprofit foundations, and access to venture capital.¹⁹ A recent global inventory of such innovation hubs in the area of information technology found that a preponderant number were indeed located within the United States. In 2000, *Wired* magazine consulted local sources in government, industry, and the media to find the geographic locations that matter most for innovation in the new digital age. Each location was rated on a scale of one to four in four areas: ability of area universities and research facilities to train skilled workers or develop new technologies; the presence of established companies and multinational corporations to provide expertise and economic stability; the population's entrepreneurial drive to start new ventures; and the availability of venture capital.²⁰ A total of forty-six locations around the world were identified in this manner as "technology hubs," and thirteen of these forty-six hubs were in the United States. Of the seventeen hubs that had the highest aggregate scores, eight were in the United States.²¹ The closest competitor was the United Kingdom, with four hubs total, and only two in the top seventeen. The closest security rival of the United States with multiple hubs on this list was China, with three hubs total, but none of China's hubs were in the top seventeen, or even in the top thirty.²²

U.S. R&D Investment

Perhaps the best way to measure the U.S. lead in science and technology is to consider inputs of R&D investment. The total U.S. R&D portfolio (private as well as public investments) exceeds \$250 billion a year. These investments have a recent history of steady expansion; in constant dollar terms, total U.S. R&D grew from \$100 billion in 1976 to \$265 billion in 2000.²³ These R&D investment are routinely credited with boosting U.S. economic growth and commercial competitiveness internationally,²⁴ yet they are also at the foundation of U.S. military supremacy.

U.S. investments in R&D far outstrip those of other wealthy states. Total gross domestic expenditures on R&D in the United States exceed those of Japan, the second-largest R&D-investing country, by 158 percent.²⁵ The United States invests 40 percent more in R&D than the original fifteen European Union (EU) states combined. This is a reflection of a greater U.S. effort, not just larger economic size. Total R&D investments in the EU in 2000 equaled 1.9 percent of GDP, compared with 2.69 percent in the United States. In 2002, the European Commission reported that the U.S. lead over

the EU in R&D spending had widened for the seventh year in a row. In June 2003, EU Commissioner Chris Patten warned his fellow Europeans of what he called a "brutally simple statistic": the United States with just 4 percent of the world's population accounted for 50 percent of the world's R&D spending.²⁶ EU officials have repeatedly described these figures as worrying for the future economic performance of Europe compared with the United States; it is also worrying for Europe's future capacity to rival the United States in highly capable military technologies.

To judge the military value of these R&D investments more carefully, it is necessary first to separate the less vital private component from the more vital public component. The private share of the total U.S. R&D portfolio has increased significantly, from 50 percent in the mid-1980s to more than 66 percent of the total in 2003.²⁷ During an interlude in the 1990s, this continued privatization of U.S. R&D, which reflected in part a real dollar shrinkage of public federal R&D, caused some defense advocates to worry. In constant dollar terms (fiscal year 2002 dollars), total public-sector federal R&D budget authority (defense plus nondefense) had earlier increased from \$60 billion in 1976 to nearly \$90 billion during the Reagan administration, but then fell back to just \$80 billion in the mid-1990s. This concern was only temporary. The federal R&D investment decline was reversed for nondefense programs in the late 1990s in response to lobbying efforts from the U.S. scientific community. For defense programs, the decline was decisively reversed after the September 11 attacks. Thus by FY 2003, total federal R&D outlays were back up to \$112 billion, roughly 20 percent in real dollars above the earlier Reagan-era peak.

Federal R&D investments in nondefense programs recovered partly due to the political strength of a new domestic science lobby. As Allan Bromley, former assistant to the president for science and technology, explains, "Scientists have become much more politically savvy, developing effective advocacy groups that drive federal policies and budgets through grassroots lobbying, media initiatives, and Capitol Hill events."²⁸ When total federal R&D spending went into a decline in the mid-1990s, this domestic science lobby pushed successfully to revive at least the nondefense component of that spending.

The Clinton administration had initially been neglectful of federal R&D investments. In his first term, Bill Clinton failed to meet even once with the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. He also undercut the executive branch access of scientists by replacing the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology with a new National Science and Technology Council that he chaired but failed to use.²⁹ Beginning in 1995, the domestic science community responded to this neglect with a successful Congress-based lobbying effort. In June 1996, the American Association for the Advancement of Science circulated in Congress a budget analysis that projected a further 25–30 percent constant-dollar decrease in federal science and technology support between FY 1995 and FY 2000, prompting five Republican senators led by Phil Gramm of Texas to submit

legislation in January 1997 calling for a doubling of the nondefense federal science and technology budget over the next decade. In the post-Cold War political environment of the 1990s, the scientific community used national economic competitiveness as its justification for advocating more nondefense federal R&D money. As a result of these lobbying efforts, the president's FY 1999 budget request contained significant new increases for nondefense federal R&D. In addition, between FY 1996 and FY 2000, federal nondefense R&D budget authority was increased 24 percent in nominal terms.

The post-Cold War decline in federal military R&D spending took longer to reverse. In constant dollar terms, U.S. military R&D fell 16 percent between 1991 and 1996.³⁰ While federal nondefense R&D began increasing after 1996, spending for military R&D remained essentially flat. By 1998, defense S&T advocates in the U.S. Senate led by Senators Joseph Lieberman, Jeff Bingaman, and Rick Santorum were sounding the alarm and calling for annual 2 percent increases in military R&D, above the rate of inflation. In 1999, writing in *Joint Force Quarterly*, Lieberman asked, "With a 30 percent decline in military research, and another decrease slated for the next fiscal year ... where will our technical superiority come from?"³¹

Such alarms failed at first to trigger any noticeable presidential or congressional response, and by FY 2001, Department of Defense R&D spending was down to just 43 percent of total federal R&D spending, well below the FY 1986 peak level of 63 percent.³² Support for military R&D spending was only restored following the arrival of a new Republican administration in Washington in January 2001, and then most decisively following the September 11 terror attacks. Total defense spending increased dramatically; and as a subcategory, military R&D investments increased as well. By 2002, according to calculations prepared by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, U.S. military R&D spending had recovered enough in constant dollar terms to surpass even the 1991 late Cold War-era level, as shown in Table 2. This recovery of U.S. federal defense R&D outlays continued into 2003, when total Department of Defense outlays for research, development, testing, and evaluation reached \$56 billion.³³ The United States, by 2003, was spending roughly as much on just the weapons development component of its military budget as any other single state was spending on its entire military budget.

Table 2: Expenditure on Military R&D in the United States and Western Europe, 1991–2002 (U.S.\$ billions, at constant 2000 prices)

	1991	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
United States	49.7	42.1	41.6	42.5	42.0	42.7	42.6	44.5	50.6
United Kingdom	4.4	3.6	3.7	3.9	3.4	3.7	3.7	–	–
France	6.5	4.5	4.3	3.4	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.5	–
Germany	2.0	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2	–
Total European Union	14.9	11.1	10.9	10.5	9.8	9.8	9.7	–	–

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Project, June 2003, http://projects.sipri.se/milex/aprod/nationaldata/equip_exp_mil_r&d.pdf.

Most U.S. defense R&D investments are in the development, testing, and evaluation of specific weapons systems, but the Department of Defense also engages in more basic S&T research, to provide the more fundamental science and technology knowledge needed to meet future military requirements. Current priorities for S&T spending include further investments in IT so as to advance the RMA; missile defense; and new weapons and capabilities based on nanotechnology, biological sensors, and robotics. This S&T budget in the Department of Defense supports roughly 35 percent of all federal research in computer sciences and 40 percent of all federal engineering research. Following the September 11 attacks, this important subcategory of defense R&D spending increased as well, reaching \$10 billion in FY 2002, back up in real dollar terms to the early 1990s' level.³⁴

The Position of Potential Rivals

As U.S. investments in defense R&D were recovering from their initial post-Cold War slump, other governments allowed such investments to continue sliding. Table 2 reveals that Europe was falling further behind the United States in military R&D investment even prior to September 11. The ratio of U.S. to total EU spending on military R&D was slightly more than three to one when the Cold War ended in 1991, and by 2000 had increased to more than four to one. Among all the wealthy nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) between 1990 and 1998, the defense share of budgetary R&D appropriations declined from 37 percent to 30 percent, but the ratio in the United States declined briefly and then recovered to 55 percent.³⁵ The closest competitor to the United States in terms of allocating R&D budget shares to the military has been the United Kingdom (35 percent), followed by the Russian Federation (30 percent), but these countries have much smaller R&D budgets overall. The United States still puts 0.4 percent of its GDP into military R&D, more than twice the proportion allotted by the United Kingdom or France. Japan is a heavy R&D spender, but it allocates only a trivial 0.03 percent of its GDP to defense R&D.

The military R&D efforts of today's Russian Federation are only a fraction of the determined (yet still inadequate) efforts made by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The Soviet Union at one point was devoting as much as 2-3 percent of its gross national product to military R&D, a larger share than most industrial countries now invest in total R&D.³⁶ When the Soviet system collapsed, state spending on military R&D was sharply reduced, and Russia's once-privileged defense scientists were suddenly obliged to accept low salaries and to work in deteriorating research facilities with outdated equipment. Nuclear physicists protested with hunger strikes or took menial jobs in other fields. In 1996 the director of the second largest nuclear research center in Russia took his own life because he could no longer endure a situation in which his employees had not been paid for five months and, in his words, were "close to starvation."³⁷ Science in Russia will recover only slowly from this collapse. Total R&D expenditures in Russia are now smaller than those

in Canada, and only about 4 percent the level of total R&D spending in the United States.³⁸

The Chinese economy has now enjoyed twenty-six consecutive years of strong growth based in part on the acquisition of new technologies. Today China's leaders clearly aspire to close the military technology gap with the United States, yet their science capacities remain far behind those of the United States. The list of deficits is long. In microelectronics China's most advanced facilities have been six to eight years behind the state of the art and continue to be critically dependent on imports. China has only limited super-computer capabilities and its PCs are composed primarily of imported parts. In telecommunications China depends on foreign firms for advanced transmission technologies. China's nuclear power industry is rudimentary, and its aviation industry is based mostly on antiquated Soviet technology. In space China's launch capability is impressive for a developing country, but its satellite capabilities remain limited.³⁹ According to a 2001 assessment, in military technology China is destined to remain significantly behind well into the future:

China's overall military technology in 2020 will still be significantly inferior to that of the United States, for several reasons. First, ... China's average level of commercial technology will still lag behind advanced world practice. Second, because development cycles for weapons are long, military systems are often designed around technologies that are a decade or more old by the time the weapons become operational (In the United States, 13 to 15 years typically elapse between the initiation of a major weapon development program and the initial operational capability of the first production units). Thus, the military systems that the United States and China field in 2020 will largely reflect the technologies available to those countries in 2010 or earlier. Finally, the process of translating civilian technological capabilities to military technology is nontrivial. Even though military systems build on technologies that are fundamentally civilian, they still involve technologies that are specifically military and thus must be independently developed. Furthermore, even if all the component technologies of a weapon system are available, the process of integrating them into a smoothly functional whole is challenging. This has been demonstrated, for example, by the difficulties Japan's defense industries have experienced in developing F-2 indigenous fighter aircraft.⁴⁰

China's stock of scientific capital is growing rapidly, but it still remains limited by advanced country standards. Despite China's size, total numbers of scientists and engineers currently being trained in China are substantially fewer than in the United States. The United States awards roughly eight times as many doctoral degrees in the natural sciences and in engineering as China. Despite several decades of strong economic growth, China's total R&D spending remains less than 2.5 percent of the U.S. R&D total (in purchasing

power dollars) and only 50 percent of the Japanese total. Much of China's scientific progress results not from indigenous R&D but from technology transfers associated with foreign investments by private firms. Indigenous innovation remains difficult in China because of various institutional constraints including continued state controls over information flows, weak factor markets, and inadequate protections for intellectual property. Roger Cliff concluded in 2001 that China's resources for technological progress were roughly comparable to those of South Korea or Taiwan in the 1970s, implying that by 2020 China's civilian economy might be able to attain the average technological level of South Korea or Taiwan today.⁴¹ This will not be enough to catch the United States, which will hardly be standing still, given its continued four to one advantage over China in new R&D investments.

China's post-Maoist leaders appreciated the contribution of science to military preparedness, as Deng Xiaoping put technology and the military third and fourth – after agriculture and industry – on his list of the “four modernizations” that China should pursue in the 1980s. High technology was then elevated to even higher priority after 1986, when China launched the so-called National High-Technology Research and Development Program (the 863 Program, so-named because it was initiated in March 1986) to speed the development of military and dual-use technologies in areas such as IT, lasers, biotechnology, and space. In 1987 the father of China's strategic missile program, Qian Xuesen, told his colleagues that China must ready itself for what he called a century of sustained “intellectual warfare.”⁴² The urgency of this new effort was reinforced when China witnessed the dominance of U.S. high-technology weapons in the 1991 Gulf War. At that point, Chinese military theoreticians began to endorse an even wider range of military high technologies, including information warfare, space weapons, directed energy, nano-weapons, unmanned combat planes, and more. The People's Liberation Army (PLA), which traditionally had counted on quantity to trump quality, began to talk of switching to a quality-based RMA.⁴³ In September 2003 China's military chief, Jiang Zemin, officially announced that the nation would reduce the size of its current forces so as to redeploy its limited resources to “quicken the pace of constructing our military's information technology.”⁴⁴

Such efforts notwithstanding, China will not be able to switch quickly from a high-quantity force to a high-quality force. The Soviet Union failed to catch up in a qualitative arms race with the United States in the 1970s and 1980s even though it devoted 2 to 3 percent of its entire gross national product to military R&D. For China, a comparable level of military R&D spending today would require an unlikely doubling of total military budget outlays.⁴⁵ Rather than trying to match the United States B-2 bomber for B-2 bomber, China will more likely focus in the short run on possible “niche” or “asymmetric” responses to the overwhelming U.S. superiority in science-based weapons. Virus attacks on U.S. computer networks or laser attacks on U.S. satellites might be an example.⁴⁶

How Secure is the U.S. Lead in Science and Technology?

Two hypothetical threats to the current U.S. lead in S&T must be considered. The first is the more rapid pace at which scientific innovations now spread across borders in the age of globalization. Will this more rapid diffusion of scientific knowledge give a catch-up advantage to laggards and make it difficult for the United States to hold its current lead? The second is the continuing underperformance of U.S. public schools in teaching science and mathematics in grades K-12. Will poor science education at home undercut the U.S. lead abroad? A front page *New York Times* article in May 2004 asserted that the United States had “already started to lose its worldwide dominance in critical areas of science and innovation.” Some of this loss may be real, but much is imagined.⁴⁷

The More Rapid Diffusion of Technical Knowledge

In the age of globalization, with scientific knowledge diffusing more rapidly across borders, will leading scientific states find it more difficult to maintain their advantage? The wider availability of low-cost telecommunications has indeed led to a “demise of distance” as regards information flows.⁴⁸ One empirical study of science and technology information flows within the United States between 1975 and 1999 discovered the average geographic distance between scientific collaborators and the average distance between inventors and those citing their inventions had increased by roughly two-thirds.⁴⁹ Yet “digital divides” between advantaged and disadvantaged societies can impede this spread of scientific and technical information, and such divides cannot easily be bridged through new investments in hardware alone.⁵⁰ Uptake and effective use at the receiving end depends heavily on levels of social or institutional development, and on the scientific and technological literacy of the receiving society.⁵¹ One empirical study found that societies with a science production rate of fewer than 150 scientific papers per 1 million inhabitants per year are markedly less able to absorb flows of scientific or technical knowledge. The study expected this threshold to rise with the steadily increasing knowledge requirements of today’s catching-up process.⁵² For societies at the bottom of the science capabilities ladder, more knowledge is now available from abroad through globalization, but the quantity needed to catch up is even greater, and too little of what is currently available is taken up or put to effective use.

Among countries that are scientifically capable, the international sharing of knowledge does have large effects, and far more sharing among such capable countries is clearly taking place. Between 1981 and 1995, the internationally coauthored share of all published scientific and technical articles, as tabulated by the National Science Foundation, increased from 17 percent to 29 percent. Scientists in the United States participated heavily in these international collaborations, publishing more internationally coauthored

articles than scientists in any other country.⁵³ The leading scientific societies now tend to be global, not national. For example, more than one-fifth of all the members of the American Physical Society live abroad, and 60 percent of institutional subscriptions to the journal of this society are purchased by foreign universities and laboratories. Yet this increased internationalization of science need not imply a net leakage of scientific knowledge out of the United States, for several reasons.

First, a great deal of American science remains autonomous despite increased international linkages. U.S. scientists do publish more internationally coauthored articles than scientists in other countries, but this is only because the total number of articles published by U.S. scientists is so large. The internationally coauthored *share* of U.S. published articles is relatively low by international standards, lower than in Canada, China, the United Kingdom, or any of the continental European countries.⁵⁴ The bulk of all collaborations in American science still remain contained within the country (the greatest demise of distance has been among collaborators within the United States, rather than across international borders). Second, a leading reason for the growth of international collaboration in science has been an increased number of "big science" projects that require the sharing of expensive large-scale equipment, and a preponderance of this equipment is located in the United States. This means that most of the foreign collaborators of American scientists are coming to the United States, rather than the other way around, and it means that the essential nodes of innovation remain geographically located within the United States. Also, many of these talented foreign scientists never go home. Nearly 30 percent of all Ph.D.'s currently engaged in R&D in the United States were born abroad.⁵⁵ This brain drain works strongly to the relative scientific advantage of the United States.

Hypothetically, the United States might risk a net loss of scientific advantage if foreign scientists or students were to come on temporary visas, work briefly in U.S. laboratories and universities, and then return home. Many of those who come, however, are in fact looking to stay. One 1998 study found that 47 percent of foreign students on temporary student visas who earned doctorates in the United States in 1990 and 1991 stayed on and were still working in the United States in 1995, and the students most likely to stay were those from nonallied countries. Nearly 90 percent of science Ph.D.'s from South Korea went home, and roughly half of the Canadians went home, but 79 percent of Indian Ph.D.'s were still working in the United States when this 1998 study was done, and 88 percent of Chinese Ph.D.'s had stayed on.⁵⁶ U.S. law has made it easier for Chinese students to remain in the United States following the Tiananmen Square crisis of 1989, and thousands of China's brightest young scientists have taken advantage. More than 500,000 students from developing countries, communist countries, and former communist countries are currently studying outside of their home countries – many in the United States – and the National Intelligence Council estimates that roughly two-thirds of these students will never go

home.⁵⁷ The comforting picture that emerges for the United States is one of “brain circulation” among allied states, combined with a strong net brain drain away from rival or potentially powerful neutral states.

Science knowledge also moves internationally when multinational business firms transfer technology through commercial sales or foreign direct investments, yet this is hardly an uncontrolled process. The U.S. State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, in the Bureau of Political Military Affairs, is empowered under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act to control through the issuance of licenses the export of specifically identified military items and technologies, including “technical data.” Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the Department of State controls all items on a specific munitions list, and enforcers do not require proof that technical data changed hands; simply talking to a foreign engineer can trigger a violation charge.⁵⁸ Commercial products and technologies with a potential military dual-use are similarly controlled under the 2001 Export Administration Act, administered by the Department of Commerce.⁵⁹ There is of course no way to keep knowledge of sensitive new technologies locked up forever. Yet when potentially hostile foreign states do occasionally gain access to finished dual-use technologies, the security loss is often contained because the weaponization of these technologies still requires a strong local R&D capability, one that most lagging technology importers – such as China – still do not have.⁶⁰

In the modern age of more collaborative science, even U.S. weapons laboratories have to some extent become globally networked. Roughly 70–75 percent of the research needed to make progress in weapons-related work is still unclassified, and it is often best developed in part through international collaboration. In 1998 America’s Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia Laboratories received 6,398 foreign visitors, including 1,824 visitors from sensitive countries, and the U.S. employees of these labs traveled frequently to scientific conferences and laboratories abroad.⁶¹ Is there a danger in such collaborations that U.S. military R&D discoveries will diffuse internationally? Security precautions notwithstanding, knowledge of U.S. advancements in military R&D will almost surely spread internationally through such linkages, but copying and imitation through espionage will not be enough to bring laggard states all the way up to a full RMA capability.

Copying was at one time a viable option for those trying to catch up with technology leaders. When Britain developed its new super battleship HMS *Dreadnought* in 1906, it took only three years for Germany to build its own Nassau-class copy. A scientifically lagging Soviet Union was able (together with the United States) to borrow and build on German rocketry innovations after World War II, and the initial U.S. lead in atomic weapons that emerged from that same war proved fleeting as well. The first U.S. fission weapon detonation in 1945 was followed by a Soviet detonation only four years later, and the first U.S. fusion weapon detonation in 1952 was followed by a Soviet detonation just ten months later.

Currently, the risk that U.S. rivals will be able to copy and match leading-edge military technology innovations is greatly reduced. First, the very few

states that might be able to copy and match U.S. IT-based military innovations are not rivals. In the IT sector, one indicator of absorption capacity is density of internet use, and among the twenty-nine states in the world in 2000 with more than twenty internet hosts per 1,000 people (the United States had nine times that number), all but four were democracies within the OECD, formally or informally aligned with the United States.⁶² The only four states above this threshold level of IT density outside the OECD were Hong Kong, Israel, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates. Or consider those states that have demonstrated some scientific prowess by patenting inventions in the United States. About 70 percent of these foreign origin patents were granted to inventors from just four countries – France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, all formal U.S. allies. The two most rapidly growing foreign patent applicant countries are Taiwan and South Korea, two more allied states. Taiwan and South Korea surpassed Canada in 1998 to become the fifth and sixth most-active sources of foreign inventors patenting in the United States.⁶³

Dominant military innovations will also be more difficult for rival states to copy because they are no longer stand-alone pieces of hardware. The RMA depends on entire systems of both hardware and software – sensors, satellites, program codes, and command systems, not just weapons platforms. Moreover, only teams of technically skilled, highly trained, and continuously practiced personnel can operate these networked RMA weapons systems. The superb U.S. all-volunteer military force, built specifically to provide such operating personnel, is a unique human and institutional asset that less capable foreign rivals can neither copy nor steal.

Potential rivals such as China cannot hope to develop an RMA capability through simple transfer, whether by purchase or theft. Through espionage China may have been able to gain information on the W-88 warhead used on U.S. Trident missiles, and China was nearly successful in purchasing from Israel the Phalcon system (which contained modern phased-array technology) before the U.S. government halted this sale in 2000.⁶⁴ Yet even with access to such imported or stolen technology, the Chinese military system will not be able to advance to an RMA capability, given the notorious weakness of the PLA in areas such as command, control, communications, and intelligence.

Weak K-12 Science Training?

Another hypothetical threat to U.S. scientific dominance is the continuing underperformance of the primary and secondary (K-12) education system in the United States. America's universities are world leaders in science, but many primary and secondary public schools in the United States have long underperformed in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (the so-called STEM fields). In 1983 the National Commission on Excellence in Education found the United States lagging behind most other industrialized nations and concluded that the nation's security was consequently at risk: "If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational

performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war. As it stands, we have allowed this to happen to ourselves. We have even squandered the gains in student achievement made in the wake of the Sputnik challenge. Moreover, we have dismantled essential support systems which helped make those gains possible. We have, in effect, been committing an act of unthinking, unilateral educational disarmament."⁶⁵

U.S. political leaders struggled to respond to this 1983 warning. All states established new content standards in mathematics, and most did so in science as well. Finally in 1990, the president and the state governors adopted the following national goal, "By the year 2000, United States students will be the first in the world in mathematics and science achievement."⁶⁶ Yet this goal was not met. In September 2000, a new National Commission on Mathematics and Science Teaching for the 21st Century, chaired by former Senator John Glenn, reviewed the Third International Mathematics and Science Study and discovered that the performance of U.S. students at the 12th-grade level, relative to peers in other countries, was "disappointingly unchanged." Out of twenty-one countries compared in this study, the United States came in nineteenth. Among twenty nations assessed specifically in advanced math and physics, none scored significantly lower than the United States in advanced math, and only one scored lower in physics. Results from the latest National Assessment of Educational Progress in 2000 were equally dismal, with fewer than one-third of all U.S. students in grades 4, 8, and 12 performing at or above the "proficient" achievement level in math and science, and with more than one-third below even the "basic level."⁶⁷ Since 1975 the United States has fallen from third place to seventeenth place in the proportion of its 18-24 year olds earning science and engineering degrees.

U.S. science has found a way to overcome this domestic educational handicap by importing trained science talent from abroad. In this sense, globalization can be counted as a support for U.S. science hegemony, not a threat to that hegemony. U.S. universities make up for K-12 educational deficits in science and math by attracting well-trained STEM students from abroad, and then by persuading the best of these foreign students to stay. In all the natural sciences and engineering, 35 percent of U.S. Ph.D.'s are now awarded to foreign students. In the physical sciences and engineering specifically, roughly 50 percent of U.S. Ph.D.'s now go to foreign students.⁶⁸ In addition to universities, high-technology U.S. manufacturing firms have also come to rely heavily on foreign-born graduates for a substantial portion of their growing workforce.⁶⁹ Between 1990 and 2000, the foreign-born share of science and engineering doctorates in the U.S. workforce increased from 24 percent to 28 percent. When it comes to science, the United States remains the pre-eminent land of immigrants. In 1999 all four of the U.S. Nobel Prize winners in physics, chemistry, physiology/medicine, and economics were born outside of the United States.

Roughly one-third of the foreign scientists now working in the United States arrived already fully trained.⁷⁰ When the United States allows graduates from India's elite institutes of technology to enter with temporary visas, the

nation gains access at no charge to a human capital resource that costs the government of India roughly \$15,000–\$20,000 per student to train. By implication, when Congress in 1998 eased the annual quota on H-1B visas, thus facilitating movement into the country for roughly 100,000 of these well-trained Indian professionals, the training cost savings for the United States equaled \$2 billion per year.⁷¹ As long as the United States can continue to attract this trained foreign talent, the weakness of its own K–12 science preparation system will not have to undermine U.S. science hegemony overall.

New Risks Post–September 11: Asymmetric Attack?

The September 2001 terrorist attacks and their aftermath highlight several new risks in this regard. The attacks are a vivid reminder that science-based dominance on the conventional battlefield does not protect against unconventional attacks on soft nonbattlefield targets, using fuel-laden hijacked airliners, weaponized anthrax spores, dirty bombs, or worse. As U.S. conventional weapons supremacy grows, those who resent and resist U.S. power may be driven to employ increasingly asymmetric attack responses against ever-softer targets, including homeland targets. There is no way to completely eliminate this asymmetric challenge, but there are ways to contain it.

First, this threat can be addressed through science itself. In 2002 the National Science Foundation initiated a series of new grants designed specifically to counter asymmetric terror threats by supporting breakthroughs in areas such as cybersecurity and the detection and decontamination of biological or chemical warfare agents. The new U.S. Department of Homeland Security is investing more than \$1 billion a year in R&D. Such efforts can and should be expanded, as is noted below.

Policy judgment and restraint are the second key to containing asymmetric threats. Science-based dominance has made the use of conventional force much easier for U.S. officials to contemplate, which brings a danger of more frequent and more careless use of force in circumstances where the conventional military results may be positive, but the political results negative.⁷² If a conventional military “victory” creates new and determined political enemies, one unintended consequence can be an increase in asymmetric threats, either to deployed U.S. forces (as in Iraq), or U.S. citizens and commercial assets abroad, or even to the homeland. More frequent and more aggressive U.S. military actions might also speed the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities among states hoping to deter U.S. conventional might. To contain the growth of asymmetric threats, it thus becomes essential to make sound judgments about the most likely political reactions of conventionally defeated or threatened adversaries. Williamson Murray and Robert Scapes argue that the United States needs to make larger investments in political and cultural knowledge, not just scientific knowledge, if it is to wage conventional wars with success.⁷³ Knowing when an exercise of U.S. conventional military dominance will be resented and resisted becomes

essential to minimizing a proliferation of asymmetric threats. This calls for more political science, not just more rocket science.

That said, the threat of asymmetric responses would not be any less if the United States were to decide to invest less in science. Thomas Homer-Dixon has argued that scientifically sophisticated systems and societies somehow present softer and more inviting targets to terrorist groups.⁷⁴ This argument is belied, so far, by the actual target choices made by the terrorists themselves: low-technology targets in low-technology societies (embassies or hotels in Africa), or middle-technology targets in low-technology societies (commercial aircraft operating in Africa and U.S. naval ships at anchor in Arabian ports), or at most middle-technology targets in high-technology societies (commercial and government buildings in the United States or commuter trains in Spain). High-technology targets in high-technology societies are apparently not that inviting, even to relatively sophisticated middle-technology terrorist groups such as al-Qa'ida. Even in the face of asymmetric threats, more science usually means more security.

New Risks Post-September 11: Reduced Access to Foreign Scientists

More science will be good for security, but an overzealous pursuit of homeland security now risks a weakening of U.S. science. An excessive tightening of U.S. visa policies post-September 11 is reducing the vital flow of foreign scientists into the United States. Between FY 2001 and FY 2003, successful U.S. visa applications in all categories fell from 10 million down to 6.5 million. The number of temporary worker visas issued specifically for jobs in science and technology in the United States dropped more sharply, falling by 55 percent in 2002 alone.⁷⁵ The weaker post-September 11 U.S. economy can be blamed for some of this decline, but not all. Tightened visa procedures are making entry into the United States by foreign scientists significantly more difficult.

Some tightening of U.S. visa and immigration policies was appropriate after September 11, as the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had gone too far in allowing suspect foreign nationals to abuse their visa status. The Palestinian immigrant who drove a truck of explosives into the World Trade Center's underground parking garage in 1993 had come to the United States legally on a student visa in 1989, but then overstayed and was two years "out of status" by the time of the attack. Congress in 1996 passed an Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act designed to police such visa abusers, but the university-based National Association of Foreign Student Advisors prevented effective implementation.⁷⁶ If a stronger student visa monitoring system had been in place in 2001, the September 11 hijackers would have found it more difficult to elude detection. Instead the hijackers remained famously unnoticed by the INS even months after the attack. Exactly six months after the attack, a belated notification was delivered to a flight school in Venice, Florida, granting visa renewal requests for two of the

hijackers who died in the attacks.⁷⁷ Following this embarrassment, INS was moved into the new Department of Homeland Security and renamed U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services in 2003.⁷⁸

Having previously erred on the side of being too lax, U.S. visa authorities are now erring on the side of being too strict. Traditionally, foreign nationals accepted to study science at American universities could expect to receive visas at U.S. embassies by providing only a passport, a university letter of endorsement, and records showing they could afford to live in the United States. Following the September 11 attacks, U.S. consular officers have become subject to criminal penalties if they grant a visa to someone who subsequently commits a terrorist act in the United States, so as a consequence larger numbers of visa requests are either denied or delayed. Foreign scientists were among the first to be squeezed out by such new policies.⁷⁹ In 2002 compared with the year before, the United States gave 8,000 fewer visas to visiting scholars, researchers, teachers, and speakers. Some individuals caught in this squeeze were prominent foreign scholars invited to speak at scientific meetings or teach at American universities. In December 2002 the three presidents of the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine issued a statement warning that ongoing research collaborations had already been hampered, outstanding foreign scientists had already been prevented from entering the country, and important international conferences were already being canceled or disrupted because of visa delays.⁸⁰ In 2003 a new rule required most visa applicants to undergo in-person interviews with U.S. consular officials overseas, causing still more delays.⁸¹

Valuable science students are being kept out of the United States by these new procedures. According to a spring 2003 report by the American Institute of Physics, numbers of international students entering graduate physics programs dropped by roughly 15 percent after September 11, and a survey of physics department chairs revealed that at the beginning of the 2002 academic year, about 20 percent of international students admitted into graduate physics programs had been unable to start specifically because of visa problems.⁸² All three of the top students (from an applicant pool of 224) accepted by the Biostatistics Department at Johns Hopkins University in 2003 could not start because of visa problems.⁸³ In one case, several hundred outstanding young Pakistani students who had been carefully selected by their government as potential future university leaders, and who had been accepted for graduate training in the United States, experienced a 90 percent visa denial rate in the United States post-September 11. These denials are now discouraging new applicants. At 90 percent of American colleges and universities in 2004, applications from international students had fallen, with applications from Chinese and Indian students dropping by 76 percent and 58 percent respectively. Mean while in Australia, France, and the United Kingdom enrollments are rising rapidly.⁸⁴

Many visa applicants also experience a kind of virtual denial, due to longer processing delays post-September 11. In the months following the attacks, the number of names on the State Department's antiterrorist lookout list doubled,

and consulates were required to run more visa applicant names through Washington's cumbersome interagency clearance system. Thus by the fall of 2002, the State Department had a backlog of 25,000 visa applications that had not been processed.⁸⁵ For science and technology students, the average wait to receive a visa increased to sixty-seven days, and in some cases delays extended up to a full year.⁸⁶ Publicly funded science research in the United States has already been disrupted by these new security measures. At the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, a government facility in Illinois that employs 500 scientists from eighteen different countries, those scientists who make routine visits home to see family experience visa troubles that can block their timely return to work. At the National Institutes of Health, where nearly half of the 5,500 staff members with advanced degrees are foreign nationals, employees are being informally warned about the perils of visiting home.⁸⁷

Tighter surveillance and security procedures have also begun to discourage talented foreign scientists from coming to the United States. New federal procedures imposed in May 2002 require universities to monitor the activities of their international students more closely. For international students from countries that the U.S. government considers to be sponsors of terrorism, the National Security Entry and Exit Registration System began to require special procedures such as fingerprinting, photos, and trips to check in at district offices.⁸⁸ In May 2003 the Homeland Security Department announced as well a requirement for "biometric" screening at U.S. borders (using photos and fingerprints) for an estimated 23 million foreign nationals entering the country every year, many of them science students or researchers. This new "Fortress America" approach to homeland security puts important social and cultural values at risk. It is also demonstrably bad for the competitive health of U.S. science, and hence for U.S. military primacy in the long run. The homeland may be slightly more secure in the short run because of these new procedures, but the long-term health of U.S. science is being impaired. David Heyman, director of the Homeland Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, warned in April 2004 that "to win the war on terror, [we the United States] may lose our scientific preeminence."⁸⁹

Conclusion: Smart Weapons, and Policies, against Asymmetric Threats

Military primacy today rests on scientific primacy, and the scientific primacy of the United States rests on a remarkably durable foundation. Rather than threatening U.S. primacy in science, globalization has strengthened it. Yet science-based military primacy on the battlefield is clearly not a guarantee of security. Determined adversaries can innovate increasingly asymmetric tactics against an endless list of soft targets, and the more domination and resentment they feel under U.S. conventional military hegemony, the more incentive they will have to move toward these unconventional responses. Conventional victories that make new enemies may encourage a dangerous shift toward

asymmetry, and if the United States then responds by indiscriminately denying foreigners access to the homeland, U.S. primacy in science could itself be critically weakened.

The war against international terror should be fought with science, rather than at the expense of science. The homeland security strategy of the United States should include much larger science investments in disciplines such as chemistry, physics, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and information technology, where promising new counterterror applications are sure to be found. Smart societies can develop not only smart new weapons for conventional use abroad, but also smart new capabilities for threat detection and soft target protection at home. For example, nanofabrication may hold the key to a timely detection system for some terror bombing threats. Silicon polymer nanowires 2,000 times thinner than a human hair can cheaply detect traces of TNT and picric acid in both water and air, and might someday be developed and deployed into "smart" cargo containers, to protect against terrorist bombs. New information technologies using powerhouse terascale computing capabilities may soon be able to help in tracking and anticipating the behavior of terror networks.⁴⁰ New systems capable of detecting dangerous amounts of radiation are increasingly affordable and unobtrusive, and the Department of Homeland Security has proposed development of a fully networked national sensor system to monitor the air continuously for pathogens, dangerous chemicals, and other public hazards. One line of defense already in place in thirty cities is a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory–designed system for monitoring the air for biological attack.

Federal investments are already moving the United States down this smart science-based response path. In the Bush administration's FY 2005 budget, roughly \$7 billion was proposed to develop high-technology defenses against terror attacks, including \$3.5 billion specifically for research and development. For example, the Department of Energy will receive \$232 million for research on the detection of nuclear weapons production. Penrose Albright, assistant secretary for science and technology at the Department of Homeland Security, defends this approach by arguing that "science is the big advantage the West has over these people who would throw us back to the Stone Age."⁴¹

Science can indeed bring big security gains in asymmetric as well as in conventional military affairs. Yet protection of national security requires that all military advantages be used with judgment and care. Security requires smart policies as well as smart weapons. When conventional military victories are made easy by smart weapons, an extra measure of caution is needed to avoid the careless creation of dangerous new asymmetric adversaries.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Richard Cooper, Daniel Johnson, Devesh Kapur, Henry Nau, Don Paarlberg Jr., Robert Ross, Michael Teitelbaum, and two perceptive reviewers for helpful advice during his preparation of this article.

Notes

1. The United States controls 90 percent of all the world's military satellites. Eight days before Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, Maj. Gen. Franklin J. Blaisdell, U.S. Air Force director of space operations and integration, stated, "We are so dominant in space that I pity a country that would come up against us." Quoted in Andy Oppenheimer, "Arms Race in Space," *Foreign Policy*, No. 138 (September/October 2003), pp. 81-82, at p. 81.

2. For a comprehensive examination of U.S. weapons dominance, particularly in the air, in space, and at sea, see Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5-46.

3. These data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Mary Acland-Hood are cited in Vally Koubi, "Military Technology Races," *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Summer 1999), pp. 537-565, at p. 537.

4. James Fallows, *National Defense* (New York: Random House, 1981).

5. Koubi, "Military Technology Races." President Ronald Reagan's 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative to develop and deploy a space-based shield against Soviet intercontinental missiles promised far more than U.S. laboratories could deliver at the time, yet it left a demoralizing impression on leaders in Moscow.

6. Delores M. Etter, "Defense Science and Technology," in Albert H. Teich, Stephen D. Nelson, and Stephen J. Lita, eds., *AAAS Science and Technology Policy Yearbook* (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2002), pp. 167-181.

7. Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales Jr., *The Iraq War: A Military History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 179.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

9. On the deficit side, several quick-response "decapitation" strikes against regime leaders failed to produce results. A classified assessment of the war by the U.S. Joint Forces Command cites several other performance deficits as well, including weak battlefield damage assessment capabilities and "fratricide" losses to friendly forces. Thom Shanker, "Pentagon Criticizes High Rate of Allied Deaths by Allied Fire," *New York Times*, October 3, 2003, p. A14.

10. U.S. conventional military preponderance depends on more than just its lead in science and technology, to be sure. Also necessary for this dominance are the nation's vast economic resources, its skilled military personnel, and its unmatched international military basing structure. For a more complete review of the magnitude and limits of U.S. conventional military dominance, see Posen, "Command of the Commons," p. 21.

11. Robert M. May, "The Scientific Wealth of Nations," *Science*, Vol. 275, No. 7 (February 1997), p. 793.

12. Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 212.

13. National Science Foundation, *Science and Engineering Indicators, 2002* (Arlington, Va.: National Science Foundation, 2002), <http://www.nsl.gov/sbe/srs/seind02/c6/c6s4.htm#c6s411>.

14. Patent counts have numerous limitations as a measure of science strength because the significance of different inventions varies widely. Counts of patent citations can help get around this problem, and here as well the United States dominates. A more difficult problem is differing national approaches to intellectual property. In many countries inventions are not patented at all, either because intellectual property laws are weak or because industrial trade secrets enjoy blanket protection.

15. Scientists from the United Kingdom consistently won approximately 10 percent of all awards in the twentieth century. Complete Nobel Prize records are available from the Nobel e-Museum, <http://www.nobel.se/index.html>.

16. See Henry R. Nau, *The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). See also Paul Krugman, "The Myth of Asia's Miracle," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 6 (November/December 1994), pp. 62-78.

17. National Science Foundation, *Science and Engineering Indicators, 2002*.

18. Michael Barry, "The Geography of Scientific Citation," *Environment and Planning A*, Vol. 35 (2003), pp. 761-765.

19. Steven W. Popper and Caroline S. Wagner, *New Foundations for Growth: The U.S. Innovation System Today and Tomorrow*, MR-1338.0-OSTP (Santa Monica, Calif.: Science and Technology Policy Institute, RAND, January 2002).
20. Barry, "The Geography of Scientific Citation."
21. These eight U.S. hubs were Albuquerque, Austin, Boston, New York City, Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, San Francisco, Seattle, and Silicon Valley.
22. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report, 2001* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 45.
23. Elisa Eiseman, Kei Koizumi, and Donna Fossum, *Federal Investment in R&D*, MR-1639.0-OSTP (Santa Monica, Calif.: Science and Technology Policy Institute, RAND, September 2002), p. 15.
24. Charles I. Jones, "Sources of U.S. Economic Growth in a World of Ideas," Stanford University Economics Working Paper No. 97-015 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, July 8, 1998), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=72188.
25. Eiseman, Koizumi, and Fossum, *Federal Investment in R&D*.
26. Claire Sanders, "European R&D Draining to U.S.," *Times Higher Education Supplement* (London), June 27, 2003.
27. Eric Bloch, "Securing U.S. Research Strength," *Issues in Science and Technology*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Summer 2003), pp. 20–22.
28. D. Allan Bromley and Michael S. Lubbell, "Science's Growing Political Strength," *Issues in Science and Technology*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Summer 2003), pp. 13–15, at p. 13.
29. *Ibid.*
30. SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Project, June 2002, http://projects.sipri.se/milex/aprod/nationaldata/equip_exp_mil_r&d.pdf.
31. Joseph I. Lieberman, "Techno-Warfare: Military R&D," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No. 22 (Summer 1999), pp. 13–17, at p. 14.
32. "FY 2001 Department of Defense Share of Federal R&D Funding Falls to Lowest Level in 22 Years," Data Brief NSF 01-319 (Arlington, Va.: Division of Science Resources Studies, National Science Foundation, February 26, 2001). The Department of Defense R&D budget accounts for roughly 94 percent of total national defense R&D budget authority. R&D funding for the Department of Energy's atomic energy defense activities accounts for the remaining share.
33. Current information on U.S. defense R&D spending policy is available at the American Institute of Physics *Bulletin of Science Policy News*, <http://www.aip.org/enews/fyil>.
34. Eiseman, Koizumi, and Fossum, *Federal Investment in R&D*, p. 69.
35. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, "R&D Defence Spending Falls," *OECD Observer*, April 28, 2000.
36. Roger Cliff, *The Military Potential of China's Commercial Technology*, MR-1292-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001), p. 63.
37. Quoted in Theodore P. Gerber, "From Crisis to Transition: The State of Russian Science Based on Focus Groups with Nuclear Physicists (U)," UCRL-JC-146574 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 2001), http://cgsr.llnl.gov/future2002/ponars_version3_12-10-01.html.
38. Comparisons are made converting foreign currencies to U.S. dollars with OECD purchasing power parity exchange rates. Eiseman, Koizumi, and Fossum, *Federal Investment in R&D*, p. 117.
39. Cliff, *The Military Potential of China's Commercial Technology*, pp. x–xi. In 2003 China used a modified version of the Russian Soyuz technology to put its first manned satellite into orbit, four decades after this had been done by the Soviet Union and the United States.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
41. *Ibid.*, p. xv.
42. Evan A. Feigenbaum, *China's Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003).
43. Richard D. Fisher Jr., "Military Sales to China: Going to Pieces," *China Brief*, Vol. 2, No. 23 (November 21, 2002), Jamestown Foundation.

44. Quoted in Joseph Kahn, "China Plans to Cut 200,000 Troops over 2 Years," *New York Times*, September 2, 2003, p. A9.

45. Cliff, *The Military Potential of China's Commercial Technology*, p. 63. Estimating China's total spending on military R&D is difficult, even for Chinese officials, because much of the official defense budget excludes R&D outlays. The nominally private defense industries run by civilian ministries under the State Council, or operated now by corporation groups, maintain production lines for PLA military orders and have their own R&D institutes that develop military products from weapons to satellites. Most investment in military R&D in China comes not from the defense budget but from the civilian investment budget. Xiaoning Cheng, "Written Testimony for U.S.-China Commission Public Hearing on China's Budget Issues," December 7, 2001, <http://www.uscc.gov/textonly/transcriptstx/texsia.htm>.

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47. This article cited a dip in numbers of papers published by U.S. physicists, and a drop in the U.S. share of its own industrial patents, back down to 52 percent (i.e., the 1990 level). William Broad, "U.S. Is Losing Its Dominance in the Sciences," *New York Times*, May 3, 2004, p. A1.

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53. Caroline S. Wagner, Allison Yezril, and Scott Hassell, *International Cooperation in Research and Development* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Science and Technology Policy Institute, RAND, 2001).

54. Only India, Japan, and Russia are less internationalized, by this measure, than the United States. *Ibid.*

55. National Science Foundation, *International Mobility of Scientists and Engineers to the United States - Brain Drain or Brain Circulation?* NSF 98-316 (Arlington, Va.: Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences, National Science Foundation, revised November 10, 1998).

56. *Ibid.* Numbers of science and engineering doctoral graduates from China and India who say they intend to stay began to decline after 1996, according to the National Science Foundation. Broad, "U.S. Is Losing Its Dominance in the Sciences."

57. National Intelligence Council, *Growing Global Migration and Its Implications for the United States*, NIE 2001-02D (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, March 2001), p. 23.

58. Bruce Berkowitz, *The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century* (New York: Free Press, 2003), p. 195.

59. Communications satellite technologies were recently removed from Department of Commerce control and placed under more restrictive State Department EAR control, when it was learned that U.S. companies had been providing sensitive information to China. Eugene

B. Skolnikoff, "Research Universities and National Security: Can Traditional Values Survive?" in Teich, Nelson, and Lita, *AAAS Science and Technology Policy Yearbook*, pp. 65–73.

60. Roger Cliff explains: "No matter how advanced the technological level of China's civilian industries or how sophisticated the civilian equipment and components available for import, all Chinese weapon systems ultimately have to incorporate purely military technologies, and these have to be developed indigenously." Cliff, *The Military Potential of China's Commercial Technology*, p. 9.

61. Irving A. Lerch, "Terrorism, Globalization, and Fear: Science in the 21st Century," paper presented at the "International Conference on Science, Technology and Innovation: Emerging International Policy Issues," John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, September 23–24, 2002.

62. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report, 2001*, p. 60, Table A2.4.

63. National Science Foundation, *Science and Engineering Indicators, 2002*.

64. Fisher, "Military Sales to China."

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67. *Before It's Too Late: A Report to the Nation from the National Commission on Mathematics and Science Teaching for the 21st Century*, <http://www.ed.gov/nits/Math/glennl/report.pdf>.

68. Irving A. Lerch, "Terrorism, Globalization, and Fear: Science in the 21st Century." See also Duncan T. Moore, "Establishing Federal Priorities in Science and Technology," in Teich, Nelson, and Lita, *AAAS Science and Technology Policy Yearbook*, pp. 273–283.

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71. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report, 2001*. According to an estimate by the American Immigration Lawyers' Association, there are some 900,000 H-1B employees in the United States today, 35 percent to 45 percent of them from India. Cited in Saritha Rai, "Cap on U.S. Work Visas Puts Companies in India in a Bind," *New York Times*, October 1, 2003, p. W1.

72. Seyom Brown, *The Illusion of Control: Force and Foreign Policy in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2003).

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74. According to Homer-Dixon, "Violent groups will soon recognize the rewards from attacking non-redundant, high-value nodes in our increasingly complex technological and economic networks. These attacks will be intended to precipitate cascades of failures or the collapse of whole technological and social systems." See "Synchronous Failure: The Real Danger of the 21st Century," remarks by Thomas Homer-Dixon to the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., March 24, 2004, <http://www.gwu.edu/~newscfr/newscenter/1212/homerdixon.html>.

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76. Nicholas Confessore, "Borderline Insanity," *Washington Monthly*, May 2002, <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0205.confessore.html>.

77. See Mark Potter and Rich Phillips, "Six Months after Sept. 11, Hijackers' Visa Approval Letters Received," <http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/03/12/inv.flight.school.visas/>.

78. An urge to tighten this relaxed approach had arisen even prior to September 11, following the 1998 nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan and also with the sensational allegations in 1999 (which later proved mostly wrong) that a Taiwanese-born scientist acting out of disloyalty had perpetrated a security breach at Los Alamos National Laboratory. In the aftermath of this Los Alamos panic, the State Department began working more aggressively to

screen immigrant visa applications from scientists in particular, using an expanded list of twenty different sensitive disciplines and an equally long list of sensitive countries, including China, Pakistan, Russia, and even South Africa.

79. Dana Wilkie, "Foreign Scientists Steer Away from States", *Scientist*, March 24, 2003.

80. As an example, when the World Space Congress was held in Houston, Texas, in 2002, more than 100 overseas delegates – including an eminent Russian astrophysicist – could not get visas in time and missed the meeting. See "Current Visa Restrictions Interfere with U.S. Science and Engineering Contributions to Important National Needs," statement from Bruce Alberts, president, National Academy of Sciences; William A. Wulf, president, National Academy of Engineering; and Harvey Fineberg, president, National Institute of Medicine, December 13, 2002, <http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/isbn/s12132002?OpenDocument>.

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90. Rita R. Colwell, director, National Science Foundation, remarks to Council of Scientific Society Presidents, Washington, D.C., November 19, 2001.

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The 'War on Terror': Good Cause, Wrong Concept

Gilles Andréani

11 September was, for all to see, an act of war. The sheer magnitude of the attacks, their merciless violence, plus the worldwide impact of the images immediately imposed the word 'war' as the only one commensurate with the event, and the outrage it had provoked. Less than ten days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President George W. Bush declared war on 'terrorism with a global reach'¹ and announced that the war would end only with the eradication of this evil. In the fall of 2001, the swift punishment of the perpetrators of these attacks, and the defeat of their Taliban accomplices following a lightening military campaign in Afghanistan, translated the US president's promise into deeds.

The struggle that began in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, however, is a long-term, many-faceted undertaking, involving police and judicial repression and intelligence, as well as diplomatic and military action. The war on global terrorism cannot end with a declaration of final victory, any more than can the war on crime or the war on drugs. The use of the word 'war' in reference to such evils, and to terrorism itself, rather than against a designated enemy, is essentially metaphorical: to those who use it, it underlines their resolve, their rejection of any kind of acquiescence or compromise. It expresses their conviction that drugs, crime or terrorism are as destructive as war, and their resolve to fight those responsible no less than wartime enemies.

And yet, in the case of 11 September, the use of the word 'war' has gone far beyond metaphor to acquire a strategic reality. It has outlived the quick Afghan campaign, the only episode in the global fight against terrorism that can properly be labelled a war. The war is now entrenched in everyday vocabulary (a Google search for 'war on terror' will reveal nearly as many occurrences as for 'Cold War'), in military parlance (the Pentagon now casually uses the acronym GWOT, meaning 'global war on terror', and in soldierly honours (two medals have been established by the US government

to this effect, the 'Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal' and the 'Global War on Terrorism Service Medal').

There are many reasons why the concept of a war against terrorism is thus taking root:

- For the first time in the history of modern terrorism, by their suddenness, the scale of destruction, the disorganisation and the cost they caused, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon unleashed a level of violence comparable in their effects of a military operation. Over the last 30 years, international terrorism had caused around 500 deaths annually. The eleventh of September 2001 marked the advent of a mass terrorism with a destructive capacity hitherto thought to belong only to states. The Security Council² and the Atlantic Council³ drew the appropriate consequences within hours, when they likened the event to an armed attack and deemed the United States to be in a position of self-defence against those who might have ordered or encouraged it from abroad.
- Psychologically, America found itself at war: having suffered an unprovoked and unjustifiable attack, its sense of vulnerability, innocence, grief and anger combined into patriotic outrage. US public opinion demanded an immediate military response commensurate with the insult. The popular fervour, the omnipresent flags and the American war rhetoric were visible all over America in the fall of 2001: this was a true nation state, and it was at war.
- In the USA PATRIOT Act, passed in October 2001, the US government has chosen to resort to legal tools derived (albeit loosely and selectively) from the law of armed conflicts to repress terrorism, both at home and abroad, thereby bringing the fight against terrorism closer to actual war in some of its legal implications.
- The war on terrorism materialised in the brief episode of the campaign in Afghanistan. Designed to topple the Taliban, the terrorists' proven accomplices, and to hunt down the terrorists on Afghan soil, this really was a war. It was preceded by an ultimatum to the Taliban to hand over the perpetrators. Implicitly sanctioned by the Security Council, the Afghan war satisfied the criteria of legitimate self-defence and enjoyed unanimous international support. There were more offers of military contributions from abroad than the US could accommodate, and most were turned down.
- It was clear within a few weeks after the 11 September attacks that the Afghan campaign would only be a 'phase one' and that the need for further military action was becoming an article of faith in Washington. However tenuous the links of Saddam Hussein's Iraq with al-Qaeda, 11 September, or organised terrorism, the Bush administration has chosen to characterise the Iraq War as a second phase in the 'war on terror'. Subsequent lack of evidence has not changed their attitude, and they have been remarkably successful in embedding Iraq in the context of the 'global war on terror', at least in the minds of the American public.

- As the American focus turned, in the fall of 2002, to Iraq, the Bush administration carved out a doctrine of preventive war, which further expanded the hypotheses under which America might resort to force to fight terrorism and their state accomplices.
- President Bush has largely and successfully identified his presidency with his role as a war president. His Democratic opponent John Kerry, who has chosen to emulate, rather than challenge, the propriety of his war rhetoric and his warlike personal profile, has not challenged the characterisation of the fight against terrorism as a war.

One may view the use of the word 'war' to refer to the fight against terrorism as a natural consequence of the enormity of the 11 September attacks and of the hatred for America that they expressed. In fact it is hard to see how President Bush could have done otherwise. It quickly became clear, however, that in reality, this 'war' was intended to go well beyond its proper remit – the punishment of the state accomplice of the 11 September attackers – and that the Afghan 'phase one' would be followed by others. War has come to be a central feature of the political reactions, as well as of the strategy and legal concepts, employed by the United States to wage the global struggle against international terrorism.

This approach has had its advantages: it testifies to the resolve of the United States and to its degree of mobilisation; it initially rallied friends and discouraged the hesitant, since the US was not going to tolerate 'neutrality' in this 'war'; it serves to cut through some of the red tape inherent in international legal cooperation, and in the American legal system, in favour of more direct and ruthless action.

Nevertheless, to call the fight against international terrorism a war entails some major drawbacks, which are now even more apparent than they were in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks. The purpose of this essay is to go deeper into the problems that stem from the concept of 'war on terror'. These can be classified in six categories. First, the use of the word 'war' gives unwarranted status and legitimacy to the adversary. Second, it exaggerates the role of military operations in fighting global terrorism. Third, at the same time, the United States bent both its internal judicial rules and international law to accommodate the concept of war on terror, with a result widely perceived as biased and needlessly vindictive. Fourth, the connection drawn by the Americans between the war on terrorism and the concept of preventive war has worried the United States' partners and undermined the anti-terrorist coalition. Fifth, the linkage with the war against Iraq has aggravated the problem, while heightening anti-Western and anti-American feeling in the Middle East and the Islamic world. Finally, even if the 'war on terror' has not blinded the US to the necessity of 'winning peace' and addressing root cultural and social causes, it has detracted from the consideration of some urgent political problems that fuel Middle East terrorism, including the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Warriors or Criminals?

A few weeks after 11 September 2001, the eminent historian Michael Howard expressed the drawbacks of the use of the word 'war' in this context. The whole history of successful fights against terrorism, he emphasised, was a mixture of repression and political opening designed to cut off the terrorists from their social and political base, whose interests they claim to represent. Therefore, success means winning people's hearts and minds.⁴ 'War', on the other hand, leaves no room for any such goal, or at the very least postpones it until after military victory. The latter, logically, is impossible to achieve, especially since the terrorist desires nothing so much as repression – blind repression preferably – in order to win the support of his base. An additional problem with war is that it is a reciprocal process: if you are at war with someone, then he is at war with you. As a result, the state of war confers a degree of common dignity on the belligerents, as well as certain rights.

That is what has always driven terrorist groups to proclaim themselves at war with the legitimate power they were fighting. The Baader-Meinhof gang and the Red Brigades claimed to be fighters in a war of the people against the German or Italian 'police states'. The latter, in turn, vehemently rejected this view and rightly treated their adversaries as criminals. The state can only countenance being at war with its peers, or with some equivalent entity (for example, a national liberation movement whose success turns it into a state in the making). Under no stretch of imagination, however, could al-Qaeda acquire any such status.

By proclaiming itself at war with Bin Laden and his accomplices, America has thus handed them their second victory: it has acknowledged that they indeed had a quarrel with America, despite the fantastic character of their grievances, and despite the fact that under any common sense definition, they were criminals rather than warriors.

For the US, there has been a measure of comfort to be derived from being at war after 11 September: it helped draw clear lines in an otherwise muddy confrontation with a ubiquitous and mysterious enemy. War is a national energiser: it reinforces one's internal cohesion, gives direction and sense of purpose to one's leadership. This is probably truer of America, which has won most its wars after having fought them at great distance and at proportionately low cost, than of most other countries, which have a living memory of war as an experience of ultimate suffering, if not disaster.

Wars have also been, in America's experience, moral clarifiers.⁵ Moreover, America's experience of war also differs from the old European conception of war as a duel among *a priori* respectable contenders. America's great wars have been all-out wars against adversaries, to be treated as criminals and pursued until their total destruction.⁶ These wars have

been devoid of chivalry; the adversary has been as much morally vilified as fought against. The idea, that 11 September 2001 was an act of war has been

America's great wars
have been all-out wars

a logical extension of this US experience of war. The bellicisation of the fight against terrorism is coherent with the American tradition of 'criminalising war', which the German political theorist Carl Schmitt condemned in his time (wrongly, it should be said, since nothing was more justified than regarding the Nazi leadership as a bunch of criminals).

The fact remains that the choice of the word 'war' has inadvertently given al-Qaeda increased stature and a measure of legitimacy. It has confirmed their self-proclaimed image of warriors, and elevated them to the point where they are now engaged in a test of arms with the world's foremost power. What more could they ask?

Whose Interest is it to be at War?

The terrorist's very first political objective is to see this state of war acknowledged by his opponent, thereby revealing the true nature (in his eyes) of their relation. For national liberation or separatist movements, the objective is to transform internal unrest into an international war: for the Algerian liberation front (Front de Libération National, FLN) in the 1950s, or the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the 1970s, recognition of a state of war had been an important objective, consistently denied by the French, who referred to the Algeria war as 'public order operations', as well as the British in Ireland, who fought IRA terrorists as criminals and denied them prisoner of war status. Internal political extremism is no less keen on being at war with the legitimate government they fight, but it is civil war they aspire to. Anarchists in the 1890s claimed that social injustice had acquired a warlike character and their resorting to violence only revealed the true nature of capitalist societies, that is, a war of the rich against the poor. More broadly, left-wing proponents of terrorism or state terror have always justified their own violence as self-defence in the context of a social war that their deeper political insight allowed them to identify, and to which they tried to awaken oppressed masses.

Similarly, Bin Laden had argued that the Muslim world was subject to aggression from a host of enemies ('Jews and crusaders', among which the US figured pre-eminently, as well as their accomplice Arab regimes in the Middle East). In response, Bin Laden has seen himself and his followers waging a defensive 'jihad', or holy war. In this case, the war he aspires to see acknowledged would be halfway between an international and a civil war. His purpose has a territorial dimension: freeing the Middle East from the sacrilegious presence of Westerners; and restoring the Caliphate. But he also regards himself to be at war with 'apostate' conservative Arab regimes, starting with the leadership of his own country, Saudi Arabia; there is no clear boundary to his calls for the violent emancipation of Muslims over the world, including in Western countries. Insofar as Bin Laden has a view of the war he pretends to wage, it is both an international and a civil war. What he seeks to achieve is a war without limits, a global civil war.

How much Bin Laden's vision of himself as a warrior, and of his struggle as a holy war, has been served by Bush's characterisation of the fight against terrorism as a war is a matter for speculation. But it would seem clear that America's instinctive sense of being at war, the enthusiastic embrace of the concept by the Bush administration and its war rhetoric have played into the hands of al-Qaeda and its leadership. It takes two to make war: President Bush and Bin Laden, the war president and the holy warrior, have not failed each other in this respect.

The Limited Record of Anti-Terrorist Wars

The use of the term war is not only a matter of semantics. There has been, and will be, an actual role for military operations in fighting terrorist organisations. In the past, there have been instances where military instruments were brought to bear against terrorist activities: these instances have ranged from the use of the military to supplement police forces under civilian command to fully fledged counter-insurgency operations. Northern Ireland and Algeria have already been mentioned in this context. It should be noted, however, that there was much more to most such conflicts (the IRA and the FLN are cases in point) than their terrorist dimension. Terrorism is a tactic rather than an ideology or a defined category of political or military movements. Many contemporary 'terrorist' organisations have been national liberation movements that first resorted to terrorism for lack of alternative military options, and which have been able to move either to actual war, or to a political process that allowed for a negotiated outcome of the problem at hand.

From this variety of experiences, few military lessons can be drawn. There has been no single pattern of using military means against terrorism. In practice, there has been a very wide range of such situations, from using military forces in a police mode as part of civil emergency procedures, to fully fledged military campaigns, where the 'anti-terrorist' dimension was superseded, if not totally lost. Few people would accept the Russian definition of successive Russian campaigns in Chechnya as 'anti-terrorist' operations. The 1982 Israeli 'peace in Galilee' operation was presented as such, and may have been in its political motives, but militarily it amounted to no less than a classical large-scale invasion of Lebanon, followed by an 18-year Israeli occupation of south Lebanon. Moreover, very few military operations have thus been conducted within the conceptual framework of counter-terrorism. Although the Vietcong, as well as the FLN in Algeria, resorted extensively to terrorism, French and American forces operated in these two instances within the framework of counter-insurgency operations, a tested and much broader framework for the conduct of military operations than 'counter-terrorism'. The same can be said of coalition forces in Iraq today, despite the widespread resort to terrorist attacks of their opponents, who include remnants of al-Qaeda, as well as terrorist groups loosely affiliated with it.

Altogether, there have been very few instances where military tactics and operations have specifically been designed to address a particular terrorist threat: the episode of the 1957 'battle of Algiers' comes to mind, as well as the British army's operations in Northern Ireland. From this limited body of experience, no category of military operations has emerged so far that can properly be labelled 'anti-terrorist'. It is conceivable that such a category will eventually materialise. One should only hope that, as such thinking develops, it takes into account the opportunistic and multiform nature of terrorism, as well as the variety of political objectives it may serve, and that it does not mistake terrorism for a new form of warfare to be met with a rigid set of military answers. In the 1950s, the West similarly mistook parallel guerrilla tactics in China, Malaysia and Indochina for a new form of warfare – 'revolutionary war'. They sought to understand it, drawing in particular on Mao's writings, in order to better fight it, including by borrowing tactics from their adversaries; these included the enlistment of the civilian population, the importance of psychological operations, and so forth. This line of thinking blinded the West to the underlying causes of these movements, in particular nationalism, and occasionally led to tactical and moral mistakes, such as the large-scale strategies of relocation of civilians in Algeria or 'fire-free' zones in Vietnam. It also paved the way intellectually for the acceptance of torture, notably in Algeria. Thinking today of terrorism as a new kind of warfare could lead us to the same kind of mistakes as thinking about revolutionary war did in the 1950s, and there are signs that this is already happening.

What Scope for War?

An additional problem with resorting to the concept of 'war on terror' in the post-11 September world has to do with the particular brand of terrorism we are now facing. In the first place, the heading 'war on terror' would seem so large as to be void of any conceivable operational content. However, from the outset, the US focus has been on 'terrorism with a global reach', which would seem to exclude not only internal terrorist movements, but also international movements focused on a given territorial cause, such as Palestinian Hamas or Basque ETA movements. The main enemy is clearly loosely knit global Islamic networks of the al-Qaeda type.

Much of our experience with fighting terrorism, however, is related to 'retorialised' movements whose interest was focused on a territory they sought to detach from an existing state, or free from a foreign presence. We now face a ubiquitous 'de-territorialised' threat, without a clear set of territorial objectives or geographical bases. Admittedly, terrorists don't hang in the air; they are necessarily located on a country's territory. Most countries will rather choose to deal themselves with the problem, but there are those who won't (the rogue states) and those who can't (the failed

<p>We face a ubiquitous 'de-territorialised' threat</p>

states). It is in these two cases that military intervention may be warranted, to deprive terrorist movements of sanctuaries which their hosts have – willingly or unwillingly – provided.

Afghanistan is a case in point. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan was both a rogue accomplice of al-Qaeda and a failed state; the 2001 intervention was justified on both counts. The current Afghan state is unable to eradicate the remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, which justifies a continued military operation by foreign forces (*Enduring Freedom*) in the south. Here is an instance of an actual war against terrorism.

Will there be many other such instances? There are reasons to doubt it. Iraq will be discussed later, but it should be noted that in the post-11 September world, the appetite for states to support global jihadist groups of the al-Qaeda type has essentially vanished; rather than maintain territorial sanctuaries, such groups seem to have melted away into their host societies to a point where 'war' is both unfeasible in practice and analytically misleading.

The eleventh of September was not only an attack on the US. It was also a direct challenge to states throughout the world, whose monopoly on large-scale means of destruction was suddenly put into question. The certainty of an intractable US response to 11 September that did not leave room for neutrality in this fight, combined with the challenge posed to the state-based international order, prompted a unanimous reaction by the community of states. The United Nations Security Council immediately called the attacks a 'threat to peace and security' and stressed 'that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organisers and supporters of these acts, will be held accountable', implicitly legitimising actions to follow against state or other accomplices of the 11 September terrorists. In Resolution 1373, the Security Council used its law-making capacity to spell out detailed obligations for states to abstain from giving support to terrorist groups in any form, and to positively contribute, internally and internationally, to the fight against terrorism. This unanimity, the swift destruction of the Taliban regime and the wide support enjoyed by the US intervention in Afghanistan will certainly reinforce the inhibition of states that might be tempted to openly support al-Qaeda and related terrorist movements. The United States made its intentions clear in the February 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: 'the states which choose to harbour terrorists are like accomplices which provide shelter to criminals. They will be held accountable for the actions of their 'guests'.⁷ The objective of denying sanctuaries to global terrorist movements is central to the strategy, and was underlined by the 9/11 Commission, which went further in identifying six priority areas of the world where the US should act to interdict safe havens to terrorists: Western Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Arabian Peninsula, Southeast Asia, West Africa and European cities with expatriate Muslim communities.⁸

This list illustrates two facts: firstly, there is no plausible candidate in it to willingly support al-Qaeda-type groups the way the Taliban regime did.

It points to two main geographical areas where al-Qaeda-type networks are now active, Southeast Asia and Western Europe. Secondly, in Europe, terrorists are not seeking to control territory, but rather to hide deep in the fabric of societies. In Southeast Asia, the 'embedded' terrorists have proven far more active and dangerous than separatist groups, whose affiliation with al-Qaeda remains elusive. In both regions, as opposed to Afghanistan, war is not an option, and terrorism is likely to be best addressed as a criminal problem than as a military enemy.

Altogether, war as a concept is hardly conceivable without a territorial dimension; in the context of terrorism, this means the territory of an accomplice state, or local turmoil which terrorists take advantage of, or territories without an effective state authority, which terrorists seek to control. No such circumstance seems to have played a role in any of the major terrorist attacks committed by global terrorist networks since 11 September.

The Limbo of 'Unlawful Combatants'

Throughout modern ages, the underlying assumption of war is that it is a fight between political entities such as states, rather than between individuals. As a result, the responsibility of those entities fighting one another normally substitutes that of the individuals who actually do the fighting, even if the war was unjust or illegal in the first place: it is this basic principle that separates soldiers from murderers. Soldiers' detention as prisoners of war entails no punitive character but is a precautionary measure of a collective kind, normally to be terminated upon the cessation of hostilities. Responsibility for their individual actions in war may fall back upon combatants only on a case-by-case basis, if it is determined that they have committed crimes, in particular war crimes. Under the 1949 Geneva conventions, that determination should result from a formal procedure to include basic guarantees such as due process, access to counsel, and so on. However, no such procedure is required simply to detain a prisoner of war: the determination by his captors that he belongs to the armed forces of the enemy or that he has participated in combat is sufficient.

War as a concept is hardly conceivable without a territorial dimension

Nowhere has the concept of a war on terror had more contentious consequences than with respect to the legal regime of those captured as prisoners in this 'war'. Nowhere has it shown more clearly its intrinsic flaws. The legal regime of detention currently being implemented by the United States rests on the notion that there is a war with the terrorists: hence the executive branch may capture and detain them at will, without judicial review, until the cessation of hostilities, just like prisoners of war. It also rests on the notion that terrorism is a crime: hence their qualification as 'unlawful combatants', to be denied the privileges of the Geneva conventions and especially of prisoner of

war status, and judged if necessary by American military commissions for their crimes. In other words, the regime combines for the US government the advantages of both the laws of war and criminal law: under the former, the ability to capture and detain combatants as a collective category; under the latter, to punish them individually. For the prisoners thus captured, there is neither the protection of the Geneva conventions, nor of US criminal procedures.

The term 'unlawful combatants' applied to the prisoners of the 'war on terror' is the expression of this botched conflation between the criminal and warlike aspects of terrorist activities under the current US approach. The problem does not lie so much with the former as with the latter aspect: terrorists are, by common admission of lawful countries, criminals. Their characterisation as combatants is much more contentious, and directly stems from the flawed concept of the 'war on terror'. Virtually none of these individuals satisfy the conditions laid down in the Geneva conventions for being considered legitimate combatants (for example, bearing arms openly, wearing a distinctive sign, being subject to organised command). It would appear normal under these conditions to regard them as 'unlawful combatants' and thus not eligible for prisoner of war status (but the Americans do allow them the minimal humane treatment granted to all persons detained in an armed conflict, which is close to POW treatment). All this might be legally defensible, provided one was in a real war situation, which normally comprises a theatre of operations, open fighting, a more or less regular army controlling a portion of territory, and actual combatants whose situation may be determined by simple criteria such as nationality and participation in the fighting. On the periphery of this core situation lie issues such as the status of partisan fighters and other irregulars who operate without uniform or in the enemy's rear, and the punishment of war criminals. A vast corpus of customary and treaty law enables decisions on these borderline cases.

In the war on terrorism, however, the peripheral is central, and the centre is marginal. Apart from Afghanistan, there has been no instance where the question of regarding al-Qaeda fighters as combatants could have seriously arisen. (In the Afghanistan campaign, it can be argued that the Taliban and, perhaps, their foreign Islamist surrogates, should have been granted the protection of the Geneva conventions, as the American military initially acknowledged on the ground. In 2001, the state power of Afghanistan was effectively embodied by the Taliban. Taliban troops bore their arms openly and were under organised command. They respected the laws and customs of war no less than the other Afghan factions in the 12 years-plus civil war that had desolated the country. The Afghanistan episode aside, all the protagonists of 'the other side' in the war against terrorism were 'unlawful combatants', without uniforms, territory, or organised command. Overall, a common-sense measure of the propriety of a legal approach is that it should not use a conceptual framework (such as positing the 'war on terror' as a real war) and then treat every single case that presents itself as an exception to a rule integral to that framework (that is, in war, combatants enjoy legal protection under the Geneva conventions).

After all, if this was a war, should the *USS Cole* and other military targets be retrospectively regarded as legitimate targets? In time of war, the Pentagon would surely qualify as such. But what are the consequences? If, on 11 September, the terrorists had attacked the building while wearing a distinctive sign and openly carrying arms rather than by treacherous means involving the mass killing of innocent civilians, would that have made the attack legal and the combatants lawful? This would be absurd and outrageous, but legally not impossible to argue, since the US has declared itself to be at war with terrorism. Then again, one need not underline the uncertainty in which the detainees of the war on terror find themselves: what are the criteria used to decide whether a 'combatant' belongs to the 'enemy' camp, absent nationality – US citizens have been so characterised – or belonging to the enemy's armed forces? Where is the theatre of operations? How will we know when the war has ended? These unanswered questions reflect the legal insecurity of the prisoners in this 'war' without limit in time or space.

However, if this uncertainty is wrong (although both the US government and the Supreme Court have recently undertaken to limit its direct consequences), its point of departure is even more erroneous. Law and politics recommend that terrorists be treated as criminals. By not doing so and by considering itself at war, the United States has enhanced the stature of its adversaries, conferring exaggerated importance and undeserved dignity on them. In their judicial treatment, it appeared needlessly vindictive and arbitrary. Societies have a right to defend themselves. It has always been accepted that, when faced with a clear and present danger, they can harden criminal procedures, or bring military means and procedures to bear on situations which resist resolution by ordinary means of restoring order or punishing criminals. These measures, of which martial law is an extreme case, allow for the use of warlike means in time of peace. Chasing al-Qaeda required more than ordinary criminal law, but in the exceptional circumstances and imminent danger of post-11 September, the US government could have obtained the adjustments and exemptions it needed on the home front and, very likely, internationally. It did not need the pretence of 'war'.

A Preventive War?

The eleventh of September 2001 demonstrated America's worst post-Cold War fears, namely, that its enemies, unable to attack America directly given its military superiority, would resort to indirect or subversive means, in particular, to mass terrorism, to achieve their ends. This concept of 'asymmetric threat', much discussed in the 1990s, focused on the evolving strategy of America's adversaries rather than on their identity and their motives. It tended to assume that it was not the adversary that was changing, but his tactics.

Then 11 September revealed the reality of mass terrorism and the emergence of large-scale asymmetric threats. It also revealed a new kind of enemy,

who combined the features of a cult and a nihilist ideology, and who, in his methods and recruitment, displayed a flexibility and a resoluteness that made him a threat without precedent. The new enemy bears no resemblance to the projections of old threats, or to the simple change of methods postulated by the theory of asymmetric war. On the contrary, by its character as a global network, it is a manifestation of modernity and may be a harbinger of things to come.

Those who foresaw the asymmetric threats were those who wanted to break out of the prison of the past and regain a freedom of manoeuvre compatible with the United States' pre-eminence and responsibilities in the post-Cold War era. They wanted to break with the dogmas of deterrence, formalistic alliances, arms-control commitments and, in particular, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. They called for a more active, flexible strategy capable of actively protecting America from its new enemies and defeating them should the need arise, rather than containing them and deterring them, as it had done with the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

This switch in American strategy from deterrence to action, and if need be, preemptive action, already well underway before 2001, was consummated after 11 September. The National Security Strategy adopted by the United States in September 2002 officially confirmed this, albeit with a residual consideration for the previous system. It defends the case for unilateral action more explicitly than ever, though without repudiating the multilateral security framework inherited from the Cold War; in particular, the 2002 National Security Strategy calls for the proactive promotion of democracy and stability, even including the hitherto abhorred means of peacekeeping and nation-building.

Beyond these hesitations, however, the strategy involves the claim to a double standard in favour of the United States: both in terms of its military superiority and its freedom of action the United States demands more and better for itself. The 2002 National Security Strategy sets for the US the task of maintaining a military superiority sufficient to deter anyone from engaging in a possible arms race with it. It also envisages the possibility of preventive war against the new threats. In defining the threats, it conflates the new non-state ones – global terrorist movements – with the old 'rogue' states. It is this combination which firmly establishes mass terrorism within the realm of

Rogue states and global terrorist networks remain distinct categories of threat

war, by presuming its convergence with traditional state enemies of the US and their WMD capabilities. In this context, the defining threat would be an apocalyptic terrorist network of an al-Qaeda type that received nuclear weapons from a rogue state. The 2002 National Security Strategy goes on to state clearly that, faced with this new combination, yesterday's strategic and legal arsenal will no longer suffice. It warns that

the US will consider itself bound neither by the strategy of deterrence nor by customary anticipatory self-defence (which allows a state to act in the event

of an actual and imminent threat), and that the US will, if necessary, act to forestall such an emerging combination of threats long before it materialises.

This conflation of the rogue states and of the global terrorist threats, however, is largely speculative. Al-Qaeda cannot be deterred, but rogue states can. The latter are concerned with their own, and their regime's, survival. They seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction to limit the range of options of the US vis-à-vis them, or to intimidate their neighbours, not to use them on suicidal surprise attacks on the US. They have spent a lot of capital, real and otherwise, in seeking those weapons; they are not about to give their most cherished toys to madmen they do not control. The rogue states and global terrorist networks remain distinct categories of threats, which do not call for the same strategic response.

In a sense, such a combination of the two threats would have been reassuring: it would present the prospect of the new terrorist threat depending on state accomplices whose destruction would provide at least a partial answer to the problem of elusive non-state actors with state-like destructive capacities. It would bring us back to a known universe, that of the state-to-state war, one in which the United States would prevail in the end.

Pre-emptive military action has always existed as an American strategic option. The 2002 National Security Strategy transformed this implicit option into an explicit doctrine, which was unnecessary. Focusing this doctrine on a conflation of the rogue state and global terrorist threats was a mistake: as desirable as it would seem to fight the latter by engaging the former in open war, including in a preventive mode, this is a mistaken strategy. Indeed, when implemented in Iraq, it did not pass the test of reality.

The Central Front in the War on Terror⁹

The US has put forward two sets of justifications for the war in Iraq. One was the non-compliance of Iraq with its UN disarmament obligations, the illegal pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes and alleged possession of at least some of these weapons. The second was that the combination of Iraq's WMD capacities and its known association with terrorist networks presented a threat to the US against which it had to defend itself. Although the United States' legal justification of the war before the UN rested entirely on the first set of arguments, the Bush administration made an extensive use of the second in its policy pronouncements and in the domestic case it built to support the war.

A telling example is this pronouncement by Paul Wolfowitz:

The connection between the terrorist networks and states in possession of weapons of mass terror poses the threat of a catastrophe several orders of magnitude greater than September 11. The weapons of mass terror and the terrorist networks with which Iraq is in league are not two distinct threats. They are part of the same threat. The disarmament of Iraq and

the war on terrorism are not only connected. Depriving Iraq of its chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, and dismantling its nuclear weapons development program, is crucial to victory in the war against terrorism'.¹⁰

Leaving aside semantics ('weapons of mass destruction' have become 'weapons of mass terror'; the word 'terror' or 'terrorist' appears six times in seven lines), this excerpt speaks to the insistence of the administration on presenting Iraq as part of the war on terror. These arguments found their way in the resolution of Congress authorising the use of force against Iraq in the following terms, which mirror the rationale of the 2002 National Security Strategy:

whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ these weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States of America or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend itself.¹¹

The ensuing failure to find either WMD programmes or weapons in Iraq, or to prove any support for, or meaningful association with, global terrorist movements on the part of Iraq, has not deterred the administration from claiming that Iraq remains part of the war on terror, a point emphatically made by President Bush to this day. Nor has it brought about a reconsideration, or qualification of the pre-emptive use of force doctrine, as laid out in the 2002 National Security Strategy.

There has been, however, an evolution in the argument. As well as pointing to the pre-war Iraqi threat, the Bush administration now makes the argument that the armed opposition it meets in Iraq and its terrorist nature justify continued US military engagement there. Iraq is now the 'central front of the war on terror'; better to destroy terrorists there than fight them in the US (an argument made by Tony Blair in Brighton before the September 2004 Labour Party conference, even as he admitted to the failure of pre-war intelligence).

This argument ignores the role which the US intervention itself has played in turning Iraq into a breeding ground for terrorism, as well as the fact that the violence in Iraq is committed by 'insurgents and terrorists' (in the terminology of American military commanders on the ground) and cannot be ascribed to terrorists alone. The respective weights of the insurgency and global al-Qaeda type movements in Iraq today is difficult to assess, but it would seem that the former far outweigh the latter.

Iraq is, at best, a costly distraction from the fight against terrorists, and has probably made matters worse by providing them a new cause (an American-led occupation in the heart of the Arab world), a shelter (provided by growing disorder in Iraq) and a training ground. Going from there to

argue that Iraq is a magnet that allows the US to lure terrorists there in order to destroy them rather than having to confront them in the US – the so-called 'flypaper' theory – belongs to the time-honoured genre of war propaganda rather than to strategic analysis.

Winning the Peace

In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, the dominant American view was that one should not ponder the causes of the attacks and the motives of their perpetrators. To seek to understand was to play into their hands, almost to excuse them. And yet, in the months that followed, the idea gained ground in the United States that the deeper causes of terrorism should be tackled. The phrase 'drain the swamp' encapsulated this aim: an ambivalent expression in reality, since it served as a vehicle for views as contrary as those of Donald Rumsfeld and Noam Chomsky on the subject. Whereas Rumsfeld explained that the operation in Afghanistan would deprive the terrorists of their main rear base, Chomsky argued that there would be no solution to the problem of terrorism without justice for the Palestinians.

Beyond this opposition, liberals and neo-conservatives, democrats and republicans alike, seemed to agree over the nature of the 'swamp': the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, which make Islamism the only safety valve for democratic aspirations, and the identification of America with these regimes. It is therefore necessary to transform this region, to promote democracy therein, and reduce America's dependence on Arab authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. As a result, overthrowing the Iraqi regime would kill two birds with one stone: it would create an opportunity to build the first Arab democracy under American protection while helping to distance America, from the standpoint of oil and strategy, from the main swamp, namely Saudi Arabia, whence 15 of the 19 terrorists who carried out the 11 September attacks originated.

To their credit, these nebulous visions acknowledged the limits to repression and the existence of underlying causes of terrorism that needed to be tackled, and they sought to do away with the authoritarian status quo in the Middle East which, as 11 September had showed, could provide no guarantee of genuine stability. Against them was their dismissive view of one of the most potent political forces in the region – nationalism: at least part of the sense of humiliation that feeds terrorism and Islamism stems from the submission of the region's authoritarian regimes to America and Washington's steadfast support for Israel. How could an invasion followed by a foreign domination of Iraq *not* augment this sense of dependence, especially in a context of close proximity between the governments of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Bush, who have made common cause in their wars on terrorism? Understandably, most Europeans persist in viewing the war in Iraq as a gamble, or even as an 'adventure', as the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had called it at the outset.

In 2004, the US sought to support reform and political opening in the region under the 'broader Middle East and North Africa' approach, a loosely concerted programme endorsed by the G8 countries' summit meeting in Sea Island, Georgia. This programme, which identifies the lack of democracy in the Middle East as the main root cause of terrorism, is a commendable effort. Its effects, however, are likely to remain limited by the resistance to change in the region, against the background of the war in Iraq and of the unopposed collapse of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. It is now only too easy for those who oppose reform in the Middle East to point to the state of affairs in Iraq and in the Occupied Territories in order to cry off political change. Addressing the root causes of terrorism and winning the peace do not only entail social and political reform in the Middle East, but also require that hard political issues are addressed, among which the overbearing US presence in the region and the Israeli–Arab conflict figure pre-eminently.

* * *

In his seminal book, Martin van Creveld announced the 'transformation of war'.¹² The end of regular armies, front lines and the distinction between combatants and non-combatants would turn war into a bloody and formless free-for-all, far removed from the regulated activity it had been in the modern era.

It would be hasty to say that 11 September 2001 plunged us into this new world. For that, mass terrorism would have to breed followers in vast numbers; it would have to spread throughout the Middle East, seize territorial bases and state resources there, to enhance its capacity to wreak havoc; it would have to embody a widely shared response to the Arab world's political perceived subservience and be viewed by Arab public opinion as a liberator, instead of a criminal and marginal expression of its grievances. We are very far from that point, and mass terrorism is not yet a defining threat of strategic proportions.

Mass terrorism is not yet a defining threat of strategic proportions

However, the response of the United States and its allies will influence these still hypothetical developments: if it is disproportionate, insufficiently targeted on the terrorists themselves, or too bellicose, it runs the risk of encouraging them in spite of itself.

America's legal, political and ideological choices made under the auspices of the 'war on terrorism' are not risk-free from that stand point. These choices, made by the United States under the influence of its legitimate anger and with the aim of sustaining its resolve, should now be reconsidered.

President Bush himself occasionally came close to challenging the concept of the war on terror. In August 2004, he said: 'We actually misnamed the war on terror. It ought to be [called] the struggle against ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies and who happen to use terror as a weapon to try to shake the conscience of the free world'.¹³ A few days later, when

asked about whether the war on terror could be won, he answered: 'I don't think you can win it. But I think you can create conditions so that those who use terror as a tool are less acceptable in parts of the world. Let's put it that way'.¹⁴ The first comment was praised by William Kristol as a step in the right direction, that is, acknowledging Islamic extremism as the true enemy in this war; the second was used by the Democratic campaign to criticise the lack of resolve of the incumbent president in the war on terror (thus prompting him to backtrack on his remarks).

Bush's common-sense remarks sought to qualify a concept he has himself defended passionately, but whose limitations are more apparent by the day. The context of a close and bitter presidential election campaign did not lend itself to that kind of qualification. At a later stage, however, one should hope that the most extreme consequences of war on terror as a concept be reconsidered, in particular, the status of prisoners in that 'war', the misguided conflation of rogue states and terrorism in American threat perceptions, the choice to elevate preventive war to the level of an explicit doctrine rather than an implicit last-resort option, and the self-defeating proposition that the war in Iraq is part of it.

Notes

1. 'Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated'. President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress, 20 September 2001 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>

2. UNSCR 1368, adopted 12 September 2001.

3. NATO Council declaration, NATO press release 2001/124, 12 September 2001.

4. Michael Howard, 'What's in a name? How to fight terrorism', *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2002.

5. The exception was Vietnam, which the American right is fighting hard, however, to reinsert into the seamless web of just causes that they identify with America's war experience. The resurrection of Vietnam to become a central theme in the 2004 US presidential campaign may be more than coincidence.

6. At the end of the campaign in Tunisia, Eisenhower disapproved of British General Auchinleck's handshake with the German commander, General von Arnim.

7. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003, The White House, p. 17.

8. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 366.

9. 'The terrorists understand that Iraq is the central front in the war on terror. They're testing our will. And, day by day, they are learning, our will is firm, their cause will fail. We will stay on the offensive. Whatever it takes, we will seek and find and destroy the terrorists, so that we do not have to face them in our own country. (Applause)' President Bush's remarks at Fort Campbell, 18 March 2004 www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040318-3.html.

10. Speech by Paul Wolfowitz, 'Iraq, what does disarmament look like?', *Council on Foreign Relations*, 23 January 2003.

11. US Congress, Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq, 2 October 2002.

12. Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991).

13. 'Bush backtracks on terrorism remark', *Washington Post*, 31 August 2004.

14. *Ibid.*

Imaging Terror: Logos, Pathos and Ethos

James Der Derian


Imagination is not a gift usually associated with bureaucracies. (*The 9/11 Commission Report*, p. 344)

The Logos of Terror

Two framed artefacts of the second Cold War hang on either side of my desk. The first is a simple black and white poster made in 1985, most probably inspired by President Reagan's description of the Afghan *mujahideen* as freedom fighters. Next to a photograph of Reagan is one of a New York City firefighter. The caption underneath says: 'A firefighter fights fires. A freedomfighter fights _____'. The second image comes from a 1985 issue of *The Manipulator*, a short-lived, large-format art magazine. On the cover is a Nancy Burston photograph entitled 'Warhead 1', a digitised composite of world leaders proportioned according to their country's nuclear weapons, in which the facial features of Reagan (55% of the world's throw weight) and Brezhnev (45%) dominate the fuzzier visages of Thatcher, Mitterand, and Deng (less than 1% each) (see Figures 1 and 2).¹

These two images speak volumes, revealing the grammatical logos that underwrites the pathos and ethos of terror. As verb, code and historical method, terrorism has consistently been understood as an act of symbolically intimidating and, if deemed necessary, violently eradicating a personal, political, social, ethnic, religious, ideological or otherwise radically differentiated foe. Yet, as noun, message and catch-all political signifier, the meaning of terrorism has proven more elusive. From Robespierre's endorsement to Burke's condemnation during the French Revolution, from the Jewish Irgun blowing up the King David Hotel to the Palestinian Black September massacre at the Munich Olympics, from Bin Laden the Good fighting the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan to Bin Laden the Bad toppling the Twin Towers of New York, terrorism, terrorists and terror itself have become the political pornography


Source: *Third World Quarterly*, 26(1) (2005): 23–37.

Figure 1: Warhead I

of modernity: one knows terrorism with certainty only when, literally, one sees it. But, in the blink of an eye, the terrorist can become the freedom fighter, and vice versa, for at one time or another nearly everyone, from righteous statesmen who terror-bomb cities to virtuous *ihadists* who suicide-bomb women and children, seems to have a taste for terror.

Without engaging in nostalgia, one can recognise that the most powerful form of terror mutated at the end of the Cold War. With the decline (if not the total demise) of a logic of deterrence based on a nuclear balance of terror, so too eroded the willingness and capacity to inflict mutually unacceptable harm that had provided a modicum of order, if not peace or justice, to the bipolar system. In its place a new *imbalance of terror* has emerged, based on a mimetic fear and hatred coupled with an asymmetrical willingness and

Figure 2: Reflections on Terrorism



capacity to destroy the other without the formalities of war.² This cannot be reduced, as much as leaders on both sides of the conflict have tried, to a post-9/11 phenomenon. It can be traced back doctrinally to the 1990's, when a series of US defense policy guidances (subsequently formalized in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense) shifted US strategy from collectively *detering* and *dominating* to unilaterally and preemptively *destroying* the enemy, and when Bin Laden issued his pseudo-fatwas which decreed Christian and Jewish civilians legitimate targets of the jihad.

As in the older, tidier balance of terror, the doctrine of taking civilians hostage and if necessary killing them still held for both sides, but it now operated as a contingent factor of an asymmetrical relationship. Regardless of

nomenclature – ‘terror’ or ‘counter-terror’ – high numbers of civilians would (and continue to) be killed in the process. It might be small solace to the victims to know they were primary targets as opposed to ‘accidental’ or ‘collateral’ victims, especially since casualty rates have been terribly skewed in both cases. When one takes into account how war-related fatalities have been reversed in modern times, from 100 years ago when one civilian was killed per eight soldiers, to the current ratio of eight civilians per soldier killed, then compares the similarly-skewed combatant-to-non-combatant casualty figures of 9/11, the Afghan War, and the Iraq War, the terror/counter-terror distinction begins to fade even further. Perhaps it is time for a new Burson composite, using the leaders of the three conflicts to proportionally represent the number of civilian casualties from the three conflicts.

With weapons systems, war-fighting doctrine and war games often wagging the dog of civilian policy, the narratives as well as the paladins of the Cold War seem destined to an eternal return in US foreign policy. Having mapped this phenomenon before 9/11, I wish to focus on what (if anything) has changed since then, and to understand the celerity and alacrity by which our age has now been defined by terrorism.³ Although the fundamentalist religious and political beliefs of the major combatants have attracted the most attention, I think we need to pay more attention to the multiple media, which transmit powerful images as well as help to trigger highly emotional responses to the terrorist event. Thanks to the immediacy of television, the internet and other networked information technology, we *see* terrorism everywhere in real time, all the time. In turn, terrorism has taken on an iconic, fetishised and, most significantly, a highly *optical* character. After witnessing the televised images of kamikaze planes hitting the World Trade Center, the home videos of Bin Laden, the internet beheading of Nicholas Berg, we were all too ready to agree with President Bush: ‘Evil now has a face’.

However, somewhere between the Pyrrhic victory of Tora Bora and the disastrous post-war of Iraq, the face of terror began to morph into a new Post-Bursonian composite. The ‘terrorist’ can now easily do double-duty as an airport security profile, featuring the checkered *keffiyeh* of Arafat, the aquiline nose of Osama Bin Laden, the hollowed face of John Walker Lindh, the maniacal grin of Saddam Hussein, the piercing eyes of Abu Musab Zarqawi (‘He could direct his men simply by moving his eyes’, said Basil Abu Sabha, his Jordanian prison doctor). The historicity, specificity and even the comprehensibility of terrorism have been transmogrified by the new holy and media wars into a single physiognomy of global terror.

Of course, our image of terror did not arrive by itself or on its own. Just as every image comes with an explicit or implicit caption – what Roland Barthes, the gifted semiotician, referred to as the ‘anchorage’ which seeks to fix the ‘polysemy’ of the sign⁴ – so too is the war on terror freighted with the narratives of the Cold War. Moreover, the legacy of the Cold War lives on through popular culture, a ‘fact’ ably noted by a Hollywood actor who knows a thing or two about the morbidity of comebacks. Playing a ‘C-fuckin’-I-A agent’ doubling as a Gulf war arms dealer, up against FBI straight man (another

constant in national security culture) Willem Dafoe, Mickey Rourke colourfully notes how the dead continue to weigh on the living:

This isn't about sides. This is about confusion. This is about creating enemies when there aren't any. And, man, the whole Goddamn world's falling apart. Peace reigns, freedom reigns, democracy rules. How are we gonna keep the military-industrial complex chugging forward without clear-cut, pit-faced, scum-sucking evil breathing down our neck? Hmmm? Threatening our very shores. Now my job is to make sure the other side keeps fighting; whatever side – I mean whatever side we're officially not on this year.⁵

Seen in this light, the war on terror is not new but part of a permanent state of war by which the sovereignty of the most powerful state is reconstituted through the naming of terrorist foe and anti-terrorist friend.

There are lessons to be learned from an earlier inter-war – one that is beginning to look too much like our own – in which two media critics, *avant la lettre*, first confronted this new matrix of art, politics and terror. Walter Benjamin took his first measure of film production in his celebrated essay, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', taking note of how mechanically reproduced art, especially film, could be especially useful to, if not generative of, fascism. Rendering politics into aesthetics had the advantage of mobilising the masses for war without endangering traditional property relations. He quotes the futurist Marinetti to chilling effect:

War is beautiful because it establishes man's dominion over the subjugated machinery by means of gas masks, terrifying megaphones, flame throwers, and small tanks. War is beautiful because it initiates the dreamt-of metalization of the human body ... War is beautiful because it creates new architecture, like that of the big tanks, the geometrical formation flights, the smoke spirals from burning villages, and many others ... Poets and artists of Futurism! ... remember these principles of an aesthetics of war so that your struggle for a new literature and a new graphic art ... may be illumined by them!⁶

The aesthetic of the reproducible image overpowered the aura and authenticity of the original. In *The Arcades Project* Walter Benjamin studied the significance of this new development for the Rankean realism that hitherto had underwritten much of geopolitical discourse. 'The history that showed things "as they really were" was the strongest narcotic of the century.' He went on to declare that 'history decays into images, not into stories'. Benjamin defined an image as 'that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation'; or, as he more simply put it, images are 'dialectics at a standstill'.⁷ I believe his endorsement of a counter-medium, the use of montage as 'the art of citing without quotation', in which 'truth is charged to the bursting point with time', has become just as valid for our own times.

Also writing in Germany in the inter-war period, and trying to understand the immense popularity of Berlin's new picture palaces, Siegfried Kracauer thought the Berliners had become 'addicted to distraction'. He called them 'optical fairylands' – 'to call them movie theaters', he said, 'would be disrespectful' – where 'distraction – which is meaningful only as improvisation, as reflection of the uncontrolled anarchy of the world – is festooned with drapes and forced back into a unity that no longer exists'. In Kracauer's view the picture palaces served as a kind of Hegelian asylum from Weimar disorder, ornate spaces where the alienated Berliner could seek reunification through what he called a 'cult of distraction'. Substitute Fox, CNN, MSNBC for the picture palace, and we find another potential guide for leading us through an 'Age of Info-terror'.

The Pathos of Terror

We 'moderns' might now recognise the increasing power of images over words, but we have been slower to understand the consequences, as they have increasingly taken on a pathological character, for the war on terror. How might we read, in the spirit of Benjamin and Kracauer, the Bin Laden videos as well as the official response to them?

At first viewing the Bin Laden home videos understandably yielded a fairly uniform and deserved response of outrage in the USA and Europe. However, not just in the Middle East but in parts of America with large Arab populations, like Dearborn, MI and Los Angeles, questions were soon raised about their authenticity. The doubts can be understood in Benjamin's terms, of the loss of aura from the original produced by technical reproducibility, but multiplied many times by the convergence of the Ages of Terror and Adobe Photoshop, or what I have referred to as the Age of Info-terror.⁶ It reflects as well an increasingly global view that Hollywood, Silicon Valley and Washington, DC have joined forces in the war on terror.

For those who might detect a whiff of conspiracy in such claims, a short history of events after 9/11 might be instructive. By early October 2001 White House advisers had already begun a series of meetings with directors, producers and executives from the entertainment industry on how Hollywood might best help the war effort. To be sure, an alliance between the military and the entertainment industry was not entirely new. The mixing of spectacle and war goes back to the beginnings of film, when DW Griffith, already famous for his 1915 *Birth of the Nation*, went to work for Lord Beaverbrook's War Office in World War I. However, there was some cause for worry with this new overture. My own concern was first triggered at the opening of the innocuous-sounding Institute for Creative Technologies (ICT), which I covered for *Wired* magazine in 1999. The ICT was set up at the University of Southern California to spearhead a remarkable project: with \$43 million provided by the US Army it would combine the virtual reality tools of Silicon Valley and the talent of Hollywood film studios to produce state-of-the-art

military simulations for future war. On the day of the opening one speaker after another, from the Secretary of the Army to the Governor of California, spoke of 'making the quantum leap to the Army After Next'; 'creating virtual environments for total immersion of participants'; and, my favourite, 'engrossing stories stocked with emotional characters who may either be simulated or manned', Jack Valenti, head of the Motion Picture Association, opened his remarks by correcting a previous speaker: 'Los Angeles is not the "entertainment capital of the world" [pause], Washington, DC is the entertainment capital of the world [laughter].'

I expressed my concern at the opening ceremony in the form of a question to Steven Sample, President of University of Southern California (USC): might not the linking up of Hollywood and the Pentagon repeat the World War II experience, when training films were mixed with propaganda films, and military simulations became a tool for public dissimulations? Were there any ethical checks and balances to assure that the ICT would not produce something like *Wag the Dog*? President Sample deadpanned a nervous sideways look and said, 'As Jack is coming up to respond to that. ...' But Sample chose to respond by going back to an earlier observation, that the ICT would develop 'synthetic experiences so compelling that people will react as though they were real – a virtual reality of sensations and sights'. He went on to make a deft analogy to Plato's poor opinion of the poets. Not actually using the word *mimesis*, he suggested as much was going on at the ICT: by performing the classical function of poetry and theatre – artistically and dramatically mimicking reality for a higher purpose – it could not help but arouse anxieties about whose version of reality was the true one. The allegory of the cave lurked behind the curtains.

Where Sample applied nuance, Jack Valenti chose pugnacity. Responding to my question he said: 'I want to illuminate a central truth to the gentleman – everything leaks, in Hollywood, in Washington. There's no way you can keep a secret. You can't fool the people for very long.' He then informed me that I needed to correct my 'Copernican complex'. He contrasted my view to the decision to drop the atomic bomb on the Japanese. Some might have seen that as a 'heartless and terrible thing to do ... but not the 150 000 American boys whose lives would have been lost. This is a lesson in Philosophy 101 that I am giving to you right now.'

I came away with a different lesson. Valenti, like many in power today, are all too ready to drop the bomb on dissident viewpoints. Nonetheless, he was on target in one regard: what separates and elevates war above lesser, 'Copernican' conceits is its intimate relationship to death. The dead body – on the battlefield, in the tomb of the unknown soldier, in the collective memory, even on the movie screen – is what gives war its special status. This fact can be censored, hidden in a body bag, air-brushed away, but it provides, even in its erasure, the corporeal *gravitas* of war. However, everything I witnessed that day at the ICT was dedicated to the disappearance of the body, the aestheticising of violence, the sanitisation of war: in other words, to everything we have seen implemented since 9/11.

Barely a week after the terrorist attack, the ICT began to gather top talent from Hollywood to create possible terrorist scenarios that could then be played out in their Marina del Rey virtual reality facilities. Then Karl Rove, White House special adviser, travelled to Beverly Hills to discuss with the top ceos how Hollywood might provide talent and resources for the battle against terrorism. Among those reported as contributing to the virtual war effort were *Die Hard* screenwriter Steven E. De Souza, *Matrix* special effects wizard, Paul Debevec and directors David Fincher (*Fight Club*), Spike Jonze (*Being John Malkovich*) and Randal Kleiser (*Grease*). Fans of Kleiser might wonder why his classic work, *Honey I Blew Up the Kid* (about an amateur physicist who turns his son into a giant) went unmentioned in the press releases. Was it proof that the US government might be embarrassed to have hooked up with B-list directors? Or was it part of an info-war campaign to keep the lid on 'Operation Shrink Bin Laden Back to Size'? When holy war comes to Hollywood, the truth is hard to come by.

As more Bin Laden tapes emerged there were calls for censorship, heightened threat levels, and a cottage industry of media critics. Debates continued to focus on whether the tapes were real or not, was he dead or alive and then, most ominously, on whether he had joined ranks with Saddam Hussein. Gone missing was any attempt to understand why Bin Laden continued to command a global audience.

After Al Jazeera broadcast the first videotape, National Security adviser Condoleezza Rice made personal calls to heads of the television networks, asking them to pre-screen and to consider editing Al-Qaeda videos for possible coded messages. Secretary of State Powell interpreted the February 2002 audiotape as proof positive that Bin Laden had forged an alliance with Saddam Hussein. Yet the most significant and constant message, intended for the aggrieved and dispossessed in Islam, has remained, like Edgar Allan Poe's purloined letter, out in the open, in plain sight, and peculiarly unnoticed. Bin Laden was adeptly using networked technology to disseminate a seductive message of prophecy, reciprocity and ultimate victory.

Shortly after the bombing campaign began in Afghanistan, and Bin Laden delivered his first videotape as a counter air-strike to the USA, he spoke with his guest and camera crew of the many dreams that had preceded 9/11: of playing soccer games against American pilots, in which Al-Qaeda members become pilots themselves in order to defeat the Americans; of a religious leader who dreamt of carrying a huge plane through the desert; of the wife of a *jihadis* who saw a plane crashing into a building a week before the event. An unidentified man off-camera interrupts Bin Laden, saying that 'Abd Al Rahman saw a vision before the operation, a plane crashed into a tall building, he knew nothing about it'. At this point Bin Laden turns to his guest and says: 'I was worried that maybe the secret would be revealed if everyone starts seeing it in their dreams. So I closed the subject'. The koranic view of dreams as prophecy appeared to be taken so seriously that Bin Laden believed operational secrecy was at risk. For Bin Laden prophecy anticipates the inevitable: a violent confrontation with the West. He further

states in the video that 'America has been filled with horror from north to south and east to west, and thanks be to God what America is tasting now is only a copy of what we have tasted'.

Prophecy is tied to reciprocity once again in the November audiotape, in which he opens with a florid invocation of 'God, the merciful, the compassionate' who sanctifies Al-Qaeda's violence because 'reciprocal treatment is part of justice ... as you kill you will be killed and as you bomb you will be bombed'. With the release of the February 2002 tape, most of the media, following Powell's lead, focused on Bin Laden's invocation to defend Iraq against the 'crusaders' by copying the 'success' of trench warfare in Tora Bora. Left unnoticed was Bin Laden once again calling on religious purity not only to counter Western technological superiority in planes, bombs and soldiers but also by an info-war: 'we realized from our defence and fighting against the American enemy that, in combat, they mainly depend on psychological warfare'. He adds: 'This is in light of the huge media machine they have'. Bin Laden instructs *the jihadists* that they will triumph in a 'just war' by fighting 'in the cause of Allah' and 'against the friends of Satan', and by avoiding 'all grave sins, such as consuming alcohol, committing adultery, disobeying parents, and committing perjury'. 'They should,' adds Bin Laden, 'in particular mention the name of God more before combat'.

Unfortunately, the US intelligence and intellectual communities, bound by rational models of decision making, were slow to comprehend this powerful synergy of prophecy, reciprocity and technology. This mythologically informed terrorism, or 'mytho-terrorism', helps explain not only Bin Laden's own motivations but also why his appeal among the aggrieved will probably outlive him and exceed the impact of his own crimes.

Mytho-terrorism has similar characteristics to other forms of violence like wars or revolutions that bind together the deprived, the weak, the resentful, the repressed or just the temporarily disadvantaged. The difference, however, that gives mytho-terrorism its spectacular power *as well as* anticipating its eventual failure, is the targeting of innocent victims in the name of a higher good. Conducted for an imagined collectivity, looking backwards to a supposed Golden Age, or predicting a future paradise, mytho-terrorism undermines a political order through asymmetrical violence but is unable to generate public legitimacy for any earthly alternatives. It relies on a perpetual struggle, a *jihad* or holy war.

The messages of the tapes portray an escalating conflict dating from the medieval Crusades that can only end in a final conflagration of vengeance against the infidel and of redemption for the *jihadist*. Bin Laden's vision depends not only on the idea of an original act of injury against Islam, but also on the persistence of reciprocal injustices. From the start, President Bush was quick to fall into this mimetic trap, responding in kind when he vowed at the Washington National Cathedral shortly after the attack 'to rid the world of evil'. By imitating the evangelical rhetoric and practice of with-us-or-against-us, he ignored the counsel and constraint of sympathetic allies who had prior experience with terrorism at home.

The obvious must be restated: this is not to claim any moral equivalence between Bush and Bin Laden but rather to identify a mutual pathology in operation, the kind of mimetic relationship that often develops in war and terror. People go to war not only out of rational calculation but also because of how they see, perceive, picture, imagine and speak of each other: that is, because of how the construction of difference of other groups, as well as the sameness of their own, takes on irreconcilable conditions of hostility. Neither Bush nor Bin Laden is the first to think that mimesis might be mined for political advantage, only to find themselves caught in its own dynamic. From Greek tragedy and Roman gladiatorial spectacles to futurist art and fascist rallies, mimetic violence has regularly overpowered virtuous intentions as well as democratic practices. The question, then, is how to break this mimetic encounter of mytho-terrorism?

Historically, terrorist movements without a mass base quickly weaken and rarely last more than a decade. However, the mimetic struggle between Bush and Bin Laden, magnified by the media, fought by advanced technologies of destruction, and unchecked by the UN or our allies, has developed a pathology of its own in which assimilation or extermination become plausible solutions for what appears to be an intractable problem.

As subsequent acts of terror and counter-terror surpassed the immediate effects of the 9/11 attack, as Bin Laden morphed into yet another avatar of evil, Saddam Hussein, we now face a pathological form of mimesis that has been medically defined as 'the appearance, often caused by hysteria, of symptoms of a disease not actually present'. Bin Laden's videotapes inflame the mimetic condition by linking terrorist attacks in Tunisia, Karachi, Yemen, Kuwait, Bali and even Moscow to an age-old crusade of Islam against the West. In response, the White House's new 'National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace' called on all Americans to guard against a 'digital disaster' by becoming 'digital citizen soldiers'. The Pentagon's main research arm, the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA), proposes under the rubric of 'Scientia Est Potentia' (knowledge is power) data-mining operations to provide 'Total Information Awareness' on citizens and foreigners alike. Meanwhile a 'Green Scare' of Islam threatens the body politic as severely as the hysteria of past Red Scares.

Dead or alive, prophet or crackpot, symptom or disease, Bin Laden as well as Hussein require a mimetic foe. Without a reciprocal hatred their prophecies lose their self-fulfilling powers. As is often the case with narcissistic psychopaths, the worst thing we could do is to deprive them of their reflections.

As we know from medical pathology, the auto-immune response can kill as well as cure. The response to the most powerful images after the Bin Laden tapes, the Abu Ghraib photos, bears this out. Consider Donald Rumsfeld's first Complaint upon the appearance of the Abu Ghraib images:

In the information age, people are running around with digital cameras and taking these unbelievable photographs and then passing them off,

against the law, to the media, to our surprise, when they had not even arrived in the Pentagon.⁹

An escalating war of images ensued. Heinous crimes were revealed, public outrage expressed, official apologies proffered, congressional hearings convened and court martials put into progress. But something went missing in this mass-mediated picture of pictures. In the rush to moral condemnation and for political expiation, the *meaning* of the images became moot. In the case of the Abu Ghraib photos, once established as 'authentic', they took on a singular significance: a crisis for the Bush administration and the USA's reputation in the world. Numerous reports of earlier instances of dissimulations, group-think acts of self-deception, and outright lies by the US government, from claims about Iraqi ties to Al-Qaeda, the presence of weapons of mass destruction, and the likelihood of a swift post-war transition to peace and democracy, all paled in comparative political effect to the digital images of simulated sex, dominatrix bondage, and mock KKK-lynchings (with electrical wires substituting for the hangman's noose).

Roland Barthes identifies the source of this power in the image: 'From a phenomenological viewpoint, in the photograph, the power of authentication exceeds the power of representation'.¹⁰ How does the authenticity of the image come to trump the representation of the word? And in the age of Adobe Photoshop, just what does *authentic* mean? This is not to suggest that the photos taken at the Abu Ghraib prison are fake, as proved to be the case with facsimile images published in the *Daily Mirror* tabloid of British soldiers torturing an Iraqi prisoner and with the images published by Egyptian newspapers of an American soldier sexually abusing a woman (actually downloaded from an unrelated porn website). It is rather to raise critical questions that the press and academics have been slow to consider. These are questions on how not just cultural interpretation, moral judgement and ideological fervor, but also new technical means of reproduction, real-time transmission and global circulation via the internet produce profound and potentially uncontrollable truth-effects through the use of photographic and videographic imagery.

As we are exposed to loop-images of prisoner abuse, Islamicist hip-hop videos, and a brutal snuff film of hostages, at some point (a point rapidly shrinking in duration) between the initial shock produced by the images (they are just too unbelievable) and the banalisation of evil through replication (they have become too familiar), the reality principle itself begins to disappear with a flick of the channel, click of the mouse. Consider just a few of the 'aberrant' responses to the Abu Ghraib images circulating on the internet. According the Associated Press, the editor of the one of the Egyptian newspapers in question, Mustafa Bakri, justified publication of the pornographic images of American sexual abuse because 'the kind of pictures on CBS made us believe that any other picture is authentic' (5 May 2004). The *Guardian* quoted the British Liberal Democrat leader, Charles Kennedy, as saying that the photos showing British abuse of an Iraqi would lead to

renewed violence even if they were fake (7 May 2004). And, as one sample from many blogs, 'SkepticOverlord' likened the fakery to an episode of the CBS-produced television series 'The Agency', in which the CIA staged a porno film to discredit a militant Islamic leader.

It may well be that in the search for authenticity we are witnessing a deeper desire for a lost moral certainty, in which the public representation of reality becomes a function of a collective struggle for ethical superiority, of a kind that initially justified the US intervention in Iraq and that ultimately provides the twisted rationale of the torturer.

The Ethos of Terror

US foreign policy has always been a struggle of ethics and power, and when politics escalates into war, the first casualty – as isolationist Senator Hiram Johnson famously remarked in 1917 – is the truth. With the casualty list growing every day in the war against terror, a war of images was inevitable. The biggest salvos in this homegrown struggle of morality, truth and power came with Michael Moore's documentary, *Fahrenheit 9/11*.

Promoted in the film trailer as the 'true story that will make your temperature rise', duly attacked by Bill O'Reilly as 'Leni Riefenstahl Third Reich propaganda', and challenged by the right-wing group Citizens United as a violation of federal election laws, *Fahrenheit 9/11*, all about the news, swiftly became the news. Lost in the polarised debate was much of an account of *how* this film succeeds, particularly of Moore's uncanny ability to evince powerful moral and emotional responses from an image-saturated mix of media. Like the Rodney King video (or the Stanley Miller sequel) of black men being beaten up by the police, the looped shot of the twin towers falling, Bin Laden's home movies, the Abu Ghraib digital snapshots, and the Richard Berg snuff film, *Fahrenheit 9/11* plays to the modern sensibility that our leaders might and often do lie but that images cannot.

In the process irrefutable images damn the guilty by association. Blacked-out names from Bush's National Guard records magically reappear like invisible ink in reverse; the Bush posse morphs into the Cartwright family from the TV series, 'Bonanza'; and shaking the hands of an Arab becomes poof-positive of calumny and conspiracy. It might be better to celebrate *Fahrenheit 9/11* as an imaginary rather than a documentary.

This is not a criticism. We had best remember again the words of Benjamin on realism as the 'the strongest narcotic of the century'. He went on to exhort those in the grip of a *faux* realpolitik that 'in times of terror, when everyone is something of a conspirator, everybody will be in a situation where he has to play detective'.

As proof, numerous print reports of earlier instances of dissimulations, group-think acts of self-deception and outright lies by the Bush administration, from claims about Iraqi ties to Al-Qaeda, the presence of weapons of mass destruction, and the likelihood of a swift post-war transition to peace

and democracy, continuously surface, sink and bubble-up from a variety of news holes. Confusion, not freedom, reigns. But in *Fahrenheit 9/11* the image seized and sustained public attention and demanded a response. Why?

We are back to the power of authentication over representation: what the word can only represent, the picture supposedly proves. The traditional print media have been slow to understand how the internet, with its real-time transmission and global circulation of images, has force-multiplied this effect and transformed the political as well as media game. Indeed, many of the most ludicrous as well as most disturbing images in Moore's film – like Bush goofing in the Oval office before he goes primetime to announce the beginning of the Iraq war, or the gun camera shot of an Apache helicopter crew coolly taking out three Iraqis – have been seen on websites for well over a year.

However, in an Age of Info-terror one begins to wonder just how profound and lasting these image-effects truly are. The King video incited plenty of righteous anger, but notably failed to indict the perpetrators. Regardless of photographs and videos to the contrary, a French *nonfiction* best seller arguing that 9/11 was fabricated found a credulous audience. The Abu Ghraib images shocked us but have yet to cause any heads to roll (or at least not any adorned with stars).

How long before photographic immanence loses its power of authentication and stimulation, we stop believing what we see, and the significance of the image itself is called into question? How many times can the truth take a beating before the public just stops believing *anything* it hears, reads and sees? Not soon enough?

It may well be that the early newspaper ads promoting *Fahrenheit 9/11* – Moore and Bush frolicking hand-in-hand in front of the White House, with 'Controversy ... What Controversy?' underneath – contain a hidden answer to these questions. Bush, Bin Laden *and* Moore have tapped into a great insecurity in which the search for authenticity becomes inseparable from the desire for moral superiority. In their projection (dare I say simulation) of exclusive truths, they have each found their mirror other.

In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche exhorts us in our search for meaning to eschew quick moral judgements in favour of a more arduous semiotic investigation:

Morality is only an interpretation of certain phenomena, more precisely a *misinterpretation*. Moral judgement belongs, as does religious judgement, to a level of ignorance at which even the concept of the real, the distinction between the real and the imaginary, is lacking; so that at such a level 'truth' denotes nothing but things which we today call 'imaginings'. To this extent moral judgment is never to be taken literally: as such it never contains anything but nonsense. But as *semiotics* it remains of incalculable value: it reveals, to the informed man at least, the most precious realities of cultures and inner worlds which did not *know* enough to 'understand' themselves. Morality is merely 'sign' language, merely symptomatology; one must already know *what* it is about to derive profit from it.¹¹

So what is it about? Here's an historical clue: 'semiotics', or the study of signs, emerged in the 16th century in the arts of war and medicine. It referred to new methods of military manoeuvre based on visual signals, as well as new medical techniques for identifying pathological symptoms in humans. From day one signs had the power to kill as well as to cure. In the 21st century we need to develop a new semiotics for the images of the war against terror. Otherwise we will continue treating its most morbid symptoms with morality plays rather than finding a cure for the all-too-real disease of imperial politics.

Epilogue

The war of images continues. Osama Bin Laden, who knocked the balance of terror askew, saw fit in an October-surprise election video to give the USA notice that this particular insurgent was resurgent. Ostensibly directing his remarks to US citizens rather than to the presidential candidates, he provided a civics lesson on the meaning of freedom and security. In case they had found the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon too subtle, he offered a more explicit explanation for his actions:

Security is an important pillar of human life. Free people do not relinquish their security. This is contrary to Bush's claim that we hate freedom ... We fought you because we are free and do not accept injustice. We want to restore freedom to our nation. Just as you waste our security, we will waste your security.

After a short digression on the strategic advantage al-Qaeda gained by President Bush 'being preoccupied with the little child's talk about her goat and its butting' (prompting former New York Mayor Giuliani to remark that Bin Laden was 'taking his lines from Michael Moore's film'), he ends the video by returning to the security dilemma:

Your security does not lie in the hands of Kerry, Bush, or al-Qaeda. Your security is in your own hands. Each and every state that does not tamper with our security will have automatically assured its own security.

It took *Saturday Night Live* just two days to subvert not only the medium and the message of Bin Laden's videotape, but also the self-image upon which global democracy is supposed to be modelled. In the skit, a news anchor (bearing some resemblance to Tom Brokaw) introduces a clip of an Osama Bin Laden impersonator speaking in Arabic with English subtitles:

Hello. I am Osama Bin Laden. And Allah be praised, this is my message to the American people. In a few days, you will hold your election to choose between the ignorant cowboy Bush and the gigolo Kerry. Over

the last several months, I have been approached repeatedly by representatives of both candidates, who have asked me if I would please endorse their opponents. But I have refused to do this. First, because frankly, I find this request sort of insulting, which it really is, if you think about it. Especially coming from Bush, who has not shown the least bit of interest in me since he invaded Iraq. And also, because to me, voting is a private matter, and one which I take very seriously. For a time, I feared that I would not be eligible to vote in this election. But recently, praise Allah, I was tracked down by two volunteers from the Kerry campaign. They signed me up, and apparently, I am now registered in Cincinnati.

Facing the logos, pathos and ethos of terror, the weapon of mass whimsy might still be the best way to counter the mimetic war of images.

Notes

1. Based on techniques first developed in the 1870s by the founder of eugenics, Francis Galton, in which photographs of criminals were superimposed into a 'natural kind', Burson's digitalised images of the 1980s subverted the notion of ideal types, for example in 'Warhead' and 'Beauty' (a composite of Hollywood actresses Jane Fonda, Brooke Shields, Meryl Streep, Diane Keaton and Jacqueline Bisset).

2. 'The art of deterrence, prohibiting political war, favors the upsurge, not of conflicts, but of acts of war without war.' See P. Virilio, *Pure War*, trans M. Polizotti, New York: Semiotext(e), 1983, p. 27.

3. See J. Der Derian, *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military – Industrial – Media – Entertainment Network*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001. It is also worth remembering the Pentagon's secret effort to model seven post-cold war 'war scenarios', including the rise of a Resurgent/Emergent Global Threat (REGT) by 2001, which was authored by Paul Wolfowitz. See P. Tyler, *New York Times*, 17 February 1992, p. A8.

4. See R. Barthes, 'Rhetoric of the image', in Barthes, *Image-Music-Text*, trans S. Heath, New York: Hill and Wang, 1977, pp. 32–51.

5. *White Sands* (1992) starring Willem Dafoe, Mary Elizabeth Mastrantonio and Mickey Rourke.

6. W. Benjamin, 'The work of art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', in H. Arendt (ed), *Illuminations*, New York: Schocken, 1969, pp. 241–242.

7. W. Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, trans. H. Eiland and K. McLaughlin, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 462–464.

8. I would like to thank Tom Levin for the gift of the phrase, 'Age of Adobe Photoshop'.

9. M. Dowd, 'A world of hurt', *New York Times*, 9 May 2004.

10. R. Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, New York: Vintage, 1982.

11. F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, trans R.J. Hollingdale, London: Penguin, 1968, p. 55.

Should HIV/AIDS Be Securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of Linking HIV/AIDS and Security

Stefan Elbe

Now in its third decade, HIV/AIDS is well poised to become one of the most devastating pandemics in modern history. Over the next years, many of the 42 million people living with HIV around the world will unfortunately join the 25 million who have already succumbed to AIDS-related illnesses. Every day the pandemic continues to kill three times as many people than died during the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, not least because in some southern African countries national HIV prevalence rates presently exceed a third of the adult population. Nor is the growth potential of the AIDS pandemic exhausted, as HIV rapidly spreads in parts of Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, Russia, and Eastern Europe (Eberstadt, 2002; Grisin and Wallander, 2002; National Intelligence Council 2002). Scholars across a plethora of disciplines, ranging from economics and sociology to development studies and social policy, have rightly recognized that the effects of this pandemic will not be confined to individual human tragedies; HIV/AIDS will have a host of wider political, economic, and social ramifications around the globe that will need to be carefully considered and addressed (Garrett, 1994; Bloom and Godwin, 1997; Linge and Porter, 1997; Godwin, 1998; Hope, 1999; Whiteside and Sunter, 2000; Barnett and Whiteside, 2002; Holden, 2003; Seckinelgin, 2003; Kalipeni, 2004; Kauffman and Lindauer, 2004). Despite the international scope of the AIDS pandemic, and the growing involvement of a number of prominent international organizations in its management, the discipline of international relations still lags notably behind many of these related fields in studying these effects.¹ Only very recently has the AIDS pandemic begun to make inroads into the core of the field through the efforts of a small group of scholars exploring the implications of the pandemic for international security (Ostergard, 2005).

This article wishes to expand the discipline's engagement with the global AIDS pandemic by opening up a novel, normative debate on HIV/AIDS and security. It does so through identifying and outlining a complex ethical

dilemma at the heart of recent attempts to frame the global AIDS pandemic as a security issue. On the one hand, a successful “securitization”² of HIV/AIDS could accrue vital economic, social, and political benefits for millions of affected people by raising awareness of the pandemic’s debilitating global consequences and by bolstering resources for international AIDS initiatives. These benefits cannot be easily dismissed and make a strong case in favor of presenting HIV/AIDS as a security issue. Through the novel application of securitization theory, however, this article also shows how such use of security language is simultaneously accompanied by two very serious and hitherto overlooked normative dangers. First, the securitization of HIV/AIDS could push national and international responses to the disease away from civil society toward state institutions such as the military and the intelligence community with the power to override human rights and civil liberties – including those of persons living with HIV/AIDS. Second, the language of security also brings a “threat-defense” logic to bear on HIV/AIDS, which may ultimately prove counterproductive to international efforts to stem the pandemic because (i) this logic makes such efforts not a function of altruism but of more restrictive and narrow national interests, (ii) because it allows states to prioritize AIDS funding for their armed forces and elites who play a crucial role in maintaining security, and (iii) because the portrayal of the illness as an overwhelming security “threat” works against the efforts of many grassroots AIDS activists seeking to normalize social perceptions regarding persons living with HIV/AIDS. These dangers in turn strongly caution against framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue, giving rise to a profound ethical dilemma at the heart of recent efforts to securitize the global AIDS pandemic. The article concludes that securitization theory cannot, in the end, resolve this complex dilemma, but raising awareness of its presence does allow policy makers, activists, and scholars to begin drawing the links between security and HIV/AIDS in ways that at least minimize some of these dangers.

HIV/AIDS and Security: The Need for a Normative Debate

HIV/AIDS is increasingly being portrayed by a range of international organizations, national governments, non-governmental organizations, and scholars of international relations as having important security implications. This was not always so. In the first two decades since the discovery of HIV/AIDS in the mid-1980s, the disease was conceptualized primarily as a public health and development issue. Although the links between HIV/AIDS and security were sporadically explored in the 1990s by a small number of analysts in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and in some security think tanks, the major international turning point in terms of conceptualizing HIV/AIDS as a security issue did not occur until 2000. On January 10 of that year, at the behest of U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrook and Vice-President Al Gore, the United Nations Security Council officially designated HIV/AIDS as a threat to international peace and security in Africa.³ It was an immensely symbolic occasion

because this was the first meeting of the Council in the new millennium and because it was the first time in the Council's history that it had designated a health issue as a threat to international security. In his position as president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn (2000) argued on this occasion that "[m]any of us used to think of AIDS as a health issue. We were wrong. ... Nothing we have seen is a greater challenge to the peace and stability of African societies than the epidemic of AIDS. ... We face a major development crisis, and more than that, a security crisis." The meeting was accompanied by the declassification of a National Intelligence Estimate entitled *The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States*. This estimate spelled out the debilitating impact of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases on U.S. national security in sufficient detail to merit the Clinton administration's designation of HIV/AIDS as a threat to the national security of the United States in the spring of that same year.⁴ The securitization of HIV/AIDS had begun in earnest.

Since that watershed meeting, there have been a plethora of reports and scholarly studies mapping out the implications of HIV/AIDS for security in greater detail. These studies have sought to assess empirically the multiple ways in which HIV/AIDS has ramifications for human security⁵ (Kristoffersson, 2000; Fourie and Schönteich, 2001; Piot, 2001; Chen, 2003; Leen, 2004), national security (Price-Smith, 1998, 2001, 2002; Harker, 2001; Heineken, 2001a; Yeager and Kingma, 2001; CSIS, 2002; Ostergard, 2002; Sarin, 2003), and international security (National Intelligence Council, 2000; Singer, 2002; Elbe, 2003; Prins, 2004).⁶ They argue that the social, economic, and political stability of communities (and even entire states) can be undermined in the long run by HIV prevalence rates ranging between 10% and 40% of the adult population (ICG, 2001; Pharaoh and Schönteich, 2003; ICG, 2004), that in some African armed forces HIV prevalence rates are estimated to be between 40% and 60%, raising concerns about their combat effectiveness (Heineken, 2001b; Mills, 2000; Elbe, 2002), and that HIV/AIDS even has important ramifications for international peacekeeping operations, which because they are staffed by members of these same armed forces, can serve as a vector of the illness where and when they are deployed (Bazergan, 2001, 2003; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2001; Bratt, 2002; Tripodi and Patel, 2002). Although a few scholars (David, 2001; Mock, 2002; Peterson, 2002/2003; Elbe, 2003; Bazergan, 2003) have since begun to raise questions about the unproblematic way in which some of these empirical relationships are increasingly posited, arguments about the security implications of HIV/AIDS have clearly not fallen on deaf ears. "The national security dimension of the virus is plain," the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Tenet, 2003) could be heard arguing before a Senate intelligence panel in 2003, "[i]t can undermine economic growth, exacerbate social tensions, diminish military preparedness, create huge social welfare costs, and further weaken already beleaguered states." The United Nations Security Council, moreover, has held three further meetings on HIV/AIDS subsequent to its first one in January 2000 and is planning to have further meetings on this issue in the future – rendering the AIDS

pandemic the latest in a long line of wider social issues to become framed as an international security concern.

Despite the evident importance of continuing to empirically assess the security implications of HIV/AIDS, the debate about HIV/AIDS and security cannot be conducted on such narrow empirical grounds alone. This debate urgently needs to be widened because recent attempts to bring the language and analytic apparatus of international security to bear on the global AIDS pandemic raise equally important normative questions about the long-term benefits and drawbacks of using such a security framework to respond to the disease. Amidst the pressing efforts to assess the complex impact of HIV/AIDS on international security, scholars and policy makers in this area have yet to engage in a more comprehensive, systematic, and open debate about the ethical tradeoffs inherent in pursuing such a strategy.⁷ This is a striking silence, given that normative concerns clearly form an integral part of the debate about HIV/AIDS and security, never lurking far from its surface. Many of those drawing the links between HIV/AIDS and security do so instrumentally in the hope that this will accrue important humanitarian benefits by bolstering international efforts to combat the spread of the disease. Peter W. Singer (2002: 158) argues that presenting HIV/AIDS as a security threat “strengthens the call for serious action against the menace of AIDS. It is not just a matter of altruism, but simple cold self-interest.” Many policy makers agree, including the director of the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), who has similarly argued (Piot, 2000) that framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue is not merely an academic exercise but “defines how we respond to the epidemic, how much is allocated to combating it, and what sectors of government are involved in the response.” In the debate on HIV/AIDS and security, scholarly interest in understanding the wider social dynamics of the AIDS pandemic frequently goes hand-in-hand with an underlying normative commitment to scaling up international efforts to respond to the disease.

This progressive belief in the humanitarian benefits of framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue has not gone entirely unchallenged, however. Taking her cue from earlier debates seeking to link environmental concerns with national security, Susan Peterson (2002/2003: 81) has warned that “[i]f well-intentioned people seek to rally support among western governments for anti-AIDS efforts in Africa, portraying disease as a security issue may be exactly the wrong strategy to employ.” In her view, such a strategy is unlikely to achieve its objectives because the empirical security implications of HIV/AIDS for the United States are insufficiently strong to motivate a sustained commitment to the issue, and because such a strategy may even begin to trigger novel security dilemmas, fueling further suspicion and rivalry between states, rather than encouraging the more open and multilateral policy approaches needed to address the illness on a global scale. Moreover, even in heavily affected countries, she finds that these security implications pale in comparison with the much more pressing impact of HIV/AIDS on health, human rights, and development, as well as social and economic justice – making

these alternative, non-security framings much more fruitful to pursue in the long run.⁸ Crucially, however, Peterson does not only challenge the political efficacy of using security language; in the conclusion to her article she also begins to raise important *normative* reservations about the long-term effects of pursuing such language in relation to HIV/AIDS. Rather than bolstering international efforts to reduce the spread of the disease, she is concerned that such moves may paradoxically end up absolving states from any moral responsibility to react to diseases in the developing world that do not engage their essential national interests. Instead of going through the complicated and ambiguous route of securitizing AIDS, the world should instead “face AIDS for what it is and will be for the foreseeable future – a health tragedy of unprecedented and staggering proportions that cries out for international and transnational humanitarian assistance, not for the garrisoning of states behind national boundaries and national security rhetoric (Peterson, 2002/2003: 81).” Peterson thus raises for the first time the possibility that the normative aspects involved in framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue may be much more complex and complicated than has hitherto been assumed by participants in the debate, and hence require further analysis.

A more detailed exploration of the ethical implications of securitizing HIV/AIDS becomes unavoidable, then, for at least two reasons. First, as is the case with so many discussions revolving around this highly politicized illness, the debate on the security implications of HIV/AIDS is already deeply invested and infused with a host of subtle normative commitments that need to be brought to the fore and debated more openly.⁹ Second, as Peterson’s intervention shows, strongly divergent views about the ethical consequences of framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue are beginning to emerge, necessitating more systematic attention to the possible benefits and drawbacks of framing the disease in this manner. Over the past decade, such normative debates have proved similarly unavoidable in relation to a wide variety of other non-military issues framed by the international community as security concerns – ranging from the environment (Deudney, 1990; Kakonen, 1994; Litfin, 1999; Ney, 1999; Ostrauskaite, 2001) and migration (Weiner, 1992/1993; Wæver *et al.*, 1993; Huysmans, 1995, 2000; Bigo, 1998; Doty, 1998; Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002), to the “war on drugs” (Husak, 1992; Aradau, 2001), transnational crime (Emmers, 2003), and even development more generally (Duffield, 2001). Given the growing policy resonance of arguments about the security implications of HIV/AIDS, the time has come to reflect more thoroughly on how such a framing of the pandemic could facilitate international efforts to reduce its spread and how this framing might also be counterproductive to these efforts. This is undoubtedly an enormous task encompassing a multiplicity of actors, issues, and arguments, and one that easily exceeds the limits of a single article; yet it is a task that must be begun if the discipline of international relations is not to restrict itself to merely tracing the impact of HIV/AIDS on international security, but to also actively contribute to finding the most appropriate ways for international political actors to respond to the pandemic.

Securitization Theory and HIV/AIDS

How, then, does one begin such a normative debate? Even though there has been an immense resurgence in normative theorizing in international relations over the past decade (Brown, 1992, 2002; Nardin, and Mapel, 1993; Bonanate, Puchala, and Kegley, 1995; Frost, 1996; Keim, 2000; Seckinelgin and Shinoda, 2001; Odysseos, 2002, 2003), there has been markedly less engagement with the particular ethical tradeoffs involved in bringing the language of international security to bear on wider social issues. For those interested in such questions, the *locus classicus* has quickly become the influential study by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (1998) entitled *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*.¹⁰ Not only is the “securitization” theory presented in this framework widely considered to be among the most important, original, and controversial contributions to the field of security studies in recent years (Huysmans, 1998: 480), it also remains the only systematic scholarly study of the ethical implications of widening the security agenda to include an array of non-military issues – making it a natural starting point for a more sustained normative debate about the securitization of HIV/AIDS. Although securitization theory is not exclusively concerned with normative questions, and also has important analytical interests in tracing the detailed social processes through which security threats become constructed by political actors, it is predominantly this normative dimension of the framework that remains indispensable for opening up a wider ethical debate about framing HIV/AIDS as an international security issue.¹¹

Indeed, securitization theory can address these normative questions more readily than many longer standing neorealist or neoliberal approaches to international security, because its constructivist account of security remains highly sensitive to the intersubjective and performative nature of portraying social issues as security concerns, that is, of “speaking” security.¹² Securitization theory forms part of a growing body of literature bringing the insights of speech act theory – as pioneered by J.L. Austin (1962) at Harvard University in the 1950s and subsequently developed by several other prominent philosophers and linguists (Searle, 1969) – to bear on social and political analysis. Austin (1962: 1) famously argued that the point of speech act theory was to challenge the assumption that “the business of a ‘statement’ can only be to ‘describe’ some state of affairs, or to ‘state some fact,’ which it must do either truly or falsely.” Even though language certainly encodes information, speech act theory illustrates that language can also do much more than just convey information, and that even when it is used primarily to convey information, language often conveys more than just the literal meaning of the words. Austin became particularly interested in phrases that in themselves constitute a form of action or social activity, that is phrases such as saying “thank you,” “you are fired,” “I promise,” “I bet,” “I nominate,” etc. These are instances in which a speaker is using language not just for the purposes of description, but also for actually *doing* something with considerable social significance – hence the term speech *acts*. In saying “thank

you," for example, one is not making a statement that is either true or false, but is undertaking the act of thanking somebody.

By way of extension, for Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, labeling an issue a security issue also constitutes such a performative speech act. For them (1998: 26) security "is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)." Security is thus not viewed by these three scholars as something that exists independently of its discursive articulation,¹³ but rather as a particular form of performative speech act; security is a social quality political actors, such as intelligence agencies, government officials, and international organizations, inject into issues by publicly portraying them as existential threats (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998: 204). Whereas more traditional approaches to security operate within a specific definition of security, revolving for example around the deployment of armed force in world politics, and then seek to ascertain empirically whether an issue *genuinely* represents a security threat, for securitization theory the designation of an issue as a security threat is primarily an intersubjective practice undertaken by security policy makers. "It is a choice to phrase things in security ... terms, not an objective feature of the issue. ..." (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998: 211); or, as Wæver (1995: 65) put it elsewhere, the "[u]se of the security label does not merely reflect whether a problem *is* a security problem, it is also a political choice, that is, a decision for conceptualization in a special way." The leader of a political party, for example, can choose whether to portray immigration as a security issue or as a human rights issue. Similarly, leaders of international organizations can choose whether they portray HIV/AIDS as a health issue, as a development issue, or, as they have done more recently, as an international security issue.

According to the framework of Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, the determination of which issues end up on the international security agenda cannot consequently be made solely on the basis of empirical criteria. Much security analysis entails making speculative predictions about future developments, necessitates prioritizing between competing claims with imperfect information, and, especially when it comes to wider social issues, requires deciding about whether an issue is best addressed under the heading of security rather than another competing framework. Inevitably, there is a considerable element of politics involved in determining how a social issue is presented in public debate. An issue can either remain non-politicized if it is not made an issue of public debate or decision, or it can become politicized if it is successfully made part of public policy and subject to a public decision. Finally, in the extreme case, an issue can become "securitized," by which Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998: 23–24) mean very specifically that it is "presented as an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure." The security quality of an issue thus does not reside for them in the nature of the issue itself or in the anticipated empirical effects of a particular phenomenon, but it derives from the specific way in which an issue or phenomenon is presented in public debate.

Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde provide their framework with a high degree of analytical focus by further specifying the precise conditions that collectively make up this "security" speech act. Rather than addressing all instances in which the word "security" is used, or all wider calls for the adoption of emergency measures, securitization theory applies only to those issues that are presented according to the particular logic or grammar of the security speech act (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998: 25). The four constituent components of this security speech act (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998: 24, 36) are presence of the following: (i) *securitizing actors* (such as political leaders, intelligence experts, etc.), declaring (ii) a *referent object* (such as a state)¹⁴ to be (iii) *existentially threatened* (e.g., by an immanent invasion), and who make a persuasive call for the adoption of (iv) *emergency measures* to counter this threat (e.g., declare war or impose a curfew). The framework advanced by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde confines itself to analyzing only those issues – be they of a military or non-military nature – that are presented in a manner conforming to all four of these criteria. The term *securitization*, in turn, formally refers to the process whereby an issue is taken out of its non-politicized or politicized status and is elevated to the security sphere by portraying it in a way that meets these four criteria. This is precisely what has happened to the issue of HIV/AIDS in recent years, where arguments have shifted from humanitarian and public health ones to officials in international organizations, governments, and non-governmental organizations (*securitizing actors*) increasingly arguing that beyond these humanitarian considerations, the survival of communities, states, and militaries (*referent objects*) is now being undermined (*existentially threatened*), unless drastic measures (*emergency measures*) are undertaken by national and international actors to better address the global pandemic.¹⁵ HIV/AIDS has become securitized.

This radically constructivist view of security also generates important new tasks for security analysts, who must now begin to reflect in greater depth on the normative consequences of securitizing a particular issue. "Our approach," Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998: 212) insist, "has the basic merit of conceptualizing security as a labeling for which actors can be held responsible rather than an objective feature of threats"; securitization theory "serves to underline the responsibility of talking security, the responsibility of actors as well as of analysts who choose to frame an issue as a security issue. They cannot hide behind the claim that anything in itself constitutes a security issue (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998: 34)." Because security analysts have a choice about whether or not to present a given issue in the language of security, they need to reflect on the wider consequences of doing so. This also means that the debate about HIV/AIDS and security cannot be waged solely on empirical grounds; for if there is an inevitable choice to "speaking" security in relation to HIV/AIDS, then the debate about the security implications of the disease will remain incomplete, unless the wider normative implications of using such language are assessed as well. Securitization theory was designed with a view to this very task; with its help "it is possible

to ask with some force whether it is a good idea to make this issue a security issue – to transfer it to the agenda of panic politics – or whether it is better handled within normal politics” (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998: 34). Yet because the global AIDS pandemic was securitized only after the publication of their study, this line of inquiry has not yet been pursued specifically in relation to HIV/AIDS.

Raising this normative dimension is all the more important because Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde think scholars would be mistaken in simply assuming that bringing the language of security to bear on the growing number of social issues is always a favorable political development. After the end of the Cold War, some security scholars quickly faulted such an expansion of the international security agenda on the grounds of the inability of security studies to accommodate such a wide variety of issues without losing analytical focus as a result. Stephen Walt (1991: 213) famously argued that expanding the field of security studies to include issues such as pollution, diseases, and economic recessions “would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems.” From a different theoretical perspective, Daniel Deudney (1990: 464) echoed that “[i]f everything that causes a decline in human well-being is labeled a ‘security’ threat, the term loses any analytical usefulness and becomes a loose synonym of ‘bad’”. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, by contrast, have criticized such an expansion on different, normative grounds. Already on the first page of their study, they warn readers of serious intellectual and political dangers involved in securitizing social issues, and hence in widening the security agenda. “Basically, security should be seen as negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics. Ideally, politics should be able to unfold according to routine procedures without this extraordinary elevation of specific ‘threats’ to prepolitical immediacy” (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998: 29; Williams, 2003: 523). In the conclusion to their study (1998: 208), they again point to the dangers of securitization, insisting that “[a]voiding excessive and irrational securitization is thus a legitimate social, political, and economic objective of considerable importance.” By highlighting the normative choices that are always involved in framing issues as security issues and by warning of potential dangers inherent in doing so, their framework marks an ideal starting point for a deeper debate on the ethical implications of using the language of international security to respond to the global AIDS pandemic.

The Dangers of Securitizing AIDS

What, then, are the specific normative dangers Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde identify, and how do they pertain to the ongoing securitization of HIV/AIDS? Based on their selection of case studies, such as the securitization of migration in Europe in the 1990s, two general dangers emerge. Both of these dangers result from the unique connotations of the word “security,” about which Wæver (1995: 47) has observed elsewhere that it “carries with it a history and

a set of connotations that it cannot escape. At the heart of the concept we still find something to do with defense and the state. As a result, addressing an issue in security terms still evokes an image of threat-defense, allocating to the state an important role in addressing it. This is not always an improvement." This passage expresses in summary form both the major normative concerns that securitization theorists have about securitization processes, namely that (i) these processes usually lead to a greater level of state mobilization, enabling the state to encroach on an increasing proportion of social life where it might not be desirable (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998: 4), and (ii) that the language of security attaches to issues a particular "threat-defense" logic that may not always be appropriate or beneficial for addressing these issues. It is worth exploring these two concerns in greater detail.

In many ways, this first concern about excessive state mobilization is deeply liberal, in that it assumes an a priori preference for a minimalist state that maximizes individual liberty, rather than for a state that is heavily involved in the management of social life. Although this is not explicitly mentioned in their framework, Buzan and Wæver have pointed to the liberal nature of such an objection elsewhere when they observe that classical liberalism can itself be understood as a project that seeks to narrow the range of things seen as security threats, so as to enlarge the realm of "normal politics" and to reduce as far as possible the areas of social life within which force could be used (Buzan and Wæver, 1998: 4; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998: 210). More specifically, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde wish to highlight two concrete threats to democratic politics inherent in using security language in order to incite state mobilization. First, states can use the language of security in order to remove an issue from routine democratic considerations and push it into the higher echelons of the state's inner circles of power, where there is less political transparency and hence also less democratic scrutiny of issues. Second, state representatives often also invoke the term "security" to justify the use of any necessary means to confront the threatening condition or to silence opposition to the state (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 21). Any emergency measures taken by the state can thus be used to override the rule of law and infringe upon valued civil liberties. Hence, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998: 29) are generally concerned about how the language of security has historically served to silence opposition to the state, how it has given state representatives special powers that could be exploited for domestic purposes, and how it can lead to the suspension of important democratic control mechanisms.

Even though this danger of excessive state involvement has not been hitherto acknowledged in the debate on AIDS and security, advocates of the securitization of HIV/AIDS will need to devote greater attention to this outcome of past securitization processes. In the case of HIV/AIDS, too, framing the issue as a security issue pushes responses to the disease away from civil society toward the much less transparent workings of military and intelligence organizations, which also possess the power to override human rights and civil liberties – including those of persons living with HIV/AIDS. One analyst

(Chowka, 2000) has pointed out that the designation of HIV/AIDS as a security issue is “a bit frightening and a bit scary ... [b]ecause that means you’re going to begin to call in the FBI, you can call in the CIA. If people are talking about things which are decided to be a national security issue, they in fact can be spied upon and civil rights protections can be suspended.” Not everyone would go this far, but it is certainly true that in the United States the armed forces and the CIA are becoming increasingly involved in assessing the security implications of HIV/AIDS. It is also true that historically state responses to the disease have frequently been undemocratic and have been characterized by periods of great insensitivity toward persons living with the virus. Calls for quarantining such people, subjecting them to various forms of violence, attempting to bar them from serving in state institutions, and refusing to issue visas to HIV-positive foreigners are only a few of the examples in which persons living with HIV/AIDS have been ostracized and even persecuted by some states for their illness. In the early stages of HIV/AIDS in the United States, Haitians were variously denied housing, required to undergo tests before entering the country, dismissed from jobs, and so forth. In Europe and Russia, moreover, many Africans were similarly targeted because of the perception that they were disease carriers (Schoepf, 2004). Portraying HIV/AIDS as a national and international security threat risks fueling such exclusionary and dehumanizing responses and could serve as an implicit legitimization of any harsh or unjust “emergency” policies that states may adopt in relation to persons living with the virus. After all, examples of such measures are not confined to the dustbin of history. In the United States, the Institute of Medicine not long ago proposed a policy of introducing mandatory screening for tuberculosis – a common condition for people living with HIV – for immigrants from countries with high prevalence rates, and it even made the case in favor of linking the permanent residence card (green card) to taking preventative treatment (Coker, 2003: 2). As recently as February 2003, the British government similarly considered implementing compulsory HIV screening for prospective immigrants amid alleged worries that HIV-positive foreigners are traveling to the United Kingdom to seek treatment (Hinsliff, 2003: 2). Such moves undoubtedly justify the first normative concern of Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde that the involvement of the state in the management of wider social issues can also have detrimental effects in terms of placing the management of such an issue behind closed doors, and by paving the way for civil liberties to be overridden if this is deemed necessary by the state.¹⁶

Participants in this debate will also need to reflect more deeply on the second danger inherent in their efforts to portray the pandemic as an international security issue, namely that such efforts bring the unique “threat-defense” logic of security to bear on an ever-growing range of social issues. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde observe on a deeper level how the immense increase in the number of securitization processes occurring over the past decade collectively construes the notion of “security” as a universally good thing – as a desirable condition toward which to push all social relations. The cumulative social effect of this proliferation of securitization processes,

of which HIV/AIDS is only the latest manifestation, is thus to convey the impression that working toward a condition of security is always socially beneficial – that “more security” is always better. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998: 29) find this to be a dangerously narrow view, because the connotations of security also attach a specific “threat-defense” logic to issues that may not always be appropriate or beneficial for their resolution.

This too is a valid normative concern in the case of HIV/AIDS, where the “threat-defense” logic entailed in the language of security can have three detrimental consequences. First, the securitization of the disease removes the issue from the more cosmopolitan and altruistic frameworks of health and development, locating it instead within a state-centric framework, where states are primarily concerned with maximizing power and security, rather than with addressing wider humanitarian concerns. In such a context, national and international action taken on HIV/AIDS is likely to be confined to those instances where it touches upon the selfish security interests of states. States may take action to defend their core security interests, but they are unlikely to undertake measures extending much beyond these narrow concerns. As Susan Peterson points out, responding to HIV/AIDS as a security issue transforms the logic of international action on HIV/AIDS into one based on narrow self-interest, which historically has not proved very effective in terms of addressing global health issues. Indeed it creates the impression that global health issues are not worth addressing in their own right, but only to the extent that they touch upon the core security interests of states, which may mean that in the long run, states will cease to be concerned about global health in areas where it does not concern their core national security interests (Peterson, 2002/2003: 46, 80). This is an important side effect of the language of security that needs to be borne in mind by those drawing the links between HIV/AIDS and security.

A second and closely related effect of the “threat-defense” logic in the case of HIV/AIDS is that it may adversely shift the identification of national and international funding priorities. Within a security framework, concern about HIV/AIDS will not revolve primarily around how HIV/AIDS affects civilian populations, but around how it affects the core institutions of the state, including the armed forces. In low-income countries in particular, this may mean that scarce resources for medicines are provided on a priority basis to the armed forces and state elites rather than to civilian populations as a whole, or, in the worst case, are diverted from civilian programs to military programs as a result of the portrayal of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. Examples of the latter have not yet been officially documented by NGOs or civil-society organizations, but there is certainly evidence that in many countries members of the armed forces routinely enjoy preferential access to medicines vis-à-vis the civilian population, or have at least moved to the front of the line in terms of receiving access to expensive antiretroviral medicines (ARVs). In Zambia, for example, members of the military have begun to argue that the armed forces should have priority access to more government funding for ARVs, because the military and their families are more at risk because of the nature

of their job and because this would contribute to world peace (Allocate More ARVs to Military Personnel, 2003). Similarly, in Rwanda, high-ranking officers increasingly have access to ARVs, but the general population does not (Amnesty International, 2004). This is part of a wider development in Africa, whereby the soldiers of many countries now have greater or better access to health care and AIDS medicines than the civilian population.¹⁷ As Radhika Sarin (in Conklin, 2003) argues, “quite a few African militaries are committed to providing treatment for their soldiers, such as the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces and Nigeria’s Armed Forces. These militaries do try and work with military spouses and civilian communities to provide HIV prevention education. However, access to antiretrovirals is very low in many African nations.” The portrayal of HIV/AIDS as a security issue thus plays into the hands of those who already have the greatest chances of access to medicines, rather than into the hands of those who are currently least likely to receive such access. Indeed, it may inadvertently help to ensure that soldiers and elites who play a crucial role in the maintenance of national and international security receive access to treatment, without being able to ensure that such treatment is also provided democratically and universally to all who need it. This too is an important normative drawback that needs to be reflected upon in a more sustained manner.

Finally, the “threat-defense” logic inherent in the securitization of HIV/AIDS also works against the grassroots efforts undertaken by many non-governmental organizations and AIDS charities over the past decade in terms of normalizing societal attitudes regarding people living with HIV/AIDS. The goal of many of these groups has been to move away from the perception that people living with HIV/AIDS are dangerous “outsiders” and a threat to society. Rather than avoiding contact with such persons in the quest to be completely safe and secure from the virus, what is needed instead is more tolerance and a better understanding of the illness. Already in the 1980s the writer Susan Sontag described how the view of disease as “invader” is a perennial feature of many public pronouncements about the “war on AIDS,” and she famously made the case for abandoning the military metaphor – both in terms of portraying the illness as something that invades the person and that invades entire societies. She (1998: 94) felt that the military metaphor “overmobilizes” and “powerfully contributes to the excommunicating and stigmatizing of the ill.” In such a context, a strategy of normalization can, from an ethical standpoint grounded in the lived experiences of those living with HIV/AIDS, easily be seen as highly advantageous in terms of cultivating a more inclusive and supportive public posture toward those persons. Ongoing efforts to securitize HIV/AIDS, by contrast, once again work against this goal by portraying the illness as a destructive and debilitating threat, and risk reversing important advances made to date regarding societal attitudes about the illness. In this way, the language of security deployed in international organizations also has important implications at the grassroots level.

The contribution, then, that securitization theory can make toward an ethical debate about whether the global AIDS pandemic should be framed as

a security issue is not just methodological but also substantive. While its unique methodological standpoint highlights particularly clearly the choice that analysts have in terms of whether they frame issues such as HIV/AIDS in security terms, its wider normative concerns about excessive state mobilization and its questioning of the usefulness of using the “threat-defense” logic of security to respond to a growing range of social issues help to highlight important and previously overlooked normative dangers inherent in the ongoing securitization of HIV/AIDS – and this despite the fact that securitization theory was formulated well in advance of these more recent efforts. It is also precisely because of such dangers that Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998: 4) generally do not believe that scholars should eagerly rush to publicly present an ever-growing range of issues as security issues; they should aim instead for “desecuritization,” that is for shifting issues out of the emergency mode and returning them to routine political processes. Securitization theory thus compels those linking HIV/AIDS and security to think more deeply about whether, upon reflection, such efforts should best be abandoned, resisted, and reversed because of these adverse effects. At this stage, the answer to the question of whether HIV/AIDS should be securitized might well be “no.” As the next section illustrates, however, such a conclusion would be premature, because in the case of HIV/AIDS, uncovering these ethical dangers does not mark the end of the normative debate about its securitization, but only the beginning of a much more complex and complicated ethical terrain that begins to unfold.

The Benefits of Securitizing AIDS

Taking securitization theory’s ethical imperative seriously also necessitates reflecting on the possible benefits a successful securitization of HIV/AIDS could have for persons living with the illness. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998: 29) insist that although desecuritization remains the abstract ideal of their framework, “one has to weigh the always problematic side effects of applying a mind-set of security against the possible advantages of focus, attention, and mobilization.” Pursuing this line of thought shows that the ethical concerns identified above in fact only apply in a qualified manner in the case of HIV/AIDS and that they also have to be balanced with a plethora of competing political, economic, and legal advantages that a successful securitization of the AIDS pandemic could accrue for persons living with HIV/AIDS. For example, although the concern raised by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde about excessive state mobilization certainly resonates within the context of a liberal democracy where the state should, *ceteris paribus*, not seek to forcefully interfere with democratic deliberation processes, outside the context of Western democracies, the relationship between state, society, and security is often more complex, so their findings in this regard may consequently be less readily applicable.

In some of the countries most seriously affected by the AIDS pandemic, it is not excessive state mobilization that poses the main problem, but, on the

contrary, the utter absence of a meaningful state response to the disease. In several southern African countries there is a widespread desire among persons living with HIV/AIDS for more action to be taken to ensure the provision of medicines – a prominent example of which is the Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa.¹⁸ In many other African countries there are millions of people who do not even have the privilege of being informed about this illness, let alone knowing whether they have contracted the virus or not; yet, their governments remain unable or unwilling to demonstrate leadership on the issue, or to make such medical provisions, or even to prioritize their illness politically. Over the past years, Thabo Mbeki's refusal to instruct the South African government to prioritize efforts to address the AIDS pandemic has been a case in point and continues to receive widespread media attention. It is, unfortunately, only one case among many. Because of the stigmatized nature of the illness, and the long illness cycle, the strategy of denial has been particularly convenient for many governments to pursue in the past, albeit with catastrophic social consequences. What is more, many scholars and AIDS activists view the minimalist (neoliberal) state promoted in Africa through the structural adjustment programs favored by several international political and financial institutions over the past decade as part of the underlying structural conditions facilitating the emergence of the AIDS pandemic, and as contributing to the limited health care infrastructure currently available in many of the countries seriously affected by HIV/AIDS (Lurie, 2004). In such a context, where a devastating illness remains largely ignored by states and where a minimalist conception of the state promoted by the international community is not helping the situation, the concern of many political AIDS activists understandably does not revolve around fears of excessive state mobilization, but, on the contrary, around the utter absence of adequate state involvement. What is needed is an urgent attempt by the international community and by governments to respond to the disease, which is what those framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue are actively trying to provoke.

The securitization of HIV/AIDS through the United Nations Security Council, because of its high public profile and unique status in international law, is one way of working toward this goal; it tries to increase the political pressure on governments to begin addressing the issue in a way that would help to ensure the survival of millions of persons living with HIV/AIDS, and it tries to encourage them to do so through early and prompt responses to the pandemic. Thus, where Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde see dangers to democracy emanating from securitization processes because of the potentially oppressive role they accord to the security institutions of states, for some AIDS activists, compelling states hitherto unresponsive to the needs of their people into greater action is an equally important political goal with a strong democratic dimension. However imperfect, it is a way of representing the ignored political voice of those with HIV/AIDS at the highest levels of government.¹⁹ Speaking at the UN Security Council in January 2001, Dr. Peter Piot, Executive Director of UNAIDS (2001), argued that “[t]he simple fact that the Security Council regards AIDS as a significant

problem sends a powerful message: AIDS is a serious matter for the global community." In the case of HIV/AIDS, then, the key normative question does not revolve around the quantity or intensity of state involvement, because some state involvement is undoubtedly needed, but around the mode and nature of such state responses.²⁰ Securitization, in this instance, is not intended to remove the issue of HIV/AIDS from the political sphere and to shift it into the security sphere, but instead to shift it out of its non-politicized status in many countries and to begin a proper politicization of the issue.

By way of extension, where Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde generally see dangers with pushing issues higher up the echelons of state bureaucracies – and thus away from civilian control – many AIDS activists see this as precisely what is needed for getting many African governments to undertake more sustained efforts and to commit more resources to addressing a pandemic that is already affecting more than 40 million people. To date, the securitization of AIDS at the international level has encouraged political actors to break the silence surrounding HIV/AIDS. For example, the Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Related Infectious Diseases adopted by several African heads of state and by the Organisation of African Unity in 2001 reasoned that it was necessary to break the silence around HIV/AIDS because HIV/AIDS is not just a health issue, but also a threat to Africa's political stability, and that fighting illnesses such as HIV/AIDS must consequently form a part of Africa's strategy for ensuring durable peace and political security on the continent (OAU, 2001). In some instances, moreover, the securitization of HIV/AIDS has also allowed states to shift responsibility for addressing the issue from ministries with only very little political clout to political bodies with greater influence on the political process. Denis Altman (2000) has observed that in countries such as Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, and South Africa, where health ministries only enjoy a modest degree of political influence and are perennially short of financial resources, the securitization of the pandemic has helped to move the issue higher up the political agenda, and HIV/AIDS has subsequently become the responsibility of ministries or committees with a greater degree of political clout and with more resources at their disposal. By illustrating that HIV/AIDS is not only a humanitarian concern but also a security concern affecting the core institutions of states, the securitization of HIV/AIDS can increase the political priority accorded to the issue by governments, which in turn could benefit those living with HIV/AIDS if this is translated into the scaling up of treatment programs.

Finally, where Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde point to the danger of security arguments being used to override the rule of law, and hence also to threaten civil liberties, from an economic perspective this ability of security concerns to override certain legal provisions is deemed to be a potential advantage. The patents on many AIDS medicines are presently protected by the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) – barring poorer countries from producing generic antiretroviral therapies and other medicines at lower prices, or even importing them from other

countries who can procure them at lower costs. Those countries who try to circumvent these restrictions can subsequently be threatened with a variety of political, economic, and legal sanctions. In 1997, some 39 different pharmaceutical companies attempted to legally challenge the South African Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, which would have enabled South Africa to “parallel” import much cheaper generic HIV/AIDS medicines. The securitization of HIV/AIDS assists groups wishing to weaken the grip of patents on life-saving medicines because these patents could potentially be overridden in light of national security considerations. The TRIPS agreement contains an important set of “security exceptions,” including Article 73(b), which notes that nothing contained in the agreement should be construed to “prevent a Member from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests” (World Trade Organization, 1994). Although no dispute has yet occurred under Article 73 since the establishment of the World Trade Organization, the devastating social and economic impact of HIV/AIDS is raising the possibility of invoking these security provisions. A recent report by the United Nations (Roffe and Melendez-Ortiz, 2005: 10) has noted that it might be possible to invoke the security exceptions of TRIPS because “it could be argued that pandemics such as HIV affect a nation far beyond purely economic interests and might therefore justify action otherwise inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement.” If states do wish to override these patents on expensive life-saving medicines in the future, or at least maintain pressure on the pharmaceutical companies when negotiating prices, it will be essential for them to demonstrate that the AIDS pandemic constitutes an emergency affecting the security of states, especially as attempts to protect such access to medicines through widening the public health provisions of TRIPS agreed at Doha in 2001 are proving increasingly ineffective and are being actively side-stepped through bilateral free trade agreements (Oxfam, 2004; Medecins Sans Frontiers, 2005). Some participants in the United Nations Security Council debates on AIDS and international security have already been able to use that forum in order to make precisely this point. The Indian representative (Sharma, 2001) has urged the Security Council, in line with its responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, “to rule that Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement must be invoked to urgently provide affordable medicines that help in the treatment of the epidemic.”

This legal dimension to the securitization of HIV/AIDS is becoming even more important because of the strong role that Indian pharmaceuticals have recently been playing in providing generic and affordable AIDS medicines to many developing countries. Because India’s Patent Act of 1970 did not apply to medicines, Indian pharmaceuticals have been able to produce generic versions of AIDS drugs for some time. The pressure of their generic products has meant that prices for ARVs have dropped from over U.S.\$ 10,000 annually to, in some instances, U.S.\$140 annually, but this has only been possible because some of the provisions of the TRIPS agreement have hitherto not applied to India. What is more, Indian Pharmaceuticals have also

been at the forefront of developing the three-in-one cocktail pill, which means that patients only need to take two pills instead of six pills a day, making their administration considerably easier. However, as members of the Affordable Medicines and Treatment Campaign point out, India is in the process of changing its Patent Act in a way that would comply with TRIPS, which requires all governments to grant developed countries a 20-year monopoly patent on all essential medicines, including HIV/AIDS drugs. There are several proposed amendments to the Act that would potentially impede generic competition. If the supply of cheap Indian medicines dries up in the near future, this will make the ability to invoke the security exceptions of TRIPS all the more pressing (Grover, 2004). In this way, the securitization of AIDS continues to play into the hands of those countries that might wish to invoke legal provisions necessary for procuring life-saving medicines at lower costs, maintaining background pressure on pharmaceutical companies. This illustrates how securitization processes can have normative benefits beyond merely raising attention and resources. Furthermore, it means that where Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde – coming from a political perspective concerned with civil liberties – point to the dangers of security arguments being used to override the rule of law, from an economic perspective grounded in the attempts of poorer states to access cheap generic medicines, this same ability of security concerns to override legal provisions is deemed to be a crucial potential advantage, and something that the language of security can uniquely bring to the debate in a way that health or development language cannot. In either case, the point here is not that the concern of Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde is not justified, but rather that in the context of HIV/AIDS, the advantages and disadvantages for those persons living with HIV/AIDS are much more evenly balanced than their normative criticism about excessive state involvement would initially seem to suggest.

The same is true regarding their other warning about the appropriateness of applying security's unique "threat-defense" logic to an ever-growing range of issues, such as HIV/AIDS. Although concern is clearly justified here as well, upon reflection, all three of the adverse side effects that this logic can have in the case of HIV/AIDS emerge in a much more complex form. The state-centric and self-interested nature of security, for example, is not seen by many of those advocating the links between HIV/AIDS and security as a drawback, but on the contrary, as an important asset that can mobilize global responses to HIV/AIDS. "It is a simple truth," Alex de Waal (2003) notes in reflecting on his experience with many African governments over the past decades, "that governments act when they perceive real threats to their power. This is a lesson from government famine prevention strategies: the political impulse is primary ... To date, few African governments have recognized the political threat posed by the HIV/AIDS pandemic." Where humanitarian development or other more altruistically inclined international initiatives have failed to generate sufficient political will and resources, for those advocating the HIV/AIDS-security nexus, the appeal to the naked self-interest of states is the

only strategy left in light of the pressing daily humanitarian implications of the pandemic.

Indeed, appealing to the self-interest of states through the language of security can be economically useful in terms of increasing the amount of international attention the AIDS pandemic receives. Securitizing the illness could assist in freeing up more scarce resources for preventing the transmission of HIV in the future, as well as for purchasing medicines to treat those persons already suffering from AIDS. In the United States, arguments about the long-term security implications of AIDS reportedly already informed President Bush's decision to launch his five-year U.S.\$ 15 billion Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (Stolberg, 2003).²¹ There has been much controversy about the strings attached to this money, about its emphasis on bilateral rather than multilateral programs, as well as the considerable delay in its appropriation, indicating that this was a shrewdly calculated political move, but such resources will undoubtedly be necessary for international efforts to respond to the global pandemic. This shows the ability of leaders to use security arguments in order to justify appropriating such considerable sums and the general expansion in AIDS funding that has taken place in recent years.²² The logic of security can thus help to maintain such funding in the years ahead as will be necessary for treatment and prevention programs.

The securitization of HIV/AIDS is not only useful in terms of increasing international aid for HIV/AIDS, but it is also an important tool in terms of provoking African governments themselves into taking the issue more seriously within their domestic politics, that is to prioritize HIV/AIDS efforts on their own political agendas and budgets. Highlighting the security implications of HIV on the armed forces, for example, can even serve as an important initial trigger for placing HIV/AIDS on the political agenda (UNAIDS, 1998; Elbe, 2002). There is evidence from countries such as Uganda, Ethiopia, and Malawi that highlighting this military relationship was crucial in securing wider political leadership on the issue of HIV/AIDS. In Uganda, President Museveni began to take the issue seriously when, in 1986, Fidel Castro took him aside at a meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Harare and informed him that 18 out of the 60 military staff that Museveni had sent to Cuba for military training were HIV positive. This spurred Museveni into commencing a wider social program on HIV/AIDS in Uganda (Museveni, 1995). Commenting on the response to HIV/AIDS by the Ethiopian army in 1996, de Waal (2003: 22) similarly observes how "within the military such as the quasi-democratic 'council of commanders,' a legacy of the army's roots as a revolutionary guerrilla army, allowed the institution to develop and implement its own distinctive AIDS program." There is also some evidence from Malawi indicating that the impact of HIV/AIDS on the army and members of parliament was crucial in prompting political leadership on this issue (Lwanda, 2004: 40). In this way, highlighting the impact of HIV/AIDS on the armed forces undermines the ability of political leaders to deny the importance of the problem and can present a very obvious way of putting HIV/AIDS on the political agenda, as well as marking an entry point for

wider HIV/AIDS programs and efforts. Thus, although in an ideal world HIV/AIDS would be addressed as a humanitarian and altruistic issue, outlining how HIV/AIDS programs would also benefit the national interests of states can help to increase international funding and can spur heavily affected states into action in a way that more altruistic health and development frameworks have not been able to do over the past decade.

This still leaves unresolved, however, the second problem: that the "threat-defense" logic could lead to the redirection of funding priorities toward the core institutions of the state. Will such a security framing not simply shift funding to the elites and the armed forces at the expense of more universal programs? Here, too, there are factors complicating the picture; for even when money is allocated to the military, this money can have a wider beneficial impact. The securitization of HIV/AIDS spurred Congress to allocate \$10 million to begin setting up a program to address the spread of HIV/AIDS in selected African militaries. In 2001, this culminated in the Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program, which has secured funding in excess of U.S.\$35 million through fiscal year 2004 (U.S. Department of Defense, 2005). Through this program, the Department of Defense has assisted 35 countries in developing HIV/AIDS prevention programs in the armed forces. Although these programs primarily focus on military personnel, and their levels of funding are small compared with other expenditures undertaken by the Department of Defense, they can have a broader impact. In Kenya, for example, the U.S. military HIV/AIDS program also extends to soldiers' dependents, with the result that 1,500 Kenyans, half of whom are not soldiers, are now receiving treatment through the program – a program which has also helped train many HIV counselors (Fisher-Thompson, 2005). A similar program is currently underway in Tanzania, and a further one is planned for Nigeria. As long as such funding does not come at the expense of funding for civilian programs, the securitization of HIV/AIDS could generate new resources that are crucial for building the health care infrastructure in poor countries and thus for international efforts to mitigate the spread of HIV/AIDS. What is more, as an organization, the armed forces also have a duty to protect the health of their soldiers when deployed abroad. This means that unlike many commercial pharmaceutical companies that lack economic incentives to develop medicines for illnesses affecting the developing world, the U.S. military continues to be engaged in vaccine research for strands of HIV that predominate in Asia and Africa in order to protect troops that might contract HIV while deployed abroad. Historically, many of the medical advances that people still benefit from today originally emerged from military research.

What is more, drawing attention to the role of HIV/AIDS in the armed forces will invariably have to form an important part of international efforts to respond to HIV/AIDS. Although many would clearly oppose privileged access to treatment for the armed forces of developing countries, when the issue of HIV/AIDS is approached from the angle of prevention,

a slightly different picture emerges. In a recent overview of new security issues, James Wirtz (2002: 311) notes that "it is not clear how military action can help stop the [AIDS] epidemic that is sweeping Africa and other parts of the world." Yet around the world members of the security sector are not only profoundly affected by, but are also important actors in, the AIDS pandemic. Although Wirtz is thus correct in the sense that the security sector cannot (and indeed should not) co-ordinate national or international responses to HIV/AIDS, it is similarly true that such efforts to mitigate the spread of the virus are unlikely to succeed unless they incorporate strategies for targeting members of the security sector. In many countries members of the armed forces mark a high-risk group, and prevalence rates in several militaries around the world are thought to range between two and five times that of comparable civilian populations. A study carried out regarding gonorrhoea and chlamydia infections at the Fort Bragg U.S. Army installation in North Carolina, for example, found that even after standardization of rates by age, race, and sex, the adjusted rates for Fort Bragg were higher than state or national averages (Sena et al., 2000). Around the world it is suspected that this is true in many militaries regarding levels of HIV as well, given that one of the transmission routes is through unprotected sexual intercourse. In some African militaries, average HIV prevalence rates are even thought to have reached between forty and sixty percent of the armed forces (National Intelligence Council, 2000). Soldiers that are of a sexually active age, and that are very mobile and stationed away from home for long periods of time often valorize violent and risky behavior, can have frequent opportunities for casual sexual relations, and often seek to relieve themselves from the stress of combat. Members of the armed forces can thus be an important vector for transmitting the virus, and will have to play a vital role – not in leading or orchestrating national and international AIDS policy – but rather in terms of taking seriously their role in the pandemic and undertaking responsible steps to reduce the transmission of HIV both within and outside of the ranks. Again, this is not to insist that the armed forces should enjoy privileged access to medicines, but rather to suggest that, given the prominent role of the military sector in the pandemic, international efforts to prevent the spread of the pandemic are unlikely to succeed in the absence of a strategy for also addressing HIV/AIDS in the military. It makes a big difference, therefore, whether the issue of HIV/AIDS in the military is approached from the perspective of treatment or prevention. Although highlighting HIV/AIDS in the military could thus be seen as detrimental if it leads to privileged access to treatment, from the perspective of global prevention efforts, drawing attention to the role of HIV/AIDS in the armed forces seems inevitable – mitigating against this second problem inherent in bringing the "threat-defense" logic of security to bear on HIV/AIDS.

What, then, of the third concern about the impact of the "threat-defense" logic on grassroots attempts to normalize social responses to the illness? Does the portrayal of HIV/AIDS as a debilitating security threat not just further

stigmatize those living with the illness? Here, too, the normative picture becomes much more complicated when the threat is not seen to emanate from a group of persons, but rather from the *virus*. Although many would find the portrayal of persons living with HIV as a security threat to be ethically abhorrent and as something to be avoided at all costs, the question of whether such an assessment is also appropriate regarding the virus itself is much less certain. There is a crucial difference between arguing that “people with HIV/AIDS are a security threat” and arguing that “AIDS is a security threat”: while the former aims to be politically exclusionary, and would bring into play a host of normative concerns already outlined by other scholars (Huysmans, 1995, 2000) in relation to the securitization of migrants in many countries, the latter can be understood as a more inclusive gesture arguing that those living with HIV/AIDS should receive assistance if they so desire. It is also the latter claim that predominates among those linking HIV/AIDS and security.

What is more, one may well be skeptical about whether, in order to avoid the “threat-defense” logic of security, the optimal long-term relationship between people and the HIV virus really is one of complete normalization and “desecuritization.” A certain normalization regarding the perception of people living with the illness would, of course, serve to reduce stigma and discrimination, but it might also culminate in an increased “threat” to life if, as a result, people begin to underestimate the lethal nature of the virus and cease to take precautions against its transmission. In Western countries, where public reactions to people living with HIV/AIDS have become slightly more normalized compared with much of the 1980s, transmission rates are again increasing – even though there is no cure for HIV/AIDS and the virus may well become drug resistant in the long run (UNAIDS, 2002: 25). In this way, aiming for normalization regarding the HIV virus might have more adverse side effects. Again, the point here is not that the normative concern of securitization theory is not justified – especially as many political actors may not be able to differentiate at this level of detail and might perceive people living with HIV/AIDS as a threat rather than the key to reversing the global pandemic; the point is that in the case of HIV/AIDS, there are, depending on where precisely the threat is seen to emanate from, also strong arguments complicating any hasty rejection of the securitization of HIV/AIDS. In the case of HIV/AIDS, the ethical picture rapidly becomes much more complex.

In all of these aforementioned instances, then, linking HIV/AIDS and security can also have important benefits for those living with HIV/AIDS, especially in terms of reinforcing national and international efforts to stem the spread of HIV and treating those already suffering from AIDS-related illnesses. Many of these advantages are also unique to the language and apparatus of security, that is benefits that a securitization of HIV/AIDS could bring to the international debate on HIV/AIDS in a way that, as the first two decades of the pandemic’s history have shown, portraying HIV/AIDS primarily as a health issue or as a development issue has not been

able to achieve. In terms of securing high-level political leadership and increased funding, the framing of HIV/AIDS as a security issue is clearly useful; it is essential in terms of potentially overriding the TRIPS provisions and politicizing the role of the security sector in the pandemic. Given these competing normative benefits and drawbacks of framing the international response to the global AIDS pandemic in the language of security, participants in the debate are left confronting a profound and complex ethical dilemma about whether they should continue to frame HIV/AIDS as a security issue.²³ Indeed, just as there are clear normative dangers inherent in presenting HIV/AIDS as a security issue, there appear to be equally important normative costs involved in not doing so. All of this generates a much more complex and unyielding normative terrain surrounding the securitization of AIDS. At this stage, the answer to the question of whether HIV/AIDS should be securitized could justifiably be both “yes” and “no.”

Conclusion

Can this ethical dilemma be resolved? It is not actually the intention of securitization theory to solve this dilemma on behalf of individual policy makers, activists, and scholars. Rather, its purpose is to cultivate among all of these audiences a deeper ethical sensibility about “speaking” security and to encourage them to reflect more thoroughly on whether the language of security is the most appropriate avenue for addressing any particular social issue. Securitization theory, Wæver (1999: 334) notes, “puts an ethical question at the feet of analysts, decision makers and political activists alike: why do you call this a security issue? What are the implications of doing this – or of not doing it?” This article has sought to take this challenge seriously and to outline both the possible benefits and dangers of framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue. Yet securitization theory is also very cautious not to prejudge the complexity of issues such as HIV/AIDS. While Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998: 29) have a general preference for resisting securitization processes, they also grant that “although in the abstract desecuritization is the ideal, in specific situations one can choose securitization, only one should not believe this is an innocent reflection of the issue *being* a security threat; it is always a political choice to securitize or to accept a securitization.” In the end this choice about whether to endorse or reject securitization processes cannot be made *for* analysts and scholars; it must be made *by* them – independently and with respect to each particular securitization they encounter, as well as with the particular audiences they engage.

What an awareness of this dilemma can do in the case of HIV/AIDS, however, is spur those advocating the links between HIV/AIDS and security to at least do so in ways that seek to minimize some of these aforementioned dangers. There are three ways in which this could be achieved. First, those presenting HIV/AIDS as a security issue could be sure to insist that it is not *exclusively* a security issue, but rather a security issue *in addition* to also

being a health issue, a development issue, an economic issue, a social issue, a political issue, a gender issue, etc. In this way, insisting on the security implications of HIV/AIDS does not unreflectively reify the traditional hierarchy between achieving security and the attainment of other social values, such as health. Nor does it simply replace an altruistic logic with a self-interested one. The security dimension of HIV/AIDS could then complement, rather than supersede, existing frameworks, and it would not undermine alternative rationales for global health initiatives, or unduly prioritize the needs of the security community over those of civil society. Second, the ethical dangers of securitizing AIDS could be further minimized by framing the illness as a security *issue*, or as an issue with an important security *dimension*, rather than as a dangerous and overwhelming security *threat*. This would still add considerable political *gravitas* to international efforts to respond to HIV/AIDS. It would probably also suffice in terms of invoking the security exceptions within TRIPS should this become necessary in the years ahead, and would similarly allow for the role of the security sector in the pandemic to be politicized, without doing so at the cost of playing on excessive fears and further stigmatizing persons living with HIV/AIDS. Finally, those framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue could also take great care to indicate that their primary concern lies with those people living with HIV/AIDS – that the problem lies not with the people living with the virus, but with the virus itself.

Here, then, the uniqueness of the case of HIV/AIDS in relation to previous securitization processes also begins to emerge particularly clearly. For it is a “danger” residing within the human body. If, as a result of the securitization of HIV/AIDS, *persons* living with the virus come to be seen as the threat, then many of the dangers already highlighted by scholars in relation to the securitization of migration and its detrimental effects on migrants come into play. If, however, it is the *virus* that is seen to be the threat, then these concerns are much less applicable, and the parallels reside much closer to environmental security, where nature is part of that which is being securitized. In this case, people living with HIV/AIDS would not be the enemy of global efforts to reduce the pandemic’s debilitating consequences, but in fact would be the only hope for achieving viable improvements in the future. Consequently, they would have to be included in these efforts in a way that does not infringe upon their human rights or civil liberties. Precisely because the virus resides inside the human body, however, the case of HIV/AIDS in the end neatly parallels neither the securitization of the environment nor that of migration; it reaffirms instead the need for security analysts to continually assess the effects of linking security and wider social issues with due consideration of the specificities of each particular issue. All of this requires participants in the debate on HIV/AIDS and security to at least follow securitization theory’s ethical imperative of thinking much more carefully about the intended audience, about the way in which the term security is used, and about the general language deployed in relation to HIV/AIDS. In the end, however, the securitization of HIV/AIDS undoubtedly remains a gamble on the ability of those presenting HIV/AIDS

as a security issue to maintain control over the uses to which this language will be put – albeit a gamble that has perhaps become necessary because of the particular vicissitudes of contemporary world politics.

Author's Note

This article was first presented at the 44th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Portland, Oregon, February 2003. The author would like to thank members of the Africa Research Group at the London School of Economics, members of the Africa Research Group at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, members of the Africa Research Group at King's College, London, participants in the Twenty-First Century Trust Conference on Disease and Security, as well as Andrew Price-Smith, Robert Ostergard Jr., Alex de Waal, Christopher Coker, Louiza Odysseos, and three anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback on previous versions of this article.

Notes

1. For two rare attempts to probe the implications of health for international relations, see Fidler (1998) and Youde (2005).

2. The term securitization refers to the process whereby HIV/AIDS is presented by officials of national and international institutions not just as a health or development issue, but also as a pressing matter of national and international security requiring the adoption of emergency measures. See also the more detailed discussion of securitization in "Securitization Theory and HIV/AIDS" of this article.

3. For an account of the genesis of this meeting, see Sternberg (2002).

4. That same year, the Clinton administration also invoked national security justifications for other non-military purposes, such as granting China "normal" trading status with the United States. Several decades earlier, in 1955, Dwight Eisenhower had similarly tried to promote his administration's National System of Interstate and Defense Highways on the basis of a national security justification, arguing that such a highway network would be essential for evacuation plans and mobilizing defenses. See Sanger (2000).

5. For competing definitions of "human security," see United Nations Development Program (United Nations Development Program 1994); Commission on Human Security (2003); and the special issue of *Security Dialogue* (Vol. 35, No. 3; September 2004) on human security.

6. I have explored competing definitions and meanings of human, national, and international security, as well as the ways in which HIV/AIDS bears on them, in greater detail in Elbe (2005). For other accounts of human and national security, see Fidler (2003) and Peterson (2002/2003).

7. For two notable exceptions, see the brief discussion in Altman (2000) and Peterson (2002/2003).

8. These arguments closely parallel those in Deudney (1990).

9. For more general reflections on the normative questions the AIDS pandemic gives rise to, see Harris and Siplon (2001), and the special section on "Health and Global Justice" in *Ethics and International Affairs* 16(2), Fall 2002. For pieces on the ethics of conducting research into HIV/AIDS see Kesby (2004) and Craddock (2004).

10. See also Wæver (1995) and Williams (2003).

11. A more comprehensive analysis of the securitizing actors, agendas, and strategies has already been undertaken by Sheehan (2002).

12. In this way, their study forms part of a larger research effort to view security issues as being socially constructed. See, for example, Wendt (1992, 1999), Finnemore (1996), Katzenstein (1996), Adler (1997), Hopf (1998), Barnett and Finnemore (1999).

13. On this point see also Hansen (2000: 288).

14. Referent objects of security do not necessarily have to be states or militaries, but more generally "things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival" (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 36). Examples of this security grammar can thus be found operating both in regard to military issues and throughout the wider security agenda. For example, it is just as possible for non-governmental organizations (securitizing actors) to declare humanity or the biosphere (referent objects) existentially threatened by greenhouse gases, requiring drastic social changes. Of course, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde are aware that, in practice, there are important constraints on which actors can successfully securitize issues. Although it remains a theoretical possibility, they find that individuals and small groups of people are rarely able to establish a wider security legitimacy in their own right. Nevertheless, this flexibility in their framework in principle allows it to be applied to the wider security agenda, including HIV/AIDS, without losing analytic focus as a result.

15. These specific and narrow criteria also set the securitization of HIV/AIDS distinctly apart from other emergency responses to HIV/AIDS that have occurred within the contexts of public health, development, or even disaster relief, such as the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resource Emergency Act in the United States. The latter clearly calls for emergency measures that provide health care and support for those persons living with HIV/AIDS, whose health needs would otherwise remain unmet. This act, however, is not intended to protect the United States from an existential threat, but instead to "reduce the use of more costly inpatient care, increase access to care for underserved populations, and improve the quality of life for those affected by the epidemic" (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2005). In this case, there are no securitizing actors arguing that a referent object is existentially threatened.

16. Indeed, this danger is not only inherent in relations between the state and the civilian population, but also *within* state institutions, such as the armed forces. In many of the world's armed forces, security arguments have already been cited for no longer accepting HIV-positive applicants for service.

17. For a more comprehensive list of medical provision for HIV/AIDS in the civilian and military populations of African countries, see www.uniformservices.unaids.org/

18. For a good overview, see Sell and Prakash (2004).

19. This is part of deeper tension inherent in securitization theory. By grounding their normative framework in speech act theory, the framework encounters difficulties when dealing with social groups that are not able to voice their views due, for example, to political marginalization. On this point see Hansen (2000: 287).

20. Even among theorists of democracy, there is considerable disagreement regarding the role the state should perform in social life, with some models arguing in favor of a role restricted to the provision of security and with others suggesting that the state must make important social provisions and perform redistributive functions.

21. Another important factor was the push for action by evangelical Christian religious groups in the United States. See Burkhalter (2004).

22. It also seems to parallel an insight expounded by William H. Foege, the former director of the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia: one must "[t]ie the needs of the poor with the fears of the rich. When the rich lose their fear, they are not willing to invest in the problems of the poor." Quoted in Gellman (2002).

23. Nor are there clear historical precedents that one could turn to. There are certainly historical precedents for diseases shaping the unfolding of human history, and indeed influencing battle outcomes. See, for example, Cartwright (1972), Diamond (1997), McNeill (1998), Oldstone (2000), Watts (1997), and Zinsler (1953). There are, however, no diseases in recent history that match the experience of HIV/AIDS in terms of transmission methods, geographic extent, demographic impact, and disease pattern.

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From Social to National Security: On the Fabrication of Economic Order

Mark Neocleous

Where did 'National Security' come from? It is well known that, following World War II, a range of civilian and military heads of different parts of the US state were brought together before a Senate committee to consider the unification of the military services. In his message to Congress in December 1945, US President Harry S. Truman had asked for the creation of a unified military establishment along with a 'national defense council', and by May 1946 both the US Army and the US Navy were advocating a 'Council of Common Defense'. Yet, by 1947, 'common defense' had been dropped and replaced with 'national security' – hence the creation of the National Security Council and the National Security Act. The most forceful advocate of the concept, Navy Secretary James Forrestal, commented that 'national security' can only be secured with a broad and comprehensive front, and made a point of adding that 'I am using the word "security" here consistently and continuously rather than "defense"', highlighting just how new and exciting this idea seemed (cited in Yergin, 1980: 194).

It was certainly new: 'I like your words "national security"', one senator commented. But it was also exciting: the fact that it was 'national security' was part of the excitement, for 'security' was a far more expansive term than 'defence', which was seen as too narrowly military, and far more suggestive than 'national interest', seen by many as either too weak a concept to form the basis of the exercise of state power or, with its selfish connotations, simply too negative (Yergin, 1980: 195; Rosenberg, 1993; Sherry, 1995: 126).

The combination of novelty and intrigue meant that, from thereon, national security has had a great career. Just a decade earlier, the multi-volume *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, published by Macmillan in 1934, contained no entry for 'national security'. The next edition of the *Encyclopaedia* in 1968, however – by which time it had become the *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* – not only contained an entry for 'national security',

but suggested that the term 'has long been used by politicians as a rhetorical phrase and by military leaders to describe a policy objective' (Bock & Berkowitz, 1968: 40). 'Long been used' may have been an exaggeration – the authors of the entry had in a journal article only two years previously described 'national security' as an 'emerging field' (Bock & Berkowitz, 1966). Nonetheless, this begs the obvious question: from where did it emerge, and why, by the late 1960s, did the concept also seem to have so seeped into political discourse that it clearly *felt* like it had been in use for a long time? Or, to put it another way: just what was it about this idea that made it so exciting?

'The doctrine of national security', suggests Yergin (1980: 193–194), 'developed to explain America's relationship to the rest of the world'. Many have accepted that this is indeed what national security is about: international relations. So, the obvious route to take here might appear to require an examination of the postwar development of the national security idea and following the mainstream tendency of highlighting its centrality to foreign policy and the birth of the national security state. But, to do this would be to remain within what Robert Latham (1997: 94) calls the auto-referential paradigm of national security, where the issues and stakes are exactly what the policymakers say they are. Adopting the language, discursive tradition and key assumptions of national security would be to replicate the rationale and rhetoric of the Cold War policymakers. The fact that the impetus and thrust of the idea of national security appears to be outwards, towards international relations and foreign policy, has in fact buried an interesting part of the history of 'national security', and has therefore obscured some interesting links between this and related concepts.

What I want to do here, then, is to unearth some of the history, and to do so by exploring a hitherto unexplored dimension of the history of 'national security', namely in the emergence of *social* security in the 1930s.

Social security and national security are not often talked about together. The extent to which 'security' has been 'disciplined' over the years (Dalby, 2002: xxvi) has meant that the study of social security and the study of national security are often miles apart – or at least several corridors apart in the modern university – with the one seen simply as a set of social policies concerned with levels of subsistence and well-being and the other seen as pertaining to foreign policy, intelligence-gathering and counter-subversion both domestically and internationally. This remains the case despite the recent surge of interest in widening the security agenda (Buzan, 1991; Wæver, 1995; Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998), in particular by redefining or developing alternative notions of security (Baldwin, 1997; Matthews, 1989; Tickner, 1995; Ullman, 1983; Huysmans, 1998), and often as part of an attempt at developing a critical security studies (Walker, 1990; Krause & Williams, 1997; Klein, 1998; Burke, 2002; Dalby, 2002). For example, even in the hugely influential new 'framework' for analysing and expanding security proposed by those working in the 'Copenhagen School', social security is way down the agenda, if it appears at all. This framework has sought to incorporate into security studies some critical thinking about an expanded security

agenda, proposing 'sectors' through which security might be analysed. Yet, despite one of the sectors being the 'societal' sector, little is said about the idea, institutions or practices of 'social security' as such, other than that there is perhaps a link through the idea of collective identity (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 7, 21, 131; Wæver, 1995: 65–71). More generally, even though international relations theory has increasingly been interested in the 'inside–outside' relationship (Walker, 1993; Bigo, 2001), little has been said about the possible relation between the security discourse most obviously associated with 'outside', namely national security, and the security discourse most obviously associated with 'inside', namely social security.

So, for all the talk about a 'security dialogue', there has not actually been much communication between those dealing with social security and those dealing with national security. Simon Dalby (2002: 7) has commented that 'income support payments were sometimes considered in terms of the provision of "economic security"'. The historical dimension of these themes should not be forgotten in all the claims to novel understanding of security.' However, the historical dimension clearly *has* been forgotten. The first aim of this article, then, is to help develop a genuine 'security dialogue' between the disciplines and discourses of social and national security by arguing for a better grasp of the historical links between them.

The second aim is to do so by suggesting that if there is any mileage in the idea of 'securitization' as a process, its primary example may lie not in the field of international politics and national security, but in the realm of social security. As part of the broad agenda for widening the field of security studies, 'securitization theory' treats security not as a clearly definable objective, nor as a specific state of affairs, but rather as the product of social processes. Securitization theory has thereby set out its stall as a critical exploration of the social construction of security issues through an analysis of who or what is said to be being secured. 'Security', on this view, is the outcome of 'securitizing speech acts': 'a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat' (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 24; see also Wæver, 1995). It strikes me that securitization theory has missed perhaps the most remarkable historical example of this process, namely in the political fabrication of a set of concerns as 'social security'.

The third aim is more conceptual, which is to link social security and national security via the notion of economic security. To do this not only requires moving between conceptual history and social history; it also involves bringing together themes within the study of international political economy and security studies. During much of the Cold War, international political economy and security studies tended to be worlds apart, with the latter often being conceived of as independent of any interest in political economy. The security studies literature was often dominated by a rather naive distinction between 'high' and 'low' politics, with 'economics' thought of as a rather lowly affair (Ripsman, 2000; Kirshner, 1998; Mastanduno, 1998; DeSouza, 2000; Dombrowski, 2005). This was always more than a little strange: first, because

given the extent to which the state system is obviously cut through by the dynamics of production, consumption and class, the extent to which the international economy is penetrated by state structures, the economic causes and consequences of international confrontation, and the budgetary constraints on grand strategy, an obvious connection exists between national security and questions of economics; second, because for these very reasons the main actors in global politics certainly never divorced security from political economy; and, third, because a number of key academics had pointed to the integral relationship between economics and security during the 1940s (for example, Earle, [1943] 1986; Hirschman, 1945; Viner, 1948). And yet, despite this, mainstream security studies came to conceive of security rather narrowly, in terms of the military and intelligence services, while international political economy developed an independent path, more or less treating economic power independently from security questions.

The conjunction of economics and security, or 'economic security', has more recently become an increasingly important dimension of both international political economy and security studies, driven not only by academics in the field but also by institutional shifts in global power. The line between the study of security and the question of economic order has become far less noticeable, as more and more scholars have highlighted the importance of studying the two together. And yet, for the most part, the work in this field focuses on the state as the referent object; only then does economic security come to figure. *'If the state is taken as the referent object, then economic security becomes part of the national security agenda'*, says Buzan, adding that *'the idea of economic security becomes awkwardly entangled with a range of highly politicized debates about employment, income distribution and welfare.'* For this reason, Buzan suggests, the conflation of social and national security can be electorally persuasive (Buzan, 1991: 232, 237, 241; emphasis added). I want to suggest that there is much more at stake here than the question of electoral gains. At stake are the far more substantive political gains to be had by the state from the idea of security. If, as Mick Dillon (1996) suggests, we think of security not as a noun that names something but as a principle of formation, then we can consider security as the principle of formation behind the reordering of the social world. And so, building on arguments I have made elsewhere (Neocleous, 2000), I will argue that what is at stake in this principle of formation is the fabrication of economic order, at the heart of which has been the idea of 'economic security' and which can be seen in both its internal/domestic dynamics (social security) and external/international dynamics (national security).

'Security – This is More Like It'

If the key idea animating the Depression was fear, the New Deal was driven by the idea of security. On 8 June 1934, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced that, among the objectives of his administration, 'I place the

security of the men, women and children of the Nation first'. Comparing simpler societies in which security was attained through the family and local community, Roosevelt suggested that 'the complexities of great communities and of organized industry make less real these simple means of security':

Therefore, we are compelled to employ the active interest of the Nation as a whole through government in order to encourage a greater security. ... If, as our Constitution tells us, our Federal Government was established among other things, 'to promote the general welfare,' it is our plain duty to provide for that security upon which welfare depends. ... Hence I am looking for a sound means which I can recommend to provide at once security against several of the disturbing factors in life. (Roosevelt, 1938b: 287–292)

Later that month he signed Executive Order 6757 creating the Committee on Economic Security (CES), the main aim of which was to prepare recommendations for 'A Program of National Social and Economic Security'.

Roosevelt's choice of the language of security would turn out to be of major historical importance. In his biographical fragment of 1934, *On Our Way*, in which Roosevelt tells the story of his administration up to March of that year, the concept of security is almost entirely absent. He refers to 'securities', as in the Securities Act of 1933, and makes an oblique reference to the 'permanent welfare and security' in the context of pricing policy (Roosevelt, 1934: 182, 230), but nowhere does security figure as a major theme. The same is true of his inaugural address of 4 March 1933. And yet, between June 1934 and 1936, security gradually became *the* concept of the New Deal.

To understand why, we need to note that by 1934 Roosevelt was faced with various insurgents, such as the followers of Huey Long, the organizations of the unemployed, elderly people organized and led by Francis Townsend, and religiously motivated activists around Charles Coughlin. Less well known, but central to the argument here, he also faced various left-wing social insurance experts. The latter in particular had been increasingly using the notion of 'insecurity' as a theme for social criticism and public policy proposals. The economist Abraham Epstein, for example, had published a book called *Insecurity: A Challenge to America*, in which he spoke of 'the specter of insecurity' as the bane of the worker's life under capitalism (Epstein, 1933: 1–20; see also Epstein, 1935b), while Max Rubinow (1934a) had been articulating demands for 'a complete structure of security' in a book called *The Quest for Security*.

At the same time, we might also point to the influence of someone like Harold Laski, who spent various month-long visits lecturing in the USA in the 1930s, becoming one of the intellectuals close to Roosevelt and writing articles in favour of strong presidency and the New Deal. His course of lectures at Brown University in the summer of 1929, published as *Liberty in the Modern State* in 1930 and reissued in 1937, had as a theme the idea that

without economic security liberty becomes meaningless: 'If [a man] is deprived of security in employment he becomes the prey of a mental and physical servitude incompatible with the very essence of liberty. Nevertheless, economic security is not liberty, though it is a condition without which liberty is never effective. ... [W]ithout economic security, liberty is not worth having' (Laski, 1937: 50–51; see also Laski, 1935: 16–17).

Roosevelt's adoption of the rhetoric of security in mid-1934 represented an attempt to outflank critics and build on the suggestions of writers such as Laski. In so doing, Roosevelt adopted and pushed the idea of security, helping to drive the concept into the very heart of political discourse. Security thereafter became central to the political debates and intellectual culture of the time, permeating the articles of national journals and becoming a major theme for books, newspapers and conferences. For example, *The New Republic* ran a series on 'Security for Americans' in late-1934 and early-1935, with contributions from major figures such as Rubinow, Epstein, Mary Van Kleeck and Paul Douglas (see Epstein, 1934, 1935a; Rubinow, 1934b; Brandeis, 1934; Van Kleeck, 1934; Douglas, 1934; Soule, 1935), while the *Survey Graphic* ran a series of articles on 'welfare and security', with pieces by leading figures from within social work, economics and welfare (e.g. Perkins, 1934a, b). Many of these were critical of the way the Roosevelt administration was working, insisting on insecurity as the fundamental problem generated by capitalism. To give just one example: 'For a long time now people have been saying that perhaps the greatest evil of capitalist industrialism is not its unequal distribution of wealth but the insecurity it brings to the majority of the population' (Soule, 1935: 266). The political scientist Harold Lasswell (1950) also came to highlight the question of insecurity as a pressing concern, in *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*, first published in 1934, while from a different political position, former president Herbert Hoover argued in a book, also published in 1934, that one of the greatest challenges to liberty is the problem of economic insecurity (Hoover, 1934: 168–188). At the same time, however, many claimed that the new proposals being suggested by the programme of 'National Social and Economic Security' would not solve the problems. Mary Van Kleeck (1934: 123), for example, suggested that 'mass provision by government and industry to provide for mass insecurity is the new definition of social insurance', while *The Nation* challenged the government on the grounds that the 'feebleness' of the proposals would leave the majority still insecure regardless of the 'high-sounding talk of economic security' (Swing, 1934: 319). Either way, insecurity was the problem, and security – of some sort – the solution. Security was now at the heart of political debate. One of the key problems of capital – the everlasting uncertainty generated by the market system – was becoming 'securitized'.

Throughout 1934 and 1935, while the CES was at work assembling the Bill on Economic Security, Roosevelt could barely stop speaking about security. On topics as diverse as banking legislation, industrial relations and the gold standard, security had become *the* major theme. In his 'fireside chat'

of 30 September 1934, for example, on the theme of 'Greater Security for the Average Man', Roosevelt suggested that his administration was moving towards a 'broader definition of liberty under which we are moving forward ... to greater security' (1938b: 413). In an address to the Advisory Council of the CES in November 1934, held in Washington and attended by activists from across the country, Roosevelt equated 'greater general security' with economic recovery: 'In developing each component part of the broad program for economic security, we must not lose sight of the fact that there can be no security for the individual in the midst of general insecurity. ... Everything that we do with intent to increase the security of the individual will, I am confident, be a stimulus to recovery' (Roosevelt, 1938b: 454). In his message to Congress in January 1935, he reiterated the theme: 'the main objectives of our American program [are] the security of the men, women, and children of the Nation' (Roosevelt, 1938c: 43). So enormous was the theme that the film *We the People and Social Security*, distributed days before the 1936 election, had by 3 November been seen by approximately 4 million people. New pieces of legislation were constantly being brought under the umbrella of security, even when 'security' did not appear to be the central issue: the new authority to administer the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenancy Act of 1937, for example, was called the Farm Security Administration.

Thus, by the mid-1930s, the New Dealers had begun to claim the language of security. In trying to outflank critics by adopting their language, in pushing the CES and the Bill for Economic Security, and in making security the central task of national reconstruction, the New Deal gradually generated an ideology of security (Piven & Cloward, 1972: 92; Schurman, 1974: 64; Klein, 2003: 78–79, 115, 138, 204). 'In the present time "security" is the word that is being bandied about on every tongue', noted the *Spectator* journal in 1936 (cited in Klein, 2003: 98). Symptomatically, this securitization followed the declaration of a state of emergency in Roosevelt's inaugural address of March 1933. Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde (1998) suggest that the successful securitizing of an issue relies on the declaration of an existential threat, requiring emergency action and exceptional measures. This is precisely the opening that Roosevelt had created in his inaugural speech, in which he claimed 'broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe' (Roosevelt, 1938a: 15). It might be said that only after Roosevelt's declaration of emergency could the securitization follow; on the other hand, it might also be said that after the declaration the securitization became likely.

The ideology of security being developed, however, was very much an ideology of what became known as *social* security. The idea of social security had been used on occasion before, in a letter of 1908 by Winston Churchill – the first noted reference cited by the *Oxford English Dictionary* – but it was in the context of the political administration of contemporary US capitalism in the mid-1930s that the idea really took off, as more and

more people and groups began to use the idea. In July 1933, the American Association for Old Age Security had become the American Association for Social Security, and its journal, *Old Age Security Herald*, became *Social Security*. Note that the *Economic Security Bill* eventually became the *Social Security Act* of 1935. As late as spring of that year, the leading figures in the US administration, including Roosevelt himself, still had not firmly settled on this as an idea: they were still talking in terms of economic security and the *Economic Security Bill*. Note also that the original Executive Order 6757 that set in motion the programme that would eventually lead to the *Social Security Act* was designed to develop a scheme for 'national social and economic security'. The security in question is social and economic, but it is also national. The legislation that would eventually emerge would be 'social security', which then became the label used by other states. The idea of 'national security' disappears, but, as I will suggest, then re-emerges in the context of a different set of debates. And, as I shall also suggest, the idea of 'economic security' initially behind the *Social Security Act* is what will link national security to its social forebear. We can get at this through placing the development of 'social security' in the wider context of class tensions and capital accumulation during the period.

At the heart of the *Social Security Act* was the notion of social insurance. It is now generally accepted that social insurance is definitive of 'social' ways of governing that can be traced back to the 1880s and the 'new' 'social' liberalism that develops out of this in the 20th century. Between the mid-1880s and World War I, much of Western Europe, Canada and Australasia put into place some form of social insurance scheme, which became a permanent feature of political administration. The chief attraction for social liberalism of the practice of social insurance is that because insurance requires regular contributions from the beneficiary, the practice appears as a form of individual thrift and prudence; moreover, it has a contractual form. In contrast to the poor laws and charitable relief, in which the recipients make no contribution to their security and are not required to exercise self-reliance, social insurance becomes a legally enforceable right that is also an 'earned' right, rather than a relationship of dependence characteristic of the poor laws and charity. Thus, as a 'moral technology of governance, constantly articulating how people should act' (Ericson, Doyle & Barry, 2003: 72), social insurance involved a shift in the cultural and political understanding of individual 'security' in relation to both the present and the future. Via the idea of social insurance, an objective *insecurity* in economic life was taken as read, with thrift used to think about and govern the subjective assumptions surrounding it. Far from being the binary opposite of security, insecurity becomes a tool for the marketing of security. Concomitantly, security becomes a tool for the reshaping of individual behaviour and notions of citizenship, constituting a certain vision of economic order in the process (Ewald, 1991; O'Malley, 2004; Wæver, 1995: 56). Roosevelt's New Deal programmes lay clearly within this historical trajectory: the 'social' had become 'securitized'. And if, as Ericson, Doyle & Barry (2003: 50) suggest, insurance is part of

the 'will to security', Roosevelt's New Deal programmes are an integral expression of this political will.

Now, on the one hand, this idea of social security was very much aimed at the working class: it went some way to help reshape notions of responsibility and risk (reminding us that the notion of risk is far from a new one in political discourse), independence and thrift among the working class, thereby fostering new conceptions of citizenship and social solidarity. In so doing, it helped cultivate the idea of 'economic security' and popularize the new means by which such security could be achieved: through social, political and cultural reconstruction engineered by the state. Through this, the Industrial working class became increasingly ordered around a regime of insurance contributions administered by the state (Neocleous, 1996: 131–140).

On the other hand, the idea of social security also became important to the way capital reorganized itself during this period. Jennifer Klein (2003) has shown that the conjunction of interests around security helped launch a new economy of welfare that in turn helped set in motion a rapid expansion of the insurance, health-care and income-maintenance options offered by non-state institutions. Where critics on the left had used the notion of security as part of a challenge to government, giving rise to a class dynamic within the debates about security, businesses and corporations quickly came to recognize the social and political premium to be gained from the new stress on security. Thus, in the years immediately following the Social Security Act, major corporations leapt on security as a way of reorganizing their corporate interests. The corporate mentality that had allowed financial and industrial corporations to accommodate themselves to the New Deal meant that insurers and business advisers quickly and easily adjusted their language and arguments to the new discourse of security. Klein comments that security had become a politically useful term now that the economic times had changed. But, it was also an economically useful term now that the political times had changed. William Graham, chief group insurance spokesman of Equitable Life, gave lectures to business groups around the country on the theme of security, while presidents of key corporations preached the new ideology: 'we subscribe to the ideals of worker security', Standard Oil's President Walter Teagle wrote in an essay entitled 'Security – This Is More Like It' in the journal *Factory Management and Maintenance* (February 1936). In the same journal a few months later, Packard Motor Company President Alvin MacCauley contributed his own views on how 'We Work Toward Worker Security' (Klein, 2003: 98).

Unsurprisingly, insurance companies took the lead in pushing this new idea of security to other companies. 'We in the life insurance business are selling security and preaching security', is how Equitable's Thomas Parkinson put it (cited in Klein, 2003: 207). Insurance companies became behind-the-scenes promoters of the government programme for security, while government promoted the new corporate 'initiatives': each legitimized and affirmed the other. Klein (2003: 207) writes that, by 1940, 'life insurers believed that Social Security had been a tremendous boon to the sale of insurance and old-age

pensions. Insurance executives instructed their agents to incorporate the new Social Security program in their sales pitch, emphasizing that federal old-age pensions would meet only the barest subsistence needs.' This quickly led to a set of close institutional connections between 'welfare entrepreneurs' and their main clients, the larger corporations, which increasingly initiated group pension, accident and health plans throughout the mid- to late 1930s. Thus, both the commercial purveyors of 'social security' and the immediate consumers of the new policies saw that they could not only survive within this new system, but might actually flourish.

This provided a number of advantages to companies. For a start, the purchase of commercial group insurance became a key mechanism for containing union power, not least through the idea of 'worker security': if workers are 'secure' under capital, what's the point in challenging it? But, the plans for security were 'twisted' in ways conducive to business rather than the workers. The key practice was for a company to dovetail its own plans for worker security with those of the government. In the case of pensions in particular, companies modified their own existing pension plans so that the total retirement annuity including social security benefits ended up being the same as under the former plan. In other words, if the amount of a public pension was likely to equal or exceed the amount owed by the company, the company pension would not be granted. Thus, companies directly reduced the benefits by the amount being paid in 'social security' by the state. Moreover, dovetailing benefited upper-income employees and corporate executives most, since companies started offering supplemental pensions solely for their most well-paid employees: General Motors created an 'Employees Retirement Plan' for executives and managers earning over \$250 per month, while at Kodak anyone earning less than \$5,000 per annum was excluded from the company pension plan. Finally, for top corporate executives, pension trusts became a useful tool for avoiding taxes, since individual taxes on pension income were deferred. Thus, the new insurance schemes functioned as a huge subsidy for large employers who had company plans, and corporations quickly learned how to use the social security system as a class subsidy for the well-paid, salaried middle class (Swenson, 2004: 9, 23; Klein, 2003: 101-102).

It is clear, then, that during these years the concept of security was quickly transformed, tweaked and adjusted. The new ideology of security worked against trade union radicalism, improved the position of the well-paid middle class, preserved the notion of the paternalistic employer, and helped sustain levels of capital accumulation despite the supposedly stringent demands made on business by the state. The radicalized political climate of the 1930s centred on the politics of security compelled corporations to offer a degree of economic security that they had previously failed to do, but corporations did so very much on their own terms, without making old-age or illness support an employee right and by maintaining managerial control. And behind all of this was the implicit idea that those living within capitalism would have to accept the inherent *in*security it produces. In other

words, employers sought to use the security plans to demonstrate that the firm was a generous employer. But, in shifting emphasis away from state and political arena to private individual economic relationships, employers and insurers redefined the meaning of security, creating a new private firm-centred definition of security. In this way, 'social security' could easily come to reflect liberal ideology and the main assumptions of corporate capital (Holl, 2005: 30). Thus, as well as securing the state, 'social security' easily became a tool for fabricating a new set of mechanisms around which industrial capital could be reordered. As the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Chase National Bank put it, security must imply 'not merely security for certain individuals or groups, however needy or worthy, but *security for the productive system as a whole*' (Aldrich, 1936: 3; emphasis added). That is, if we are to talk about 'economic security', then we must apply this idea to corporations and the capitalist system as a whole as much as to the individual worker. 'Economic security' for the worker morphed into the economic security of capital and turned to the advantage of the capitalist class. The logic of security provided a means for *reshaping* capital and the behaviour of workers around a new regime of insurance.

According to Bruce Ackerman (1998), the New Deal was a crucial moment in US constitutional history: in legitimizing the activist state via a great act of popular sovereignty, the New Deal consolidated the foundations of activist government and so fundamentally altered the USA's constitutional politics. We might add that this period fundamentally altered politics more generally, because it placed security at the centre of activist government, reformist politics and a 'social' liberalism. In *practical* terms, it legitimized some limited working-class demands *vis-à-vis* the capitalist economy. At the same time, however, it also satisfied middle-class desires and was turned to the advantage of corporations, legitimating the latter's place in the modern polity. In *theoretical* terms, 'security' had become central to the dominant ideology, if not *the* dominant idea itself; the modern capitalist social formation had gone some way to becoming securitized. As a principle of formation, security had become a key part of the political administration of capitalist modernity.

But, 'security' only gained such cardinal political legitimacy in the form of 'social security'. As *social* security, it could satisfy the demands of large numbers of radicals and socialists, who could read it as an advance for the working class. Moreover, the especially important legitimacy attached to this idea of social security would then create a special status for the idea of *national* security when the latter eventually emerged. From hereon in, 'security reasons' could be cited for any and every attempt at a political reordering of society. And if this could work on the domestic front, what about the international?

'One Supreme Objective'

Despite the commonplace assumption that social security refers merely to a set of social policies concerned with welfare, Roosevelt in fact had a much greater

vision for his social security reforms, which were to be introduced as a means of strengthening and defending the nation as a whole. At the same time, the emerging idea of national security was not to be restricted to military defence but would have major social consequences. This is the logic of 'national security' originally behind the CFS and the Economic Security Bill, but one can also trace these links through a 'Message to Congress' on 4 January 1939. Comparing dictatorship and democracy, Roosevelt comments that the strength of the latter 'can be mustered only when its people ... have conviction that they are receiving as large a share of opportunity for development, as large a share of material success and of human dignity, as they have a right to receive'. In this sense, 'our nation's program of social and economic reform is therefore a part of defense, as basic as armaments themselves' (Roosevelt, 1941: 5). This was a hint as to how much Roosevelt equated the New Deal with national defence. On the one hand, 'national security' was far from reducible to a question of military hardware. Rather, his idea was that US security rested on all constituents of national power, especially on the unity of the US people. On the other hand, 'social security' was a means of strengthening the nation. Thus, his address wove together his *domestic* and *international* security policies such that they were almost indistinguishable.

Writers interested in developing the international dimensions of security in this period were also picking up on the same connection. In an important article on 'American Security' attempting to define security in terms of national strength vis-à-vis the allies and other international powers, for example, Edward Mead Earle initially distinguishes this kind of security from 'domestic' security: 'this definition does not deal, of course, with security in the domestic sense, important as that is'. But, he then adds that 'social security, especially manifest in the phenomenon of unemployment, has important repercussions in foreign affairs' (Earle, 1941: 189). In this sense, social security programmes were seen as the first line of national defence by many liberals (Sherry, 1995).

It was this broad vision of security at the heart of the New Deal that helped shape and develop the idea of national security. In his State of the Union Address in January 1944, Roosevelt outlined his discussions with other leaders concerning the conduct of the war and the prospects for the postwar world:

The one supreme objective for the future, which we discussed for each Nation individually, and for all the United Nations, can be summed up in one word: Security. And that means not only physical security which provides safety from attacks by aggressors. It means also economic security, social security, moral security – in a family of Nations. (Roosevelt, 1950a: 33).

The project of security at home had in Roosevelt's view achieved a new set of rights – to decent housing, education, good health, protection from economic fears ('all of these rights spell security') – and only this security is the basis for peace in the world (Roosevelt, 1950a: 41). Just as the New Deal brought

'social security' to the USA, so 'one world' of a family of nations would bring 'political security' to the entire world (Schurman, 1974: 42); just as the essence of the New Deal was the notion that big government must spend liberally in order to achieve security and progress, so postwar international security would require liberal outlays to overcome the chaos created by the war. Thus, aid to other nations would have the same effect as social welfare programmes within the United States – it would achieve 'security' for 'men and women and children in all Nations', which in turn would help sustain security for Americans at home: 'Freedom from fear is eternally linked with freedom from want' (Roosevelt, 1950a: 33–34). Imperialism by any other name, this 'one world' would quickly become the 'free world' and be founded on a particular concept of economic order.

As the question of fear became increasingly externalized onto a foreign enemy, however, so the question of security appeared to point in increasingly international directions. 'Social security' was clearly an inadequate term for this, as it now was gradually becoming associated with 'soft' domestic policy issues such as old age insurance. And 'collective security' would not do, associated as it was with the dull internationalism of Woodrow Wilson, on the one hand, and still very much connected to the institutions of social security, on the other (a series of pamphlets published from 1947 called *Studies in Individual and Collective Security* were essentially about social security). Only one term would do: national security. What we are dealing with here, then, is what Paul Virilio (2005: 170) has described as a short circuit established between 'national security' and 'social security', in which the policies 'insuring' the security of the population are a means of securing the body politic, and vice versa. Social security and national security were woven together: the social and the national were the warp and the weft of the security fabric. The warp and the weft, that is, of economic security.

Robert Pollard (1985: 13) has suggested that 'the concept of "economic security" – the idea that American interests would be best served by an open and integrated economic system, as opposed to a large peacetime military establishment – was firmly established during the wartime period'. In fact, the concept of 'economic security' became a concept of *international* politics in this period, becoming liberalism's strategic weapon of choice and *the* main policy instrument from 1945 (Latham, 1997: 143; Pollard, 1985: 3), but the concept itself had longer history, as we have seen. *Economic* security, in this sense, provides the important link between social and national security. As a weapon of choice, it would be used as diplomatic leverage in arguments for international aid. As one State Department memo of February 1944 put it, 'the development of sound international economic relations is closely related to the problem of security' (cited in Pollard, 1985: 13). But, it would also continue to be used to think about the political administration of *internal* order. Hence Roosevelt's comment in December 1943 that 'we must plan for, and help to bring about, an expanded economy which will result in more security ... so that the conditions of 1932 and the beginning of 1933 won't come back again' (Roosevelt, 1950b: 574). On security grounds, inside and outside

were constantly folding into one another, the domestic and the foreign never quite properly distinguishable. The reason why lay in the kind of economic order that was being secured.

Take, as a starting point, the European Recovery Program (ERP, or Marshall Plan). This has generally been understood as a huge economic panacea, 'saving' Europe from economic disaster. However, Alan Milward has suggested that this conventional reading of the Marshall Plan and US aid tends to accept the picture of postwar Europe on the verge of collapse and with serious social and economic discontent, such that it needed to be rescued by US aid. In fact, excluding Germany, no country was actually on the verge of collapse. There were no bank crashes and very few bankruptcies, and the evidence of a slowdown in industrial production is unconvincing. There is also little evidence of grave distress or a general deterioration in the standard of living. By late 1946, production had roughly equalled prewar levels in all countries except Germany. And yet Marshall Aid came about. Milward argues that the Marshall Plan was designed not to increase the rate of recovery in European countries or to prevent European economies from deteriorating, but to sustain ambitious, new, expansionary economic and social policies in Western European countries (which were already in full bloom conditions). In other words, the Marshall Plan was predominantly designed for political objectives (Milward, 1984; Kolko & Kolko, 1972; Leffler, 1992). This is why the Marshall Plan was so inextricably linked to the Truman Doctrine's strategy of new global commitment, at the heart of which was the possibility of intervention in the affairs of other countries in order to rebut a perceived worldwide trend away from the 'system of free enterprise'.

The point here is not just that the Marshall Plan was 'political'. It is fairly clear that the Marshall Plan was multidimensional, and to distinguish reasons that are 'economic' from reasons that are 'political' misses the extent to which the economic, political and military were entwined. The point is that it was very much a project driven by the ideology of 'security'. The referent object of 'security' in this context is 'economic order', viz., capitalist order. The government and the emerging national security bureaucracy saw the major threat as economic – or, at least, the potential of a counter-hegemonic power exploiting economic disorder – as far more important and likely than military confrontation. As Latham (1997: 175) notes, at first glance the idea of military security within a broad context of economic containment appears to be one more dimension of strength within the liberal order. But, in another respect, the project of economic security might itself be viewed as the very force that made military security appear to be necessary. In this sense, the priority given to *economic* security was the driving force behind the US commitment to underwrite military security for Western Europe.

More to the point, however, is that the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine implied not just a programme for 'economic security', but an attempt at *reordering global capital*. And *this* project was also undertaken in the guise of national security. NSC-68, the most significant national security document

to emerge in this period, stated that the 'overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish' (National Security Council, 1950: 401). In this sense, we can also read the Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, as part and parcel of the security project (Mastanduno, 1998; Pollard, 1985). The key institutions of 'international order' in this period invoked a particular vision of order, with a view to reshaping global capital as a means of bringing social order and thus security – political, social and economic – from the communist threat.

'Communist', that is, as opposed to 'Soviet'. Communism, of course, pre-dates and exceeds the Soviet Union. But, the nature of the military threat ascribed to the latter is related to the character of the former as a more general threat to the system of private property. The implication drawn from this by David Campbell (1992: 159) is that 'the well-developed antipathy towards communism within the United States stems from the way in which the danger to the private ownership of property it embodies is a code for distinguishing the "civilized" from the "barbaric"'. This, Campbell suggests, is the basis for the interpretive framework that constituted the Soviet Union as a danger independent of its actual military capacity. Thus, the rise of the national security state was not dependent on any supposed military threat posed by the Soviet Union; even the US national security managers correctly identified this at the time as both limited and weak. Indeed, in many ways the Soviet Union was a side issue. NSC-68, the most significant national security document to emerge in this period, stated that the policy of creating a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish embraces two subsidiary policies: 'One is a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat. It is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community. The other is the policy of "containing" the Soviet system'. Thus, the document later adds, 'even if there were no Soviet Union we would face the problem of the free society ... of reconciling order, security, the need for participation, with the requirements of freedom' (National Security Council, 1950: 401, 412). The policies would have been followed, then, *even if there were no Soviet threat*. The issue was communism as a threat to private property, and thus to the vision of an 'economic order' of the 'civilized West'; that is, communism as an alternative socio-economic order, not the Soviets as a military threat. And the real danger of this communism was that it might reside *within* the civilized West rather than 'over there' in the East. Just as communism was/is a problem of the 'inside' as well as the outside, so the security solution had to straddle the domestic and the foreign.

The mediating link between inside and outside, the concept through which the attempt to reshape capital could oscillate between the domestic and foreign, the national and international, was 'economic security'. Just as the doctrine of containment looked to economic aid to produce the necessary resistance to communism in Europe and elsewhere, policies such as the

Marshall Plan mirrored the doctrine of containment, with the Truman government seeking to overcome Congressional recalcitrance to the ERP by promoting it as a security measure (Gaddis, 1982; Latham, 1997; Pollard, 1985; Ambrose, 1985). The major National Security Council documents from 1948 through to 1950 all highlight this dimension of the security project. NSC-20/1 (National Security Council, 1948: 102), for example, noted approvingly of the role of the ERP in limiting Soviet influence and thereby securing the USA in its objectives, while NSC-68 (National Security Council, 1950: 408) noted that 'foreign economic policy is ... an instrument which can powerfully influence the world environment in ways favourable to the security and welfare of this country', again citing the ERP as a principle feature of the policy. Similarly, the 'Military Aid Program' (MAP) to help rearm Western Europe in the light of an emerging NATO was administered by the State Department rather than the Defense Department because MAP's main purpose was to continue the Marshall Plan's policy of buttressing economic stability and thus political order in Western Europe. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 explicitly stated this: 'Congress recognizes that economic recovery is essential to international peace and security and must be given clear priority' (cited in Pollard, 1985: 227-228). And, in conjoining security and economy in such ways, the USA was able to gain ideological support for both the politico-strategic and economic dimensions of liberal order building. The conceptual consistency between the strategy of economic security and liberal order-building meant that 'economic security' could be justified on liberal grounds, emphasizing economic (and thus 'human') needs over military ones. The fabrication of the new order of global capital could thus look decidedly liberal and humanitarian, an appearance which helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process and, of course, played on individuals' desire for personal and 'social' security by using notions such as 'personal freedom' and 'social equality' (Latham, 1997: 144-146).

All of this is to suggest that although the late 1940s saw the emergence of what has become known as the 'national security state', this emergence was heavily driven by the notion of 'economic security'. In other words, the emerging global power moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all - its economic strength - in order to fabricate a certain vision of economic order, both internally and internationally. Marx and Engels (1848) once highlighted the historical role of the bourgeoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests, pointing out that the need for a constantly expanding market for its products forces the bourgeoisie across the whole surface of the globe and compels all nations to adopt the bourgeois mode of economic order. From the mid-20th century onwards, this project would increasingly be conducted under the guise of security, through which the USA has seen fit to reorder - either overtly or covertly - the affairs of myriad nation-states, even those

with democratically elected governments, and to thereby restructure international order more generally. Far from merely 'reacting' or 'responding' to events, under the guise of national security, the USA has sought to reshape international society, administering global order according to a security doctrine behind which lies a commitment to capital accumulation.

Conclusion

I have been arguing, then, that a commitment to understanding security and the process through which the world has become increasingly securitized requires us to focus some attention on the history of 'economic security'. To say this is not just to argue for a more sustained cross-referencing, overlap or even a reuniting of international political economy and security studies. Much as there is of value in recent innovations along these lines (for example, Ripsman, 2000; Kirshner, 1998; Mastanduno, 1998; Dombrowski, 2005), such developments have all too often omitted the *domestic* links between political economy and security. As I have tried to show, in the space of 15 years the concept 'economic security' moved from being a key ideological trope for reorienting individuals, classes and corporations around a new form of capitalist order, under the rubric of 'social security', to being a key factor in the US attempt to shape the world in an anti-communist fashion, under the rubric of 'national security'. It has constantly shifted between these two registers ever since, being a crucial tool for fabricating a particular vision of economic order. On the one hand, the power politics of both domestic and international life became securitized, and the common thread underpinning such securitization was a vision of a certain kind of economic order. To achieve such an order, the concept of 'economic security' was of paramount importance. On the other hand, we might also say that it has been through the *combined* effect of social and national security that security per se has come to be one of the major mechanisms for the fabrication of the political order of capitalist modernity. 'Economic security', in this sense, has been far more than a question of politicians trying to be electorally persuasive. And its importance requires us to go beyond even the conjunction between international political economy and security studies. Rather, economic security has been integral to the theory and practice of both social and national security, *uniting* the domestic and international, the inside and the outside: it has been the foundation stone of the project of security.

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